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Introduction
A PIGS EYE VIEW OF EUROPE
You know, Europe is a hell of a long way from here.
—JOSÉ SARAMAGO, The Stone Raft
And from now on, who knows who ‘‘I’’ really is!
—GESUALDO BUFALINO, L’uomo invaso
I had been suspecting it for a while. But it was on the morning of March
26, 1995, that seemingly overwhelming evidence almost convinced me
the metamorphosis was on its way: I, Roberto M. Dainotto, no longer
was an Italian; slowly but surely, I was becoming European!
Hints of an imminent transformation had been around for a while:
with the Treaty of Rome of 1957, as its preamble stated, Italians had
‘‘determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe’’; and in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty, according to
article A, had pushed us toward ‘‘an ever closer union among the peoples
of Europe.’’ Neither Rome nor Maastricht, however, could possibly com-
pare with the news of March 26. On that day, the European Union (eu)
had taken, or so I believed then, the most decisive step ever toward the
final accomplishment of my personal fate—my ultimate transubstantia-
tion into ‘‘the people of Europe’’: ‘‘Bonn, March 26—In a move that
showed the limits as much as the extent of their common purpose, 7 of
the 15 European Union members formally dismantled border controls
between their countries today—meaning that travelers will be able to
journey between them without passports . . . Italy . . . [has] also signed
the convention setting up the passport-free zone’’ (Cowell A6).
If ‘‘feeling European’’ was really a matter of ‘‘travel[ling] constantly
across [Europe] on cheap interrail tickets’’ (Byatt 50), it meant that only
then could I, finally, feel part of the imagined community of other
faraway creatures holding, like me, a European passport. I say ‘‘finally’’
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because the citizens of France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands had already been circulating freely across their borders
since 1985, when the Schengen treaty was signed. In fact, even some
non-eu members—Norway and Iceland—were let into the passport-free
zone, which looked rather like a Nordic alliance. The Italians, on this
side of the Alps—which no lesser spirit than Johann Wolfgang von Goe-
the justly called ‘‘the dividing line between north and south’’ (31)—had
not been invited to join at that time.
The anxiety we felt at that initial exclusion is hard to describe. As
Giuseppe Turani used to write on the pages of the daily La Repubblica,
we badly wanted ‘‘to become like all others . . . to become a European
country, not so Mediterranean, not so pizza-and-mandolin, not so de-
fective’’ (36). And how could we possibly overcome our parochial—let
alone ‘‘defective’’—identities if we were denied the ‘‘promised disap-
pearance of physical borders’’ that alone granted ‘‘an enhanced meaning
of Europe’’ as a cultural identity (Bamyeh 35)?
So, when in 1995 Italy—along with the other southern countries of
Portugal, Greece, and Spain—finally made it to the borderless Europe,
signs of elation were palpable: ‘‘Champagne was on o√er at Milan and
Rome airports to mark the country’s full membership of Schengen,’’ the
Economist reported (‘‘Europe: Those Fuzzy Frontiers’’). The euphoria,
however, did not last long. European clerks in Brussels soon started
referring to the Giovanninos-come-lately with an unflattering acronym:
Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain—the pigs, no less, as Lindsay Waters
reported. We could cross borders now; but ‘‘a southern accent . . . does
not help who carries it around’’ (De Luca 22). The usual, unmistakable
glimmer of suspicion still met us in the eyes of our northern cousins,
hardly waiting for us with open arms on the other side of the border. In
fact, land borders, after a brief token opening of a few days, were soon
shut closed again on our face. We were Europeans—only in theory,
though!
No matter how hard we Italians had managed ‘‘all the way to erase our
identity’’ (Go√redo 58); no matter how we tried to forget the pizza and
mandolin; no matter how much we worked to ‘‘northernize our habits
and customs’’ (Cassano, Modernizzare 123); no matter all the sacrificing
of piece after piece of the welfare state and the relentless privatization of
all for the sake of ‘‘modernizing’’ and ‘‘Europeanizing’’ (Morlino 237)—
we were no longer Italians, but we were not Europeans either. The
international press did not take long to register the fact that despite the
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opening of borders, Italy, along with the other pigs, remained nothing
more than a southern country in the eyes of Europe. It was, so to speak,
di√erent:
Northerners have tended to stress di√erences between the political cul-
tures of cold and warmer climes. Up north, the primmer attitudes of
Protestantism, stricter laws against influence-peddling, older and stron-
ger individual rights before the state, judges less in hock to the executive,
and a more independent press were all thought to have ensured higher
standards of public and political conduct. In the south, where democracy
was generally a more fragile plant, family and clan loyalties held more
sway than any sense of obligation to the state. (‘‘Is Europe Corrupt?’’ 49)
Articles such as this (written, incidentally, on the occasion of the scandals
of party finance corruption not in the south but in Germany and France)
were reminders of how the old theses of Edward Banfield’s southern
backwardness and amoral familism—of ones older, in fact, going back
to Montesquieu’s climatology—had trickled down and cemented into
commonplaces of both popular and political imaginations. Newspapers’
titles kept beating the same news from Europe: ‘‘Northerners Sni√ at
‘Club Med’ ’’ (Kamm); ‘‘Sober North Vies with Siesta South’’ (Boyes); or,
more ominously, ‘‘Europe’s Southern Shadow.’’ In the meantime, Brus-
sels’ parliamentarians still talked of a ‘‘two-speed Europe’’; the Franco-
German axis still saw a ‘‘southern problem,’’ a pathological ‘‘Mediterra-
nean syndrome’’ threatening to infect the whole of Europe (see Borzel
141); and the indefatigable Turani kept reminding us that even in the
Europe of open borders, and despite all talks of common identity, Italy
remained ‘‘some kind of Disney nation . . . a Latin American country
from the old times . . . transplanted in the heart of wise, austere and
virtuous Europe’’ (Turani 32). The hopes of 1995, in short, were soon to
turn into indignation: to hell with virtuous Europe!
Ressentiment, admittedly, is not a very noble human instinct—nor is it
conducive to serene scholarly research. In order to write this book on
Europe from the notoriously vindictive perspective of the clan of pigs, I
have tried, then, to ennoble that most bathetic of emotions with the
philosophical mantle of Nietzschean genealogy. (It was Nietzsche, after
all, who presaged the age of the Euro: ‘‘Only money can force Europe to
unite’’ [qtd. in Iiritano 32].) Could a genealogy of the concept of Europe
help me explain the peculiar place of the south in that very concept?
Where did the idea of the south as pigs of Europe come from? Did
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Montesquieu’s climatology survive even the advent of air-conditioning?
How could the south, at the same time, be Europe and non-Europe?
What follows is therefore an attempt to single out, in eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century theorizations of Europe, the surfacing of structures
and paradigms that have since informed ideas of the continent and of its
cultural identity. On the one hand, what I am to propose is a genealogy
of Eurocentrism—the emergence of modern theories of Europe that
assume one can explain Europe ‘‘without making recourse to anything
outside of Europe’’ (Dussel, ‘‘Europe’’ 469–70). On the other, I want to
argue that those modern theories cannot be explained according to the
usual paradigm of European identity-formation, that ‘‘the concept of
Europe must have first been formed as an antithesis to that which is not
Europe: . . . the first opposition between Europe and something that is
not Europe . . . is . . . Asia’’ (Chabod 23). It would be against the logic of
Eurocentrism, in fact, to form a sense of European identity by making
recourse to Asia or anything outside of Europe. As I will imply in the
next few chapters, Eurocentrism properly begins when a modern theory
of identity—identity as dialectics of the same—takes its first tentative
shape in the pages of Montesquieu, and from the latter finds its final
systematization in Hegel’s understanding of Europe as the ‘‘end of his-
tory.’’ A modern European identity, in other words, begins when the
non-Europe is internalized—when the south, indeed, becomes the su≈-
cient and indispensable internal Other: Europe, but also the negative
part of it.
Indebted to the subaltern historiography of Ranajit Guha, Homi
Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, as well as to the subaltern epistemol-
ogy of Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo, Europe (in Theory) questions
Eurocentrism not from the outside but from the marginal inside of
Europe itself. One objective is to trouble the tranquil waters of Euro-
pean studies, often driven—either by spontaneous enthusiasms or by eu
grants and sponsorships—to advertise a lofty Europe of ‘‘inventiveness
and creativity, democracy, liberty, critical sense and tolerance, and re-
spect of other cultures’’ (Kapuscinski 64). Another objective is to state
the facts of the dialectical nature of Eurocentrism: the way in which ‘‘the
parochiality of its universalism’’ ends up ‘‘reducing, rather than expand-
ing, the possibility of . . . inclusiveness, of genuinely cosmopolitan or
internationalist perspective, of intellectual curiosity’’ (Said, Humanism
53). Eurocentrism, in short, is one category through which I am trying to
explain the dialectical inclusion and exclusion of the south—its histor-
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ical necessity for the formation of a parochial universalism and its lim-
inality in any modern theory of European identity.
This is as far, however, as the concept of Eurocentrism—or, for that
matter, the paradigms of subaltern studies—can carry Europe (in The-
ory). The homogenizing assumptions of the term, in fact, run the per-
petual risk of obliterating the interior borders and fractures of Euro-
pean hegemony; they hide from view Europe’s own subaltern areas—the
south—of knowledge production. Along with the ‘‘damaging assump-
tion’’ that theory is limited to some ‘‘Eurocentric archive’’ (H. K. Bhabha
19)—an assumption that still dominates what is being called European
studies—there is a similarly damaging assumption that the archive of
European theory is located somewhere between Franco-Scottish En-
lightenment and Anglo-German Romantic nationalism. It is not enough
to say, en passant, that even Europe had and has its margins. In sub-
altern historiography’s usual reliance on what is assumed to be European
theory—Said’s French and British archives for the definition of Orien-
talism; Marx and Heidegger in Chakrabarty’s denunciation of the ‘‘arti-
fice of history’’—the blatantly Eurocentric gesture marginalizing what
Franco Cassano has called ‘‘southern thinking’’ (Pensiero) is mirrored
perhaps too closely. Was there no other Orientalism than that of Silvestre
de Sacy and William Jones? No philosophy of history but Hegel’s?
Coeval with the emergence of a theory of Europe as a self-su≈cient
system, there was, on the contrary, the development of other theories
that, from the margins of the so-called southern question, were trying to
imagine a di√erent Europe. It is the task of Europe (in Theory) to bear
witness to the mere fact of the historical existence of such theories,
whose traces seem otherwise to have been lost both to European and
subaltern studies. After an outline of ancient theories of Europe in chap-
ter 1—from Aristotle’s classical antithesis of European freedom and Asi-
atic despotism to the so-called crisis of classical thought in the seven-
teenth century (Hazard, European Mind )—my story begins, in chapter
2, with Montesquieu’s rhetorical inventio of Europe’s north-south di-
vide. Montesquieu, I maintain, inaugurates the Eurocentric archive un-
derstood as a theory of Europe in which a supposedly ancient under-
standing of European identity—‘‘The nations . . . in Europe, are . . .
comparatively free,’’ while those ‘‘in Asia . . . [are] ruled and enslaved’’
(Aristotle 7.7)—is reoriented to find the figure of antithesis no longer in
external Asia, but in an internal south ‘‘moved away from morality
itself ’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2.477).
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After this exploration of the Eurocentric archive opened by Mon-
tesquieu, and after discussing the identification of Europe with a
seventeenth-century so-called Republic of Letters, chapter 3 looks then
at the work of the Spanish Jesuit Juan Andrés, the first noncanonical
figure that this book tries to reevaluate. Expelled from Spain in 1779,
Andrés moved to Parma, Italy, and published a seven-volume history of
nothing less than the literatures of the whole world. A first attempt at
what would be called comparative literature, Andrés’s work challenged
the dominant thesis of a French origin of modern literature and pro-
posed what is known today as the Arabist theory. If Montesquieu had
claimed that as colonies of the Oriental world of Islam, the civilizations
of Spain and Italy did not constitute an integral part of Europe but were
its negative south, Andrés was then ready to declare Al-Andalus and
Sicily as the very origin of Europe’s modernity—and such origin of
Europe, interestingly enough, was to be located in the Orient.
I return to hegemonic theories in chapter 4, devoted to the apparent
paradox of nationalism as the distinguishing feature of European iden-
tity. Madame de Staël, di√erentiating between ‘‘two very distinct litera-
tures: the one that comes from the south, and the one which descends
from the north’’ (Littérature 203), laid the basis for later theories of
southern backwardness and defective nationalism. Such a dialectics of
north and south, which Staël had borrowed from Montesquieu, reap-
pears by the end of the chapter in Hegel’s idea of Europe as the ‘‘synthesis
of Universal History,’’ and in his full-fledged theory of dialectical iden-
tity. Chapter 5 then concludes the book by giving space to another
southern answer to the Europe of Montesquieu, Hegel, and the newly
formed nation-states. Michele Amari, an Italian Orientalist of the 1840s,
represents a peculiar case of southern Orientalism. Not only does he
attempt a reevaluation of the south as the cradle of an ‘‘original social
democracy’’ (Amari Storia 1.171) brought into Europe by Islam; more-
over, he strives for a plurilingual, pluriconfessional, and pluriethnic
Europe—Caucasian, Jewish, and Islamic at the same time—that may still
be worthy of some consideration as an antidote to any clash of civiliza-
tions. Far from being any antithesis to the Orient, Amari claims, Eu-
rope’s history and civilization find their roots in the East.
The contamination of what would otherwise remain a pantheon of
European classics—Montesquieu, Voltaire, Staël, Hegel—with the pe-
ripheral figures of Andrés and Amari intends to introduce an element of
historical contestation to that idea of modern Europe taking shape be-
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tween the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. What was at stake in
such controversies was not only the question of borders and identity—
who was European and who was not (or who was European in theory
only). The core of the quarrel was who, and from which geopolitical
position, was entitled to define those borders and identities. In other
words, who had the right to produce knowledge and theory of and for
Europe?
In outlining my story, I have thus been reading some historical at-
tempts to theorize Europe, both from the center and from the southern
margin—other margins could be thought, such as the Balkans (Todo-
rova), Eastern Europe (Wol√), or the extreme North (Davidson)—not
so much for their scientific as for their rhetorical contribution to the
discourse of Europe. Their historical importance lies for me not in their
ability to represent adequately any European reality—the European ge-
nius, after all, may consist exactly in this refusal to see reality (says María
Zambrano)—but in shaping it. Theories of Europe, in other words, have
perhaps described little, but have prepared lots of the commonplaces—
correct or false arguments that equally ‘‘seem to be true since all, as it
were, acknowledge them as such’’ (Aristotle 2.21.11)—that still shape
what we think, say, legislate, and, in the end, make, of Europe. The idea
of the defective Europeanness of the south that has shaped the policies of
the two-tier Europe; the belief in the centrality of a European culture
guiding the work of the European Task Force on Culture; the mission of
Europe’s human rights and civilizing role that has led the Italian premier
Silvio Berlusconi to declare ‘‘the superiority of our civilization’’ and his
involvement in the war in Iraq against ‘‘the heritage of Islamic culture’’
(Commission on Human Rights 13); the idea that ‘‘France and Germany,
above all others [are central] . . . to Europe’s future’’ (Charlemagne 13);
Pope Ratzinger’s claim of Turkey’s ‘‘extraneity’’ to Europe, along with
Pierre Manent’s editorial in Le Figaro recommending the expulsion of all
Muslims from Europe’s ‘‘Christian soil’’ (Introvigne 25)—words, feel-
ings, and actions of today’s politics and journalism still rely, consciously
or not, on the conceptual and verbal forms, on the thesaurus of images,
on the rhetoric of figures that have historically defined Europe in theory.
Europe, to rephrase the same concept in the words of the anthropolo-
gist Eric Wolf, is not only ‘‘the reality of the natural world [geography]
and its human transformations by techniques [science and economy]
and organization [politics]’’ but also ‘‘the reality of schemata of orga-
nized knowledge and symbolic operations learned and communicated
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among human beings’’ (xiv). The legal scholar Miriam Aziz has also
hinted at the relevance of the symbolic when, in discussing contempo-
rary European law, has shown how legislative activity is determined not
only by present interests (national or otherwise) but also, and conspic-
uously, by the legislators’ historical memory of ‘‘visions and versions of
Europe’’ that have been theorized across the centuries (1–22). The way in
which Europe has been theorized and imagined, in other words, still
determines the praxis of legislative and political activity. Instead of vi-
sions, I have used here and there the term rhetorical unconscious: it hints
at the way in which contemporary discussions—on Europe’s Christian-
ity, on the ‘‘clash’’ of East and West, or the fracture of north and south—
are still informed by old commonplaces, expectations of what we take
Europe to mean. To take my words from Peter Carravetta: ‘‘It will be
interesting, and highly problematic, to see how some interpretations
[and theories of Europe], that at some moments in history were consid-
ered factual truths, keep influencing [even when they are discredited as
factual truths] both the rhetoric and the action of di√erent peoples in
di√erent epochs,’’ including the present one (25).
Europe (in Theory) therefore implies the idea that social realities and
institutions—say, Europe with its undergoing unification—are not the
mere by-product of journalism and policy papers, which in turn would
create social consciousness or consensus around some ideas and thus
determine practical decisions. Social consciousness about what Europe
is, and a consensus around its meaning, are, rather, at least in good part,
the product of what I have called a rhetorical unconscious. It is what has
been said and written for around three centuries about and around
Europe that still determines what we think and do about it; what our
dailies report; and what our policy makers decide.
The sociological literature about Europe seems in fact to confirm my
hypothesis, while failing to draw its immediate consequences. In recent
statistical studies of popular support for European integration (Lindberg
and Scheingold; Ammendola and Isernia) we find a di√erentiation be-
tween ‘‘specific support’’ (a utilitaristic rationale of benefits and costs)
and ‘‘a√ective support’’ (a prelogical desire to be part of Europe). What
we learn is that even in the absence of real economic or political advan-
tages, and sometimes despite economic sacrifices paid to the fiscal pol-
icies of Maastricht, ‘‘a substantially a√ective support’’ for integration has
remained strong in many countries since the 1950s (Ammendola and
Isernia 140). What eludes the logic of statistics, however, is exactly the
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nature—and logic!—of that a√ective support. It is the task of what Ed-
ward Said has called ‘‘humanism as democratic criticism,’’ therefore, to
go beyond the limit of statistics and start investigating not only the
attachment of historical societies to ‘‘words [such as Europe] as bearers
of reality’’ but also to make such words ‘‘disclose what may be hidden or
incomplete or masked or distorted. . . . In this view of language, then,
words are not passive markers or signifiers standing in unassumingly for
a higher reality; they are, instead, an integral formative part of that
reality’’ (Humanism 58).
The problem, in this context, is no longer whether the humanities
with their tools—rhetoric, philology, historicism—will be adequate or
relevant to the technologized, quantified, and statistic-oriented sciences,
but whether the latter are still capable of responding to the humanities
(in the way in which Aristotle’s Politics and Logics were responding to the
Topica; and the way in which Plato’s Republic anxiously had to respond
to the arts).
Rhetoric, philology, and historicism provide the critical theory guid-
ing this book. They restitute Europe to the history of its construction
(which is not a Montesquieu-like history of progress, nor a chronology
of progressive realizations of ideas). They make today’s Europe less of a
given, less of a ‘‘real’’ that can only be managed by economics, politics,
and its pundits, and more of a historical accident still open to the pos-
sibility of change and to what used to be called praxis. In this practical
sense, this is a book about Europe (in theory).
But theory, as Homi Bhabha warns us in the epigraph to this book, is
located ‘‘inevitably within the Eurocentric archives’’ (19). In order to
become praxis, a history of theories of Europe needs to start questioning
the very presuppositions of those theories—the ways in which theory
itself is enmeshed in the construction of a Eurocentric universe. In
‘‘Eurocentrism and Its Avatars,’’ Immanuel Wallerstein argues that ‘‘sci-
ence emerged in response to European problems at a point in history
when Europe dominated the whole world-system,’’ and that it is there-
fore ‘‘virtually inevitable that its choice of subject matter, its theorizing,
its methodology, and its epistemology all reflected the constraints of the
crucible within which it was born’’ (93–94). What both Bhabha and
Wallerstein suggest is that ‘‘Eurocentrism is not a matter of attitudes in
the sense of values and prejudices, but rather . . . a matter of science, and
scholarship, and informed and expert opinion’’ (Blaut 9); Eurocentrism,
in other words, is embedded in the same theories that, between the
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eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, have shaped, and continue to
shape, our own teaching and academic curricula. As Eric Wolf has sug-
gested, Eurocentrism is inseparable from either pedagogy or disciplinary
formations: it is what ‘‘we have been taught’’ (5), if not explicitly,
through what and how we study.
In this book, Bhabha’s epigraph therefore stands to signify that theori-
zations of Europe have coincided with, or at least have not been extra-
neous from, theorizations of, well, theories of the various disciplines of
knowledge. Montesquieu’s intention to theorize a modern Europe, for
instance, ends up theorizing modern historiography. Juan Andrés theo-
rizes comparative literature and literary historiography in order to re-
theorize Europe after Montesquieu. The Romantics’ theories of the na-
tion as a model of bureaucratic and state organization superior to, and
more modern than, all other kinds of state organization run parallel to
their theorizations of a Europe of nations. Finally, Michele Amari felt the
need to theorize both Orientalism and national history (storia patria)
anew in order to theorize a di√erent Europe of nations founded not on
the myth of the French Revolution but on that of Muslim Sicily. Europe
(in Theory), in sum, looks at some of the ways in which theorizations of
Europe have produced Bhabha’s Eurocentric archive. Needless to say,
this Eurocentric archive is European in theory only: it is to my reader to
imagine the various ways in which such an archive has extended, like
Tocqueville’s ‘‘gradual and continuous progress of the European race,’’
to the entire West with ‘‘the solemnity of a providential event’’ (Democ-
racy 398).
1 The Discovery of Europe
SOME CRITICAL POINTS
From a work of criticism, we expect today concrete results, or, at
least, demonstrable theses and viable hypotheses. Yet when the
word appears in the dictionary of European philosophy, ‘‘criticism’’
means rather an investigation concerning the limits of knowledge—
concerning that which, precisely, is not possible to hypothesize or
maintain.—GIORGIO AGAMBEN, Stanze
In his relentless (and relentlessly cited) Clash of Civilizations, the very
man Henry Kissinger once commended as ‘‘one of the West’s most emi-
nent political scientists’’ (qtd. in J. Bhabha 597n17) confidently argued
that ‘‘Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Or-
thodoxy begin’’ (Huntington 158). For us in the humanities—still af-
flicted perhaps by some ‘‘realism of uncertainty’’ (Newman)—the abso-
lute certainty with which Huntington could draw such a neat map of
Europe was, to say the least, enviable. Putting an end to the hairsplitting
sophistries of Brussels bureaucrats and academic theorists who kept
chewing over the ‘‘old problems of boundaries’’ (Slack and Innes 3)
and ‘‘what is meant by the term ‘Europe’ ’’ (Brugmans 11), Hunting-
ton almost gave us the specific coordinates to trace the boundaries of
Christian and Western Europe: it was as if Santiago de Campostela in
the northwest and the Virgin Mary’s House of Ephesus in the south-
east could provide a definite and unquestionable geographical body to
Europe.∞
Such a clerical map was at once the confirmation of Martin Lewis and
Kären Wigen’s notion that continents were but cultural constructs and
the outdoing of ‘‘metageography’’ itself. Is not a continent, the skeptical
metageographers would have asked, ‘‘one of the main continuous bodies
of land on the earth’s surface’’ (the definition, after all, is as authoritative
as the Oxford English Dictionary)? But, if so, rather than a continent,
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Europe would only be ‘‘a small heading of the Asiatic continent, . . . a
western appendix of Asia’’ (Valéry 24 and 38; see also Rougemont 33; and
Derrida, Other Heading 11–17). It looks as if the term continent, as ap-
plied to Europe despite the land continuum of Eurasia, embodies only
some European fantasies, and no more: the fantasy of a Europe that
wants to imagine itself di√erent, that wants to separate itself from Asia;
the fantasy, moreover, of a Europe that wants to think itself as a geo-
graphical, natural, and factual unity. But then again, where does Europe
end? On the Adriatic? In Yugoslavia? Turkey? Or perhaps even Russia?
One can see why Lewis and Wigen, writing only one year before the
Clash, thought that ‘‘there are many reasons to believe that the . . .
continental scheme . . . obscures more than it reveals’’ (2–3). But where
Lewis and Wigen saw di≈culties, Huntington only saw the certainties of
(political) science.≤ Ipse dixit! Centuries of beating about the bush of
Europe and its borders had been ended with the straightforward ways
that have always marked the ‘‘practical science’’ of the ‘‘Geheimrat’’
(Hardt and Negri 33–34)—what Immanuel Kant called the ‘‘political
moralist, i.e., one who forges a morality . . . to influence the current
ruling power . . . even at the expense of the people, and, where possible,
of the entire world’’ (‘‘Perpetual Peace’’ 128–29). Too bad that such prac-
tical science did not believe its business to be overly concerned with the
limits of that morality. Too bad it had to do away with all complexities of
a definition of Europe. Too bad it aimed instead at producing readily
usable, if fundamentalist, civilizational hypotheses that the current
power could immediately translate into ‘‘momentary commands’’ (Kant,
‘‘Perpetual Peace’’ 129).
What does the fortune of the clash theory tell us about cultural pro-
duction today? If what we expect of theory is a set of readily usable
hypotheses that can be promptly translated into political action, Hun-
tington’s book has proven a sign of the times: ‘‘We have become all too
practical. Fear of the impotence of theory supplies a pretext for bowing
to the almighty production process’’ (Adorno 44). Between one cavalier
theory of Europe and another of the West, the Clash has crowned an
age in which all that has been asked from an increasingly scientific, prac-
tical, and Sokalized academia was not criticism and complications, but
usable theses by the pound.≥ The humanities have quickly succumbed;
criticism—‘‘questioning, upsetting and reformulating so much of what
is presented to us as commodified, packaged’’ (Said, Humanism 28)—
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disbanded as an unnecessary complication, while the practical sciences
have become hegemonic in all cultural discussions.
In all fairness (and to avoid some unnecessary clash of the disciplines
here), quite a good number of social scientists have seen little science and
lots of cultural prejudice in Huntington’s confessional view of world
geography in which alternatives are homogenous and civilizational bor-
ders as unmovable as the mountain that never went to Muhammad. The
civilizational thesis has accordingly been castigated as a ‘‘one-sided con-
jecture’’ (Wilson 255), and one, moreover, that ‘‘does not survive histori-
cal scrutiny’’ (Amartya 16). To which one must add, still, that Hun-
tington did not really discover the civilizational boundaries of Europe,
but adopted them ready-made, like Marcel Duchamp’s famous urinal,
from an age-long cultural tradition of European thought in the process
of discovering itself as European. The chapter that begins here would like
to trace a brief and critical history of such a ‘‘discovery of Europe.’’∂
Before the incipit of this story brings us back to another conflict of
civilizations (in the beginning were the Persian Wars), let me o√er an
apology and a preface first. The apology concerns the telegraphic brev-
ity, undoubtedly fraught with many simplifications, with which this
opening chapter attempts to outline the story—after all, ‘‘no history
could be written’’ (Pagden, introduction 1)—of the discovery of Europe
from 500 bc to the early 1700s. Although the real concern of this book is
with the emergence of an idea of dialectical and self-su≈cient Europe in
the late eighteenth century, I find that a brief outline of what precedes
such surfacing is altogether necessary to my later argument. Not because
I believe a history of the idea of Europe should or could be o√ered here:
such history is impossible not in Anthony Pagden’s sense—too much has
been written already (the same argument in Lützeler)—but in the sense
that history, as Dipesh Chakrabarty suggests in Provincializing Europe, is
the very thought that produces Europe as its own ‘‘sovereign, theoretical
subject’’ (27). Writing a history of Europe, or of the idea of Europe,
means, then, tautologically, to write a history of the European idea of
history.
I will try to enter the logic of this tautology later in this book. Before
doing that, however, what I would like to accomplish here is to recon-
struct the repertoire of ideas and commonplaces, and analyze some
critical points, that the eighteenth-century theorists of Europe will find
available to them, ready to use and argue in their definitions of either
14 CHAPTER 1
Europe or, mutatis mutandis, ‘‘Universal History.’’ As a preface, I would
like to justify the title of this chapter by saying that Europe, too, had to be
discovered. Not only in the sense that at di√erent times in their histories,
also Africa (Northrup), Islam (B. Lewis; Abu-Lughod), Japan (Keene),
and the by now ubiquitous American tourist (Rahv) had to discover
firsthand the ‘‘old continent’’ they only knew from literature or legend.
More important than that, Europe had to discover itself as Europe—that
is, to find unity in the plurality of all its imperial, national, local, cul-
tural, and civilizational di√erences. When did Europe begin to see itself
as one?
E Pluribus Unum: Theories of Beginnings
Sometimes it can seem hopeless. How do you mould a single European
people out of the lumpen masses scattered across the continent? Euro-
pean citizens . . . still insist on speaking di√erent languages, they read
di√erent papers, worship at the shrines of di√erent celebrities, chortle
at di√erent television programmes. But there is one exception. . . .
—CHARLEMAGNE, ‘‘The Players Do Better Than the Politicians
in Making Europe Loved’’
In a chapter of his The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance, pro-
grammatically titled ‘‘The Discovery of Europe,’’ John Hale begins:
‘‘When in 1623 Francis Bacon threw o√ the phrase ‘we Europeans,’ he
was assuming that his readers knew where ‘Europeans’ were, who they
were, and what, in spite of national di√erences, they shared. This was a
phrase, and an assumption, that could not have been used with such
confidence a century and a half before’’ (3). For Hale, therefore, it was
between 1450 and 1620 ‘‘that the word Europe first became part of com-
mon linguistic usage and the continent itself was given a securely map-
based frame of reference, a set of images that established its identity
in pictorial terms, and a triumphal ideology that overrode its internal
contradictions’’ (3).
Robert Bartlett’s The Making of Europe, instead, follows Marc Bloch’s
idea of the Middle Ages as the ‘‘childhood of Europe’’ (Bloch, Feu-
dal 442) and sees Europe becoming one already in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, when a militarily hegemonic Frankish center (Ger-
many, France, North Italy) begins conquering, colonizing, and ‘‘Euro-
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peanizing’’ the rest of the ‘‘continent’’ (Britain, Flanders, the Low Coun-
tries, Iberia, Southern Italy). Such colonization changed a previously
‘‘highly compartmentalized world’’ into one where religion, economy,
and systems of education were shared by all, so that, eventually, a ‘‘cul-
tural homogenization of Europe’’ was achieved under Frankish rule: ‘‘By
1300 Europe existed as an identifiable cultural entity. It could be desc-
ribed in more than one way, but some common features of its cultural
face are the saints, names, coins, charters, and educational practices . . . .
By the late medieval period Europe’s names and cults were more uni-
form than they had ever been; Europe’s rulers everywhere minted coins
and depended upon chanceries; Europe’s bureaucrats shared a common
experience of higher education. This is the Europeanization of Europe’’
(Bartlett 291).
Adopting a similar line of reasoning, but implicitly refuting the Frank-
ish beginnings of Europe, Norman Davies’s Europe: A History dates a
‘‘birth of Europe’’ back to the period of ‘‘barbarian’’ migrations, inva-
sions, and conquests that penetrated the Roman Empire from around
330 (date of the founding of Constantinople) to 800 ad. For Davies,
Europe was (and still ought to be) an ethnic melting pot, the product of
centuries-long racial dispersals and mixings—a cosmopolitan project,
that is, forgotten by a later age of nationalism:
By the eighth century, therefore, the ethnic settlement of the Peninsula
[Celts, Slovenes, Huns, Goths, Jewish, Afro- and Indo-European ‘‘Ro-
mans’’] was beginning to achieve a lasting pattern. The eighth century,
indeed, was the point when important social crystallizations occurred.
Yet five more major migrations [Vikings, Magyars, Mongols, Moors, and
Turks] had to happen before all the basic population of the future Europe
was complete. Europe was conceived from the most diverse elements, and
her birth was painfully protracted. (238)
Enrique Dussel, who has other continents in mind, goes forward to 1492,
‘‘date of the ‘birth’ of modernity,’’ to trace back an origin of Europe ‘‘as a
unified ego exploring, conquering, colonizing an alterity’’ (‘‘Eurocen-
trism’’ 66). Only through a confrontation with its colonial Other, not
through Bartlett’s internal forms of colonialism or Davies’s migrations,
can Dussel’s Europe emerge as an identity. And while Helmut Reinicke
(iii) maintains the same colonial beginning of Europe in the year 1492,
Bernard Lewis, in The Muslim Discovery of Europe, goes back to another
confrontation (and another Other) to find Europe born on the day
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Charles Martel faced the Muslim armies in Poitiers. The year was 732: ‘‘It
was indeed on this occasion that the very notion of Europe as an entity
which could be threatened or saved appeared for the first time’’ (18).
M. E. Yapp, on the other hand, convinced that Poitiers is ideologically
still a Christian, rather than a European, coming together, does not agree
with Lewis in the least: ‘‘The emergence of the concept of Europe re-
quired . . . the waning of the power of the idea of Christendom. For that
process we must look at a much later period’’ (138). Europe emerges then
for Yapp with a much (much!) later ‘‘secular shift’’ (142)—when the
religious threat of Islam wanes and, in 1714, the treaty of Utrecht remains
the last testament to Europe as a ‘‘Christian Republic.’’ After 1714, in
other words, with the secular ‘‘emergence of Britain as the leading naval
and military power in Europe’’ (O’Brien 65), Yapp’s true and secular
Europe began.
While some venture as far back as the homo abilis (Cunli√e; Phillips)
to find the beginnings of Europe, others see the latter as a yet unfinished
project, a still ‘‘hopeless goal’’ best left to Beckham to bend into con-
ceptual and cultural unity under the auspices of the European Foot-
ball Federation: ‘‘Over the past decade [in the 1990s] European foot-
ball teams have turned into [the only] living, breathing embodiment of
European integration’’ (Charlemagne, ‘‘Players’’ 55).
Rather than attempting the impossible task of determining which one
is the true beginning of a self-consciousness of Europe, we would better
ask ourselves, simply: Why so much ado about beginnings in the first
place? The fact is that beginnings, as Edward Said once wrote, are always
disingenuous: one begins from A not because there is some irrefutable
reason to do so, but only because ‘‘the beginning A leads to B’’ (Begin-
nings 6). It is quite likely, in this sense, that Hale begins in 1450 (A)
only to argue, as the undoubtedly Eurocentric reviewer does not miss a
chance to remark, the universal value (B) of the Renaissance’s ‘‘stunning
achievements that shaped (for better and for worse, but mainly for
better) the future not only of Europe but of the whole world’’ (Nauert
1087). Bartlett and Davies (like Geary) begin with medieval conquest (A)
only to dispel the myth (B) of all ethnonationalisms, whose ‘‘idea of
exclusive national homelands is a modern fantasy’’ (Davies 217). And
Bernard Lewis suggests the battle of Poitiers as a beginning of Europe
(A) with the clear intent to theorize (B) the original and fundamental
importance of Muslim-Christian rivalries—the clash of civilizations—in
the shaping of Europe and the West.∑
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To paraphrase Denis Donoghue’s ‘‘America in Theory’’ (4), you think
you are reading about the beginning of Europe—in the Renaissance, at
Poitiers, in 1450 or 1492—and you suddenly find yourself within a sys-
tematic theory hinging on the word Europe and all its supposed mean-
ings. It is in this first sense that, as the title of the present book maintains,
Europe is in theory: speaking of Europe means—implicitly or explicitly,
consciously or not—creating a theory not only of Europe itself but of a
whole series of other things, such as culture (Hale), modernity (Dussel),
nationalism (Bartlett), secularization (Yapp), and so on.
Assuming the game of beginnings is then not entirely naive, let me be-
gin my story from the Persian Wars (500–449 bc), when the Greek states
first reunited as ‘‘Europe’’ in order to confront the threat of Darius’s
Persian Empire. It is a good date, after all, to start understanding the very
secular and military origin of the east/west antithesis that still informs,
as a rhetorical unconscious, more recent civilizational clash theories. It
brings us back to an old Europe, no doubt, but one that may still bear on
the ways a new one is imagined.
Old Europe
Today, the center of gravity is shifting.
—DONALD RUMSFELD, press briefing, January 23, 2003
I’m looking for a permanent center of gravity.
—FRANCO BATTIATO, ‘‘Centro di gravitè permeneate’’
In a transcription of the notes he took for a course held at the University
of Milan in 1943 (while yet another clash of civilizations was haunting
Europe), Federico Chabod wrote:
European consciousness means di√erentiation of Europe, as a political
and moral entity, from other entities . . . the concept of Europe must have
first been formed as an antithesis to that which is not Europe. . . . Now,
the first opposition between Europe and something that is not Europe . . .
is the fruit of Greek thought. Between the age of the Persian Wars and the
age of Alexander the Great emerges, for the first time, the sense of an
Europe opposed to Asia—opposed in habits and culture, but, mainly, in
political organization: Europe represents the spirit of ‘‘freedom,’’ against
Oriental despotism. (23)
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Before the Persian Wars, as we know from Denys Hay, ‘‘the word Europe
was associated in the first place with myth’’ (1)—the myth, later popu-
larized by Ovid, of Europa, daughter of Agenor, king of Tyre, who lived
in what we now call Lebanon. From there, she was kidnapped by Zeus
disguised as a white bull, and brought to, well, Europe: ‘‘The god little by
little edges away from the dry land, and sets his borrowed hoofs in the
shallow water; then he goes further out and soon is in full flight with his
prize on the open ocean. She now trembles with fear and looks back at
the receding shore, holding fast a horn with one hand and resting the
other on the creature’s back’’ (Ovid 1.121).∏ Europa’s flight may have
meant ‘‘to record the westward flight of Canaanite tribes early in the
second millennium bc’’; and her rape may have represented the his-
torical facts of ‘‘an early Hellenic occupation of Crete’’ (Graves 1:196–
97). All that is certain, however, is that an explicitly political, cultural,
and moral distinction of Europe, beyond the reach of mythology, was
achieved only when Darius’s armies started threatening with insistence
the Greek cities. Isocrates (436–339 bc), urging a pan-Hellenic unity
against the Persian threat, leaves us the first written record, in his Pane-
gyricus, of a political understanding of Europe (see Momigliano; de
Romilly): the latter is a strategic alliance to make common front against
the Eastern menace. If strategy requires uniting the cities’ forces into one
Europe, war propaganda necessitates a demonizing of the enemy, which
is accordingly depicted as ideologically and culturally opposed to ‘‘us.’’
Europe, though geographically united with Asia, begins then to emerge
as a commonplace ideologically separated from, and rhetorically op-
posed to, a negative place ‘‘of lavish splendour, of vulgarity, of arbitrary
authority, of all that was antithetical to Greece and Greek values’’ (Hay
3). To summarize with the unforgiving words of Neal Ascherson, ‘‘In this
particular encounter [with Asia] began the idea of ‘Europe’ with all its
arrogance, all its implications of superiority’’ (49).π
What is intriguing about Arnaldo Momigliano’s theory is that it makes
Europe originate quite instrumentally from a simple rhetorical antithe-
sis concocted for specific military ends: for Isocrates, Europe is the land
of freedom and good government; Asia is the threat and commonplace
of slavery and despotism. Fighting together against Persia means, then,
nothing less than to protect civilization against evil. As Aeschylus puts it
in The Persians, those ‘‘Europeans’’ will never be vanquished—freedom,
if not God, is on their side: ‘‘They are slaves to none, neither are they
subject’’ (qtd. in Davies 102). A theory of Europe, from its very out-
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set, is a theory of Orientalism, which is this book’s intention to follow
throughout.∫
All this is nice. But it is also quite puzzling: Whatever happens to
Africa—third continent in the Greeks’ tripartite oecumene—in this rhe-
torical construction of free Europe against the despotic Orient? Well, it
looks like Africa is a continent de trop in the fable of early European
identity. It is as if, in Denys Hay’s poignant words, ‘‘two continents
suited the Greeks better than three’’ (2).
Jacques Derrida could not have put it better: it is a binary logic of
identity and otherness, a binary way of thinking, that begins ‘‘Europe.’’
Put di√erently, Europe arises as a structure ‘‘of dichotomies or polarities:
good vs. evil . . . identity vs. di√erence . . . . The second term in each pair
[being] considered the negative, corrupt, undesirable version of the
first’’ (Of Grammatology viii). In this second sense, Europe is in theory,
and born inseparably from it: at the same moment in which a place that
starts calling itself Europe develops its peculiar logic—its binary way
of thinking, its structure of language, its deep grammar, its logos, its
‘‘grammatology’’—it also institutes the cultural and epistemological lim-
its that make it possible for that place to identify itself as Europe: ‘‘The
reflection on identity as open question and as relation to alterity, begins
from the ‘philosophy’ and the way of thinking of Europeans . . . it may
be that European peoples recognize in the question of identity their
own di√erent and common identity, the game of alterity as identity’’
(Gnisci 86).
In the theory of Greek beginnings—a theory of the origin of European
identity in a Greek thinking characterized by an ‘‘attitude of continuous
comparison and confrontation with the other’’ (Gnisci 20)—Europe
thus emerges with (or as) a new way of binary thinking and dialectical
antitheses: ‘‘All derives from this original ambivalence that has always
been the foundation of European identity’’ (Iiritano 41); ‘‘the originality
[of Europe] is exactly in its having developed a thought of oppositions
that is absent, instead, in any other culture’’ (Perniola 117); ‘‘the antithe-
sis East-West is a mythical-symbolic asset that is proper of Europe only’’
(Marramao 59); ‘‘in Europe, one thinks one is identical with oneself in as
far as one is di√erent from the other—identity is built on di√erence’’
(Le Monde, qtd. in Pisano 289). Europe is the coming together of ‘‘Ira-
nian oracles and Athenian rationalists’’ (Cassano, Pensiero 25–30), of
Dyonisian and Apollinean (Nietzsche), of ‘‘the world of nature (physis)
and that of men (nomos)’’ (Pagden, ‘‘Europe’’ 37).
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While the ideological limits are set, the geographical boundaries, how-
ever, remain (until Huntington, that is) vague and mobile, as the most
recent discussions on the European Union’s inclusions and exclusions
still attest. Isocrates’ Europe, for instance, coincided with Greece, south-
ern Spain, Southern Italy, Sicily, and lower France; Herodotus did not
even take the idea of Europe as a continent very seriously at all, since,
geographically speaking, Europe and Asia were not even separated by
any sea (Herodotus 2.16). At any rate, wherever it was or ended, Europe
was for the Greeks a heaven blessed by perfect weather (Herodotus 2.26),
an ‘‘extremely beautiful land,’’ one ‘‘of highest excellence’’ (Herodotus
7.5). We will follow the unfolding of climatology—the idea, namely, that
gentle and temperate climates engender gentle and temperate peoples
living in gentle and temperate political systems—in the following chap-
ter on Montesquieu. The first step of such unfolding, however, can
already be found in Hippocrates (460–370 bc), for whom Europe and
Asia form not only ideological but also climatic and moral antitheses:
A variable climate produces a nature which is coupled with a fierce, hot-
headed and discordant temperature, for frequent fears cause a fierce
attitude of mind whereas quietness and calm dull the wits. Indeed, this is
the reason why the inhabitants of Europe are more courageous than
those of Asia. Conditions which change little lead to easy-going ways;
variations to distress of body and mind. Calm distress and pain increase
courage. That is one reason for the more warlike nature of Europeans.
But another cause lies in their customs. They are not subjects of a mon-
archy as the Asiatics are and, as I have said before, men who are ruled by
princes are the most cowardly. (Qtd. in Mikkeli 8–9)
To which Aristotle added the following in the seventh book of the Politics:
‘‘The nations in cold regions, particularly in Europe, are full of [cour-
age] . . . which is why they continue to be comparatively free . . . . By
contrast, those in Asia . . . lack [courage]; which is why they continue to be
ruled and enslaved’’ (7.7). Strabo (63 bc–21 ad), the link between Greek
and Roman culture, followed by declaring Europe’s climate best ‘‘suited
to the development of excellence in men and in governments’’ (Strabo
2.5.26).Ω Both political and natural considerations, in sum, identified
Europe against Asia and claimed the superiority of the former over the
latter. Arguably, nature and geography were being transformed into sym-
bols and commonplaces, into systems of meaning: cold was given a moral
and political significance (courage), and heat another (cowardice).
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The Romans, by and large, inherited much of the Greek definition of
Europe, including the idea of Europe’s perfect weather. Pliny (23–79
ad), who called Europe ‘‘by far the fairest of lands,’’ was certain that
its gentle climate had produced ‘‘gentle [people], clear reason, fertile
intellects . . . and they also have governments, which the outer races
never have possessed’’ (1.2.80). Yet the East had started to lose much of its
immediate political signification for Rome: the Persian threat was on the
wane, and, more significantly, Constantine had moved the capital from
western Rome to eastern Byzantium (renamed Constantinople for the
occasion) in 331. This does not mean that the memory—what I am call-
ing the ‘‘rhetorical unconscious’’—of a fundamental antithesis was lost.
Traces of it were preserved in fact in the very science that had invented
it—rhetoric—where the term Asiatic, for instance, started meaning a
deviation from normative humanitas, and ‘‘tended to become pejora-
tive . . . in a literary sense—bombastic and over elaborate composition
could be thus described’’ (Hay 4).
At any rate, it is agreed that the term Europe was of little interest for the
Romans, for whom Europe existed, at most, as a relatively superfluous
geographical concept: ‘‘Caesar never used the word. Virgil referred to it
now and then, but merely in passing; and the same is true of Cicero,
Horace, Statius, Sallust, Tacitus, Appianus, and St. Augustine’’ (Duro-
selle 65). The Mediterranean, not Europe, was the organizing principle
for a Roman rhetoric of self-definition, of politics, and even of mapmak-
ing (Hay 6). The vague borders set by the Roman Empire, though ‘‘not
always precise lines on a map or judicially defined’’ (Kormoss 84), con-
figured, then, an identity pushing southward and comprehending the
northern coasts of Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria.∞≠ At the same time, a
northern barrier, set between the Rhine river and the Hadrian Wall
(begun in 122 ad), would separate a sedentary civilization from the
nomadic barbarians of Tacitus’s Germania and Caesar’s Gauls. In a way,
traditional east/west divisions were supplemented, if not replaced, by
new north/south ones—with the south as the locus of a desirable hu-
manitas, and the north as the site of barbarism (see Fournier 97): ‘‘On
one side of the frontier the reunited Roman Empire held firm; on the
other a restless mass of peoples, largely in the tribal stage of develop-
ment, tilled the forest clearings or roamed the plain. Understandably
enough, most Romans saw this division in terms of black and white. For
them, the Empire was ‘civilized’—that is, subject to ordered government;
the barbarians were, by definition, ‘uncivilized’ ’’ (Davies 213–14).
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Despite its scarce interest in Europe, the Roman Empire will play a
very important role in the genesis of modern Europe that I will follow in
the next chapters: the Romans had been the first ‘‘Europeans’’ to con-
ceive of the city-state (Pliny’s ‘‘governments’’) as a legal person, a res
publica that belonged not to the emperor (who could die and be re-
placed), but to its inhabitants. The Twelve Tables (450 bc), and the later
Codex of Theodosianus (438 ad), along with the Justinian Laws (529
ad), had been the first attempts to legislate the limits of political power
and individual rights (‘‘individual’’ being understood as a nonslave,
propertied male) within the republic. The Italian humanists of the fif-
teenth century were instrumental in making of Rome the symbol of
whatever is good about, and culturally proper to, Europe: their work was
meant as a preservation and recovery of Roman culture after the de-
struction caused by the barbarians from the north.
It was only with the growth, initially within the Roman Empire itself,
of two oriental religions—Judaism first, and Christianity following—
that Europe regained importance and began to acquire a new sacred
connotation underpinned by the authority of the scriptures. While
Arab-controlled Jerusalem replaced Rome and Byzantium as the center
of the orbis christianus exemplified in the so-called t-o (or terrarum
orbis) maps, the three continents of the Greek oecumene were tied to
precise theological meanings through the myth of the diaspora of Noah’s
progeny.∞∞ According to Christian exegesis, the great human diaspora
mentioned in the sacred texts of Christianity prepared what Maurice
Olender has called ‘‘a geography of malediction’’:
[Ham commits the sin] to expose publicly his Father’s [Noah’s] obscen-
ity by laughing and making fun of his nudity. Ham therefore sees his
cursed descendants become ‘‘servant of servants . . . unto his brethren’’
(Gen.9.25). The Church Fathers, who had read Josephus, attribute the
peopling of Africa to him. To his two brothers who ‘‘went backward, and
covered the nakedness of their father; and their faces were backward, and
they saw not their father’s nakedness’’ (Gen.9.23), tradition grants two
other continents. Shem, marked in Genesis by his privileged link to
the eternal Elohim, receives Asia. Japheth, whose Hebraic name evokes
‘‘beauty’’ as well as ‘‘openness,’’ the ‘‘wide space’’ of a legacy capable of
‘‘dilation’’ and ‘‘expansion,’’ will be the father of Europe. For the readers
of the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Old Testament, the ety-
mological fiction of a ‘‘Euru-opa,’’ meaning ‘‘wide vision,’’ could serve to
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confirm the providential ambition of this continent which ‘‘sees far’’
(eurus, ops). Since Hecataeus of Miletus in the sixth century b.c. the
Greeks had divided the world into three parts: Africa, Asia, and Europe.
From this point on, this ancient geography was christianized thanks to
the new biblical ancestors of humanity. (10; see also Ricceri 4–5)
Japheth’s descendants were then said to have occupied Europe, Ham’s
Africa, and Shem’s Asia. In this ‘‘ethnic rationalization of space’’ (Mig-
nolo, Renaissance 219), the subaltern position of Africa, and the hege-
monic one of Europe, were sanctioned for the second time. Moreover,
west and east, Europe and Asia, Japheth and Shem were once again
bound together in a series of rhetorical antitheses of European and,
as Edward Said calls it after Freud, ‘‘non-European’’ (Freud): uncir-
cumcised/circumcised, New/Old Testament, future/past of monothe-
ism, Hellenic/Semitic. The Jew would then occupy, to the days of Ausch-
witz and beyond, the formal place that was once assigned to the Persian
as the very antithesis to Europe.∞≤ To the Jew, a new child of Shem would
soon be added as the figural antithesis to Europe’s race.
When Muhammad had his vision in a cave of Mount Hira, north of
Mecca, it was the year 610 of the Christian calendar. The privileged place
of Christianity as the latest prophesy that amended an older one was
immediately shattered by the newer parvenu from the east that arrogated
onto itself the privilege of all emendations. It was the beginning of a long
warfare between Christianity and Islam, which eased only, and tempo-
rarily, with the breakup of the caliphate in the ninth and tenth centuries.
Islam’s armies had soon started pushing at the doors of Europe, and the
speed and extent of their conquests had been unseen since the times of
Julius Caesar: by 643, they had reached Tripoli; by around 652, they
started attacking Sicily (discussed in chapter 5 of this book); between 660
and the 670s, Arab navies kept besieging an apparently impregnable
Constantinople; and by 711 Córdoba, Toledo, and most of Spain were
in the hands of Muslim armies, now advancing toward the Pyrenees.
The threat of Islam made di√erent peoples—Romano, Gallic, and ‘‘bar-
barians’’ or Arian Christians—enter into a coalition, in 732, which the
chronicler Isidor Pacensis called ‘‘Europeenses’’ (B. Lewis 18). This was a
Europe, as Denis de Rougemont notices, quite limited in extension to
‘‘the people who live north of the Pyrenees and the Alps’’ (47). The
Mediterranean was being replaced by the Alps as the center of a new
Europe.
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What the advent of Islam accomplished was to halt the spread of a self-
declared universalistic and ecumenical religion on the Asian and African
borders, thereby making Christianity coincide with a geography tenta-
tively called Europe. It is at this point that Europe began, in a way, to lose
some of its political meaning and reduced itself to a mere religious and
geographical denotation: ‘‘The moral . . . almost ideological content of
this Europe is the Roman Church’’ (Chabod 29–30). As an example of
the loss of moral connotations, ‘‘it is instructive to witness the e√orts of
Bede, writing as late as the early decades of the eighth century. . . .
He describes Gregory the Great as being pope ‘over the whole world,’
and being set over ‘all the churches which obey the true faith.’ Faced
with exactly the same linguistic problem a century earlier, St. Columba
had . . . addressed the pope as ‘Head of all the churches of the whole
Europe’ ’’ (Hay 28). As Novalis would reminisce with longing in 1799,
Europe is Christianity in those happy years known as Europe’s Middle
Ages: ‘‘What a beautiful and happy time when Europe was a Christian
land, and one Christianity humanly lived in this part of the world; one
great common interest reunited all provinces of this spiritual kingdom’’
(10–11).∞≥
The symbol of such a Christian Europe is undoubtedly Charlemagne,
king of the Franks (768–814), ‘‘inventor’’ of Europe for some (Curcio;
Jordan), and, for others, the one who made Europe disappear behind the
hegemonic concept of Christianity (Perroy): ‘‘His title was none other
than that of the true monarch of the West, of the monarch ruling over
that entity which was called Europa by some, and the imperium Chris-
tianum by others, and also imperium Romanum by still others’’ (Ull-
mann 105). Between 800 and 814 ad, Charlemagne was at work trying to
reconstruct the waning Roman Empire into his new Holy and Roman
Empire. Yet whether this domain was imagined as Europe or Chris-
tianity is not a matter of mere nominalism. A Christian world is one: it is
the orbis christianus of t-o maps, made of the sons of Noah, brothers
everywhere—some already enlightened by the glow of Providence, some
others, like the children of Shem, still ignorant of Truth but convertible
nonetheless. This wholesome world stood in intimate contrast with that
of Europe, which coincided instead with a gens (Japheth’s), one ‘‘ethnic’’
(Lyser 37) people united under a secular authority. The distance between
the terms, rather than suggesting synonymy, may have marked a per-
ceived tension, instead, between a factual geographical Europe—a limit
of Charlemagne’s expansion—and an ideal, speculative one—a ‘‘destiny,’’
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as it will later be called by Hegel—still in the process of becoming, and
toward which Charlemagne imperially strived. As K. J. Lyser puts it,
‘‘Europe is here the geographical . . . setting of that world order that
alone counted, the Christian one’’ (34).
If Christendom was then the bearer of all moral and political mean-
ings, Europe remained the limit of its geographical realization. As a
limit, Charlemagne’s Christian Europe, unable until the end to recon-
stitute the old empire, ‘‘only succeeded to half of the Roman domina-
tions, and grew up on the north-western provinces’’ (Woodru√ 1). As the
Venerable Bede saw it, Europe was composed of Gallia, Germania, and
Spain (Rougemont 48). Whereas the Romans, focused as they were on
the Mediterranean, had comprehended the African coast as part of the
empire’s identity, Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire clearly marked a
southern frontier: the Mediterranean was periphery and extreme limit
of Europe. In fact, in his study of the linguistic usage of the terms Oriens,
Occidens, and Europa between the sixth and the tenth centuries, the
philologist Jürgen Fischer follows Marian Henryk Serejski and counts
at least thirty mentions of Europe in the years of Charlemagne. Such
zealous accounting is meant to suggest that European was, around the
Carolingian court, a token of Frankish identity signifying an opposi-
tion to, and independence from, anything southern, Mediterranean, and
Roman. Although the lands immediately above the Mediterranean were
then technically part of the empire, the term Europe, if we follow
Fischer’s suggestion, was already alluding to a northern di√erence from a
south that was European in theory only: a negative Europe increasingly
abhorred as the site of corruption, decadence, and decay.
It is for this reason that theories about Charlemagne as the ‘‘ori-
gin’’ of Europe will usually be enmeshed in some kind of north/south
polemics—from Montesquieu’s theory of a Carolingian rebirth of Eu-
rope, through Madame de Staël’s romantic Middle Ages, to the his-
toriographies of François Pierre Guillame Guizot, Jules Michelet, and
Henry Pirenne. Around Charlemagne hinges in fact the vexed question
of whether the origin of European freedoms had been Roman or, rather,
Frankish. Were the Romans those who gave freedom and the law to
Europe? Or where they despots, whose chains were broken by the proud
Germans with their customary laws?∞∂ The polemic, in fact, had begun
as early as 1573, when François Hotman wrote his Franco-Gallia against
the dismissal of the ‘‘barbaric’’ Middle Ages theorized by Italian (and
therefore Romano-centric) humanists.
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Hotman’s text ‘‘narrates the German conquest of Gaul in order to
show that the conquerers possessed among them freedom and equality’’
(Carravetta 46). The theory was based on some vague allusions taken
from Tacitus’s Germania, but, no matter if ‘‘the improbability of . . .
these assumptions is obvious to all’’ (Sergi 34), it acquired authority first
with Montesquieu’s theorization of feudalism (discussed in the follow-
ing chapter), and then with the German Romantics’ theories of the
Markgenossenschaft (a communal village putatively typical of early Ger-
man tribes). Tacitus’s allusions, in a way, were the rhetorical uncon-
scious that started informing theories—let alone the historiography of
Armand Maurer or the political science of Friedrich Engels—which
served indi√erently both the nationalist Right and the internationalist
Left to theorize an ‘‘original’’ Europe beginning not with Rome but with
the northern Germans (see Sergi 33–36).
In terms of chronology, the polemics between Roman and German
origin of Europe meant an endless controversy over the issue of the
Middle Ages: were they the ages of darkness, or the rebirth of (Caro-
lingian) Europe? On the one side, southern humanists (we will follow
Juan Andrés in chapter 3) claimed that the Middle Ages were a period of
decay from the glorious epoch of Rome; on the other, the northern
philosophes were unwilling to share humanism’s ‘‘pejorative concept of
mediaevalism, whose purpose had been to undermine the legitimating
doctrine of translatio imperii ’’ (Pumfrey, Rossi, and Slawinski 60)—the
shift of hegemony from southern Rome to Charlemagne’s Frankish Holy
Roman Empire.
Along with the north/south divide, at any rate, remained the east/
west one. Charlemagne and the Christian-Frankish Empire, first of all,
identified and defined themselves in opposition to, once again, the Ori-
ent: ‘‘The Frankish Empire would probably never have existed without
Islam, and Charlemagne without Mahomet would be inconceivable’’
(Pirenne 27). Moreover, the Byzantine Empire, with its wealth and os-
tentation, with its display of a new kind of ‘‘Oriental’’ luxury in daily
life and liturgy, created a new longitudinal division between Latin or
Roman Christianity, on the one hand, and Greek and Slav orthodoxy on
the other. The iconoclastic wars between an eastern church accused of
worshipping images and a purer western one replacing crucifixes with
crosses and Virgin Marys with whiteouts had begun already in the eighth
century. Charlemagne, paying homage to Rome, and breaking away
from Byzantine orthodoxy, had increased a sense of western Christian
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distinctiveness that had come close to establishing, in Robert Bartlett’s
words, ‘‘a quasi-ethnic’’ identity.∞∑ The schism was finally formalized in
1054, with the Papal Bull excommunicating the Patriarch Cerularius, and
with the latter’s Synodal Edict formalizing the breach. ‘‘This was no mere
quarrel between rival sects. . . . It involved real hatred’’ (Duroselle 127).
The Greeks, once central in the formation of the idea of Europe, became
one ‘‘of the ‘borders of Europe’ . . . , one of the ‘peripheral’ countries of
Europe’’ (Balibar 1). Dante’s casting of Ulysses and Diomedes in hell is a
chapter in this marginalization of Greece. For its re-Europeanization, we
need to wait until the 1820s, when the Greek wars of national liberation
against the Ottoman Empire will fuel the Romantic generation of Lord
Byron.
Back to the Middle Ages: it is in the name of Christianity, and not of
European expansion, that the crusades began to protect the loathed
Byzantines from the continuing pressures of the eastern ‘‘Saracens.’’∞∏ In
1095, just as Europe was starting to grow toward Bohemia, Poland, and
Hungary (Lyser 136–37), pope Urban ii called on Christendom to take
arms against Seljuk’s advance: ‘‘Dios lo volt’’ (God wishes it). The call,
which would result in the forty-day siege and mass massacres of Jerusa-
lem in 1099, had an e√ect similar to Poitiers: French, German, Provençal,
and North Italian armies united and mobilized against the common
enemy from the east. Once again, however, the unifying principle was
not Europe—understood as a territorial or political concept—but Chris-
tendom, with its symbolic cross painted in red as the badge of a union
authorized by the divine.∞π
The Christian God of love had wanted a holy war. Under Him, Chris-
tendom constituted not only a moral and political concept but a race:
In 1098, for example . . . after the crusaders had taken Antioch, Jesus
appeared in a vision to a priest in the army, [and] asked: ‘‘Man, what race
is this (quaenam est hec gens) that has entered the city?’’ and received the
answer: ‘‘Christians.’’ . . . French chansons and rhymed chronicles talk of
la gent cristiane, and in one of them, La chanson d’Antioche, Jesus is
pictured hanging on the cross, explaining to the good thief alongside him
that ‘‘from across the sea a new people (novele gent) will come, who will
take revenge for the death of their father.’’ (Bartlett 251–52)
As a race, Christianity had the imperative to defend itself from Shem’s
Muslim progeny and take revenge on the Jew, time allowing, ‘‘for the
death of their father.’’ The world had become, in the Christian mentality
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of the Middle Ages, a clash of civilizations, a ‘‘territorial dichotomy that
shaped mental geography in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth cen-
turies. The abstract ‘Christendom’ also summoned into being its mirror
image: ‘heathendom’ . . . The world was seen as the arena of the clash of
great religio-territorial spheres’’ (Bartlett 253–54).
Despite the monomaniacal obsession to conquer Jerusalem, which
lasted for around two hundred years and climaxed in horrors—eight
thousand Jews killed in Rhineland, seventy thousand Arab civilians
in Jerusalem—that even the most pious Saint Bernard could not but
denounce, the Christians never managed to ‘‘free’’ the Holy Land. As
Jacques Le Go√ summed up the results of the seven Crusades from 1096
to 1291, ‘‘their only fruit . . . was the apricot’’ that the Christians had
brought from Armenia (95). Some indirect e√ect of the Crusades, how-
ever, can still be observed. First, they confirmed the Franks as the leading
European power and as the paladins of its Christianity. Second, they
exacerbated the implicit theory of the essential Christianity of Europe.
Third, and just as important, the Crusades established a pan-European
set of knights’ orders, and a landed aristocracy di√used over the ter-
ritory. Like Charles Martel after Poitiers (Trevor-Roper 96) and Char-
lemagne in his undertaking to defend the territories of Christendom,
the Crusader kings had to reward obedience and service in battle with
landed property—the foeudum—and therefore divide the land of the
empire among a class of landlords (Bloch, Feudal ). For Montesquieu
(see next chapter), feudalism was that uniquely European institution
that created the social conditions for freedom to mature there and not
elsewhere.
The rise of a popular literature in vulgar tongues, sometimes religious
and didactic (the Italian ‘‘rhythms’’ of Lawrence and Saint Alexis), more
often celebrating and codifying the oppositions of ‘‘courteous pala-
din[s]’’ and ‘‘heathen Arabs’’ (Chanson de Roland verses 576 and 2810),
constitutes another contribution of the age of the Crusades to the culture
of Europe. For the first time, imperial Latin was abandoned in favor of
popular languages singing the ‘‘pride of France, renowned land, you see’’
(Chanson de Roland verse 3315); for the first time, rhetorical argumenta-
tion was leaving room to a catechistic acceptance of revealed facts that
Erich Auerbach saw hinging on the rhetorical figure of parataxis;∞∫ and
for the first time, the kings and queens of tragedy, along with the serves of
comedy, were being replaced by the intermediate baronial classes. The
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result was a new literary code, as well as a new ethical one, both resulting
in the codification of a Christian worldview in the chanson de geste:
The knightly will to fight, the concept of honor, the mutual loyalty of
brothers in arms, the community of the clan, the Christian dogma, the
allocation of right and wrong to Christians and infidels, are probably the
most important of these views. . . . They are posited without argument as
pure theses: these are the facts. No argument, no explanatory discussion
whatever is called for when, for example, the statement is made: paien unt
tort et chrestiens unt dreit (heathens are wrong and Christians are right).
(Auerbach, Mimesis 101)
Supplementing the chanson de geste, which celebrated the exploits of
Frankish and Arthurian chivalry, the chanson d’amor entertained the
courts of Europe with songs of courting and love. The troubadours
would bring these songs from one court to another, thus assuring the
formation of a common European canon based, roughly, on a predilec-
tion for accent-based prosody, rhyme, decasyllabic verse, and the topos
of courtly love.
Both the philosophes and, again, the Romantics saw the chanson
d’amor as intimately tied to the development of one European culture:
courtly love was for them a peculiarly European phenomenon, necessi-
tating, as I will discuss in chapter 4, of a non-Oriental understanding of
love, of women’s role, and of heterosexual, monogamous marriage (see
Passerini). Despite this retroactive eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
theorization of love and epic poetry as European, the chansons were
still written under the hegemony of the concept of Chrestientet (Chris-
tianity). Christian knights, not European warriors, people the laisses
(strophes) of the Song of Roland, from which the very word Europe
remains conspicuously absent:
D’altre part est li arcevesque Turpin.
Sun cheval broche e muntet un lariz;
Franceis apelet, un sermun lur ad dit:
‘‘Seignurs baruns, Caries nus laissat ci;
Pur nostre rei devum nus ben murir.
Chrestientet aidez a sustenir!
Bataille avrez, vos en estes tuz fiz,
Kar a voz oijz veez Jes Sarrazins.’’
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[On the other side is the Archbishop Turpin.
He spurs his horse and mounts upon a hill;
he calls the Franks, and tells them:
‘‘My lords, barons, Charles brought us here;
He is our King, and we would die for our king,
and to help him defend Christendom.
You will fight, you all are bound to it,
for you’ll see with your own eyes the Saracens’’]
(Chanson de Roland verses 1124–31)
It is only with the institution of universities in the thirteenth century
that a more secular culture of Europe begins to disengage itself from
Christianity. Built on the remains of Alcuin and Charlemagne’s system
of schools and monasteries, shaped after merchants’ guilds and corpora-
tions, and characterized by the extraordinary mobility—‘‘from one end
of the former Carolingian empire to the other’’ (Wieruszowski 21)—of
its teachers and students, the university or studium generale soon became
the main instrument for the hypostatization of a European culture as
Culture, and for its dissemination in the Christian territories of the
West.∞Ω In Robert Bartlett’s words, the medieval universities, imposing ‘‘a
common experience of higher education’’ through both curricular stan-
dardization and teachers’ mobility, were the true engine for ‘‘the Euro-
peanization of Europe’’ (288–91). The university centers of Bologna,
Paris, and Oxford, while establishing ‘‘a kind of metropolitan cultural
dominance’’ (Bartlett 288), also theorized what culture was and divided
it into the two complementary parts of trivium (grammar, rhetoric,
and dialectic) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and
music).
Central in this curriculum, despite ecclesiastical resistance, was the
figure of Aristotle.≤≠ He soon began to represent ‘‘a veritable encyclo-
pedia of knowledge’’ (Daly 79) for the medieval student to work on and
study; ‘‘the entire encyclopedic and pedagogic project of the West was
being founded’’ (Sini 63) on his concept of logics. Through Aristotle,
indeed, the need for logic and demonstrable hypotheses was upheld in
the new universities against the catechistic predilection for parataxis that
had distinguished the previous age. What was canonized through the
Analytica, the Metaphysics, Topica, and Politics was a veritable way of
thinking, a theory of knowledge that competed with the authority of the
scriptures and posited ‘‘empiricism as the basis of all knowledge, the role
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of reason in the treatment of empirical matter and the eventual presenta-
tion of knowledge in logico-deductive systems of definitions, hypotheses
(axioms), postulates, and theorems or propositions’’ (Pedersen 274).
Abelard’s Sic et non, ‘‘set[ting] side by side judgments which seemed at
first view contradictory’’ (Daly 11) only to solve them later through the
mediation of reason, was but one example of the necessity to submit
even revealed truth to the scrutiny of reason. Through Aristotle, the
academic centrality of dialectics as the proper method of critical think-
ing and cultural transmission in Europe was, in short, instituted. Grow-
ing from the initial antithesis of east and west, Europe was now develop-
ing into a veritable dialectical and secularized thinking, into a binary
logic recognized, undoubtedly with some Eurocentric presumption, as
the only valid epistemology.
Already in the medieval university a theory of knowledge came close
to fully theorizing Europe itself. It did not do that, however, because the
kind of knowledge on which such a university depended was still in large
measure reliant on an element that later theories of Europe would have
to obliterate and repress in order to claim a purer Europeanness: the
Arab (see Menocal, Arabic Role). While the Carolingian schools had
confined themselves within the strictures of religious education, the
enlightened Abassid caliphs of Persia (750–1258) had equipped the so-
called House of Wisdom of Baghdad (762), the observatories of Cairo
(1005), and the schools of Córdoba (1010) with all the Greek manuscripts
they could import from Byzantium. Aristotle, forgotten, if not abhorred,
in the lands of Christianity, had been ‘‘discovered’’ in the European
universities of the thirteenth century only through the translations and
commentaries of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rashid (Avverroës), who
had preserved his texts. The study of geometry, arithmetic, mathematics,
and astronomy, having fallen into oblivion in Charlemagne’s Europe,
had also been brought from Córdoba and Toledo via Islam. Secular
poetry, finally, marginalized by Christian diction, had entered Europe
through the Sicilian court of Fredrick ii, an ‘‘eighteenth-century man
born in the thirteenth’’ (Amari, Musulmani 4:730), who had managed to
create a center of cultural exchange among Greek, Arab, and Jewish
cultures between 1196 and 1250.≤∞
What came to be known as ‘‘Graeco-Arab philosophy’’ (Campanini 5)
was the metaphysical and cosmological imaginary of medieval Europe—
an imaginary famously depicted by Dante in the Comedy. But whether
Arab philosophers could, in the end, be foundations to anything Euro-
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pean at all—this was to be the core of endless controversies: was the
Arabs’ role that of passive preservationists of an originally European
culture (O’Leary)? Had the Arabs merely translated, as in a famous title
by Richard Walzer, ‘‘Greek into Arabic’’? Had they even ‘‘alienated’’ their
Islamic faith in order to embrace Plato and Aristotle (Netton)? Or were
the Arabs creating and planting the very roots of Europe’s modern sci-
ence (Saliba)? Despite their di√erences, all these positions inherently
deny a fundamental (and fundamentalist) opposition between Europe
and Islam. In order to claim such fundamental opposition again, Arabs
and Jews—the progeny of Shem—had to be transformed, in the Euro-
pean imaginary, from producers to objects of knowledge. The transfor-
mation, which will culminate in the academic institutionalization of
Oriental studies (Said, Orientalism) that I discuss in chapter 5, begins
perhaps in 1311, when the Council of Vienna first instituted the teaching
of Hebrew and Arab in the major European universities. The new disci-
pline of ‘‘oriental philology’’ (Pedersen 298; Dvornik 65) was a science
largely understood within the logic of the church’s ecumenical mission
of speaking to the unbeliever: knowledge of the unbeliever was useful for
conversion; or, plainly, for the self-defense of Christianity. The most
serious consequence of this creation and institutionalization of a new
discipline was that the ‘‘Oriental’’ element, now symbolically relegated
within the field of ‘‘oriental philology,’’ left the disciplines of philosophy
and logic uncontaminated by any spurious, non-European element.
Bracketing away Ibn Rashid, Aristotle became, then, the foundation of
European knowledge—and such knowledge could study, but not be stud-
ied by, the ‘‘Oriental.’’ At any rate, the canonization of Aristotle despite
Christian reservations clearly hints at the emergence of a secular Europe
somewhat independent from Christendom. The hegemony of the Ro-
man Church was slowly breaking down. Among the causes of its en-
feeblement is, in 1378, the establishment of the residence of the French
antipope in Avignon, France. The French attempt to take away the pa-
pacy from Rome started a rather unbecoming dispute:
No one conducted a more vigorous campaign against the residence of the
popes at Avignon than the Florentine exile, Petrarch. In 1366 he pub-
lished a letter claiming that only the crudest motives retained pope and
cardinals in the Rhone valley. From this point a lively controversy devel-
oped between Petrarch and a series of French apologists for Avignon. The
exchanges were scarcely edifying and much turned on Petrarch’s accusa-
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tion that the French were barbarians, like all other trans-Alpine peoples,
and counter charges of corruption and incivility in Italy: all a curious
anticipation of the later battle of the books which developed between the
two countries in the sixteenth century. (Hay 73–74)
This was the seed that would later produce the schisms of the national
churches (Gallican, Anglican) from Rome. The weakening of Christian
unity, however, was its most immediate e√ect. By 1396, when the Cru-
saders were defeated in Nicopolis, the idea of a common Christianity
seemed unable to maintain a unitary front against the emboldened en-
emy. The Crusades were over. Christendom immediately saw its confines
shriveling under the attacks from the east: in 1427, the Turks occupied
Serbia; in 1446, Mourad iii invaded Greece; in 1448, after the victory of
Kosovo, the Turks held total control of the Balkans; in 1453, Constan-
tinople fell—scandal and wake-up call for Christianity—and the vic-
torious Mohammed ii started moving toward Bosnia, which fell in 1465.
Another Europe—an eastern one with Poland as frontier, ‘‘periphery
and shield’’ (Mikkeli 38)—was being shaped by the advance of Turkish
and Muslim armies: to the rest of the continent, this other Europe
appeared dark, threatening, and quite Oriental; its sinister symbol, con-
cocted between 1462 and 1465 by Florentine writers at the service of the
Christian court of Hungary, was Dracula, the demon from the east
haunting the dreams of Christianity (Berenger). What was clearly a
living dead, however, was the unifying force of Christendom. Another
imagined community, so to speak, was needed to defend ‘‘us’’ from the
scurrying Turks: a linguistic shift from Christianity to Europe had to
occur once Christianity had lost any cementing power. It is not that, to
be sure, Christianity disappeared altogether; simply, some of its moral
and political signification was being transferred, relocated, and trans-
lated into the idea of Europe.≤≤ Traces of this translation are clearly
visible as late as in Sebastian Münster’s Universal Cosmography of the
Whole World (1575), or in Abraham Ortelius’s Theater of the Universe
(1587)—one insisting that ‘‘Europe comprehends today Christendom,’’
the other that ‘‘Europe is name of the part of the world since ancient
times comprising Christendom’’ (qtd. in Céard 58).≤≥
Translation was, slowly but surely, e√acing its original, and incor-
porating it. Eager to submit Christendom to the concept of Europe was
the Vicar of Christ himself, Silvio Enea Piccolomini, elected pope Pius ii
in 1458. At the congress of Mantua (1459), he already seemed less inter-
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ested to recapture the holy places to Christendom than ‘‘to drive the
Turk out of Europe.’’ And in the letter to Mohammed ii, the conqueror
of Constantinople, the pope did not ask the victorious Saracen to con-
vert for the gain of paradise, but to surrender, rather, for the sake of
‘‘admiration from the whole of Europe’’ (qtd. in Hay 85). The impor-
tance of this pope in the promotion of the concept of Europe, which had
been previously eclipsed by the linguistic hegemony of his own faith,
should not be underestimated. For one, to quote Denys Hay, Pious ii
turned the word [Europe] into an adjective. There was little classical
encouragement for a use of ‘‘European’’: Europaeus and Europensis are
found, but not commonly or in the most admired authors . . . . Dante, for
instance, goes out of his way to avoid the word in a passage where he
writes of ‘‘Asians and Africans’’ but styles the natives of the third conti-
nent as ‘‘inhabitants of Europe.’’ . . . In Pius ii, however, the word has
come to stay. Its usefulness made it have real significance. (86–87)
So Europe became a quality, an attribute that could determine or qualify
the object to which it was attributed. Just as heat makes the iron warm,
or blueness makes the sky blue, so did Europe now make its inhabitants
Europeans.≤∂ It was a spirit of the place, shaping its people in its own
image. This may imply, incidentally, that a relative cultural consen-
sus had already been achieved regarding what, exactly, Europeanness
was supposed to qualify: in the cultural horizon within which Europe
emerged as an adjective, European meant a cultural, humanistic value
based on the tradition of the so-called classics, on the cult of ancient
Rome, and on the study of ancient thought. It was Jacob Wimpfeling’s
Europa colta—the place of culture (Chabod 45–47)—that would become
the core of Europe as the Republic of Letters I discuss in chapter 3.
Europe was back—as a unifying, moral, and political concept. Yet
this was not necessarily the same Europe of Isocrates, but one decid-
edly moving northward: ‘‘Enea Silvio [Piccolomini],’’ suggests Philippe
Braunstein, ‘‘gave [Europe] a German body’’ (35). The true spirit of
classical Europe, for Piccolomini, was no longer to be found in the
‘‘heretic’’ (read orthodox) Greeks, nor in the corrupted Romans, but in
the Frankish and German north, raised up from barbarity by Char-
lemagne, the new center and heart of modern Europe. Nor was the pope
the only one to push the center of Europe up north: as the decline of
Christendom had been in good measure determined by frictions be-
tween the Roman papacy and the nascent Gallican church of Avignon, it
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is unsurprising to see the new Europe bearing the signs of this tension.
The anonymous writer of a pamphlet advocating a move of the papal see
from Rome to Avignon insisted that France (more precisely, Marseille),
not Rome, was the geometric center of Europe (qtd. in Hay 74–75).
In 1407, Richard Young, from England, would rehearse similar argu-
ments: ‘‘The French are at the very heart of Europe’’ (qtd. in Martene
and Durand 749). In sum, a growing interest in the word Europe, in-
creasingly privileged over Christianity, seems historically to coincide
with ‘‘a transfer of the center of gravity away from the Mediterranean . . .
to the triangle Germany-France-England’’ (Elton 97). Long gone are
the days when Francesco Petrarca (in Italia mia) could boast the self-
confident superiority of Mediterranean Europe separated by the provi-
dential Alps from a ranting and raving north: ‘‘Ben provide Natura al
nostro stato, / quando de l’Alpi schermo / pose fra noi et la tedesca
rabbia’’ (Nature well sought after our well-being / when She posed the
Alps / as a shield between us and the German rage) (611). In the age of
Pope Piccolomini, a Mediterranean hegemony is no more. From now
on, a Mediterranean dignity will need to be defended, more or less
hysterically, through the usual and desperate claims to origins—that
modern European poetry begun in Spain (Andrés’s claim, discussed in
chapter 3); or that philosophy, the ‘‘thinking of Europe,’’ must have
begun midway between the Greek archipelago and Southern Italy (for a
history of such a claim, see Casini 35–67).≤∑
Continuing with our story of the unfolding of dialectical Europe, we
should stop, at this point, to single out two ‘‘discoveries’’ that seem quite
important for the Renaissance self-understanding of Europe: the print-
ing press and America.≤∏ By embedding language in the manufacturing
process of mass-produced books, the printing press transformed words
and ideas into commodities (Ong, Orality 118) that could be sold and
exchanged in markets much wider—continental—than the ones the
amanuenses could have ever dreamed of covering. Printing, then, made
local phenomena (the Italian Renaissance, German Protestantism) pan-
European ones; it made old classics and new authors widely (and
cheaply) reproducible, thereby promoting the canonization of (Euro-
pean) culture; it made maps of the world easily accessible, thereby articu-
lating a new consciousness of space, and of Europe’s place in it; it moved
Europe toward a new stage of the Aristotelian cult for logics and preci-
sion by imposing unprecedented standards (dictionaries, grammars) to
linguistic expression; it also made the exchange logic of early capitalism
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an integral part of the cultural production, embedded already in the
printing, circulation, and sale of the book commodity (Eisenstein).
In 1469, Giovanni di Spira introduced printing in Venice, and the next
year presses would be found in Milan, Verona, Foligno, and Florence.
Niccolò Machiavelli would publish one of the very first European best
sellers—The Prince—in the brand-new Blado Press of Rome on January
4, 1532. Starting to imagine politics as a science, Machiavelli’s text, like
the Art of War that was to follow, theorized not only an entirely secular
Europe—Christendom being reduced to the all-too-secular papal state—
but also, and most important, a certain self-su≈ciency of Europe.≤π
Apart from very few examples taken from Asia—I count Moses, Cirus,
and Darius—all possible forms of government, and an entire repertoire
of princely conducts, could be theorized by looking at Europe, and at
Europe only: ‘‘My reasoning in matters of war needs not go beyond
Europe. Hence, I need not recount what the Asian habits were’’ (566). To
legitimate such closure of Europe, and bracket away the world entire,
Machiavelli had to theorize a plurality of the European world that both
Montesquieu (chapter 2) and Hegel (chapter 5) would put at the basis of
their dialectical Europe (on Europe’s plurality and multiplicity, also see
Morin 27): ‘‘Europe has had many excellent men of war; Africa a few;
and Asia even less. This has happened because in these last two parts
of the world, there have always been one or two empires at most, and
only a few republics; only Europe has had a few empires, and an infinite
number of republics’’ (585).
A fragmentation of power among di√erent states, for Machiavelli,
made Europe the place where courage and military genius had to grow:
if no single authority existed and controlled all others, each prince then
needed to acquire political skills (which political science would impart),
military cleverness (which war could form), and personal fortitude
(which republican freedom nourished). Not only did Machiavelli’s Eu-
rope have many republics; moreover, each of its republics had multiple
centers of power that balanced authority among each other, thereby
preventing a single authority from becoming despotic: ‘‘The examples of
the two kinds of governments can be observed today in Turkey and
France. The Turkish monarchy is governed by one lord, and all others
are servants. But the king of France is placed amidst a multitude of long-
established lords’’ (127). Machiavelli’s theory (or its rhetorical uncon-
scious) will return for instance in Houdar de la Motte’s ballet L’Europe
galante (1697), where Europe is represented as a set of di√erent national
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characteristics (see Hazard, European Mind 54). It will also reappear
in Montesquieu’s distinction of Europe from an Asia ‘‘where [instead]
the rules of politics are everywhere the same’’ (1.252). On the other
hand, Machiavelli is already echoing here the memory—or rhetorical
unconscious—of Isocrates’ initial definition of political Europe as the
locus of freedom. Curiously enough for a book published after 1492,
also Isocrates’ binary oecumene returns to inform Machiavelli’s politi-
cal science: not only Africa but also, and most strikingly, America, is
now absent from Machiavelli’s antithesis of Europe versus Asia. Has
America not registered yet in the symbolic order and rhetorical un-
conscious of the Europeans? The new geographical fact means nothing
yet? Machiavelli, in fact, is not an exception: ‘‘It has . . . been shown
that during the sixteenth century books . . . on the New World were
relatively few in comparison with those on Asia Minor and the Orient’’
(Hay 99).
Despite Machiavelli’s silence, Columbus’s return from the Americas
would, in the end, spur a novel interest in the self-theorization of Eu-
rope. Reshaping the whole European notion of space, the existence of
America ‘‘shattered at a blow traditional geography and especially the
traditional geography of religion’’ (Hay 99) that so far had divided the
world into three continents; it ‘‘forced a redefinition of Europe and its
place on the globe’’ (Mignolo, Renaissance 264). Paul Hazard adds:
Of all the lessons derived from the idea of space, perhaps the latest had to
do with relativity. Perspectives changed. Concepts which had occupied
the lofty sphere of the transcendental were brought down to the level of
things governed by circumstance . . . . Practices deemed to be based on
reason were found to be mere matters of custom, and, inversely, certain
habits which, at a distance, had appeared preposterous and absurd, took
on an apparently logical aspect once they were examined in the light of
their origin and local circumstances. (Hazard, European Mind 11; see also
Dupront)
A process of Occidentalization—which had begun, if not with the
Persian Wars, then at least when ‘‘Christendom’’ had separated from
eastern orthodoxy—reached the final stage when ‘‘Europe began to look
West to build an extension of [its] own destiny’’ (Mignolo, Renaissance
325). Europe was moving further from the Mediterranean; now, Europe
was the West, and western was its future. The new allegorical world
maps, such as Nicholas Visscher’s 1658 ‘‘Orbis terrarum,’’ personified
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the four continents in the corners of the map and earnestly attested
this Occidentalization of Europe: ‘‘In a culture with alphabetic writing,
where conventions have established that reading proceeds from left to
right and from top to bottom, a hierarchy for a meaningful distribution
of objects on the space of the page has also been established. The places
where the four continents were located are highly significant, reinforcing
the meaning already expressed by clothing and sitting positions. Europe,
of course, is at the upper left corner’’ (Mignolo, Renaissance 279).
While becoming the West, Europe, which in the t-o map had usually
(but not necessarily) occupied the lower left corner, was also moving up
north. And, as if this were not enough, it was becoming center too: in
1569, the Flemish cartographer Gerhard Mercator produced what would
soon become the most widely used cartographic projection of the world
(now spherical again) on a plane surface. In the attempt to represent
compass directions (useful for commercial navigation) as straight lines,
Mercator’s projection had to distort proportions: and it may not be
mere chance that, centering between Paris and London, such distortion
‘‘shows . . . Europe . . . as relatively large with respect to most of the
colonized nations’’ (Turnbull 7).
This frenetic activity of mapmaking, which both the cheaper printing
process and the ‘‘discovery’’ of America had ushered in, must have had
some considerable e√ect on European minds: first, it canonized, once
and for all, a definite position of Europe in the world—west, center, and
north—all at the same time.≤∫ Moreover, Columbus’s deed (like Ves-
pucci’s, Magellan’s, Drachs’s, and even Cortez’s) could be easily read as a
sign of Europe’s superiority—the ‘‘smallest continent’’ on earth, yet ca-
pable of conquering, ‘‘with its skills and courage,’’ all others (Louis
Moreri, qtd. in Céard 63).≤Ω Mapmaking, in this sense was only asked to
represent such superiority in visual ways, and to compensate for relative
smallness with the centering on Europe in Mercator’s projection.
Mapmaking was also instrumental in personifying Europe again, long
after the myth of Europa had downed, as a type, a character, and a genius
loci. Represented as a woman-queen, Europe graciously accepts, in a
condescending version of colonial exploitation, the gifts of the other
continents. Here is Walter Mignolo describing Visscher’s personifica-
tions of the four continents on the edges of a 1636 ‘‘Orbis geographica’’:
Europe and Asia are represented by well-dressed ladies, while Africa and
America are represented by seminaked women. Comparing the represen-
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tation to that of Asia, a di√erence emerges in position. Europe is sitting
on the ground, while Asia is sitting on a camel. Thus, while Asia is similar
to Europe in that both are well-dressed ladies, they di√er in the surface on
which they are sitting. However, Asia is similar to America, since both
these seminaked women are sitting on an armadillo and the crocodile,
respectively. Asia, because she is well dressed, resembles Europe, while
she also resembles Africa and America because she is sitting on an ani-
mal. (Renaissance 273)
And here, as a supplement, is Denys Hay describing, in more general
terms, the typical European iconology of the four continents between
1577 (the anonymous Habitus praecipuorum populorum) and 1611 (Ce-
sare Ripa’s Iconologia): ‘‘Europa—crowned, cuirassed, holding a scep-
ter and an orb, with weapons, scientific instruments, a palette, books
and Christian symbols; Asia—garlanded and richly dressed, holding an
incense-burner, and supported by camels and monkeys; Africa—naked,
with elephants and lions, snakes and palms, and often with the sun’s rays
like a halo on the head; America—naked, with a feathered head-dress,
holding a bow and arrow’’ (104). Personifying Europe was an immensely
powerful rhetorical procedure of definition and selection: at the most
explicit level, such personification founded the identity/sameness of
Europe and its peoples against that of other continents. It did so by
fashioning an identity that was highly appealing to the Europeans of the
time: Europe was not the pillager of tribal communities or the continent
torn by wars of religion and dynastic succession, but, rather, represented
elegance, science, culture, Christian ethos, and, in a word, civility. Sure,
it wore the insignia of the warrior, but how else could it face the animal
threat of Asia or the plain savagery of Africa and America? The con-
frontation of civilization and savagery, as often remarked, generated two
apparently contrasting paradigms of the ‘‘European man’s discovery of
himself as . . . a moral being’’ (Elliott 159). On the one hand, the prevail-
ing European position was the one taken by François Ranchin in his
History of the World (1637). For Ranchin, savagery ought to be civilized
by Europe—and Europe, accomplishing this most pious mission that
admittedly brought back some gold, was not pilfering America’s wealth,
since robbery was said to presuppose property, and property civilization
(qtd. in Céard 58). A ‘‘Europeanization of the world’’ (Cocks 16) was a
moral mission that meant, among other things, an education of the
savage into the bourgeois ethics of property. The other position was
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Montaigne’s critique of European civilization (the thirtieth of the Essais
titled ‘‘Cannibals,’’ 1588), or Bartolomé de Las Casas’s accusation of Cor-
tez’s (Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias, 1552), in the name
of a purer ‘‘good savage.’’ Despite obvious di√erences, both positions do
assume a European superiority in relation to the savage: European supe-
riority is argued explicitly in the case of Ranchin’s civilizing mission–
some kind of ‘‘white man’s burden’’ that Europe (and later the West)
ought to carry in order to bring social, cultural, and moral development
to all corners of the world; and the same superiority is assumed im-
plicitly in the case of Montaigne and Las Casas, as ‘‘denunciation of one’s
faults becomes intellectual gymnastics [for strengthening and bettering
the image of Europe], not recognition of the superiority of the other’’
(Dupront 51).
Ranchin’s thesis of a fundamental coincidence of civilization and
property, and of both with Europe, will be put (see chapter 2) in the
service of the theorization of Europe as the place of true wealth—that is,
private property—di√erent from the apparent or ‘‘unrealized’’ wealth
typical of the ‘‘vacant places of America’’ (Locke 5:120). Its most immedi-
ate e√ect, however, was to open for Europe one of the major sources of
its primitive accumulation (and, therefore, of its capitalistic moderniza-
tion): colonial plunder.≥≠
Personifications of Europe, finally, gave an immediate, conceptual
image of unity symbolized by the harmony of the body in all its parts.
We can find such symbol neatly represented in Sebastian Münster’s fa-
mous Cosmographia universalis (1544), which represents Europe as a
woman with Spain as its head (France and England have not yet dis-
placed her from hegemonic position). Unity, in turn, meant the implicit
institution of some standards of Europeanness: if Europe was a person,
then it had, like a person, one character, one way of life, one ‘‘genius,’’
and one mode of conduct.≥∞ This was the duck stage of the theorizations
of Europe: a place had to walk like Europe, look like Europe, and quack
like Europe in order to be Europe. What Europe had to look like, in turn,
was su≈ciently summarized in the iconology of Europe—‘‘a scepter and
an orb, with weapons, scientific instruments, a palette, books and Chris-
tian symbols.’’ Any deviation from this standard, abroad but also within
Europe itself, was to be considered as nothing less than a defect of
Europeanness: could the ugly-duckling Turks without Christian sym-
bols ever be Europeans for Montesquieu (chapter 2)? Could eighteenth-
century Spain (chapter 3), alleged to be behind by now in both scientific
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instruments and books, be considered fully European? And would Sicily,
eternal colony without a scepter (chapter 5), ever claim to be a part of
Europe? 1492, the year of the ‘‘discovery,’’ is, then, also the year of Eu-
rope’s first planned ethnic cleansing, of her cohering into one character:
the fall of Grenada, with the ensuing conversion or expulsion of Jews
and Moors ordered by bishop Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros in that
year, points already to the disturbing fantasies of one ‘‘ ‘pure’ European
identity’’ (Ali 37).
From this process of di√erentiation, personification, and identifica-
tion, a sclerotic and one-way consciousness of Europe—both in its geo-
graphic and in its moral and political sense—was cementing between the
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. England, in the meantime, was
rising as a major player in European a√airs. The Portuguese state (which
had begun European expansion overseas in 1415 with the seizure of the
Muslim port of Ceuta, followed by Madeira in 1420, Mauritania in 1448,
and the Congo River in 1482), and the Spanish crown (which had fi-
nanced Columbus in 1492) were quickly declining, su√ocated by debts
contracted with foreign merchants to cover the military and commercial
costs of their colonies overseas. A more entrepreneurial class of mer-
chants, instead, had begun British expansion overseas: its exploitation of
the colonies profited the state enough cash in taxation to grant, in turn,
su≈cient military power to consolidate possession, protect the routes
from pirates, and monopolize commerce with the Orient. Once British
expansion was in motion, the system kept reproducing and amplifying
itself: exploitation of the colonies’ riches and labor power kept generat-
ing new wealth; exploitation of the colonies’ preexisting ethnic, caste, or
tribal divisions kept providing the low-cost bureaucratic and military
apparatuses for the control of the territories. Marginal to Europe in
terms of both geography and demography, England soon became not
only a visible part of Europe but its antonomasia. For the explorer of
Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, therefore, it was only natural to compare
Atlantis’s food not simply to England’s but to ‘‘any collegiate diet that I
have known in Europe’’ (107); to desire to ‘‘see Europe’’ in the moment
of despair (108); or to speak comfortably of ‘‘we in Europe’’ (113). Also,
William Shakespeare’s Sebastian, in The Tempest, could confidently talk
of ‘‘our Europe’’ (act 2, scene 1, verse 103). Europe was England, and the
other way around.
Even outside of England, Europe was in everyone’s mind—first of all,
after the obsession with space that the ‘‘discovery’’ had entailed as a
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precise geographic place on the map. Rabelais’s Gargantua (1534), com-
forting cuckolded Panurge with a little lesson in geography, goes to show
what sharp interest in cartographic matters the man of the Renaissance,
cuckold or not, must have had: ‘‘Thy beard, with its hues of grey, white,
yellowish, and black, hath to my thinking the resemblance of a world-
map. Look, look here. Here’s Asia. There are Tigris and Euphrates. Af-
rica’s at this juncture. And here is the mountain of the Moon. See the
fenny march of Nile? On this side lies Europe’’ (438). Don Quixote (1605–
15) echoes such interest in geography while advancing the author’s clas-
sicist criticism of the kind of modern ‘‘comedies that would start one day
in Europe, continue with a second day in Asia, and a third in Africa; and
if there were a fourth day, it would be in America, so all four parts of the
world would be covered’’ (Cervantes Saavedra 1.358). Ironies apart, Don
Quixote had an assured vision of a wholeness of Europe (toda la Europa)
(Cervantes Saavedra 1.156)—an idea of wholesomeness and unity that
would be taken up, in turn, by the ‘‘whole Europe’’ (Europa toda) of the
Portuguese poet Luís Vaz de Camões, enthused to see Lusitania at the
head of this unity:≥≤
Eis aqui, quase cume da cabeça
De Europa toda, o Reino Lusitano,
Onde a terra se acaba e o mar começa,
E onde Febo repousa no Oceano.
[Lusitania is here,
almost like the head of the whole Europe,
where the earth ends and the sea begins,
and where Phoebus rests in the Ocean.] (54)
While echoes of the ‘‘false kidnapper of Europe’’ (Góngora y Argote
63) would return in the mythologizing of Góngorismo and baroque
theater alike, it was images of Europe’s unity that prevailed since the
sixteenth century. John Donne, most dramatically, wrote in the Devo-
tions (1631): ‘‘No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea,
Europe is the less’’ (126). Even the inhabitants of the Low Countries, who
since the technical introduction of windmills with rotating turrets, circa
1550, had managed to drain their lands to new levels of security and
prosperity, had combined ideals of independence (from the Hapsburg
family) with ideas of European wholesomeness. Erasmus of Rotterdam,
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in the Consultatio de bello Turcis inferendo (1643), reestablished the need
for European military unity vis-à-vis the despotic Turk—and added,
with a wink to the nascent economy of capital (what Blom calls ‘‘com-
mercial republicanism’’), that another di√erence between ‘‘us’’ and the
east had now to be noticed: ‘‘European wealth’’ (qtd. in Hay 106). In fact,
if by European wealth one understands the nascent economy of capital,
the emergence (quite literally!) of the Low Countries defined Europe as
an ethic of capitalism opposed not only to the east but also to the south,
and to Spain in particular.≥≥
Perhaps more exemplary of the rehabilitation of the notion of Europe
around the Renaissance was Ludovico Ariosto, whose Orlando furioso
(1516–32) secularized and Europeanized those very women, knights, ar-
mies, and loves that the chanson de geste had kept instead under the
banner of Christianity. A geographic consciousness of Europe animates
the travels and adventurous moves of Ariosto’s characters. In canto 4,
stanza 45, Atlas sends a hippogri√ to Roger to help him flee Europe
(‘‘perché d’Europa con questa arte il toglia’’). Roger flies on his winged
horse, and eventually ‘‘lasciato avea di gran spazio distante / tutta l’Eu-
ropa’’ (he left all Europe far behind) (Ariosto 6.17). What constituted ‘‘all
Europe’’ seemed, in spite of an ironic tone, a certainty for Ariosto: Russia
was the border, the threshold separating the ‘‘continents’’ of Europe and
Asia.≥∂ A bird’s eye view of Europe’s border could then be precisely
mapped out when Roger ‘‘giunse alle parti di Sarmazia: e quando / fu
dove Asia da Europa si divide, / Russi e Pruteni e la Pomeria vide’’ (he
made it to Sarmatia [between the Vistula river and the Caspian Sea]; /
and once he got where Asia and Europe separate, / he saw Russia, Pru-
teni, and Pomeria [the Baltic region]) (10.71).
More than a geographic designation, however, Ariosto’s Europe was a
prosopopoeia: ‘‘Europe is in arms [against the Moor], and looks forward
for the battle’’ (Ariosto 5.99). As a persona, her alter ego is the ‘‘cruel
Saracen’’ (Saracin crudele, 14.47 and 18.10); the ‘‘uncanny Saracen’’ (Sara-
cin bizzarro, 18.36); the ‘‘haughty Saracen’’ (Saracin superbo, 24.68 and
35.41); and, last but not least, the ‘‘rascal Saracen’’ (Saracin ribaldo,
26.59). Nothing new, one might say, under the skies of Europe: Ariosto’s
was the old antithesis of east and west, of Christianity and Islam. The
Christian age of the Chanson de Roland, however, was clearly over, and
secular Europe had become the limit and interpellation of a cultural
community.
So much insistence on European unity, in truth, only veiled the reality
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of profound conflicts that traversed and fragmented the region. The
Hundred Years War (1337–1453)—which had nothing to do with any
eastern menace but rather with inter-European religious, dynastic, ter-
ritorial, and commercial conflicts—was still fresh in Europe’s memory. A
new nationalist spirit seemed to have possessed the continent, to the
point that Christian Europe, too, was now divided: the Gallican church
in France, the Anglican one in England, the Teutonic churches in Ger-
many, all of which followed di√erent flavors from place to place ac-
cording to one ‘‘Germanic liberty’’ or another. More important still,
Protestantism—Lutherans in Germany and Scandinavia, Episcopalians
in England, Zwingli’s Reformers in Switzerland, and Calvinists between
Geneva and Edinburgh—had divided Europe once more after the break
of Byzantium. As the Orthodox Church had split Europe between east
and west, Protestantism was now parting Europe between the reformed
churches of the north and the Roman Catholic ones of the south. The
Catholic south took, in Protestant eschatology, the place of antithesis
once assigned to the Muslim of the east:
Eschatology had been used in anti-Islamic polemic since the Middle
Ages, but during the Reformation, it became widely prominent among
both theologians and preachers. With its emphasis on the imminent
return of Jesus, eschatology enabled communities within the Reforma-
tion movement to a≈rm their unique role in the fulfillment of God’s
design in history—when God would raise His elect to glory and destroy
their enemies. Particularly in the exegesis of Martin Luther, the figure of
the Turk became associated with the Papal enemy of God—both of whom
were identified with the ‘‘Little horn’’ in the Book of Daniel and the
‘‘Beast’’ in Revelation. For Luther, the eschatological kingdom of Christ
was to prevail after the destruction of the Catholic and the ‘‘Mahometan’’
adversaries. (Matar 153)
With the Reformation, a latitudinal crisis ‘‘between an increasingly
wealthy protestant North and an increasingly impoverished Catholic
South’’ (Pagden, introduction 13) completed the latitudinal fracture of
Europe, shifting its center of influence away from the Mediterranean.
From this crisis, according to some, would be born ‘‘the Spirit of mod-
ern Europe’’ (Ritter 15).≥∑
That spirit, however, was a restless one. Neither the foundation of the
Jesuit Order in 1540 (see chapter 3), nor the spread of this ‘‘spiritual
militia’’ in the service of the Roman Church in the four corners of the
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continent (and the known world) served to pacify such religious zeal.
France was the very eye of its storm: from 1559 to 1598, Paris was blood-
ied by incessant wars of religion. The edict of Nantes, signed by the
French king Henry iv in 1598 to grant freedom of religion within his ter-
ritory, only partially diminished the tensions between Protestant Hugue-
not and Roman Catholics, which flared up again in 1685 when Louis xiv
revoked the edict of tolerance. Also Northern Italy, Central Europe, and
Germany were troubled, since 1618, by the Thirty Years’ War fueled by
the religious controversies between Catholics and Protestants. It was
enough to make the likes of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz nostalgic of
the lost Carolingian unity, and eager to protect the spoils of the Holy
Roman Empire—the German Reich coinciding with the novel notion of
‘‘Mitteleuropa’’—not only from the Turks of the Orient but also from
the Catholics of the South (Baruzi 28; Le Rider 10). England, for its part,
had finished a civil war (1642—49) with the spectacular execution of
its king. And if religious controversies and regicides were not enough,
other imperial and dynastic wars were flaring up all over: the Franco-
Spanish wars (1515–1713); the Anglo-Dutch wars (1641–74); the eight
Franco-British wars (1689–1815); the Swedish expansionist movements
for a Scandinavian empire. This was the background in which Thomas
Hobbes, perhaps unsurprisingly, started looking ‘‘in the nature of man,
[to] find three principall causes of quarrel’’ (185).
Apart from some vague reference in Leviathan (Hobbes 684 and 685),
however, Thomas Hobbes’s concern hardly centered around Europe:
what really mattered was the legitimacy of sovereignty—divine right,
original consent, or popular representation—in ‘‘these parts of Europe’’
(392), in England, that is. Less than ten years after the Leviathan, Europe
mattered quite a lot, instead, to Maximilien de Béthune, the Duke of
Sully and a high minister of the just assassinated King Henry iv of
France. In the generalized European state of warfare he saw around,
Sully managed to bring discussions about Europe to an entirely new level
when, in the thirtieth book of his Oeconomies royales (1662), he tried to
revive the assassinated king’s ‘‘grand design.’’ The idea was that of bring-
ing all warring factions together by creating nothing less than a united
Europe—or, in Sully’s words, ‘‘of bringing the whole of Europe together
as a family’’ (De Béthune 77). Such a family, which Sully unsurprisingly
believed ought to be paternalistically fathered by France, was to create
nothing less than a ‘‘union’’ (87), a ‘‘general counsel of Europe’’ (88), and
a ‘‘confederation’’ (90).≥∏ What else could anyone want in a Europe that
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was, slowly but surely, becoming caput mundi, the leader of the world,
and expanding its empires in the whole known world? ‘‘No, the French
have nothing else to desire, if not that the heavens give them pious, good,
and wise kings; and that those kings will use all their power to keep
Europe in peace’’ (74). After Sully, the themes of Europe’s more or less
utopist union for the sake of perpetual peace—which, beyond utopia,
answered well to the mercantilist need of breaking down local barriers to
trade (Cocks 17)—was taken up by William Penn (‘‘Essay towards the
Present and Future Peace of Europe,’’ 1693), the Abbé de Saint Pierre
(‘‘Projet de paix perpétuelle en Europe,’’ 1712), Gottfried Wilhelm von
Leibniz (‘‘Observations sur le projet de paix perpétuelle en Europe,’’
1714), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (‘‘Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle,’’ 1756),
and Immanuel Kant (‘‘Zum ewigen Frieden,’’ 1795), among others.≥π
Just as instrumental for a self-consciousness of Europe were all the real
and fictional encounters with often exoticized other cultures that now
included, along with the usual Arabs, also Persians, Americans, Indians,
and, increasingly, the Chinese.≥∫ The growth of an exotic literature from
the late seventeenth century is certainly a sign of the times, but it is also a
sign of the kind of ideal place that Europe was starting to mean. Les six
voyages of J. B. Tavernier (1676) in Persia, the New Voyage (1697) of the
buccaneer William Dampier, the History of Japan (1727) by Engelbert
Kaempfer, the Travels in Arabia of J. L. Burckhardt; and then Daniel
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels
(1726)—as critical of Europe as these texts could sometimes be, they all
proceeded from some shared assumption of what Europe, despite its
local di√erences, actually meant: culture versus nature, society versus
kinship, dressed versus naked, cooked versus raw, civilization versus
naivety. In sum, Mr. Lemuel Gulliver ‘‘was an Englishman’’ (Swift 180),
and, as such, ‘‘the scourge of France’’ (127). But he was also, despite such
contrasts, profoundly European in culture: ‘‘I spoke,’’ he says, ‘‘High and
Low Dutch, Latin, French, Spanish, Italian, and Lingua Franca’’ (19). He
was European in ‘‘infernal habits’’ too: ‘‘Yahoo as I am, it is well known
through all Houyhnhnmland, that, by the instructions and example of
my illustrious master, I was able in the compass of two years (although I
confess with the utmost di≈culty) to remove that infernal habit of lying,
shuΔing, deceiving, and equivocating, so deeply rooted in the very souls
of all my species; especially the Europeans’’ (vi).
In the literature of perpetual peace, as well as in the exotic one, a
concept of Europe, infernal or heavenly, starts crystallizing to the point
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of becoming prescriptive and didactic: Europe is in need of unity, and,
after all, di√erences apart, it is one if compared to any exoticized place.
No need to beat this dead horse since a few authoritative quotes may
indeed su≈ce: ‘‘In this literature, the concept of Europe is ultimately
defined’’ (Chabod 85); through this literature, ‘‘Europe looked as if it had
taken permanent shape’’ (Hazard, European Mind 53); and so, ‘‘in the
course of the seventeenth century the processes which had led to this
result were finally brought to a conclusion. By the beginning of the
eighteenth century it is in terms of Europe that Europeans view the
world’’ (Hay 117). Which is to say: by the early eighteenth century, Eu-
rope is already ‘‘made’’ (Treasure), ‘‘discovered’’ (Hale), ‘‘invented’’ (Pag-
den, ‘‘Europe’’ 70), ‘‘germinated’’ (Mikkeli 61), and one.
Toward a Modern Europe
To recognize the importance of European unity hardly
means that someone has to su√er passively the ways and
methods through which such unity is constructed.
—FRANCO CASSANO, Modernizzare stanca
Expanded from North to South. . . .
—WILLIAM BLAKE, Europe: A Prophecy
It is then at this point that canonical histories of the idea of Europe stop,
short of an interruptus, their otherwise turgid narratives: for Denys Hay,
by the beginning of the eighteenth century Europe has ‘‘emerged,’’ is well
formed, and rien ne va plus; for Heikki Mikkeli, who sees postwar theo-
ries of European unities and European federations as a completion of an
otherwise unfinished project of the Enlightenment, it is ‘‘towards the
beginning of the eighteenth century [that] a feeling of belonging to-
gether prevailing among the European intellectuals . . . had been grow-
ing stronger and stronger’’ (60); and for Federico Chabod, what happens
next is but a disappearing of Europe, its retreat ‘‘in the second half of the
eighteenth century . . . with the a≈rmation of the idea of nation’’ (122)—
an a≈rmation, namely, which culminates in National Socialism and
against which Chabod tries to resurrect the idea of Europe.
But it is exactly from this point that I need to start my real story.
Because, first of all, it would be wrong to assume that this Europe, which
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has formed by the eighteenth century through confrontations with exot-
ic Others and fantasies of perpetual peace, was in fact an amiable a√air.
The sort of perpetual peace that Europe could insure for Sully, we should
not forget, was predicated on the hegemony of France. A True-Born
Englishman, for one, would hardly agree to being subaltern to a country
‘‘where mankind lives in haste, and thrives by chance. A dancing nation,
fickle and untrue’’ (Defoe). (Nor did the Englishman love Spain, ‘‘Presi-
dent of Hell’’; or Italy, ‘‘where Blood ferments in Rapes and Sodomy’’).
The idea that a sense of nationalism would begin only in the late
eighteenth century, and immediately ruin a sense of beautiful and peace-
able Europeanness, sounds, frankly, a little disingenuous. A modicum
of ephemeral peace in Europe was obtained, whenever it was, through
the never-theorized but ordinarily practiced doctrine of the balance of
power. According to it, any change in one nation’s power constituted a
potential threat to all others: not only colonial expansions but also do-
mestic territorial partitions and distributions had to be regulated by
internationally negotiated treaties—Utrecht in 1713, Vienna in 1738, Aix-
la-Chapelle in 1748, and Paris in 1763—that prevented one power from
becoming preponderant. Such a balance of power obviously mirrored
preexisting conditions of supremacy: risen and rising empires—France,
England, the Dutch—divided territories overseas and within Europe
between themselves. Weaker territories—like the Italian ones discussed
in chapter 5—were treated as bargaining chips exchanged by the big
nations in a debonair ‘‘spirit of cheerful cynicism’’ (Davies 582). More-
over, the context in which this eighteenth-century Europe ‘‘emerges’’ is
one in which the previous religious divide between a (Protestant) north
and a (Catholic) south is doubling into more fundamental contrasts—
economic, cultural, political—between north and south.
With such a state of a√airs, it would be quite surprising if the concept
of Europe that emerged in the eighteenth century did not also mirror,
and legitimate, the same division of power. Since the fulcrum of the
seventeenth-century balance of power, the center of ‘‘the intellectual
hegemony of Europe’’ (Hazard, European Mind 55), and ‘‘far and away
Europe’s greatest power’’ (Davies 579) was certainly France, it would be
quite surprising if the ‘‘Europe’’ that Mikkeli, Hay, and Chabod accept as
Europe were not, in fact, what Rougemont with less scruples claims as ‘‘a
French Europe’’ (143). Moreover, it would be equally surprising if the
same eighteenth-century Europe, which the scholarly doxa insists to see
as fundamental for any new one, would not carry within itself the germ
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of a north-south divide: after all, as Heikkii Mikkeli concedes, ‘‘by 1700
the term ‘Europe’ was, especially in the political thinking of the Protes-
tants, in regular use’’ (60; emphasis mine). Eighteenth-century Europe,
in short, is a French theory of Europe, and one expanding from north to
south—privileging the former and marginalizing the latter.
French and northbound Europe begins to be theorized through a
French theoretical quarrel between the ancients and the moderns: ‘‘The
Past abandoned; the Present enthroned in its place!’’ (Hazard, European
Mind 30).
In France, several ideological conflicts conjoined to produce a climate
in which attitudes to the past became highly politicized and dangerous
indicators. France was evolving rapidly into a centralized state, for
which French apologists sought a cultural history which revolved neither
around Rome nor the Roman conquest. Secular pressure to invent a
Gallican culture was compounded by pressures for a Gallican Catholi-
cism with greater autonomy from Rome. And these conflicts were minor
compared with the tensions building in France between sympathizers
and opponents of the German Reformers. Finally, the Wars of Religion
were incited by a feuding nobility, whose arguments over monarchical
succession and the balance of power between king and nobility were
naturally backed up by competing histories of the ‘‘true’’ French consti-
tution. . . . The concern of some of the French noblesse de robe with a
proper, critical practice of history reflects their attempts to find new, sure
and useful ways to legitimate French institutions. (Pumfrey, Rossi, and
Slawinski 62)
To be precise, French Europe begins not with a dismissal of history—
Cartesian submission of history to transhistorical reason; Jansenist sub-
mission of history to morality; and the philosophes’ submission of his-
tory to the superior relevance of the present. It begins, rather, with a
retheorization of history that, following Paul Hazard, we can date to the
year 1668, when Charles de Saint-Évremond Réflexions sur le divers génie
du peuple romaine first appeared in print. From its very outset, Saint-
Évremond’s celebration of modernity relies on a clear philosophy of
history: humankind is endlessly perfectible, and history is the story of its
endless progress. Antiquity, accordingly, is now assigned the unflattering
task of representing nothing more than backwardness. All this has at
least one consequence: the place of authority once assigned to Rome and
Greece as the perfect models of Europe is now questioned in the name of
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more recent perfections that Saint-Évremond can hardly find in the
Greco-Roman Mediterranean. If Europe has any model at all, it is not
the foundation of Rome but that of the French Academy: ‘‘It would
appear, in short, that the powers who have the moulding of our destinies
had then no other concern than the founding of the city of Rome. . . . I
hate admiring references which repose on mere fables’’ (qtd. in Hazard,
European Mind 38).
What about the Greeks? Were they not viable models in the formation
of a modern European culture? Not so for another Frenchman, Bernard
Le Bovier de Fontenelle, who, in the Digression sur les anciens et les
modernes (1688), dismissed the Greeks as childish pranksters, good only
at spreading bogus fables from which modern Europe should promptly
be disabused:
As children, we are taught so much about Greek myths, and get so
accustomed to them that when we grow up we do not recognise how
extravagant they really are; but if we could disabuse our minds of our
ingrained idea of them, if we could see them with fresh eyes, we should
realize with amazement that what is called a nation’s early history is in
reality nothing but a phantasmagoria, a string of childish tales. Can it
really be, we ask ourselves, that such things were ever given out as truth?
If those who passed them on did not believe them, what was their motive
for deceiving us? (qtd. in Hazard, European Mind 38)
For Fontanelle, a European ‘‘quality of mind or genius’’ is the achieve-
ment of a more recent age. Not only is Europe better than Asia, Africa,
and America. Modern Europe is, also, better than the ancient one. Mod-
ern Europe, moreover, begins exactly in those Middle Ages that southern
humanists had condemned as periods of barbarity and decay, and which
the new French historians now praised by ‘‘inventing complex Frankish
and Gallic societies’’ (Pumfrey, Rossi, and Slawinski 61) that resisted
Roman conquest, gloriously defeated Rome, and, in so doing—as we will
see very clearly with Montesquieu—laid the foundations for modern
Europe to grow. If modern history should be rewritten and retheorized,
then, it is because the ‘‘mere fables’’ of the Romans and the ‘‘childish
tales’’ of the Greeks can hardly account for the luminous present in
which France first, and, second, the whole northern world of Europe,
stand today. To understand that present, a new history should now be
devised (see Pisano).≥Ω
What we have, then, codified already in Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet’s
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Discours sur l’histoire universelle (1681), is a new theory of history under-
stood not as a recovery of the past, but as metaphysics—a universal
history, that is, shaped as a chronology and a teleology of great epochs
carrying a precise meaning in the great scheme of things. At the heart of
their meaning, and at the end of these histories, lay a new, modern
theory of Europe: its end was nothing else than the formation of a theory
not of the universe, but of ‘‘what Europe is in the universe’’ (Bossuet 4).∂≠
And, within this Eurocentric theory, there was a supplementary one, one
concerned not with the centrality of Rome or Greece in any theory of
Europe, but with ‘‘what Paris and the Ile de France mean within Europe’’
(4).
Much of what passes today as modern Europe begins—this is the
contention of the present book—from this theorization of history. From
it begins, for instance, a theory of Europe as the end of history claimed,
before Hegel (chapter 4), already by Montesquieu (chapter 2) and John
Locke, who saw America arrested in history, representing, as it were,
‘‘still a pattern of the first ages of . . . Europe’’ (5:151). Progress, teleology,
and manifest destinies—these are the key terms of the history of univer-
salized Europe that only begins in the eighteenth century. Yet in this
history, it is no longer the confrontation with the exotic Other (the
Persian, the Muslim, the American savage, and so on) that interests the
theorists of Europe, but rather a dialectical confrontation of Europe with
itself, with its own internal Other. History, so to speak, unfolds as a
geography pitting a past of Europe—the Greek and Roman south—
against its most luminous and giddy present—what Paul Hazard calls
‘‘the light from the North’’ (European Mind 53–59).
Europe (in Theory) starts from this crisis of north and south, from
where theories of Europe have typically ended. Its objective, as my epi-
graph suggests, is not to create a demonstrable theory of Europe and
patch the crisis with viable hypotheses, but rather to study the limits (its
south?) of a theory of Europe that becomes hegemonic with the names
of Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron of La Brède, and of Montesquieu,
around the year 1740. This is not a theory of Europe, but an analysis of
that which, precisely, a theory of Europe has found recurrently impos-
sible ‘‘to hypothesize or maintain’’ (Agamben, Stanze xi).
2 Montesquieu’s North and South
HISTORY AS A THEORY OF EUROPE
Is Europe but a category e√ectuated by Montesquieu’s reflection?
—JEAN GOLDZINK, ‘‘Montesquieu et l’Europe’’
‘‘The concept of Europe must have first been formed as an antithesis to
that which is not Europe’’ and ‘‘the first opposition between Europe and
something that is not Europe . . . is . . . Asia’’—Federico Chabod’s
pronouncement, reported in the previous chapter along with Samuel
Huntington’s and Bernard Lewis’s insistence that Europe’s cultural iden-
tity is fundamentally opposed to Islam and historically formed against its
threat, still forms an integral part of today’s theories of Europe. According
to such theories (summarized by Bugge), Europe is the antithesis of what
Jean-Marc Moura calls ‘‘the Orient’’—a ‘‘vague’’ and ‘‘imaginary place’’
that refers indi√erently to any one of ‘‘three areas of an undefined geogra-
phy that subsume the notion of the Orient: Asia; the Mediterranean and
Islamic territories; and the space of Byzantine Christianity’’ (14).
Arguably such theories of European identity as the antithesis to the
Orient proceed from philosophical theories of identity based on ‘‘the
opposition of the I and the ‘other’ by which the I knows itself ’’ (Haber-
mas 145). In other words, since identity is always di≈cult to establish in
isolation, everybody and everything, ‘‘including Europe,’’ as Peter Riet-
bergen writes in Europe: A Cultural History, ‘‘exists only by virtue of its
contrast or its opposite’’ (xxi). Accordingly, Roger Ballard’s ‘‘Islam and
the Construction of Europe,’’ starting from the assumption that Euro-
pean identity is not ‘‘a self-evident fact of nature’’ and thus impossible to
maintain per se, concludes that only ‘‘the disjunction between Chris-
tianity and Islam’’ (20) and the opposition between the two can give
Europe the possibility to know itself as ‘‘I’’ (against ‘‘them’’). Similarly,
François Hartog locates the Greek foundations of the idea of Europe in
the Persian Wars: ‘‘The Persian Wars gave a meaning [to Europe], by
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providing it with an antithetical figure: that of the Persian’’ (20). Of the
same opinion is Michel Foucault: ‘‘In the universality of Western ratio
there is one dividing line, which is the Orient’’ (Histoire de la folie iv).
Massimo Cacciari reaches the same conclusion: ‘‘[Europe] emerges, first
of all, from the contrast between the irreducible archipelago of the
[Greek] póleis . . . and the powerful kingdom of the [Persians]’’ (Geo-
filosofia 15). If one adds to all this Silvio Berlusconi’s distinction between
free Europe and enslaved Islam, Oriana Fallaci’s discrimination between
Western culture and Eastern barbarity, and the endless eu discussions
about the Europeanness or non-Europeanness of ‘‘Asiatic’’ Turkey—well,
you get the point.
Before I hear Eurocentric, let me notice that even scholars from a less
Europeanist school than the ones just cited seem to take the figural
antithesis Europe-Asia for granted. Once again, the starting assumption
(stated this time by Edward Said in Orientalism) is that ‘‘the construc-
tion of identity . . . involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ ’’ (45);
ergo, Europe, in order to imagine and theorize its own identity, has ‘‘to
polarize the distinction’’ (46) between Western and Oriental, European
and Arab, or us and them: in sum, ‘‘European culture gained in strength
and identity by setting itself o√ against the Orient’’ (3). Ditto for Abdel
Malek, who accuses Europe of constituting itself as a subject by con-
structing the Orient as its own demonic object. or negative Other (107).
Disjunction, contrast, contraposition, opposition, antithesis, polariza-
tion: these are the figures that crop up, since Chabod, in reflections on
Europe. The consensus is such that one can hardly resist the temptation
of being a bit skeptical about all of this. The problem is that this rhetori-
cal paradigm’s canonical status seems to prevent us from seeing the
question of Europe’s self-formation in any other thinkable way. The
present chapter intends, then, to test one hypothesis, namely, that the
Europe-versus-Orient paradigm may be overlooking a supplementary
and modern genesis of Europe. In the same eighteenth century in which
the idea of Europe seems to solidify, and in which Orientalism, as Said
has discussed, is established as an academic discipline, Europe starts
conceiving a new logic for self-definition that renders the Other super-
fluous. This new logic, which grows under the eighteenth-century eco-
nomic imperative of Europe’s self-reliance (Bassand), and which culmi-
nates in Hegel’s ‘‘dialectic of the same’’ (Descombes), forms an integral
part of the much discussed European ‘‘dream of a full . . . clos[ure]
of history: the suppression of contradiction and di√erence’’ (Derrida,
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Grammatology 115): it coincides with Eurocentrism, in other words, un-
derstood as the assumption ‘‘that one can explain Europe without look-
ing at [the rest of the world]’’ (Jubran 233). Around the eighteenth
century there seems to arise a new desire, within European theory, to
concoct an idea of Europe as ‘‘complete knowledge of itself ’’ (Berthold-
Bond 15). No Other is needed in such a novel fable of identity: exotic
di√erence is, instead, ‘‘occluded’’ (Dussel, ‘‘Eurocentrism’’ 65), trans-
lated, and replaced by one contained within Europe itself.
In order for European theory to dispense of the absolute Other, a
di√erent rhetoric of antithesis between what Europe is (identity) and
what it is not (di√erence) must, nonetheless, be organized. Di√erence
has to be translated from the radical Other onto a negative part, or
moment, of the European self. In Orientalism, Edward Said already
alluded to such a translation when he mentioned European theory’s
‘‘domestication’’ (4) and ‘‘encompassing’’ (65) of the Oriental other.
Said’s interpreters have usually taken this to mean that Orientalism as an
academic discipline domesticated the otherwise untamable Orient to
European knowledge and colonial designs. It seems to me, however, that
Said was hinting at a supplementary kind of domestication when he
suggested, for example—admittedly en passant—that ‘‘the Oriental was
linked [by European anthropology] to elements in Western society (de-
linquents, the insane, women, the poor)’’ (207). If such ‘‘elements of
Western society’’ were made to represent the same characteristics as the
Orient, it can then be argued that one was the translation of the other:
Europe, in the context described by Said, could fathom its identity not
only by opposing itself to the Orient but by matching itself against those
internal elements of Western society.
What needs to be added to Said’s hint is that these deviant elements of
Western society are not only molded in the image of the Oriental but,
also, geographically determined: the deviant, the internal Other of Eu-
rope, is a southerner (see Petraccone). As Italy had been consistently
represented in the European thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as Europe’s backward south (Moe 13–36), it is not surprising to
see that Italy soon became the hotbed for more or less scientific discus-
sions trying to distinguish, at least, a good and European Italy—a north-
ern one—from a bad and barbaric one—the south. If Orientalism had
canonized the Oriental as ‘‘lethargic’’ (Said, Orientalism 39) and led by a
‘‘need for vengeance that overrides everything’’ (49), Cesare Lombroso,
the patriotic anthropologist from the northern Italian city of Verona,
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observed southern Calabria in 1862 as a ‘‘barbaric’’ place where ‘‘sloth
was hypostatized as merit, vengefulness as system’’ (89). Just as Oriental-
ism had canonized the Orient as a place of backwardness representing ‘‘a
distant European past’’ (Said, Orientalism 85) and the Oriental as an
epiphany of ‘‘primitiveness . . . [that] had not been subject to the ordi-
nary processes of history’’ (230), so Lombroso’s southerner served as the
example of an ‘‘atavist primitiveness . . . the e√ect of a hindered develop-
ment, in the collective moral sense, resulting in the permanence of a
barbaric stage’’ (514).
Lombroso had made the discovery of southern ‘‘atavism’’ in 1870,
when he had examined the cranium of Giuseppe Vilella, a Calabrese
peasant and brigand by race—no matter that the authorities had always
missed the chance to suspect him of anything.∞
Alfredo Niceforo, a Sicilian member of the Roman Anthropological
Society and of the Italian Society of Geography, could not but internalize
the theory and confirm: the south ‘‘has been atrophied on the path to
civilization and has conserved moral ideas of primitive societies; men
thus present an individual psychic atavism, and the entire region shows
forms of social atavism’’ (Delinquenza 41). Niceforo could then dis-
tinguish within Italy itself between a properly ‘‘European’’ and a ‘‘Medi-
terranean’’ race. The south was a deficiency of Europeanness; put dif-
ferently, it was its past. Niceforo’s reviewer for the daily Il Secolo asked,
then, rhetorically: ‘‘Isn’t it like in a nightmare? Isn’t it shocking to read
that habits typical of Arab tribes before Mohammed are still alive today
in some regions of Italy? Isn’t it shocking to find that such behavior is
enacted not by Tuaregs and Bedouins, but by Italian citizens?’’ (qtd. in
Petraccone 164).≤
The atavism of the south—a latitude blocked ‘‘within ideas and senti-
ments that belong to the European civilization of the past’’ (Niceforo,
Italia 38)—was thus largely translated by the anthropology of Lombroso
and his descendants from the original texts of Orientalism: in both
scientific and popular literature (see Dickie 100–119), the Orient was the
south, and Europe’s Other was to be found, as in a nightmare, within
Europe’s own borders. The editorial introduction to the first issue of the
Revue de l’Orient, 1843, had already prepared the context for such trans-
lation: ‘‘Our Orient comprehends the European countries of the Medi-
terranean’’ (Hugo 8). What Italian anthropology could contribute to the
Revue’s translation was a positivist explanation of such southern dif-
ference: ‘‘the influence of climate,’’ had determined Lombroso (42);
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‘‘northern and southern climate,’’ had agreed the gymnast of criminol-
ogy Enrico Ferri,≥ because ‘‘in the northern climate man’s stubborn
confrontation with an ungenerous nature forces individuals and genera-
tions to an endless intellectual and physical exercise. Hence the develop-
ment of a robust character, which will make this man less artistic than
the pleasure-seeking southerner, but stronger because made of iron’’
(Delitti 48).
Yet neither Orientalism nor anthropology lay at the origin of such a
domestication of the antithesis of Europe into Europe’s own south. The
cultural climate for this reorientation of Europe’s identity had already
been set in 1737, in a dark laboratory of the rue Margaux, in Bordeaux,
France, where the carcass of a sheep was being sacrificed at the altar of
Europe’s resurgent science of climatology.
The Silence of the Sheep: Climate (in Theory)
Let your lips, proposing a hypothesis
Not know about the hand faking the experiment.
—CZESLAW MILOSZ, ‘‘Child of Europe’’
It all began when Monsieur le President of the Academy of Bordeaux,
Charles Louis de Secondat, the baron of Montesquieu and member of
the up-and-coming noblesse de robe (nobility attained by o≈ce) with
something always to prove to an older feudal nobility, ‘‘undertook exper-
iments, described in De l’Esprit des Lois, on a sheep’s tongue under the
microscope with the aim of discovering its reactions to changes in tem-
perature’’ (Shackleton, Montesquieu 305–6):
I have observed the outermost part of a sheep’s tongue, where, to the
naked eye, it seems covered with papillae . . . I froze the half of this
tongue, and, observing it with the naked eye, I found the papillae consid-
erably diminished: even some rows of them were sunk into their sheath. I
examined the outermost part with the microscope, and perceived no
pyramids. As I defrosted the half of the tongue, the papillae seemed to
rise, and under the microscope I could see the glands beginning to reap-
pear. (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:476)
The episode is considered by Montesquieu’s biographer, who does not
seem to stomach well the gothic odors of the dissecting room, as an
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example of the somewhat naive but marginal scientific observations that
Montesquieu was undertaking while preparing De l’esprit des lois. For
Shackleton, Montesquieu’s analytic interest in the e√ects of heat and
cold on physical bodies was secondary in his research, and by no means
meant to suggest ‘‘the paramountcy of climate’’ (Shackleton, Montes-
quieu 317) as a determining factor of his science of the body politic. No
doubt, Shackleton is right. Yet the kind of scientific experiment that
Montesquieu was concocting in the rue Margaux went clearly beyond a
naive approach to the physical sciences and was to prepare, in fact, the
greatest and most disingenuous rhetorical demonstratio for the hypothe-
sis of Europe that Montesquieu was at that point working to articulate.
Montesquieu’s critical experiment was moved, more than by science,
by a singular sociological mysticism: the conviction, in other words, that
the tongue of the sheep could speak, through the president’s shamanic
powers of observation, the whole complexity of social relations in the
world. In that tongue, Montesquieu had found the grail, the philoso-
pher’s stone—the key to it all. In it was hidden the secret principle that,
once revealed, could tell humankind ‘‘what gives a specific character to a
nation or a certain spirit to one particular individual; what modifies a
whole sex and what a√ects a single man; what forms the genius of
societies and the genius of a single person at the same time’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:39). The sheep’s tongue was a little système du monde, a
microcosm that contained, in itself, the secret essence of all—a particular
case, in other words, that represented a more general and universal law:
‘‘I have posed the principles,’’ Montesquieu had announced in the pref-
ace to the Spirit, ‘‘and I have seen the particular case tied with another
law, or depending on another, more general law’’ (Oeuvres 2:229).
A law was, in Montesquieu’s understanding of the word, a relation (un
rapport ) between things. These relations were humanly perceived, rather
than mere facts of nature: ‘‘The law, in general, is human reason, insofar
as reason governs all the people on earth’’ (Oeuvres 2:237). Social rela-
tions, which constitute the positive laws that relate individual bodies to
the general political body of a nation, were in turn predetermined by
natural relations and natural laws: ‘‘They [positive laws] must be relative
to the physics of the country: to the frigid, or hot, or temperate climate’’
(Oeuvres 2:238; original emphasis). In this metatheory of the law, in
other words, the relation between physical/climatological realities and
political formations was not a casual but a necessary one (‘‘They must be
relative’’). An analysis of social relations had then to begin, necessarily,
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from an analysis of physical rapports, that is to say, from an analysis of
the relationship ‘‘between a body in motion and another body’’ (Mon-
tesquieu, Oeuvres 2:233). The problem, since at least Galileo Galilei, had
been how to make those bodies—‘‘man as a physical being’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:234)—communicate their laws, so as to decipher the
book of nature, the secret, perhaps divine, language of mute things.
What the experiment of the tongue, then, signified for Montesquieu was
the possibility of finally giving a tongue to these silent bodies: to have
them speak, through the medium of his presidential observations, their
otherwise unuttered natural laws that lay at the very basis of any posi-
tive ones.
What the tongue spoke to Montesquieu was one of those ‘‘beautiful,
grand, and simple ideas, quite worthy of the majesty of nature’’ that
the president had always assumed distinguished the findings of ‘‘us,
the moderns’’ from the forgettable ones of the ancients (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 1:33). Assuming those papillae were the organs of taste through
which the sheep (a gourmand one at that) enjoyed her food, Montes-
quieu could therefore deduce that all pleasures, like the particular one of
taste, had to be correlated to climate. The colder the temperature, the
smaller becomes the papilla—and the lesser is the capacity to taste. The
warmer the environment gets, the larger grows the papilla—and so the
pleasure of taste reaches its heights: ‘‘This observation [of the sheep’s
tongue] confirms what I have been saying, that in cold countries . . . one
has little sensibility to pleasure; in temperate countries, one has more; in
warm countries, their sensibility is exquisite. As climates are distin-
guished by degrees of latitude, we might distinguish them also in some
measure by those of sensibility’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:476).
What this natural law meant for the establishment of human, positive,
and social laws was that ‘‘in warm climates,’’ where a sensibility for
pleasures is extreme, ‘‘despotic power generally prevails’’ (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 2:297). An extreme drive toward pleasure engenders an extreme
drive to satisfy it: ‘‘More lively passions multiply crimes that will sat-
isfy those same passions’’ (2:477). Cold climates are climates of coop-
eration between men: their union is their strength, and the conscious-
ness of their strength makes them courageous. Warm climates, instead,
are climates of fear: they engender either abuses or cowardice. In warm
climates, therefore, only despotism, the law of the strongest capable
of instilling fear in all others, can rule: ‘‘One should therefore not be
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surprised if the cowardice of the peoples of warm climates has almost
always made them slaves, whereas the courage of the peoples of cold
climates has kept them free. It is an e√ect that derives from its natural
cause’’ (2:523).
At this point, pour ainsi dire, it does not matter if the adequate under-
standing of societies can be found in the examination of men or in the
observation of a sheep’s tongue; the conclusion is one and the same:
‘‘One can conclude that climate contributes infinitely to modify the
spirit’’ (2:44). Humankind, like the tongue, is one and the same every-
where and under every climate on earth; but heat and cold have di√erent
e√ects on otherwise equal bodies. Cold tightens the pores. All the vigor
that remains inside the body produces a ‘‘more vigorous’’ and coura-
geous race of men. Heat, on the contrary, dilates the pores, so that vigor
escapes. We have, then, the feeble, cowardly, vengeful, lazy, and passive
character unable to fight for his or her freedom that Montesquieu swears
to have found in the hot climates: ‘‘The heat of the climate may be so
excessive as to deprive the body of all vigor and strength. The faintness
is therefore communicated to the mind; there is no curiosity, no noble
enterprise, no generosity of sentiment; the inclinations are all passive;
indolence constitutes the utmost happiness; scarcely any punishment
is so severe as mental employment; and slavery is more tolerable than
the force and vigor of mind that would be necessary for human con-
duct’’ (2:477).
Climatology was certainly not a new theory for Montesquieu (see
Shackleton, Montesquieu 302–19). Jean Bodin’s La méthode de l’histoire
(1566) and La république (1576), which had set forth a theory of the e√ect
of climate on society and government, were among Montesquieu’s regu-
larly consulted books. In the ‘‘Réflexions sur la monarchie universelle’’
(1734), climatology had already been mentioned as a providential engine
of human history that had saved many times Germans and Gauls from
the Roman hordes: ‘‘It is very di≈cult for nations of the South to con-
quer those of the North, and all Histories prove that. Southern Nations
find in the North an unconquerable enemy: climate’’ (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 2:28). The only enemy of the otherwise proud nations of the
north remains climate itself: ‘‘The Roman historians have constantly
observed that the people of the North, almost unconquerable in their
countries, were no longer such when they were in warmer countries’’
(1:1354). Also, in the ‘‘Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des
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romains et de leur décadence,’’ written in the same year, climate had
explained such disparate social ‘‘facts’’ as the Macedonians’ military
prowess in war (2:94) or the fecundity of Oriental women (2:187).
By the time he had jotted down the preparatory notes for De l’esprit
des lois, Montesquieu was quite certain that a ‘‘temperate climate,’’ as the
Aristotelian good middle between extreme heat and excessive cold, was
conducive to progress and civilization (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:1075).
Aristotle himself, for his part, had never talked of a temperate climate,
when, revisiting Hippocrates’ climatology in the seventh book of the
Politics, he had opened the road for Montesquieu’s theory of the social
implications of temperature: ‘‘The nations in cold regions, particularly
in Europe, are full of [courage] . . . which is why they continue to be
comparatively free . . . . By contrast, those in Asia . . . lack [cour-
age]; which is why they continue to be ruled and enslaved (Aristotle,
Politics 7.7).
After Aristotle and before Montesquieu, however, the science of cli-
matology had managed to move the commonplace of the courageous
nation from an unqualified ‘‘cold’’ region to a more ‘‘temperate’’ zone.
Ibn Khaldun, writing around 1377, had presented not the cold, but the
temperate zones of the Mediterranean (today’s Maghreb, Middle East,
and southern Europe) as the most perfect for the constitution of socie-
ties. Europe (in Theory) discusses the nineteenth-century recuperation
of Ibn Khaldun’s climatology (and of the Mediterranean as a locus of
perfection) in chapter 5. In eighteenth-century France, however, Mon-
tesquieu does not want the Mediterranean, but rather a putatively north-
ern France, to be identified with the perfection of what is temperate and
therefore not excessive but just. It is then very likely, and it has been
suggested (for instance by Gates) that Montesquieu knew of Ibn Khal-
dun’s climatology, which had become popular in France since the pub-
lication of Jean-Baptiste Chardin’s Voyages en Perse et autres lieux de
l’Orient in 1680. The fact that Montesquieu never mentions Ibn Khaldun
is then highly significant: Montesquieu’s temperate (climatologically and
therefore politically) zone is not Ibn Khaldun’s Mediterranean, but a
European north comprising England, Holland, Germany, Belgium, and
France. North of this temperate north was for Montesquieu the exces-
sive cold of Siberia and Lapland, which reduced people to a state of
savagery. South of it was exactly Ibn Khaldun’s Mediterranean, demoted
to a hot, dry place. In a way, both the extremely cold north of Lapland
and Siberia and the excessively hot south of Spain and Italy produced a
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similar breed of humans: savage, non-European, and with a brown skin
(see Duchet 254–65).
Rather than from Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu therefore inherits the
notion of a temperate climate directly from Jean Bodin, who, in the
République, had divided the world into a colder north inhabited by rude
and ‘‘dirty’’ peoples, a hotter south inhabited by cunning and malicious
ones, and a temperate ‘‘Europe’’ with France at its center (Carravetta 42).
Montesquieu, at first glance, seemed then to translate Aristotle’s seventh
book of Politics almost word by word: ‘‘It is not surprising that the
cowardice of the people of hot climates has almost constantly rendered
them slaves, and that the courage of the people of cold climates has kept
them free’’ (Oeuvres 2:523). But his move of the zone of perfection from
Aristotle’s (and Ibn Khaldun’s) Mediterranean to a temperate north was
full of strategic significance: ‘‘You will find, in the climates of the north,
peoples who have few vices, many virtues, and much sincerity and can-
dor. As you move toward the countries of the south, you will believe you
have moved away from morality itself ’’ (2:477).
Plenty has been written, since, about Montesquieu’s climatological
politics and about his spatial logic of di√erence. While some scholars
have insisted on Montesquieu’s ‘‘environmental determinism’’ (Sprout
and Sprout 50) and on the way ‘‘physical environment, especially climate,
impinges upon human character and political institutions’’ (Shklar 12),
others have minimized the importance of climate in Montesquieu’s poli-
tics by stressing instead the primacy of social factors and moral causes
(e.g., Shackleton, Montesquieu 317) or by restricting the influence of
geographical factors to the limits of a ‘‘qualified determinism’’ (Richter
134). Although climate is certainly not the one and only cause that
Montesquieu singles out, it seems problematic, on the other hand, to
dismiss or minimize it excessively after Montesquieu himself wrote, for
instance, that ‘‘it is the di√erent needs depending on di√erent climates
that have formed di√erent ways of living; and these di√erent ways of
living have formed the di√erent kinds of laws’’ (Oeuvres 2:483–84); or
that ‘‘it is climate that decides [the relations between the sexes]’’ (2:517). It
may be that in order to save the ‘‘father’’ of political science from a
determinism that is less credible to us, a complete ‘‘emancipation [of po-
litical theory] from the environment, has been accomplished by [some]
critics with too much ease’’ (Kriesel 566).
At any rate, despite di√ering interpretations regarding the importance
of climate in Montesquieu, critics seem to agree that the goal of De
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l’esprit des lois was to theorize European freedom against Asiatic despo-
tism (see, for example, Chabod 106). Franco Venturi, minimizing the
importance of climate in his old but still pertinent essay entitled ‘‘Orien-
tal Despotism,’’ takes De l’esprit des lois as the pivotal text that canonized
the antithesis Europe-Orient in a modern context: ‘‘Synthesizing the
political wisdom of past ages,’’ says Venturi, Montesquieu moved away
from a narrowly political definition of despotism which claimed that ‘‘it
is only governments which are despotic’’ toward a modern one that
assumed that ‘‘society may be so too’’ (134). Di√erently put, despotism is
not the product of political systems, but of general social conditions, or
‘‘culture’’ (Abrahamian 4). For Venturi, Oriental despotism and Euro-
pean freedom were, then, not the conditions of specific forms of author-
ity, but political drives embedded in the structure itself—culture, moral-
ity, systems of belief—of Oriental and European societies. Perry
Anderson gives instead significant importance to climate and geography.
Yet he comes to the same conclusion as Venturi: ‘‘Montesquieu’s declared
principle of explanation for the di√erential character of European and
Asian States was, of course, geographical: climate and topography deter-
mined their separate destinies’’ (465).
In truth, the antithesis Europe-Orient was a well-established com-
monplace in Montesquieu’s times (see, for example, Longino). Since at
least 1704, when Antoine Galland had translated The Thousand and One
Nights into French, the Orient—a concept that hardly di√erentiated
between India, Persia, and Arabia (Mariani Zini 20n3)—had cohered
into popular imagination as the ‘‘Other’’ place to everyday France. For
good and for bad, the Orient was, once again, the antithesis of modern
Europe, which had, in turn, Paris at its center: this was the sure lesson
drawn from reading the endless number of Galland’s imitators—from
François Pétis de la Croix’s Mille et un jour (1710–1812), to Charles de
Fieux, Chevalier de Mouhy, who rewrote Marguerite de Navarre’s Hep-
taméron in 1740 as Les milles et une faveurs. The more the French genius
prided itself for being utterly and Cartesianly reasonable, the more it
needed, it seems, to imagine an Orient of magic, flying carpets, and
genies in the bottle. Even Voltaire (Vision de Babouc, 1746; Bababek et les
fakirs, 1750) and Diderot (L’oiseaux blanc, 1748; Les bijoux indiscrets,
1748), or Montesquieu himself with the Lettres persanes (1721), would put
aside reason for a while and indulge instead in the pleasures of the
‘‘Other’’ life in the east.
The Orient as the unreasonable antithesis to the (French) West was the
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horizon of expectations against which De l’esprit des lois was, and still
largely is, interpreted. Nicolas Antoine Boulanger, in the Recherches sur
les origines du despotisme orientale of 1761, had soon noticed in Montes-
quieu a paradigmatic distinction between Europe and the east. Also,
Abraham Hyacinte Anquetil-Duperron, in a spirited defense of his be-
loved Asia printed as Législation orientale (1778), had accused Montes-
quieu of creating stereotypes of Asia that could only serve the colonial
interests of Europe. The philosophes themselves, led by Voltaire, had
come to the same conclusion, while accepting that Montesquieu’s text
was in fact the theorization of the Europe-Asia di√erence.
What seems to be lost in this kind of interpretation, however, is noth-
ing less than the modernity of Montesquieu’s science of politics—the way
in which climatology is slowly but surely abandoning Aristotle’s longitu-
dinal di√erence and preparing instead the modern and romantic lati-
tudinal distinctions that Madame de Staël would set, in the year 1800,
between two European cultures: one ‘‘that come from the south,’’ and
one ‘‘that descend from the north’’ (Littérature 203). To begin with,
Montesquieu could not care less about Aristotle—or, for that matter,
about the authority of the ancients in general. They did not know better,
and, at best, they wrote ‘‘without knowing what they said’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:43).∂ So while De l’esprit des lois could appear to be
following Aristotle and the ancients in its identification of climate as the
natural cause that divides free and progressive nations from despotic and
backward ones, the conclusion of book 17, chapter 2, announced an
unarguably modern thesis: it is not in the west, but ‘‘in the climates of
the north’’ that peoples have ‘‘few vices, many virtues’’; and it is not in
the east, but in ‘‘the countries of the south’’ that one finds oneself ‘‘away
from morality itself.’’
What is immediately apparent here is that the old discussion between
freedom (Europe) and despotism (Asia) has been translated into a mod-
ern, latitudinal rhetoric of north and south. Heat and cold, rather than
physical geographies fixed in the reality of Aristotle’s Greece and Persia,
have become for Montesquieu two rhetorical commonplaces that can be
translated at will in order to articulate and unfold a new idea of Europe.
‘‘Europe,’’ writes Montesquieu, ‘‘has come to such a high degree of
power, that history cannot compare it to anything else’’ (Oeuvres 2:644).
The Oriental—once the Persian, later the Muslim and the Turk—has
ceased to represent any menace at all. By 1782, in fact, his fundamentally
comic role in the unfolding of modern European history will be can-
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onized by young Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s Die Entführung aus dem
Serail. It is consequently useless to judge Europe against Asia and the
East in 1748: ideally, if not geographically (see the discussion on Eurasia
in chapter 1), ‘‘Europe is separated from the rest of the world’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:710). This does not mean that Europe can now define
itself without a confrontation with a negative Other: it means, rather,
that since ‘‘one finds the same di√erence within Europe’’ (2:481), a mod-
ern theory of Europe can now dispense with any comparison ‘‘to any-
thing else’’ and focus instead on this internal di√erence within Europe. It
is not only in Asia, after all, ‘‘but in the south of Europe that laws do
exactly the contrary’’ of what European laws ought to do (2:481). And it
is not only in Asia that freedom, constitutive of Europe according to
Aristotle, is negated; freedom, alas, is ‘‘never to be seen in the southern
climates’’ of Europe itself (2:526; emphasis mine).
Interlude: A Theory of Postcolonialism
The ordinary e√ect of colonies is to weaken the colonizing
country, without increasing the population of the colonized one.
—CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, Lettres Persanes
If Montesquieu’s ‘‘modernity’’ was, in G. Bonno’s words, the attempt to
theorize ‘‘a moment in which European hegemony was being extended
all over the world’’ (289), it must be noticed that such theorization
followed one very firm assumption: that such an extension of Europe all
over the world had now to be balanced by a new centrifugal movement—
by a return to Europe. Montesquieu’s eagerness to declare colonialism a
closed chapter in the history of Europe—especially after the failures of
Colbertism∑—bears directly on his attempt to make of Europe a self-
contained system in which di√erence (north and south) is represented as
an internal dialectic of the same. The logic of colonial expansion, from
its very outset, runs counter to the logic of De l’esprit des lois: if laws are
proper to one specific locale (climate and geography) and to one people’s
sense of morality (culture), colonialism then poses the problem, dis-
cussed for instance in book 19, of how to establish an alien colonial rule
in a place that is naturally disinclined to it (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:574–
83).∏ The Lettres persanes had already warned Europe that such a colonial
e√ort was in fact to weaken the conquering country; the same point had
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been advanced, a propos the decline of Spain, in the ‘‘Considérations sur
les richesses de l’Espagne’’ (ca. 1728); and the ‘‘Considérations sur les
causes de la grandeur des romains’’ had condemned ‘‘the folly of con-
quering new territories in a movement of extension that brings the
conqueror nothing but the illusion of power and the reality of weakness’’
(Volpilhac-Auger 51). It was now De l’esprit des lois that dramatized the
need for an abandonment of colonialism—by producing, for one, a
theory of Europe as complete knowledge of itself, and which no longer
wishes to find its Other in any faraway colony or land.
Montesquieu’s rationale for declaring the age of global conquest and
expansion over was modern in the most businesslike sense of the word:
De l’esprit des lois, as David Carrithers suggests, ‘‘considered the priori-
tization of commerce [as] the chief distinguishing feature of modernity’’
(‘‘Introduction’’ 18). Not only was colonialism hindering the free cir-
culation of goods and capitals by imposing such ‘‘unnatural’’ regulations
as the colonial power’s exclusive right of negotiation with the colonies
(Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:643). Worse, colonialism was prone to confuse
the end (commerce) with the means (war of conquest). A criticism of
colonial expansionism began, then, in the name of business, with a
consideration of the commercial failure of the most illustrious of colo-
nial conquests—the Spanish one of the Americas. The Spaniards—a
backward southern nation—certainly did not know better the principles
of modern commerce: ‘‘The Spaniards considered these newly discov-
ered lands as the subject of conquest; while others, more refined in their
views, found them to be the proper subjects of commerce’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:643).
Yet the problem was not simply military conquest; what was truly
problematic about colonialism was that its conquests of faraway lands
were quite di≈cult to turn into productive commercial enterprises—
even for more modern and refined countries than Spain. It is not sur-
prising that for a thinker so interested in geography as Montesquieu was,
the problem could be described in spatial terms: simply put, for com-
merce to be fruitful to European countries, distance had to be taken into
account. What worth, then, was the immense gold of the distant Amer-
icas? Montesquieu answered with an accountant’s precision:
To extract the gold from the mines, to give it the requisite preparations,
and to import it into Europe, must be attended with some certain ex-
pense. I will suppose this to be as 1 to 64. When the specie was once
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doubled, and consequently became by one-half less precious, the expense
was as 2 to 64. Thus the fleets that brought to Spain the same quantity of
gold, brought a thing which really was of less value by one-half, though
the expenses attending it had been twice as high. If we proceed doubling
and doubling, we shall find in this progression the cause of the impotency
of the wealth of Spain. (2:646–47)
Compared to the squandering of faraway colonialism, even German and
Hungarian mines, though relatively poorer than the American ones,
revealed themselves as more useful—‘‘extremely useful,’’ as it were—than
the ones overseas: ‘‘Those mines of Germany and Hungary, which pro-
duce little more than the expense of working them, are extremely useful.
They are found in the principal state; they employ many thousands of
men, who there consume their superfluous commodities, and they are
properly a manufacture of the country. The mines of Germany and
Hungary promote the culture of land; the working of those of Mexico
and Peru destroys it’’ (2:648).
Distrust for the commercial viability of colonialism was only one of
the reasons that had led Montesquieu to close Europe’s doors in the face
of the entire world. Hygiene was a second one, since at least the days
when syphilis had landed in Europe with Columbus’s caravels (2:485). A
third was the maximization of productivity that, as the discussion of
slavery concluded (2:496–97), was achieved more easily by giving incen-
tives to local salaried laborers (who could in turn buy produced goods
and thus increase the wealth of the nation) than by importing slaves
from other lands. And a final reason was the troubles of Europe them-
selves. Too much energy, believed Montesquieu, had been spent thinking
about colonialism, and too little trying to solve the most immediate
problems of Europe. Such immediate problems were not transcontinen-
tal but internal: Europe had certainly come to ‘‘such a high degree of
power’’; but it was also, at the height of its hegemony, profoundly sick at
its core: ‘‘A new sickness has spread over Europe: has taken our princes,
and has made them organize a disproportionate number of soldiers’’
(2:470). After the endless wars of religion discussed in chapter 1, the war
of the Spanish succession was now pitting ‘‘one half of Europe against
the other half ’’ (1:1356).π Sully’s ‘‘chimerical’’ project of perpetual peace,
which was to answer, as we have seen in chapter 1, the disunities of the
wars of religion, had miserably failed (Pensées number 1482). A new
project was now needed, and Montesquieu, unaccustomed to despair,
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identified such a project with the modern ethics of the market: ‘‘The
e√ect of commerce is to tend toward peace’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres
2:585; also see Rosso). In a modern world, in which successful com-
merce was not between metropolis and colony but ‘‘done mainly be-
tween north and south’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:603), a focus on
inter-European commerce could su≈ce to guarantee a perpetual peace
between all European nations.
What such a modern project of perpetual peace entailed was the shift
from ‘‘a model of brutal and ephemeral conquest, [to] a model of orga-
nization of an empire [where . . . ] commerce reigned’’ (Volpilhac-Auger
49). This passage from an old colonial model to a modern and commer-
cial one was for Montesquieu not only an epochal or historical but a
geographical one. To move from colonialism to commerce meant, in
other words, to move the center of European hegemony from the south
to the north. Colonialism had been for Montesquieu the soul of the
Roman Empire—of an empire centered on the Mediterranean, that is,
that no longer constituted the center (‘‘L’Italie n’est plus au centre’’) but
only a ‘‘corner of the world’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 1:1380). And colo-
nialism had been the drive of another southern empire—the Spanish
one—that had eventually collapsed and was now to be put under the
supervision of Europe (‘‘en tutelle dans l’Europe’’; see Montesquieu
Oeuvres 1:1380, 1382). Commerce, instead, was the new ethics of a protes-
tant north, and of France in particular, the ‘‘most powerful nation’’
(2:375), ‘‘heart or even head’’ of the new Europe (‘‘au milieu d’Europe
[France] en étoit le coeur si elle n’en étoit pas la tête’’ (2:30). If northern
nations had engaged in the adventures of colonialism, and even started
quarrelling over colonies, Montesquieu now warned them: colonial in-
terests were against their nature, against their modern, protestant, com-
mercial European spirit. Colonialism, in short, would only bring them
to disaster.
As climatology had divided Europe into north and south, so did the
advent of modern commerce split Europe into two perfectly balanced,
antithetical parts:
In Europe there is a kind of balance between the southern and the north-
ern nations. The first have every riches of life, and few wants: the second
have many wants, and few riches. To one Nature has given much, and
demands little; to the other she has given but little, and demands a lot.
The equilibrium is maintained by the laziness of the southern nations,
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and by the industry and activity which Nature has given to those in the
north. The latter have to work a lot, or else they would lack everything,
and degenerate into barbarianism. This has naturalized slavery for the
people of the south: as they can easily dispense with riches, they can even
more easily dispense with liberty. (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:603)
What is crucial here is not so much that southern Europeans could be
militarily conquered and enslaved (servitude is, after all, natural in the
south), but that north and south formed for Montesquieu a perfect
economic system: the south was an immense reservoir of natural riches
that existed there in excess; and the north was the center for the indus-
trious manufacture of finished goods. It was the nearby European south,
to which ‘‘Nature has given much,’’ which had now to be controlled and
exploited by the laborious and progressive northern nations—not the
distant Americas, which only yield a return of ‘‘2 to 64.’’
The logic of excess and industriousness was in fact quite reminiscent
of the second of the Two Treatises on Civil Government (1690) in which
John Locke had tried to justify the ‘‘private dominion’’ of things against a
natural law commanding that ‘‘all the fruits [Mother Nature] naturally
produces . . . belong to mankind in common’’ (5:115–16). Locke, intent to
justify private property as the very institution that distinguished the
progressive and ‘‘civilized part of mankind’’ (5:117) from another that
was still in ‘‘a pattern of the first ages’’ of Europe (5:151), had claimed that
‘‘labour put a distinction between [private] and common’’ (5:116) and
‘‘removed . . . [the object] from the state of Nature wherein she was
common’’ to make it ‘‘mine’’ (5:117). Labor, in other words, legitimated
property: ‘‘Cultivating the earth and having dominion, we see, are joined
together’’ (5:119). Excess was, then, available to appropriation through
labor: ‘‘As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life
before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. What-
ever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others’’ (5:117).
Locke’s theory of property, however, aimed at founding an ethics of
colonialism and of legitimating the exploitation of the putatively ‘‘vacant
places of America’’ (5:120) by industrious Europe.∫ What Montesquieu
now needed was a translation of Locke’s theory of property from a
colonial context into one in which ‘‘European commerce is done mainly
between north and south.’’Ω Commerce, in a way, had already realized
such a translation. It was a theory of Europe, now, that needed to be
conceived to represent adequately the way in which Europe had already
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become a system, a complete whole in which its two complementary
parts worked in perfect—can we say dialectical?—synergy.
To theorize such a balance of one Europe divided in two, a new theory
of identity was needed, and what Elena Russo calls Montesquieu’s ‘‘mod-
ern psychology’’ could have certainly been a first step in this direction.
Montesquieu’s modern individual, di√erent from the unselfconsciously
wholesome one of the ancients, appeared split by an internal contradic-
tion ‘‘that tear[s] the modern man apart’’: he ‘‘conflates the two func-
tions of man and citizen into a single identity’’ (Russo 115). As a man, this
individual was led by nature to satisfy his immediate needs; as a citizen,
he was limited by culture to reconcile his satisfaction with the social
good. A similar split between nature and culture, in fact, formed the
identity and character of Montesquieu’s nations: ‘‘There exists, in every
nation, a general character. It is produced in two ways: by physical causes
which depend upon the climate . . . and by moral causes which are a
combination of the laws, religion, habits and manners’’ (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 2:58).
It might not have taken much imagination to the undoubtedly quite
imaginative president to translate this paradigm of dialectical identity
onto Europe itself. So while he had begun book 5 by listing as an antithe-
sis to Europe all the usual suspects of Orientalism—the Turks, Persia,
and the Mongols (2:296)—by the time he got to book 14, Montesquieu
had already split Europe into two ‘‘functions’’ of a single identity: a south
determined by nature (‘‘away from morality itself ’’); and a north led
instead by a culture of cooperation with the state (‘‘few vices, enough
virtues, and much sincerity and frankness’’). The antithesis of European
freedom, too, had been relocated within Europe’s own south. Europe
was in itself  ‘‘torn apart’’ by two conflated drives—one to liberty, the
other to slavery: ‘‘It is the peoples of the north who have and always will
have a spirit of independence and liberty that is lacking in the peoples of
the south’’ (2:718). The other political climate that Aristotle had imag-
ined in Persia had been now brought within the borders of Europe.
Back to the Tongue
The whole idea of climatology, after all, had come to Montesquieu nei-
ther from reading about Asia in the Politics nor from thinking of the
vanquished and vanished Persian Empire. It had been a more modern
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preoccupation—the southbound Grand Tour—that had led Montes-
quieu to Italy, where the idea of climatology had hit him like a revelation.
The rising industry of guide-books and travel memoirs had already
warned him about the noxiousness of Italian air:
Returned travelers had often given evil reports of the air of Rome, and
guide-books seldom failed to comment on the noxious and even lethal
e√ects of the atmosphere either of the city itself or of the Roman cam-
pagna. Rogissart’s Les Délices de l’Italie, Misson’s Nouveau Voyage d’Italie,
and Addison’s Remarks on several parts of Italy, all of them known to
Montesquieu, cited by him, and possessed by him at La Brede, allude to
the unhealthy qualities of the Roman air. Shortly before departing for
Italy, he had made the acquaintance of the Reflex ions critiques sur la
poésie et sur la peinture, by the Abbé Dubos. The learned Abbé asserts the
influence of climate on national character. Giving a fairly detailed analy-
sis of its mode of operation. (Shackleton, Montesquieu 303)
In 1729, when Montesquieu entered Rome, he was confronted by a
scene even more desolate than his readings had prepared him for: the
place was ‘‘without commerce or industry,’’ and all was totally opposed
to the economic and social logic of what Montesquieu called ‘‘the system
of Europe’’ (Oeuvres 1:661). In this wasteland, internal but also alien to a
European system, Montesquieu was promptly informed by his com-
patriot Cardinal de Polignac—the same who had explained to the Holy
Father the ‘‘di√erence’’ between France and Italy (‘‘Saint Père, vous ne
savez la di√érence de la France à l’Italie’’; 1:667)—of Rome’s distinctly
bad weather (‘‘l’intempérie de Rome’’; 1:663). Naples’s weather was quite
bad too (‘‘l’air n’y est pas des plus sains’’; 1:717), and Pozzuoli’s was even
worse (‘‘l’air y est très mauvais’’), especially after the heat of summer had
made it absolutely and unredeemably pestilential (‘‘lorsque le chaleur de
l’été . . . l’air doit être empesté’’; 1:725).
The voyage south of the European system soon became for Montes-
quieu a descent into an inferno whose heat was the most proximate
secular metonymy reminiscent of the theological flames of hell: at the
baths of Pozzuoli, the heat was su√ocating (‘‘la chaleur m’ayant presque
su√oqué’’) and waters were boiling (‘‘une eau bouillante’’; 1:725). From
the ground, sulfuric smoke exhaled (‘‘une fumée de soufre sort de plu-
sieurs endroits’’; 1:726). Not even a miracle could redeem such a place!
Speaking of miracles, the Neapolitans regularly celebrated the one of
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San Gennaro, whose blood, preserved in two glass bowls from the time of
his martyrdom (he was beheaded in 305), was said to liquefy three times
every year—on the first Sunday of May (the anniversary of the translation
of his body to Naples from nearby Pozzuoli); on September 19 (the date
of the martyrdom); and on December 16 (the date of the eruption of the
Vesuvius in 1631). On September 19, 1729, Montesquieu stood among a
crowd of ecstatic Neapolitans to witness the liquefaction of the saint’s
blood, which the priest had brought from the crypt of the homonymous
church to the open square. ‘‘Miracle!’’ howled the crowd. Not so quick,
annotated instead Montesquieu, with ethnographic scruple and empiri-
cal skepticism, in his diaries. Far from being a miracle, the liquefaction
could in fact be easily explained according to the principles of climatol-
ogy, whose hermeneutic virtues Montesquieu was clearly contemplating
already: ‘‘I am convinced that all this is the result of temperature change’’
(Oeuvres 1:728). By bringing the coagulated blood from the cold crypt to
the sunny square, the priest, helped only by a providential change in
temperature, had caused the ‘‘miracle’’ to happen.
Marginal as this little episode may be in the production of Montes-
quieu’s oeuvre, it should, at the very least, give us anecdotal proof of how
many things, really, climate could explain. Just as it explained the miracle
of San Gennaro, it explained the social reality of the south: the unbear-
able heat of Naples had formed human beings that were ‘‘the most
miserable in the world,’’ a people that was ‘‘more vulgar and popular
than any other’’ (‘‘bien plus peuple qu’un autre’’) (1:729). They were
people, in other words, in the sense of a ‘‘corrupt people that rarely does
great things.’’ Sure enough, they celebrated, along with their saint, their
hero too—Masaniello. But Masaniello wanted to change the government
into a republic, start a revolution, and talked of freedom too. Did the
people of Naples join him in his fight for liberty? Of course not (1:729):
as De l’esprit des lois would later explain, revolution ‘‘can seldom be
e√ected without infinite pains and labor, and hardly ever by idle and
debauched persons’’ (2:281). And infinite pains and labor, as we know,
can hardly arise in the debauchery of heat.
The palimpsest of Aristotle’s political climatology, which had estab-
lished the antithesis between a hot and despotic east on the one hand,
and a cold and free Europe on the other, was then totally rewritten
according to the climatological findings of the Voyages. Already there,
Europe had appeared as a continent fractured by a deep latitudinal
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divide: ‘‘It looks to me that the more northward one moves, the more
easily one finds people who are resilient to travails; the further one
moves towards the hot countries of the south, one finds flaccid bodies
and a looser spirit’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:701–2).
The task of De l’esprit des lois was, then, to theorize, after the empirical
observations of the Italian Voyages, a political science of the north-south
di√erence. The climatic hell of the Voyages was to become, in De l’esprit
des lois, the very natural cause for the positive institution of cultural, po-
litical, moral, and even religious commonplaces of the south’s negativity:
When the Christian religion, two centuries ago, became unhappily di-
vided into Catholic and Protestant, the people of the north embraced the
Protestant, and those of the south adhered still to the Catholic. The
reason is plain: the people of the north have, and will forever have, a spirit
of liberty and independence, which the people of the south have not; and
therefore a religion that has no visible head is more agreeable to the
independence of the climate than that which has one. (2:718)∞≠
After the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Montesquieu’s suggestion
that ‘‘the people of the north embraced the Protestant [religion]’’ and
that Catholicism constituted the renunciation of ‘‘the spirit of liberty
and independence’’ obviously had clear political significance. In 1598,
King Henry iv had promulgated a decree at Nantes to restore internal
peace in France after the wars of religion. The edict defined the rights of
the French Protestants and granted them liberty of worship, full civil
rights, and even subsidies for Protestant schools and city governments.
Cardinal Richelieu during the reign of Louis xiii, and then Cardinal
Mazarin under Louis xiv, had slowly stripped the French Protestants
of all political rights, until the final revocation of the edict in 1665.
For Montesquieu, Richelieu’s and Mazarin’s catholicization of France
equaled a southernization of the country—a progressive loss of liberty
and a move toward a southern religion ‘‘away from morality itself ’’: ‘‘In
Rome there is nothing as convenient as a church to pray to God and to
assassinate your neighbor. People are not restrained here as in other
countries, and, if you don’t like the looks of an other man, you only need
to order your valet to stab him two or three times, and then take refuge
in a church’’ (1:677). France, for Montesquieu, was a northern country—
and thus it opened to Protestantism and religious freedoms. The imagi-
nary dividing line between north and south could be singled out for
him, with great geographic precision, in the Apennine Mountains:
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There is, in Italy, a southern wind, called Sirocco, which passes through
the sands of Africa before reaching Italy. It rules that country; it exerts its
power over all spirits; it produces a universal weightiness and slowness;
Sirocco is the intelligence that presides over all Italian heads, and I am
tempted to believe that the di√erence one notices between the inhabitants
of northern Lombardy, and those of the rest of Italy, derives from the fact
that Lombardy is protected by the Apennines, which defend her from the
havoc of the Sirocco. (2:45)∞∞
Europe, to be sure, is one, like the sheep’s tongue: but heat and cold
have di√erent e√ects on this one tongue. ‘‘I froze the half of this tongue,’’
and, as the drive to pleasure cooled down, ‘‘a spirit of independence and
liberty’’ condensed; the other half, under relentless heat and African
winds, compelled only by pleasure, made the very idea of freedom evap-
orate. This was, in the last analysis, the lesson to be learned from the fall
of Rome. Sure, the causes of Rome’s fall lay in its warlike and colo-
nial nature. Yet Roman decadence had arrived, first and foremost, with
a general covetousness for pleasure: ‘‘Their desires became immense’’
(2:353). All sorts of ‘‘Oriental’’ excesses, indolence, and lust (2:122),
drowned Rome in the path to decadence. In the ‘‘Reflections on the
Inhabitants of Rome,’’ at the conclusion of the Voyages, Montesquieu
recalled those excesses, and, above all, decadent Rome’s ‘‘prodigious
appetite,’’ the ‘‘debauchery of the table,’’ the ‘‘art of eating in excess’’ that
involved the ‘‘use of emetics to eat more’’ (1:910–11). Now we know the
reason of it all: the Romans’ papillae, like the sheep’s, had enlarged in an
excessive search for taste.
From a sheep’s tongue, an entire theoretical system was thus born: it
encompassed all and explained the universe. It theorized, at least, Eu-
rope as the climate antithetical to all such debauchery. The antithesis to
such Europe, however, was no longer east, but was to be found in the
history of Europe itself—in its past, that is, which was its south. In the
beginning, there was the tongue.
The Geography of History
Since the human mind has the experience of time but does not have
a representation for it, it represents time through spatial images.
—GIORGIO AGAMBEN, Infanzia e storia
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Climate, Robert Shackleton insists, was not the only cause De l’esprit des
lois had singled out for the formation of the general spirit of a na-
tion. Montesquieu would have certainly agreed, but with an important
qualification: ‘‘Mankind is influenced by various causes: by the climate,
by religion, by the laws, by the maxims of government, by precedents,
morals, and customs; whence is formed a general spirit of nations. In
each country, as any one of these causes acts with more force, the others
weaken in proportion. Nature and climate rule almost alone over the sav-
ages’’ (Oeuvres 2:558).∞≤ Certainly, a whole series of cultural factors—reli-
gions, laws, governments, precedents, morals, and customs—balanced
for Montesquieu the e√ects of nature, and hence of climate, in human
societies. Savagery, however, as the borderline circumstance of a com-
plete subjection to a state of nature, prevented culture from modifying or
taming the e√ects of nature. These, as we already know, were felt mainly
through pores and papillae contracting and dilating under the action of
temperature.
Perfect sociability, on the one hand, and a state of nature, on the other,
were the two extremes of the human condition—extremes that repre-
sented, in fact, the dual or dialectical nature of humankind discussed
above: ‘‘Man, as a physical being, is governed like all the other bodies by
invariable laws. As an intelligent being, he tirelessly transgresses the laws
that God has established, and changes the ones he himself has estab-
lished’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:234). Like man (the particular), like
nations (the general law): ‘‘The life of nations is like the life of men’’
(2:377). In an absolute state of nature, the law of climate was absolute. In
an absolute state of civilization, the law of nature was nothing, and the
law of man, politics, was all.
In this sense, neither the state of nature, nor perfect sociability, were
possible conditions for humankind: being ‘‘man,’’ for Montesquieu,
meant to partake of a dual nature. The hypothesis of a state of nature—
that is, of ‘‘man before the establishment of society’’ (2:235)—was, then,
just a hypothesis, useful only insofar as it helped theorize the di√er-
ences in social realities as tensions toward one of the two hypothetical
extremes. For Montesquieu, there were, in other words, societies that
tended toward the ‘‘state of nature, and in which [men are] unrestrained
either by a political or civil law’’ (2:913); and there were societies that
tended toward perfect sociability: they could be republics (‘‘moins il y a
de luxe dans une république, plus elle est parfaite’’; 2:334); aristocracies
MONTESQUIEU’S NORTH AND SOUTH 75
(‘‘plus une aristocratie approchera de la démocratie, plus elle sera par-
faite’’; 2:247); or monarchies (‘‘[quand] chacun va au bien commun,
croyant aller à ses intérêts particuliers’’; 2:257).
For Montesquieu, who concurred with Hobbes on at least this point
(Lowenthal 494), the state of nature was the hypothetical beginning of
human history; the end of that history was to be the utopic realization of
politics as the final transgression of the natural laws that God has estab-
lished. It was not Hobbes’s fantasy of a state of nature, but the reality
of the di√erent kinds of societies that stood between beginning and
end, that interested Montesquieu: his question, if any was central to De
l’esprit des lois, was how to escape an undesirable proximity to the state
of nature and establish, as close as humanly possible, the reign of the law.
The perfecting of the law was the slow progress of politics, ‘‘a smooth
file, which cuts gradually, and attains its end by a slow progression’’
(Oeuvres 2:487). If the utopic end of politics was the fulfillment of per-
fection, its most attainable and practical one was the understanding and
preservation of the circumstances that had allowed ‘‘our admirable law
of today’’ (2:317) to flourish from previous conditions of savagery and
barbarity.
A progress from savagery to the law, however, was not for Montes-
quieu a merely historical telos. A distrust for history was certainly in the
air of Montesquieu’s France: ‘‘The reformation of knowledge which Des-
cartes [had] envisaged, and actually did bring about, was designed to
contribute nothing to historical thought, because he did not believe
history to be, strictly speaking, a branch of knowledge at all’’ (Colling-
wood 59). Especially the kind of universal histories à la Bossuet, in-
formed by an ecumenical ethos too much in odor of biblical orthodoxy,
were consistently perceived as ‘‘incompatible with the new spirit of sci-
entific enquiry stirring in the late seventeenth century’’ (Barraclough
84). Despite such epochal skepticism, Montesquieu had expressed in his
Pensées the ‘‘intention to write a historical work’’ (Shackleton, Montes-
quieu 227). That he eventually discarded such a project to write instead
De l’esprit des lois does not mean that Montesquieu had abandoned his
historicist ambitions altogether (see Hulliung 3–5, 140–72): on the con-
trary, already in the preface we are informed that De l’esprit des lois
intends to trace, from a set of ‘‘principles,’’ nothing less than ‘‘the histo-
ries of all nations’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:229); and by book 3, we are
reminded that Montesquieu’s was not a refutation of previous histories,
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but, rather, its ultimate synthesis and ‘‘confirmation of the entire body of
historiography’’ (2:251).
De l’esprit des lois presented, then, not a local history of France or
Europe, but a universal history with Europe and France as the last stage —
modernity—of a linear chronology of infinite betterment. This was uni-
versal history as philosophy of history: written from France, it recapitu-
lated and comprehended in a retrospective gaze the entire body of histo-
riography and transcended the various ‘‘chronicle[s] of miscellaneous
facts’’ into a unitary perspective giving meaning to and ‘‘a≈rming the
superiority of the present age’’ (Carrithers, ‘‘Philosophy of History’’ 61).
Undoubtedly, Montesquieu’s philosophy of history was not Bossuet’s
universal history. It was not guided, for example, by the assumption of a
theological design. A teleological design, however, was certainly present in
Montesquieu; only, it had to be derived not deductively from a putative
will of God, but inductively, from the empirical order of physical realities
(on Montesquieu’s historical empiricism, see Oake 48–49). This was
Montesquieu’s ‘‘dialectics of history’’ (Althusser 37–58): it began from
empirical observations and finished by arranging them into a telos point-
ing to ‘‘the manifestation of an intemporal truth’’ (Gearhart 180).
And while the creation of the Lord Almighty no longer appeared
perfect in all its parts, humankind’s secularized progress from imperfect
savagery, through barbarism, to ‘‘the laws of today’’ was then imagined
as an empirically observable telos. Progress was observable in the sense
that it was not simply something that could be grasped by history—the
science of a past that no one can see any longer—but the subject matter
of geography. Progress, in other words, was understood by Montesquieu
as a series of contiguous, observable places. ‘‘Savage’’ could no longer be
for Montesquieu the myth of a prehistoric past impossible for the sci-
entist to observe, but an ethnographic space open still to the gaze of
the analyst: ‘‘savage’’ was the ‘‘new world’’ of Louisiana (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 2:292) and of America in general (2:536), which had not yet
entered the West; savage was Siberia (2:537), as was part of North Africa
(2:602). In these places resided the observable origin of historical prog-
ress that the reportages of merchants, travelers, local historians, and
missionaries had but begun, ethnographically, to reconstruct.
Geography was, then, becoming the new organizing principle of Mon-
tesquieu’s theory of progress. History was, like a branch of the ars memo-
randi, a progress best represented as a movement from one place to
MONTESQUIEU’S NORTH AND SOUTH 77
another. Barbarity was its second stage, observable in the farming tribes
of North Africa (2:602), in the despotic regimes of the Near East (2:537),
in the customs of India (2:478), and, ‘‘no matter what others say,’’ in
those of China (1:1358). Barbarous was a place of history, where nomadic
hunting had been successfully replaced by a farming culture rooted in
the communal territory (2:537). Barbarous, more important, was a place
where ‘‘histories always feel servitude’’ (2:537).
History was thus spatialized, and time converted into place: Asia,
Africa, and America represented old, prehistoric moments in the geog-
raphy of universal history. They ‘‘were assigned a place ‘elsewhere’ ’’ of
the present, marginalized as the not-yet of the European ‘‘structure of
time’’ (Chakrabarty 8). It was in Europe, and in Europe only, that the
historical passage from barbarity to ‘‘the laws of today’’ could finally be
observed.
Europe, indeed, was the present—or, in fact, it was the synthesis of
human history, the place of the final fulfillment of modernity overcom-
ing a past of barbarity.∞≥ In the Pensées that Montesquieu was collecting
for his eventually aborted attempt at writing a universal history, we read
that Greece had opened nothing less than a ‘‘new time’’: ‘‘In those new
times, the fervor for liberty gave them [Greeks] love for the country,
heroic courage, and hatred of kings—and this drove them to do great
things’’ (Oeuvres 1:1364). Love of freedom was the ‘‘proof of the novelty
of the Greeks’’ in the telos of universal history. If savagery and barbarism
were, then, prehistorical stages, true history seemed to open, for Mon-
tesquieu, with the ‘‘new times’’ of freedom. This new history was the
story of freedom’s unfolding: ‘‘History is thus converted into a tale about
the furtherance of virtue’’ or a ‘‘moral success story’’ (Wolf 5). Moreover,
this was a story that coincided with a place—Europe, whose ‘‘circum-
stances,’’ comments a reader of Montesquieu, ‘‘are always contained
within the story of liberty’’ (Courtois 321).∞∂
Rome—after Greece, and for only a short while—represented the sec-
ond stage of the European progress to freedom, at least ‘‘until this de-
mocracy [Rome] became corrupted’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 1:1369).
With the fall of Rome, it was then ‘‘our German fathers’’ (2:329)—‘‘The
people of the North of Europe, source of freedom’’ (1:1354)—who came
to answer the historical task of realizing liberty in Europe once and
for all.
German, like its counterpart Roman, was a term loaded with politi-
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cal overtones in Montesquieu’s France: Romanists imagined the French
monarchy as the ideal heir of the absolute powers of the Roman em-
peror; Germanists, instead, argued for a Germanic origin of France, in
which the monarch’s powers were subject to a check by the intermediate
feudal nobility—intermediate because this nobility would mediate polit-
ically between the interests of the monarch and those of amorphous
servant masses with no rights which the eighteenth century called, with
no hint of Romantic and nationalist connotations, ‘‘the people’’ (‘‘peo-
ple as a social, rather than a national entity,’’ writes Hof 74). Hardly any
argument about Rome and Germania, in fact, was free from political
overtones in this context. Attempts to sever France from southern and
specifically Roman origins had noticeably begun at the time of the Galli-
can schism of the fifteenth century, and a politico-religious question had
soon turned into a wider cultural one concerning the relation of France
with Rome. Put simply: was France the heir of Rome, or was its ancestry
to be located somewhere else, as in the German forests? For François
Hotman, author of Franco-Gallia (1573), the German conquest of French
Gaul had brought to the country a love for freedom and equality (broth-
erhood had to wait for two more centuries!) and had dispelled the
despotism with which Hotman identified the Romans. Politically, this
meant—for Hotman before Montesquieu—that ‘‘the monarch’s absolute
power in France was therefore an usurpation of that primitive [German]
freedom, and needed some correction’’ (Carravetta 46).
Translating such question in philological terms, Guillame de Postel’s
De originibus of 1538 (echoed in 1580 by Joachim Périon’s Linguae gallicae
origine) had steadfastly refuted, for instance, a Latin origin of the French
language. Still in the Encyclopédie, and until the emergence of German
Romantic philology,∞∑ an independence of the French language from
Latin was in fact de rigueur in antiabsolutist circles—and an argument to
the contrary was a clear avocation of monarchic unlimited power.
Following Martin Thom, I should observe that this dispute had very
important bearing on theories and historical chronologies of Europe.
The question was whether modern Europe had originated in the Medi-
terranean, during classical times; or whether it had begun in the Middle
Ages, with the Northern Franks’ destruction of the Roman Empire.
Romanists were ready to ‘‘condemn rather than celebrate the medieval
order’’ (Thom 26), whereas the Germanists, anticipating a Romantic
cult of the Middle Ages that I will discuss in chapter 4, made modern
Europe originate from a northern overcoming of ancient and Mediterra-
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nean Europe. In other words, the antithesis was not simply a political
one pitting against each other the Romanist defenders of absolute mon-
archy and the Germanist proponents of an aristocratic middle class
between monarch and third estate. The antithesis was also, in the full
sense of the word, geopolitical: whereas Germanism ‘‘celebrated the
contribution of the Aryan nomadic tribes to European culture,’’ Roman-
ism, instead, ‘‘argued that it was the urban traditions of Egypt, Phoenicia
and Asia Minor that had created a basis for civilization in the Mediterra-
nean’’ that had peaked with Rome (Thom 27).
Far from ‘‘de-mythologizing’’ (as claimed by Hulliung 60) the myth of
either a Roman or a German origin of Europe (ergo France), Montes-
quieu was ready to take from the diatribes of Romanists and Germanists
a twofold conclusion: Roman laws (in political terms, monarchical abso-
lutism) belonged to an ancient cycle of history that had by now ended
with the fall of Rome; German laws (i.e., monarchical power mediated
by the nobility) had opened yet a new historical cycle—modernity—that
had now climaxed in France. The admonition addressed to the French
monarchy was clear: in Louis Althusser’s words, absolute power was an
‘‘ancient’’ form of government, and a reintroduction of absolutism in
France ‘‘today’’ would have meant a regress into history’s past; ‘‘modern
times belong to feudal monarchy, and feudal monarchy belongs to mod-
ern times’’ (64–65).
I will get in a moment to Montesquieu’s understanding of feudal
monarchy as a separation of powers between king and nobility and the
foundation of modern freedoms. What I should notice first is the idio-
syncratic way in which Montesquieu translated the political split be-
tween Germanists and Romanists in his own geohistorical terms. Ger-
mans and Romans, in other words, became for him concepts dividing
Europe into two complementary antitheses, and its history into an an-
cient and a modern time. Book 4 had already established, in some Mani-
chaean way, the ‘‘Di√erences of the E√ects of Education in the Ancients
and the Moderns,’’ as the title goes. Also a part of book 21 had been
devoted to ‘‘the principal di√erence between the commerce of the an-
cients and the moderns.’’ In truth, De l’esprit des lois in its entirety was
committed to contrasting the ‘‘tyrannical and arbitrary principles’’ that
were ‘‘guided by ancient histories’’ to ‘‘our modern reason’’ (2:379). Ger-
mania and Rome were now the places and times of all these di√erences.
Rome, southern and Mediterranean Rome, stood as the synecdoche of
an ancient past that no longer was. It was not only Rome as a historical
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empire that was ancient, premodern, and precommercial: ‘‘their [the
Romans’] genius, their glory, their military education, and the form
of their government kept them from commerce’’ (2:632). But also con-
temporary Rome, the one Montesquieu had seen in the present of 1729,
was a premodern, precommercial space where ‘‘every one is at his ease
except those who labor, those who cultivate the arts, those who are
industrious, those who have land, those who are engaged in trade’’
(2:713). Not Rome as a historical empire but Rome as a place emerges as
‘‘ancient.’’ What is Rome, then? Rome, simply, is the past—the time of
Europe’s yore that archeology and tourism are already reclaiming for the
northern gaze: ‘‘We can never leave the Romans; so it is that still today, in
their capital, we overlook the new palaces and go look for the ruins of the
past’’ (2:414).
Against this backward and southern place, ‘‘our German fathers’’ open
instead the way to modernity. ‘‘In northern regions a machine robust
and well built but heavy finds pleasure in whatever is apt to throw the
spirits into motion’’ (2:477). What this meant was that, if ‘‘mankind are
influenced by various causes,’’ and if ‘‘in each country, as any one of
these causes acts with more force, the others weaken in proportion,’’ one
could then conclude that climate was the strongest cause in the south
(Rome), history in the north (Germania). The historical progress from
ancientness to modernity remained the prerogative of a northern spirit
‘‘in motion’’: ‘‘According to Montesquieu, climate in the north and in the
temperate zones is such that in the end it has little visible e√ect on
political institutions. It is in the zones close to the equator, according to
Montesquieu, that climate has a determining role in a direct sense . . . it is
in the ‘south’ where the particular circumstances of climate have a di-
rectly determining e√ect’’ (Gearhart 187).
Only Europe, compared to the savagery and barbarity of other conti-
nents, has a history. In a way, history is Europe, whereas other continents
are only fragments of its past stages. Yet history is also a progress that
goes from an ancient south—‘‘a bad country’’ (un mauvais pays) gov-
erned by climate—to the modern north—‘‘a better one’’ (un [pays] meil-
leur) (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:532–33). It was in this better north that
one had to look, then, to discover the traces of Europe’s modernity: its
constitutional freedoms; its forms of government (2:409); and, above all,
its most modern institution of all—private property.
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Gallic Feudalism
These Romans are fools!
—RENÉ GOSCINNY AND ALBERT UDERZO, Asterix le Gaulois
What François Bernier had gained after his thirteen years of travels in
the Mogul Empire (first published in 1663 as Mémoires sur quelques
a√aires de l’Empire Mogol) was the undisturbed certainty—reinforced
rather than weakened by the very fact ‘‘that he failed to grasp the basic
tenets of Brahamanism’’ (Mukherjee 11)—that freedom was a uniquely
European good, and that such uniqueness had something to do with an-
other uniquely European good—private property. The Other of Europe
—Oriental India in this case—was despotic not so much because of
Aristotle’s climatic conditions, but simply because lacking of a concept
of private property: ‘‘The King is proprietor of all the lands in the
empire, there can exist neither dukedoms nor marquisates, nor can any
family be found possessed of wealth arising from a domain and living
upon its own patrimony’’ (Bernier 227). Di√erently than Francis Bacon,
who believed that knowledge is power, Bernier rather believed that prop-
erty is power, and that on its fair division resides a fair division of
political authority. What had made Europe free, for Bernier, was the rise
of a propertied class: ownership had entailed all subsequent divisions of
power, and led, as a necessary consequence, to constitutionalism, free-
dom, justice, and wealth. As Bernier concluded his address to Colbert,
the minister of finances for Louis xiv, he wrote: ‘‘Yes, my dear Lord, to
conclude briefly I must repeat it; take away the right of private property
in land and you introduce as a sure and necessary consequence tyranny,
slavery, injustice, beggary and barbarism’’ (Bernier 238).
With the Travels in the Mogul Empire Bernier had thus introduced a
new commonplace, complementary to the climatological one, in the
rhetorical distinctions of free Europe from the despotic Orient. Henri de
Boulainvilliers, in the Histoire de l’ancien gouvernement de France (1727),
had brought the question of the relationship between property and
freedom to the fore when he had maintained that despotism resulted
from ‘‘the barbaric law of the Orient [which] annihilated private prop-
erty’’ (qtd. in Venturi, ‘‘Oriental Despotism’’ 139). Montesquieu had little
patience for Boulainvilliers (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:891); but the idea of
private property as the foundation for European freedoms certainly
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proved an attractive one, at least to the extent that private property
meant for him an overcoming of the state of nature and a historical
progress toward civil liberty: ‘‘As men renounced their natural indepen-
dence to live under political laws, they also renounced the natural com-
munity of goods to live under civil laws. Those first laws established
freedom; the second, property’’ (2:767).
Freedom and private property were, then, the two sides of the same
coin—of the di√erence, that is, between Europe and the rest of the world.
The problem, for Montesquieu, was that both Bernier and Boulain-
villiers had seen private property as something short of miraculous,
which ‘‘suddenly appeared over all Europe without being connected
with any of the former institutions’’ (2:883). Once again, Montesquieu’s
scientific ambitions could not allow for miracles to go unexplained:
‘‘I should think my work imperfect if I did not speak about these laws’’
that established freedom and private property at the same time (2:883).
Book 30 of De l’esprit des lois, announced as a ‘‘Theory of Feudal Laws,’’
served as Montesquieu’s explanation of Europe’s miracle. Feudalism was,
with an allusion to Virgil’s Georgics, the metaphoric ‘‘root’’ from which
Europe had grown tall: ‘‘The feudal laws form a very beautiful prospect.
A venerable old oak raises its lofty head to the skies, the eye sees from
afar its spreading leaves; upon drawing nearer, it perceives the trunk but
does not discern the root; one must look under the ground to discover
it’’ (Montesquieu 2:883–84).
Digging around the tree of European freedoms, Montesquieu found
the roots of feudalism. That such roots were firmly implanted in north-
ern soil should not, at this point, come as a surprise. Briefly, this was the
argument of book 30: the ‘‘dark labyrinth’’ of the history of feudalism
brings us back to the German laws (2:884). When the German princes
were fighting the Romans, they instituted laws, which rewarded the most
valorous soldiers by elevating them to the rank of ‘‘companions,’’ and by
compensating them with the fruits of the booty. These nomadic princes
had no lands to give away; the companions were, then, not proper
feudatories, but early antecedents of them (2:885–86). Companions were
subsequently transformed into so-called antrustiones when the Ger-
man tribes of the Franks founded a monarchy in what had been Roman
Gaul; the princes now had lands to give away as revocable rewards. The
‘‘unique property’’ of the prince was, for the first time in human history,
divided (2:887). Vassalage grew from the institution of the antrustiones
when growingly powerful landlords started opposing the king during
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the Merovingian and Carolingian periods: they obtained that land prop-
erty be made hereditary and irrevocable for their descendants; and they
started attracting to their sphere of authority all the freemen that had
been, until then, under the tutelage of the monarch. As fiefs became
patrimonial, the vassals grew into an aristocracy by birth: its titles and
power were now perpetual and no longer depending on the discretion of
the king (2:890–92). Finally, the authority of the king was counter-
balanced by the growing authority of the aristocracy: privatization of
property had then created the presuppositions for a political division of
power, and for the political liberties of the Franks (2:892). This first divi-
sion of power, in turn, engenders other ones, and becomes the founding
stone of European freedom: ‘‘There is no freedom if judicial power is not
separated from legislative and executive powers’’ (2:397).
Feudalism thus confirmed Bernier’s theory: private property was
the cause for the growing influence of the European aristocracy, which
served to balance the otherwise absolute power of the king-despot found
in the east. Such confirmation, however, also produced two corollaries:
that the barbarous and prehistoric east dispensed altogether with any
concept of private property (in chapter 5 of this book I will discuss some
dissenting opinions); and that ancient Roman property was not real or
modern property. In the early Roman republic, Montesquieu explained,
possessions were not patrimonial but personal. Instead of being inher-
ited from father to son, property was ‘‘disposed through a popular as-
sembly’’ (2:780). In the times of Justinian, on the other hand, private
property was patrimonial, but fragmented, at the death of the owner,
between all sons and daughters. The e√ect of these laws of transmission
was to render impossible any accumulation of power alternative to the
emperor’s (2:789): without patrilineal inheritance of private property,
the republic was doomed to end with the dissolution of Caesarism. It
was only with the Franks that the supposedly ancient history of property
took a new and modern turn toward the feudal establishment of patri-
monial assets, and the consequent creation of an alternative source of
power concentrated in the nobility. Modern Europe, as the overcoming
of barbarity and the foundation of a new mediated sovereignty, then
came into being with Charlemagne, who remains Montesquieu’s very
personification of the spirit of modern Europe: ‘‘Charlemagne’s contin-
uous victories, the sweetness and justice of his government, seemed to
found a new monarchy . . . Arts and Sciences seemed to reappear. One
can say that the people of France was destroying Barbarity’’ (1:1095).
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If Europe was, since Aristotle, the land of freedom, Frankish patrimo-
nial law was for Montesquieu the only conceivable origin of Europe. It
was also the origin of a new end of history, which was neither despotism
(Asia) nor colonialism (the South), but rather the progress of man to
freedom and commercial wealth. In theorizing such origin, old classical
distinctions acquired a new and modern flavor: the freedom that Europe
could boast vis-à-vis Oriental despotism was now reframed to embody
the needs of a rising capitalist Europe concerned less with climate and
abstract ideals than with ‘‘the preservation of every man’s right and
property’’ (Locke 5:62).∞∏ More important, the east-west antithesis was
supplemented by a new one that divided Europe into a before and an
after of the institution of private property—between an ancient pre-
capitalist south and a modern and capitalist north. The combination of
climate (nature) and private property (culture), then, served Montes-
quieu ‘‘to establish the intrinsic superiority of Europe over the rest of the
world, Asia in particular. At the same time, it provide[d] the basis for
Montesquieu’s assertions of the superiority of one part of Europe over
another’’ (Moe 26–27).
Put di√erently, after 1748 Europe coincided with a theory of history in
which the south figured already as the negative term—nature, the past—
posited by the spirit of a progressive north on the path toward its self-
definition and self-realization. History, understood metaphysically as
universal history, was a progress in space—from an ancient south to a
modern north. At the basis of this theory was climatology, along with
some bizarre experiment on a sheep’s tongue. Not much, one would
think, to make the theory credible. But the ways of the rhetorical uncon-
scious are many.
Coda
Who does not know how much the question of the influence of climate
has been studied, along with the importance that Montesquieu gave to
climate! If one considers the direct influence of climate on man, that
influence may well be less powerful than it has been supposed. But the
indirect influence of climate.
—FRANÇOIS PIERRE GUILLAUME GUIZOT,
Histoire de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l’Empire romain
jusqu’à la rèvolution française
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In 1769, William Robertson, a firm proponent of the theory of northern
feudalism as the origin of European modernity, trustingly echoed Mon-
tesquieu’s climatology of northern pride:
The same circumstances that prevented the barbarous nations from be-
coming populous, contributed to inspire, or to strengthen, the martial
spirit by which they were distinguished. Inured by the rigour of their
climate, or the poverty of their soil, to hardships which rendered their
bodies firm and their minds vigorous; accustomed to a course of life
which was a continual preparation for action; and disdaining every oc-
cupation but that of war or of hunting, they undertook and prosecuted
their military enterprises with an ardour and impetuosity, of which men
softened by the refinements of more polished times can scarcely form any
idea. (5)
Around ten years later, however, Edward Gibbon had to entertain the
possibility that climatology, questioned as a science, could interfere with,
and weaken, his theory put forth in The Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire. Did this mean that, along with climatology, one had to throw
away anything built with it? Certainly not! Even after the fall, he wrote,
‘‘the name of Rome must yet command our involuntary respect: the
climate (whatsoever may be its influence) was no longer the same’’
(3:978). Whatsoever may be its influence . . . . Luckily, climatology was
no longer necessary for Gibbon to claim that the Germans, not the
Romans, were ‘‘the rude ancestors of the most polished nations of mod-
ern Europe’’ (1:1); or that ‘‘the northern countries of Europe . . . were
filled with a hardy race of barbarians, who despised life when it was
separated from freedom’’ (1:32). What had replaced climatology to give
scientific authority to these claims? Empirical historiography had: rather
than dissecting goats, Gibbon consulted archives, annotated pages, com-
pared documents, evaluated circumstances—and, above all, he read so
carefully ‘‘the comprehensive genius of the president de Montesquieu’’
(472n). Not Montesquieu the climatologist, mind you, but Montes-
quieu the legal historian of Gallic feudalism, the one who had claimed
that constitutional freedoms were first ‘‘found in the northern woods’’
(Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:407): ‘‘The Franks, after they mingled with
their Gallic subjects, might have imparted the most valuable of human
gifts, a spirit and system of constitutional liberty . . . which had
been sketched in the woods of Germany’’ (Gibbon 2:489). The northern
woods of Montesquieu thus returned in Gibbon’s woods of Germany.
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Montesquieu, who had to find in the empirical science of climatology
the legitimacy for his theory, was transformed into a legitimating au-
thority himself. The process—from climatology to German freedoms—
had been bracketed away, when not even denounced as faulty. Its end
result, however, began to return as the rhetorical unconscious: it had
become archival truth.
From Scottish historians to Italian physiologists, physiognomists, bi-
ologists, and anthropologists—the gap was not an unbridgeable one for
the rhetorical unconscious. Montesquieu’s Europe became ethnography
for Cesare Lombroso; climatology turned into fieldwork and biology:
social maturity, instead, remained a progress from the prehistory of a
homo meridionalis under the yoke of climate and natural factors to the
full realization of the homo europaeus (see Teti 154). Perfectly sociable,
perfectly cultured, ‘‘an intelligent being’’ ready to ‘‘transgress the laws
that God has established,’’ the homo europaeus was the distinguished
member of this new and modern Europe in formation—a refined Re-
public of Letters that the homo meridionalis awkwardly entered with that
constant fear of being mistaken for the delivery boy of the Café Orientale
downstairs.
3 Republics of Letters
WHAT IS EUROPEAN LITERATURE?
Which literature, whose world?
—DAVID DAMROSCH, What Is World Literature?
The concept of a republic of letters—ideal of ‘‘an intellectual community
transcending space and time’’ (Dibon 26)—had been circulating widely in
Europe for quite some time. Never before or after the publication of the
monthly Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, however, had the republic
seemed such a reality: from 1684 to 1687, Pierre Bayle had run and edited
the journal with the purpose of transcending national boundaries and of
creating an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual toleration among
cosmopolitan and learned readers. The son of a French Protestant family,
Bayle knew well how constricting national boundaries and laws could be
for intellectual research and curiosity: with the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes and the reimposition of state religion in 1685, Bayle had to re-
nounce his faith in order to continue his studies at the Jesuit school of
Toulouse. When, after the completion of his courses, he reconverted to
Protestantism, he became the victim of utter discrimination and intol-
erance. His works were attacked and censored, and his brother was even
jailed because of Bayle’s ‘‘heretic’’ publications. When he managed to flee
to Holland to join the Protestant Academy of Sedan, Bayle soon started to
look for ways of overcoming state censorship and intellectual silencing.
His ultimate aim was the creation of a class of scholars whose reflection
would be free and unhindered by any state: truly cosmopolitan scholars,
in short. His main instrument to reach such goal was the Nouvelles.
In 1751, only three years after the publication of De l’esprit des lois,
Voltaire reminisced (in Le siècle de Louis xiv) ‘‘that happy century’’
crowned by the Nouvelles as the beginning of a new era of intellectual
cooperation that the journals, salons, and—last but not the least—the
Encyclopédie were now to bring back to life:
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A Republic of Letters was established imperceptibly in Europe, despite
wars and despite religious di√erences. All sciences, all arts thus received
mutual help. Academies have formed this Republic. Italy and Russia have
been united by literature [unies par les lettres]. English, Germans, and
French went to study in Leyde. The famous physician Boerhaave was
consulted at the same time by the pope and the czar. His greatest stu-
dents have attracted foreigners in the same way, and have become in a
way the doctors of all nations. Those who really know, in any branch of
knowledge, have tightened their bond with this great society of learning,
scattered everywhere, and everywhere independent. (Oeuvres historiques
1027)
As utopia, the Republic of Letters represented the possibility of a free
flow and exchange of ideas unhindered by religious, political, or ter-
ritorial divisions: As Annie Barnes has remarked, academies, univer-
sities, journals, symposia, public debates, and even epistolary exchanges
promised the formation of a cosmopolitan ‘‘ideal state’’ based on ‘‘inter-
national intellectual cooperation’’ (qtd. in Goodman 15). What politics
and religions divided, lettres, said Voltaire, united.
A Theory of Literature
Literature: this word is one of those vague terms that are so
frequent in all languages . . . . Literature . . . designates, in all of
Europe, knowledge of works of beauty, an acquaintance with
history, poetry, eloquence, and criticism.
—VOLTAIRE, Dictionnaire philosophique
What Voltaire meant by lettres is probably best understood by making
reference to the homonymous entry signed by Louis, the chevalier de
Jaucourt for the Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des
arts et des métiers, par une société de gens de lettres:
Letters. This word designates in general the enlightenment [lumières]
produced by study, in particular the study of belles lettres or literature. In
this last sense, one distinguishes literate people [gens de lettres], who only
cultivate the erudition of varied and amusing amenities, from those who
devote themselves to abstract sciences, and to sciences of a more sensible
utility. Yet one cannot acquire them [abstract and practical sciences] to
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an eminent degree without knowledge of lettres. Derives that lettres and
proper sciences have, among them, the tightest bonds, liaisons, and rela-
tions. It is the task of the Encyclopédie to demonstrate that . . . lettres are
the key to sciences; that sciences, on their part, contribute to the perfec-
tion of lettres . . . . Grammar, Eloquence, Poetry, History, Criticism—in
one word, all the parts of Literature (Littérature)—will be seriously defec-
tive, if the sciences do not reform and perfect them . . . one must be a
philosopher and a literate man [homme de lettres] at the same time.
(Diderot 9.409)∞
For lettres one must then not only understand literature (grammar,
eloquence, poetry, history, and criticism), which limits itself to ‘‘knowl-
edge.’’ Lettres also includes the capability to translate such knowledge
into practice and into things ‘‘of a more sensible utility.’’ Letters are the
synthesis of the arts, the ‘‘amusing’’ literature, and sciences, which are
eminently useful. Such a synthesis is possible only through philosophy—
the abstract science—that draws from the otherwise useless knowledge
of literature a method for its usability. What is important, however, is
first of all the di√erence between literature and letters. Hence the ques-
tion of erudition: literature, in and by itself, is only a sterile, unproduc-
tive amenity. Its pleasure, as Jaucourt seems to notice with some degree
of matter-of-fact skepticism, is the pleasure of talking well and name-
dropping: to what possible use?
Sure enough, literature is necessary—the key, as it were—to produce
anything of some utility. We know the logic from more recent discus-
sions: the workforce—Jaucourt’s ‘‘trades’’—needs ‘‘literature’’ (I guess
today we call it ‘‘literacy’’) to read manuals, be flexible, on top of a world
that changes rapidly, and happy. Literature, in other words, is necessary
—as a means, however, not as an end. Jaucourt writes: ‘‘Literature (Lit-
térature), s.f. (Sciences, Belles Lettres, Antiq.). General term that in-
dicates erudition, the knowledge of Belles Lettres and of the subjects
related to it. Look under Lettres, where they are praised, and where has
been demonstrated their intimate unity with proper Sciences’’ (Diderot
9.594). As a matter of fact, literature’s ‘‘intimate unity’’ with the sciences
had been hardly ‘‘demonstrated’’ under Lettres, which had in fact taken
such unity apodictically, while leaving to the whole Encyclopédie the
arduous task to prove anything. (Brilliant method, in fact, if you think
about it: it is not that I cannot demonstrate anything—I have already
done it elsewhere!) At any rate, Jaucourt’s point is that literature should
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be (whether or not this can be demonstrated) intimately tied to the
practical sciences: left by itself, literature is vacuous knowledge, ‘‘erudi-
tion’’ and, in one word, ‘‘pedantry.’’ How unfortunate, then, that many
men of letters, ‘‘today,’’ have become such pedantic bores. The very
expression man of letters has turned—vox populi!—into a ‘‘most o√en-
sive insult’’ (‘‘injure plus o√ensante’’) (Diderot 9:594). All this has hap-
pened not because of literature’s own faults, but because its pedantic
clerks have betrayed literature’s true mission. And what is, exactly, such
mission? To o√er a key to praxis, no doubt; but also, and more impor-
tant, to create, maintain, and improve the perfectly polite and urbane
society of the Republic of Letters:
Despite the bitter criticism of ignorant bu√oons, we dare to assure our
readers that only the letters (lettres) can polish the spirit, perfect taste,
and lend grace to the Sciences. However, to be profound in Literature
(Littérature), we must abandon those authors who do nothing but em-
bellish things, and rest on the sources of antiquity: on the knowledge of
religion, of politics, of government, of customs, of habits, of ceremonies,
of games, of celebrations, of sacrifices e spectacles that was proper to
ancient Greece and Rome. (Diderot 9.595)
Apart from a continuous (and not always convincing) attempt at
separating lettres from littérature, what is clear is that a modern notion of
literature, overcoming a stale cult of Greek and Roman antiquities, is
prescribed here for the reader of the Encyclopédie: not literature as erudi-
tion, then, but literature as key to practical knowledge; not literature as a
cult of the past, but as praxis on the present and creation of a progressive
future; not literature as knowledge for knowledge’s sake, in the end, but
literature as the formation of citizens—of a society of polished spirits,
perfect taste, and graceful sciences. This is literature, in sum, understood
as the basis of the transnational Republic of Letters of poets, doctors, and
mathematicians already praised in Le siècle de Louis xiv .
In the entry on Lettres, Jaucourt had in fact advised his reader to ‘‘look
under Literate People.’’ Here we find, penned by Voltaire, a very clear
statement regarding the cosmopolitan nature of littérature and lettres at
the time of the Encyclopédie:
Literate People. This word corresponds to that of grammarians. For the
Greeks and the Romans, grammarian was a man versed not only in
grammar properly speaking, but in all branches of knowledge . . . . The
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meaning of this word is today more extended than it was for the Greeks
and the Romans. The Greeks only knew their language. The Romans
studied only Greek. Today, the man of letters adds to the study of Greek
and Latin also the study of Italian, Spanish, and, above all, English.
(Diderot 7.599)
More sympathetic than Jaucourt to Greeks and Romans, Voltaire, too,
is eager to stress the di√erence between literature—or, more precisely,
the man of letters—of today and the one of the olden days. Once mono-
lingual, this man has become today a true cosmopolite: he speaks in
tongues! The knowledge he needs to possess is not simply that of his
home country but that of the universe. Literature, in sum, is not na-
tional, but universal.
No matter if this man of letters was not a woman; and no matter if
a hierarchy—‘‘above all, English’’—is already becoming apparent here:
cosmopolitan in spirit, multilingual in language, Voltaire really saw the
Republic of Letters as the true realization of a benign universalism—a
multiculturalism of sorts already pitted against the yet unborn Nicolas
Chauvin of Rochefort and against the already dead Jacques Bénigne
Bossuet. Let me insist on this point: Voltaire believed in his own univer-
salism. For its sake, he had (pitilessly) demoted Bossuet’s Discours sur
l’histoire universelle to a ‘‘Discourse on a part of universal History’’ (Vol-
taire, Oeuvres complètes 11:158; emphasis mine). What was the problem
with Bossuet? Voltaire did not have a word for it, but it was, undoubt-
edly, his Eurocentrism. How could Bossuet—Voltaire would complain at
the opening of the Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations (1756)—
dismiss the ‘‘powerful empire’’ of the Arabs as un déluge de barbares, an
‘‘overflow of barbarians’’ (Oeuvres complètes 11:158)? How could he fail to
mention China—where, after all, silk, paper, glass, porcelain, gunpow-
der, and even the printing press had originated (11:171–72)? What kind of
universal history was his, when it did not even refer to India—as if
the most beautiful, intelligent, and human game, chess, had not been
invented there, along with the idea of the popular state and many other
things still (11:185–89)?
All this truly irritated Voltaire. A universal history, like an accurately
cosmopolitan knowledge, had to extend beyond Europe. Even more so,
since in comparison to such antique civilizations as the Chinese, the
Indian, and the Arab, Europe was just a mere parvenu on the scene of
universal history: ‘‘From any point we look at it, we must acknowledge
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that we were only born yesterday’’ (11:215). The Chinese, the Indians, and
the Arabs—those same Arabs that Montesquieu had condemned to a
destiny of climatological barbarism—were civilized when the Europeans
were still living in caves. They had literature when we had yowls! So
spoke the voice of cosmopolitan conscience to Voltaire. After that, feel-
ing certainly good about his enlightened refusal of Bossuet’s Eurocen-
trism, Voltaire could earnestly go on: yes, those people were civilized
before we were, and developed their literatures before we did—but then
they no longer progressed, as we did instead. All those civilizations,
which came to history before Europe, have not managed to progress
beyond a certain stage; whereas the Europeans, who came later, have
continued, and continue still, to progress on the path of history:
We ask ourselves why the Chinese, having gone so far in older times, have
always remained at the same stage; why their astronomy is so old and so
dim-witted; why their music still ignores semitones. It looks as if nature
has given that kind of men, so di√erent than ours, organs made to find all
at once what is strictly necessary, and incapable to go beyond that. We, on
the contrary, developed our knowledge much later, and have since per-
fected it very rapidly. (11:173)
Bossuet has certainly been left behind by Voltaire’s more enlightened
cosmopolitanism. A comparison with Montesquieu, however, still seems
necessary. Rather than being ‘‘barbarians,’’ Arabs, Indians, and Chinese
did possess for Voltaire beautiful and refined civilizations. This is not as
blunt as Montesquieu’s Europeanism, then. Voltaire’s cosmopolitanism,
however, comes to very similar conclusions to those of De l’esprit des lois:
history is a teleology of progress that moves, ‘‘like the sun’’ (‘‘en suivant
le cours apparent du soleil’’; Voltaire, Oeuvres complètes 11:184), from east
to west. Whereas the east is the beginning of universal history, Europe is
its modernity. If not history tout court, at least progress is the peculiar
endowment of Europe—the only continent, in fact, where knowledge
does not come ‘‘all at once,’’ but through stages of continuous evolution.
As proof of Europe’s advancements and eastern stagnation, it is enough
to look at literature; and since ‘‘one of the infallible proofs of the superi-
ority of a nation in the spiritual arts is the culture perfected by poetry’’
(11:215), Voltaire starts looking at, and comparing, Arab and Chinese
poetry, on the one hand, and European poetry, on the other. Con-
clusion: both Arabs and Chinese had poetry before Europeans did; but
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it was only in the Europe of Augustus and of Louis xiv that poetry
truly improved. If, from poetry, one then goes on to belles lettres, and
from them—the key—to the practical sciences, one single truth seems to
emerge from Voltaire’s cosmopolitan investigation: ‘‘they’’ came before
‘‘we’’ did; but they have remained ‘‘like we were two hundred years ago’’
(11:217). Two hundred years: counting backward from Voltaire, we can
now understand the reason for the superiority of European literature—
Francis Bacon and the scientific revolution. One understands now why,
of all modern language, the man of letters needs to learn ‘‘above all,
English.’’ What Europe had two hundred years ago, and the other conti-
nents did not, was the kind of literature prescribed by the Encyclopédie.
The Arabs had their literary amenities, and the Chinese their erudites.
But only Europe had the true wisdom of gens de lettres like Francis
Bacon, who put knowledge and belles lettres to the service of Jaucourt’s
‘‘more sensible utility.’’
In the meantime, the cosmopolitan overture to the universe predi-
cated by the unwritten constitution of the putative Republic of Letters
brought Voltaire back precisely to Montesquieu’s more frank (pun in-
tended) Europeanism. If literature was now climaxing in Europe, this did
not mean that the Republic of Letters could forgo the study of the
Orient, which, pace Bossuet, was an origin of sorts (Orient, from Latin
origo, or origin, as in the origin of the sun) and had had, as such, its own
literary glories. But this did not mean, either, that Orientals could be
part of the Republic of Letters: they could be objects, but never subjects,
of study. In the words of Hans Bots and Françoise Waquet, the Republic
of Letters ‘‘limited itself to territories identified with the values of [arts
and sciences]—in fact to Europe only’’ (71). As the opening issue of the
Journal des savantes (1665) assumed, authorship itself—the possibility of
being the subject of writing, theorizing, historicizing, or philosophizing
—seemed to be a peculiarly European characteristic: ‘‘The design of this
journal being to inform of what happens in the Republic of Letters, it
will mainly be composed of a precise catalogue of the major books
published in Europe’’ (Bots and Waquet 71; emphasis mine).
The fact is that the universalism of the Republic of Letters, as well as its
cosmopolitanism, remained, in Im Hof ’s expression, ‘‘a purely academic
and theoretical question’’ (104). In practice, the republic was a rather
limited a√air. It included not Europe tout court, but merely its courtly
and mobile nobility, which recognized ‘‘the same rules of class every-
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where: the military code of honor for the o≈cers; duty and faithfulness;
the matrimony with persons of equal standing only’’ (Hof 103). In this
restricted sense, the Republic of Letters had become the figure of identity
for Voltaire’s Europe: through publications such as the Gazette littéraire
de l’Europe (1764), the republic managed to establish a ‘‘good taste’’
common in the courts all over Europe; it gave Europe one common
literary canon shared ‘‘from Paris to Saint Petersburg’’ (Marino 13), and it
provided courtly Europe with an imaginary ‘‘single body, a cultural and
spiritual unity distinguished from the rest of the world’’ (Chabod 117).
Following Montesquieu’s hint about the fundamentally ‘‘Oriental’’ na-
ture of the European south, Voltaire’s Essai had observed that ‘‘the Ori-
ental climate, nearer to the South, obtains everything from nature; while
we, in our northern West [Occident septentrional ], we owe everything to
time, to commerce, and to a belated industry’’ (Oeuvres complètes 11:158–
59). The east, like the south, owes everything to a nature that, in Montes-
quieu’s words, gives ‘‘all the riches of life, and few wants.’’ Europe, west-
ern Europe, is produced instead by ‘‘time.’’ It is, as De l’esprit des lois had
remarked, the transgression of ‘‘the laws that God has established.’’ Na-
ture versus culture: history coincides, then, for Voltaire as for Montes-
quieu, with Europe itself. Consider for instance Voltaire’s entry for ‘‘His-
tory’’ in the Encyclopédie, where Europe, with France at its center, would
be the degree zero of history, the one and only perspective of history into
which any other needs to be translated:
If you make a history of France, you are not compelled to describe the
course of the Seine and the Loire rivers; but if you give to the public the
conquests of the Portuguese in Asia, it is necessary a topography of the
discovered countries. One needs that you take your reader by the hand
along Africa, the coasts of Persia and India. One expects from you some
instructions about the customs, the laws, and the habits of these nations,
which are new for Europe. (Diderot 8.221)
If Europe’s development is belated vis-à-vis the Orient, this is because
the time of Europe is modernity—the only possible perspective from
which history, the past, can be conceived qua past. Europe only can
retroactively look at the past. The Orient, instead, is the past. Only Eu-
rope, therefore, can be the subject of history. What also emerges from
Voltaire’s discussion of the ‘‘Oriental climate, nearer to the South,’’ is that
Europe is divided into a western Europe—the antithesis of the Orient—
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and a southern one—the dialectical negation and internal Other of the
Occident septentrional. The south of Europe, very much like the exotic
Orient, is a place of nature. It owes nothing to progress, history, or
the arts and sciences. Like the Orient, southern Europe too developed
early—but did not continue to do so.
Also in this marginalization of the south of Europe, Voltaire’s north-
centric cosmopolitanism was confirmation of, rather than deviation
from, the practice of the Republic of Letters. Bots and Wacquet, again,
remind us that ‘‘Italy seemed [to the self-declared citizens of the re-
public] to be in an inexorable process of decline, which Spain sadly
shared. Portugal did not deserve a mention. . . . The Loire river was a
dividing line; it is in the north that one found the centers of importance:
Rouen, Troyes, Lyon, and, above all, Paris’’ (74). In Voltaire’s words,
neither the Italians nor the Spaniards—the south, that is—but, rather,
the French were the ‘‘legislators’’ of this modern Europe of culture (‘‘les
Français furent les législateurs de l’Europe’’; Oeuvres historiques 1002).
Besides France, only the north—England, ‘‘above all’’—could participate
in the creation of Europe’s modern literature.
We have followed the theorization of French Europe in the previous
chapter on Montesquieu. In fact, it was already by the middle of the
eighteenth century, in the heyday of Bayle’s Nouvelles, that ‘‘French men
of letters saw themselves as the leaders of a project of Enlightenment that
was both cultural and moral, if not political. By representing French
culture as the leading edge of civilization, they identified the cause of
humanity [and certainly of Europe] with their own national causes and
saw themselves as at the same time French patriots and upstanding
citizens of a cosmopolitan Republic of Letters’’ (Goodman 4). ‘‘Far and
away Europe’s greatest power’’ (Davies 579), France was certainly the
seventeenth-century leading cultural force: its châteaux and gardens had
become the object of imitation all over Europe, its cogito the method, its
modernity the standard, its classicism the aesthetics, and its language the
lingua franca of the European cultivated classes from Palermo to Am-
sterdam. As Timothy Reiss maintains in The Meaning of Literature, it was
since the constitution of the Académie Française by Cardinal Richelieu
in 1635 that France had taken his task to legitimate its own values—
‘‘increasing social tranquility, the growth of commerce, the settlement of
military discipline, and the reform of finance and luxury expenditure’’
(70)—as the very logos of a modern Europe moving already, as Jean
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Baptiste Le Ron D’Alembert would soon record, to a capitalist epis-
temology ‘‘greedy of utilizable knowledge’’ (‘‘avides de connoissances
utiles’’; Diderot iv).
Accordingly, France had finished to consolidate, through the work of a
centrally controlled academy, the status of French as ‘‘the ‘most per-
fect of modern’ languages’’ (Reiss 71)—one whose ‘‘genius’’ was to utter
and incarnate the culture of modern Europe. Voltaire, in the preface to
Oedipe (1729), was among those who believed that ‘‘each language has its
own genius, determined by the nature of the construction of its sen-
tences, by the frequency of its vowels or its consonants, its inversions,
and its auxiliary verbs’’ (qtd. in Folkierski 227). Beginning already with
Cartesian linguistics, the supposed genius of the French language was
seen as an immediate propensity for rational discourse. As an index of its
natural rationality, its logical construction—subject, verb, object—was
most often mentioned (see Rosiello; Puppo 42–56; Mercier Faivre 176–
79). Such theses had been abundantly theorized by Dominique Bou-
hours in 1673. The philosophes—the most authoritative of which would
be Antoine Rivarol in 1785—had then further theorized the necessity for
‘‘French as the language of the Republic of Letters’’ (Goodman 21):
‘‘Since our language has spread throughout Europe, we thought that the
time had come to substitute it for Latin, which since the renaissance of
learning had been the language of scholarship. I must say that there is
more excuse for a philosopher to write in French than for a Frenchman
to compose verses in Latin. I would even agree that the use of French has
helped to make the Enlightenment a more universal phenomenon’’ (Di-
derot xxx). As a corollary, even literary good taste, in the words of J. E.
Spingarn, had to be judged against the standard of French: taste was ‘‘the
result of the application of [Cartesian] reason to aesthetic pleasure’’ (18).
Since French, as the naturally rational language, was also the most Carte-
sian, it had then to be the most beautiful as well. French, along with the
literature written in it, had to be elevated to a model of good literary
taste. As Paul Hazard wrote, ‘‘Beauty is reason; and reason is France’’
(Révolution 121).
French literature is the legislating literature; French history the per-
spective on universal history; and French language—which since the
Treaty of Rastadt, 1714, was also the language of European diplomacy
(Duroselle 234)—the language of the French Enlightenment as ‘‘a more
universal phenomenon.’’ In the words of Louis Réau, eighteenth-century
Europe was, fundamentally, a ‘‘French Europe’’; and, as Louis-Antoine
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Caraccioli’s 1776 treatise (obviously written in French) o√ered as an
echo, this was the time best described as Paris, le modèle des nations
étrangères ou l’Europe française. The Encyclopédie, in this context, was
nothing more than a monument erected to this hegemony of France.
Montesquieu himself, who was not new to the collaborative ideals of
the republic (Deuvres 1:21), contributed to the Encyclopédie with an essay
entitled ‘‘Essai sur le goût dans les choses de la nature et de l’art.’’ In 1753,
D’Alembert had asked the president to contribute an essay on despotism
and one on democracy. What D’Alembert in all likelihood expected was
a recapitulation of the very arguments of De l’esprit des lois: Asia is
despotic, Europe is democratic, and the head and heart of this Europe is
France. Montesquieu, instead, wrote about taste, and the essay was pub-
lished in 1757, two years after the author’s death (Shackleton, Essays 103–
7). Sure enough, Montesquieu’s testament was not a masterpiece of
originality: taste is the arbiter of beauty; beauty is that which gives
pleasure; and what gives pleasure is unity in variety. Groundbreaking or
not, however, Montesquieu’s essay intended, rather than repeating the
argument of De l’esprit des lois, to now extend French hegemony from
political to aesthetic issues. In this sense, the ‘‘Essai sur le goût’’ was
symptomatic of an epochal shift in the understanding of Europe: Europe
was to be defined not only in political and climatic terms but also in
cultural ones.≤ Prescriptive in tone—refrain from enjoying the voice
of the Italian castrati; despise the ‘‘insu√erable’’ arias of Italian opera
(Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:1261)—the ‘‘Essai sur le goût’’ educated the
aspiring man of letters to develop good taste: and good taste was not only
defined in a French book—the Encyclopédie—but dictated from France
speaking on behalf of humankind. ‘‘In our present way of being’’; ‘‘the
pleasures of our soul’’ (2:1240–41; emphases mine): was that ‘‘our’’ the
generalization of French taste over all humankind?
The presence of Montesquieu’s Europe in the Encyclopédie, in fact,
went well beyond his actual contribution. At the entry ‘‘Europe,’’ Jau-
court, for instance, wrote that: ‘‘No matter what, Europe remains the
smallest part of the world; yet, as remarks the author of De l’esprit des
lois, Europe has come to such a high degree of power, that history has
hardly anything to compare it to’’ (Diderot 6.211). Montesquieu had
already sanctioned the wonderful uniqueness of modern Europe. And
Montesquieu had prepared the promotion of France, recapitulated in
Jaucourt’s entry about it, as the marvel of the modern Republic of Let-
ters: ‘‘Around the last century, the Arts, the Sciences, Commerce, Navi-
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gation, and the Navy appeared under Colbert, with such an admirable
speed as to astonish Europe’’ (Diderot 6.211, 7.282). Jaucourt’s logic de-
rives from Montesquieu, and the mention of De l’esprit des lois is debt
paid. Yet the uniqueness of Europe is here not only its freedom but
nothing less than what Jaucourt himself had previously called lettres:
The arts, belles lettres or literature, and the more ‘‘sensible utility’’ pro-
duced by arts—commerce and navigation above all.
Letters, then, define the glory, unity, and uniqueness of Europe. What
is Europe, however, for Jaucourt? As the geographer of the Encyclopédie,
Jaucourt had a very clear sense of the way in which geography, after
Montesquieu, confused itself with history, thus forming a spatial chro-
nology of humankind’s progress. If France, with its lettres, was for him
the unquestioned place of modernity, then Italy, on the contrary, as the
entry on the country suggested, was a memento of a time that no longer
is: ‘‘The good days of Italy have eclipsed, and its glory vanished. Its
commerce is past, the source of its riches dried up’’ (Diderot 8.932).
Under ‘‘Spain,’’ not altogether di√erently, we read: ‘‘This beautiful king-
dom, which once impressed great fear on the whole of Europe, has
slowly fallen into such decadence that it can hardly overcome’’ (5.953).
Undoubtedly, neither Italy nor Spain represented modernity. Voltaire
had made a similar point: ‘‘Spain is the country with which we are no
better acquainted than with the most savage parts of Africa, and which
does not deserve the trouble of being known’’ (Oeuvres complètes 1:390–
91; see also Salvio). Spain is, then, preyed on by the Inquisition, a place
arrested in a time of savagery that precedes not only modernity but also
history itself: no doubt, it does not deserve the trouble of being known.
Also Italy, once glorious, fails to enter that very century of Louis xiv
that, with Descartes and the lesson drawn from Bacon, brought Europe
into modernity: in that century, writes Voltaire, ‘‘there was no longer
taste (goût) in Italy’’ (Oeuvres historiques 10002). As Jaucourt then sug-
gested in his article on Europe, being European meant to belong to a part
of the world ‘‘more important than all because of its commerce, its
navigations, its fertility, its intelligence and the industry of its peoples;
because of its knowledge of Arts, Sciences.’’ If neither Italy nor Spain,
however, had participated in this progress of letters, could they be said to
be Europe at all?
In the same way in which Montesquieu had theorized history, climate,
and freedom as a way of theorizing Europe, Voltaire and Jaucourt were
now theorizing letters, literature, and the arts and sciences to theorize the
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Republic of Letters. Such a republic coincided with Europe, and at the
same time was smaller, limited to the Occident septentrional, and bigger,
universal, than the mere geography of Europe. Montesquieu’s geopoliti-
cal argument—Europe is the di√erence of north and south—was recon-
verted by Voltaire and Jaucourt into a geocultural one (Dumont-Wilden
76): Europe was defined by its culture—in this sense, it was a Republic of
Letters, a ‘‘grand republic divided into various states’’ (Voltaire Oeuvres
historiques 620); but this culture had its heart in France. Its past, instead,
was to be found between Italy and Spain. European culture as the culture
of modernity was, then, the historic progress of letters from south to
north, from Greece, through Rome, to the French age of Louis xiv,
unveiled from France as the future of humankind.
A promising future indeed. Yet once southern countries had been
dismissed as remnants of the past, and once France had been patrioti-
cally elevated to the rank of the ‘‘legislator of Europe’’—once these steps
had been taken, the universalistic claim of the Encyclopédie’s cosmopoli-
tanism was doomed to encounter the di≈dence of any parts of human-
kind, let alone Europe, that did not feel exactly French. Was it possible
that, in order to become cultured, modern, and European, one had to
become, also, French? Napoleon had not yet written that ‘‘all men of
genius and all who have gained respect in the republic of letters are
French, no matter what their country’’ (qtd. in Hazard, Révolution 116);
but already by midcentury the sense was that the rhetoric of the arts and
sciences was becoming the voice of French hegemony trying to define
Europe in its image.
In 1750, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had already moved his attack against
the arts and sciences with his ‘‘Discours’’ for the Academy of Dijon.
The thesis of his speech was unequivocal: arts and sciences, taking hu-
mankind out of a ‘‘happy ignorance,’’ had corrupted its morals while
introducing ‘‘luxury, dissolution, and slavery’’ (Oeuvres 3:15), and damn-
ing Europe in an undesirable modernity. Already there, Rousseau’s was
not so much an attack against letters, but one against the philosophes’
understanding of the letters as the bearer of a certain kind of progress
for humankind—Jaucourt’s ‘‘polishing the spirit, perfecting taste, and
giv[ing] grace to sciences.’’ All this polishing, taste, and grace was seen by
Rousseau as an attempt to transform women and men into Parisians—
a√ected, unnatural, and artificial.
In a letter addressed to D’Alembert in 1758, the argument was re-
capped on the occasion of D’Alembert’s suggestion—in the article on
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‘‘Geneva’’ for the Encyclopédie—to open a theater, similar to the ones in
Paris, in Rousseau’s hometown. The suggestion was not received well by
Rousseau, citizen of Geneva. Since the time of the revocation of the edict
of Nantes (1685), Calvinist Geneva (along with Protestant England) had
become a myth (Ramat) in Europe, standing for religious freedom and
all northern, anti-Catholic virtues. As I noted in the chapter on Montes-
quieu, Catholicism and southern despotism were seen as two sides of the
same coin. Paris, after Richelieu and Mazarin, was seen as nothing less
than a betrayal of the northern cause for freedom—religious or other-
wise. Although Montesquieu had tried, in De l’esprit des lois, to remind
France of its northern and Protestant duties, the image of France one
could draw from André De Murault’s Lettre sur les Anglois et les Francois
(1761) or from Voltaire’s Lettres écrits de Londres sur les Anglais et autres
sujets (1734) was that of a reactionary bulwark of anti-Calvinism. Calvin-
ist Geneva, on the contrary, stood as the positive model of a modernity
threatened by Catholic Paris.
Speaking as ‘‘a good citizen of Geneva’’ moved by ‘‘love of country,’’
Rousseau, in the letter, simply argued that the imposition of anything
French would be pernicious for the moral tempter of the Protestant
people of Geneva. If the Republic of Letters was centered on Catholic
Paris, then it was high time to dispel the myth of its universality:
To ask oneself if Spectacles are good or bad in themselves, is to ask oneself
a question that is too vague to answer. . . . Spectacles are for the people . . .
there is, between one People and another People a prodigious diversity of
habits, temperaments, and characters. Man, I agree, is one: but man
modified by Religions, Governments, laws, habits, prejudices, climate,
becomes so di√erent from himself that one should no longer look for
what is good for man in general, but what is good in a specific time and
place. (Oeuvres 5:16)
In other words, such theaters could be good for Paris, but not for the
people of Geneva. The literary standards set in Paris around the En-
cyclopédie were not, for Rousseau, necessarily the same as the norms that
existed elsewhere.
Peculiar, in this context, was Rousseau’s reevaluation of the south as
the place of an original ancientness and of the past. No longer the
commonplace of Montesquieu’s Catholic despotism, but, rather, the
incarnation of a nostalgia for an older way of living that modern Europe,
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with its arts and sciences, had long forgotten to remember, the original
south, before being corrupted by the religion of the pope, was fragment
of a paradise lost: ‘‘In the south the first familial ties were formed; there
the first rendezvous between the two sexes occurred. . . . There were the
first festivals; the feet were restless with joy . . . . [And] the voice accom-
panied that joy with passionate accents. Pleasure and desire melted to-
gether, and made themselves audible. There was, in the end, the true
cradle of humankind’’ (Essai sur l’origine des langues 107). In Rousseau’s
reevaluation of the south, there was the implicit attempt to theorize the
essence of Europe again—after and against Montesquieu and the phi-
losophes. The south, which Montesquieu, Jaucourt, and Voltaire had
seen as the limit of Europe’s Republic of Letters, became for Rousseau,
along with northern and Calvinist Geneva, a positive utopia. Yet in
Rousseau as in Montesquieu, the south remained a distant fantasy of
primitivism against which modern and northern Europe, with nostalgia
or with pride, could still theorize itself. It remained the antithesis—
nature; the past—posited by the spirit of a modern north eager not only
to define itself but also to overcome its own discontents in some superior
synthesis, or in a return to a hypothetical origin. In the meantime,
however, the south was not silent and was writing its own theory of
Europe to claim its own place, viva voce, in the Republic of Letters. If
Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Jaucourt had theorized some kind of Europe
in which certain standards of the arts and sciences immediately dis-
qualified the southern countries, then a rehabilitation of the south could
not be thought of without a rethinking of those same standards. More-
over, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Jaucourt had theorized a Europe de-
fined by its progress. Such a Europe was the modernity of history—its
present and its end. Of this Europe, the south was at the same time
margin and internal antithesis—its past. To reclaim the Europeanness of
the south, to theorize a Europe not simply shaped in the image of Paris
but capable of including the southern di√erence, what was necessary
was, first, a rethinking of the arts and sciences, and, second, a new
theorization of history. In other words, the south, striving to enter Eu-
rope with its Republic of Letters, needed now not only a new and more
elastic and comprehensive theory of Europe but a new theory of history
and of the arts and sciences within it. An expatriate Spanish Jesuit took
this task on himself. It may have scared Hercules, but Father Juan Andrés
did not seem to think that anything was too big for him.
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Juan Andrés: A Spanish Jesuit in Italy
If a great number of talents and learned men in all sciences had
not come in exile to Italy from the last borders of Europe!
—VINCENZO MONTI, Per la liberazione d’Italia
Juan Andrés renounced his right of primogeniture on Christmas Eve
1754 in order to wear the robe and become a Jesuit. He could not have
chosen a worse time. Since the order had been founded in 1540 with the
implicit (though never stated) intent to stop the Protestant Reformation,
Europe had already witnessed an ideological divide between Reforma-
tion and Counter-Reformation, Protestantism and Catholicism, Molin-
ism and probabilism that had typically set Jansenists and Protestants
against the Jesuit order.
Especially relevant for these pages were the quarrels concerning the
status, limits, and ends of knowledge—quarrels that had immediate
practical relevance in the restructuring of schools and educational sys-
tems all over Europe. As Alasdair MacIntyre has suggested, the Protes-
tant Reformation had brought about a fairly new conception of what
knowledge is: ‘‘Reason can supply, so these new theologies [Protestant-
ism but also Jansenist Catholicism] assert, no genuine comprehension of
man’s true end; that power of reason was destroyed by the fall of man.’’
In other words, these new conceptions consider knowledge of human-
kind’s ultimate meaning an aporetic impossibility and limit the reach of
human knowledge to some kind of ‘‘practical’’ reason capable only to
assess ‘‘truths of fact and mathematical relations but no more’’ (53–54).
Luther’s interpretation of Romans 1:17, concerning the justice of God,
precluded any possibility for human reason to understand and know
such justice. The latter could be acquired not by reason, studying, and
knowledge, but by grace—and, to a lesser extent, faith—only. As the
second article of the Large Catechism put it, ‘‘although the whole world
with all diligence has endeavored to ascertain what God is, what He has
in mind and does, yet has she [humankind] never been able to attain to
[the knowledge and understanding of ] any of these things’’ (Luther 601).
Luther thus limited the reach of reason, as Mark Painter echoes Mac-
Intyre, ‘‘to manage earthly a√airs of survival, state and law. But it is
completely inadequate when applied to a√airs of the spirit. With Luther
reason becomes observational, calculative, managerial and limited to the
working out of practical matters’’ (6). It becomes, then, a prelude to
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Immanuel Kant’s practical reason, or, put di√erently, to Max Weber’s
Protestant spirit of capitalism.
As for the consequences all this had for pedagogy, these are clear to
be seen: post-Lutheran Europe soon began to witness the emergence
of two separate educational projects. On the one hand, the Jansenists’
‘‘small schools’’ of Port-Royal, whose model spread across ‘‘central and
northwest Europe’’ (Ong, Ramus vii); on the other, the ‘‘colleges’’ of the
Jesuits, which ‘‘produced a southern, Italy-centered ‘Christian Human-
ism’ ’’ (Scaglione 48). What knowledge was or meant arguably con-
stituted the core of the endless controversies between the two pedagogi-
cal models. For Jansenism, knowledge, unable to attain metaphysical
truths, had to be limited to the pragmatics of social living—it became
knowledge of what constituted perfect citizenship; for the Jesuits, in-
stead, knowledge could not be limited to pragmatics, but had to provide
a metatheory of knowledge aimed at understanding the presuppositions
that generated, in the last analysis, practical knowledge. In other words,
on the one hand, we have the practical dialectic (dialectica utens) of the
Jansenists, aimed at merely explaining what one knows, for instance, in
medicine or law; on the other, there is the teaching dialectic (dialectica
docens) of the Jesuits, which wanted to teach the pupil not what we
know, but how we know what we know (Ong, Ramus 162).
What I have been calling the Jansenist model had its heyday in the
small schools of Port-Royal and was already becoming hegemonic in
Voltaire’s Republic of Letters. In 1763 (the same year, incidentally, of
Rousseau’s Émile), Louis-René de La Chalotais published his truly influ-
ential Essai d’éducation nationale that rehearsed many of the Jansenist
pedagogical tenets in a climate of general enthusiasm for reforms. For La
Chalotais, education, to begin with, had to be national, modern, secular,
against the ‘‘vice of monasticity’’ (read the Jesuits), and run by the state.
Second, and in line with Luther’s distrust for papal Latin, schooling had
to be done in vernacular French.≥ Third, education’s goal was to form
good citizens and to do so had to teach practical subjects, not the anti-
quated and useless humanities. Fourth, knowledge, being practical, was
a commodity, produced by the school against the student’s tuition, and
always quantifiable and measurable through written examinations (the
‘‘document’’ that begins the ‘‘humanist assault on oral disputation’’;
Ong, Ramus 155), grades, and promotions.
Two things must be noticed about La Chalotais’s influential model:
first, that despite what his contemporaries saw in it, this model was less a
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rationalization than a secularization of post-Lutheran pedagogy. Already
Jean Duvergier de Hauranne, abbé de Saint-Cyran, founder of Port-
Royal, had claimed that the goal of education was service ‘‘not only for
God, for Jesus Christ and His Truths but also for the common good, and
for the interests of the Kings of the land . . . because if Jesus Christ died
for men, it is just that men will die not only for Jesus Christ but also for
other men’’ (qtd. in Sirignano 25). And Luther (in the Discourse on the
Utility of Sending Children to School) had attacked humanistic education
for being antiquated and largely pagan. The second point to be made is
that the Essai ’s polemical adversary was most evidently Jesuit educa-
tion. It was Jesuit schools that stuck to a predominantly humanistic
curriculum—Cicero’s Familiares, Erasmus’s De copia, Martial, Caesar’s
commentaries, Aesop, Aristotle, Livy, Lucia, Homer, Isocrates, and Virgil
—with little interest, in fact, in the ‘‘morality’’ or Christianity of the
books (Scaglione 78). Jesuit schools kept recommending, with disregard
for national languages, that ‘‘all, especially the students of the humani-
ties, must speak Latin’’ (Farrell 96). And Jesuit schools, always refusing
the written test, with their endless discussions (the oral disputatio), with
their ‘‘pedagogy of the spoken word’’ (Sirignano 82), and with their
obsession with rhetoric and eloquence (Codina 40; O’Malley), were the
major obstacle to the commodification and the measurability of knowl-
edge. What is worse, the Jesuits’ refusal to perceive direct tuition, their
willingness to have 60 to 65 percent of their students from ‘‘sons of the
working class,’’ were at the same time inflating the price of the knowl-
edge commodity, and establishing a true monopoly over it (the statistics
are by Scaglione 118; for a di√erent take on Jesuit schools’ elitism, see
Martin).
The issue of education was in fact not marginal to the Jesuits’ first
expulsion from a European state. In 1750, Sebastião José de Carvalho y
Melo, the Count of Oeyras and future Marquis de Pombal, blamed the
Jesuits for exercising economic control in the colonies, of accumulating
immense (and untaxed) riches in Uruguay, of fomenting Indios’ revolu-
tions in Paraguay, and, last but certainly not least, of monopolizing
education in the home country. As Franco Venturi summarizes, Pombal
had basically accused the Jesuits ‘‘of opposing the will of the mercantilist
state, which had now [in its attempt to overcome its economic crisis]
decided to control the economy and education, religion and culture’’ of
the country (‘‘Church’’ 224).
The Jesuits were expelled from Portugal in 1758. In France, in the
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meantime, they were being accused not only of protecting their ‘‘feudal’’
privileges but also faced criticism for perpetuating a useless, backward
humanistic culture hindering the modernization of the state (North-
east). As Robert Palmer noticed in a clever essay of 1940, the expulsion of
the Jesuits in France coincided with a growing interest on the part of
school reformers to create a modern and national educational system for
the preparation of citoyens:
Their general message was that education should be nationalized, and its
object be to form citizens. Reformers complained that the schools were
too secluded from civil life, that teachers in religious orders lacked patri-
otic spirit, that children were taught to see their true country in another
world, and to place their allegiance too exclusively in God and religion.
The old humanistic and literary education was condemned as useless in
itself . . . . La Chalotais held, against the cosmopolitan and humanistic
tradition of the Jesuits, that education should conform to the national
character, be controlled by the government, and conducted by men who,
‘‘not renouncing the world,’’ practiced the civic virtues that they taught,
and had interests the same as those of the country. (‘‘National Idea’’ 101–
2; see also Mortier).∂
In 1762, the Jesuit Order was expelled from France. The secularization
and state control of both economic planning and national education was
also central in the decision of Carlos iii to expel Andrés’ order from
Spain in 1767. Fanatically pious when in Naples (where he was king, too),
Carlos iii was a rabid secularizer in Spain. He had very good economic
reasons (e.g., the expropriation of their lands) to expel the Jesuits from
Spain (Renda Espulsione ; Renda Bernardo Tanucci). He also had fairly
convincing ‘‘cultural’’ motives for the expulsion: the Jesuits’ attempt—
669 colleges, 176 seminaries, and a lot of private tutoring for young
aristocrats (Domínguez Moltó 21)—to organize education against state
monopoly (Brizzi 189). With the expulsion of the Jesuits, in other words,
the traditional war of religion had translated into a new educational
quarrel between the ancients and the moderns—between an idea of
economic and cultural modernization centered on state schooling, on
the one hand, and, on the other, the Jesuit Order as the perceived sur-
plus, if not obstacle, to that modernization. An integral part of such a
querelle was to promote, pretty much in Jaucourt’s vein, the develop-
ment of useful sciences. The Jesuits, identified with an old intellectual
order still busy studying an old, unmovable tradition based on the lesson
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and imitation of the ancients, were perceived as the obstacle for a mod-
ern innovation of the curriculum requested by the new emerging bour-
geois classes (Valero 192). Central to the political decision of expelling
the Jesuits—in Portugal, France, and Spain—was, then, the cultural
‘‘question of national education’’ (Palmer, ‘‘National Idea’’ 100)—the
choice, namely, between a pragmatically utilitarian national culture for
the sciences and trades, on the one hand, and the Jesuits’ humanistic and
cosmopolitan (if not otherworldly) culture on the other.
When the decree of expulsion was promulgated in Madrid on April 2,
1767, Juan Andrés had to leave his teaching position at the Royal and
Pontifical University of Gandía, the first Jesuit college that, in 1546, was
forced by the insistence of the population to open its doors to non-Jesuit
students. Andrés had been teaching there, for three years, courses in
Latin, Greek, and Hebrew under the general rubric of rhetoric. Educa-
tion in Gandía followed the Ratio studiorum: ‘‘The disciplines were
divided in the traditional manner: first the Humanities . . . beginning
with advanced Grammar . . . Rhetoric, languages (Latin, Greek, and
Hebrew) . . . . Then Logic . . . and on to Philosophy proper’’ (Scaglione
70). Andrés left Gandía in the early days of April. Without food or
clothing, he was put on a boat with other Jesuits from all over Spain.
They were denied permission to land in Civitavecchia, Italy, and finally
landed in Bonifacio, Corsica, where the patriots led by Pasquale Paoli, in
the midst of their never-ending revolution for self-determination, fed
the Jesuits and granted them temporary refuge. Andrés left Corsica for
the more tranquil Italian mainland in 1768, when Pope Clement xiii,
starting a full-fledged diplomatic war against Portugal, Spain, France,
and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, decided to o√er asylum to the
Jesuits in the Papal State.
Here, in Ferrara, he lived for five years, until, on August 15, 1773, the
new pope Clement xiv, in the attempt to reconcile the papacy with
the foreign powers (and ‘‘advised by the Holy Spirit’’; qtd. in Del Rio
143), suppressed the order from his lands.∑ Once he left Ferrara, Andrés
moved to Mantua, where he arrived in January 1774. He stayed until the
arrival of Napoleon in 1796. Here, in ‘‘that center of Italian learning and
culture’’ (Mazzeo 39), Andrés achieved a rather prominent European
status as a learned person and as citizen of the international Republic of
Letters: he was visited by the likes of Johann Gottfried von Herder and
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, exchanged opinions and courtesies with
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learned Italians, befriended other Jesuits in exile, and carried out his
research to write his magnum opus.
The way in which the conditions o√ered by Mantua helped Andrés to
put together his learned and cultured work is obviously hard to quantify.
Although it might be a bit of a stretch to call Mantua that center of
learning and culture,∏ the city had witnessed, under the enlightened rule
of empress Marie Therese of Austria, a significant cultural ‘‘reawaken-
ing’’ after the collapse of the Gonzagas (Quazza 229–30). Academies
were being founded and financed—the Virgilian in 1752; the Theresian of
Beaux Arts in the same year; the Philarmonic in 1761. Middle schools
and universities, many under Jesuit control, had been reformed and
modernized with a series of decrees between 1760 and 1761.π The city
library had been constructed with the marbles (and a few books as well)
salvaged from the destroyed villas of the Gonzagas. In sum, although not
a center of frenetic intellectual life, Mantua, like the nearby Milan ruled
by the same tolerant absolutism of Marie Therese, had witnessed a num-
ber of political and cultural reforms that had introduced some measure
of modernization while keeping at bay the more revolutionary implica-
tions of the French enlightenment.∫
It was in this climate of moderate Lombard reformism, in which
trans-Alpine revolutionary ideas had been mixed with conservative Ital-
ian ones, and where great energies were employed for ‘‘the reorganiza-
tion of the schools, of the universities, of culture in general’’ (Venturi,
‘‘Church’’ 218; see also Venturi, Utopia), that Andrés found his new
home. Mantua was quite open to the new philosophies of moderniza-
tion coming from beyond the Alps; and, at the same time, it appeared
tolerant enough of the Jesuits, who were cherished for their cultural
prestige and employed, both by the state and by private patrons, for the
reorganization of the educational system: ‘‘There are so many Spaniards
of merit here, that is impossible for me to list them one by one,’’ wrote
Andrés to his brother Carlos (Andrés, Cartas familiares 1:4). A Voltairian
Jesuit, Saverio Bettinelli (1718–1808), was the venerated cultural symbol
of the town. In other words, the incandescent and polarized atmosphere
of Rome, Naples, or Venice—where Jesuits and so-called modernizers
were at each other’s throat (Del Rio 126–28, 136–37)—was far enough
from Mantua to allow Andrés the intellectual distance necessary to ab-
sorb the lessons of Montesquieu, Voltaire, and, above all, Rousseau; it
was so far, on the other hand, that acceptance of enlightened principles
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did not need to be unconditional to the point of fanaticism. Mantua was
the perfect meeting place for di√erent ideas and diverging national prej-
udices to meet and discuss (see Menéndez y Pelayo). It was a little
republic of letters whose enrichment of Italian culture has perhaps been
underestimated and in which Spanish Jesuits showed ‘‘a wonderful ca-
pacity to adapt’’ (Batllori 514).
In sum, Mantua o√ered the perfect atmosphere for an intellectual
trained in the humanities, and one knowledgeable of the so-called prac-
tical sciences as well, to reconsider the presuppositions of both. From
‘‘this beautiful part of Europe’’ (Andrés qtd. in Mazzeo 17), Andrés then
meant to attempt a general assessment of nothing less than all sciences.
He wanted to look into their origins and foundations. Most important,
he wanted to trace their history and progress. In doing just that, he
found something at the same time hopeless and peculiar: what the Ency-
clopédie had theorized and canonized as the literature, was, after all, just
a French local phenomenon hypostatized as universal. Still, there were
other possibilities to retheorize literature: Andrés, the Spanish Jesuit in
Italy, chose to retheorize from the south.
A Theory of Literary Historiography: Decentering Europe
Arguably the son of an encyclopedic age that ‘‘had its roots in [Roger]
Bacon, the Encyclopédie, and the British Universal History’’ (Arato,
‘‘comparatista’’ 1), Juan Andrés was not kidding when he titled his mag-
num opus Dell’origine, progressi e stato attuale d’ogni letteratura (Of the
Origins, Progress, and Present State of all Literatures). Echoing D’Alem-
bert’s program for the Encyclopédie—‘‘to go back to the origins and
generation of our ideas’’ (Diderot na9)—but renouncing the collabora-
tive framework of the Republic of Letters, Andrés, all alone, set out to
study not only the origin of ideas but also their progress.Ω Proud of
introducing an undertaking that ‘‘no other author, I believe, has con-
ceived so far’’ (Andrés, Dell’ origine 1:i), Andrés opened the first part of
his seven-volume treatise, published from his Mantuan exile in 1782,
with a master plan—‘‘maybe too daring and bold’’ by his own admission
—that would later gain him little of the glory he had dreamed of, but, in-
stead, the unflattering nickname of ‘‘the presumptuous friar’’ (Carducci
2.45).∞≠ He should have seen it coming. The very incipit of Dell’origine
was an invitation to brag-bashing—like that pretentious claim to be
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writing nothing less than ‘‘one critical history of the events that literature
has su√ered in all times and in all nations; a philosophical sketch of
literature’s [letteratura] progress from its origin to the present’’ (1:i).
Literature, first of all: what did this term mean for father Juan Andrés?
His understanding of it was, to say the least, quite broad: it encom-
passed not only the belles lettres but also history, geography, chronology,
archeology, grammar, mathematics, mechanics, hydrostatics, natural
science, nautical science, acoustics, optics, astronomy, physics (general
and applied), chemistry, botany, natural history, anatomy, medicine,
philosophy, jurisprudence (secular and canonical), theology, biblical ex-
egesis, and ecclesiastical history. Literature, in other words, was some-
thing reminiscent of (but, we will see, rather di√erent from) Jaucourt’s
letters: not in the sense that Andrés saw the necessity to translate belles
lettres into some ‘‘more sensible utility,’’ but in the sense that litera-
ture represented for him the synthesis and totality of human knowl-
edge.∞∞ Writing a history of the origin and progress of all of this was,
one has to agree, quite a big task at hand. And then, ‘‘in all times and in
all nations’’!
It is easy to see how this gigantic e√ort, that only the daring few have
claimed (and timidly at that) as the putative origin of comparative litera-
ture (e.g., Guillén 27), fostered in fact a whole thesaurus of self-righteous
ironies. Esteban de Arteaga, for instance, another Spanish Jesuit in Italy,
commented in 1785: ‘‘Yes, I confess I value myself only a literary pigmy,
not a giant. I have not dared to face the Herculean task to cover the
sciences and the literatures of all ages, all climates, and all nations. The
Signor Abate Juan Andrés, bigger than me, and certainly more confident
in himself, instead, has just done that’’ (Arteaga 1:178). To discuss all of
this literature in all times and all nations, specialization in one field, to
Arteaga’s discomfort, obviously had to be sacrificed. As the apologist
Ettore Guido Mazzeo puts it, Andrés ‘‘was in essence the opposite of the
specialist’’ (Mazzeo 69). He liked to think broad, and was, by and large, a
cosmopolitan scholar (Bérkov; Tejerina). Like that other cosmopolitan
Voltaire, he could not accept a universe shrunk to Bossuet’s Ile de France.
True enough, Andrés’s cosmopolitanism, when compared to that of
Voltaire, seemed much more dictated by petty and practical reasons:
it was because of the necessity of exile, not because of aspirations to
become a man of letters, that Andrés had had to learn to master lan-
guages and cultures other than his native Spanish. It was the new his-
torical reality of exile, not studium, which had faced Andrés with the
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comparatist’s problem of understanding not one culture—if we follow
Adolfo Domínguez Moltó’s interpretation that ‘‘ ‘all literature’ equals ‘all
culture’ ’’ here (67)—but, historically and critically, all cultures in rela-
tion with one another.∞≤ And it was, in the end, his allegiance to the Jesuit
world with its ecumenical mission and its horizons ‘‘necessarily shaped
by the supranational character of the Society’’ (Brizzi 188), not his com-
mitment to the Republic of Letters, that had imposed on Andrés a cos-
mopolitan, transnational perspective, and perhaps a first understanding,
however vague it might have been, of cultural di√erences.∞≥
All, alas, to no avail. While Voltaire’s universal history was canonized as
the first true example of the genre (Fueter 358), Dell’ origine remained,
even for the comparatist, a monstrous work ‘‘with no sense’’ (Wellek,
Discriminations 25) and an ‘‘excess of encyclopedic gusto’’ (Getto 99).∞∂
Such strong reactions are curious—not so much because I believe An-
drés’s was a better model for Weltliteratur than, say, Goethe’s; but be-
cause, despite so much insistence on Andrés’s alleged encyclopédisme,
Dell’origine was the clear attempt, in more ways than one, to go beyond
encyclopédisme and against all that the latter stood for. It is enough to see
how Andrés, already in the first few pages of his preface, sets his tone of
polemical sprezzatura against the philosophes in general and D’Alembert
in particular. In the ‘‘Preliminary Discourse,’’ the latter, following Bacon’s
taxonomy, had divided human knowledge into erudition (memory),
belles letters (imagination), and philosophy (reason), as if one could be
studied in itself and separated from the others. Also Jaucourt, as we have
already seen, had divided knowledge between literature (belles lettres),
philosophy (abstract), and (practical) sciences. Andrés responded:
This kind of division is correct if we consider the relations of the various
sciences with the faculties of our mind; but it is not very fruitful if
we want to follow the progress that has been accomplished in those
sciences . . . . Surely, natural history and ecclesiastical history are branches
of historiography; but how can we separate natural history from physics,
and ecclesiastical history from theology? In sum, such division . . . can
serve those who want to examine the genealogy of sciences, but not those
of us who want to write their history. (Dell’ origine 1:iv)
In the Encyclopédie, the crisis of a traditional discursive system based
on theological or Aristotelian notions of the unity of all knowledge had
engendered a process of di√erentiation and fragmentation and produced
a discreet series of self-regulating and autonomous disciplinary domains
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(M. McKeon 17). As Voltaire had written in the Encyclopédie under
‘‘Belles Lettres,’’ ‘‘universal knowledge is no longer possible to man: the
true men of letters move their steps in di√erent fields, since they cannot
cultivate them all’’ (Diderot 7.599). The temptation to see Andrés as a
conservative obscurantist trying to reclaim a lost and untenable unity is
strong. What such prejudice would betray, however, is the assumption of
the fundamentally progressive nature of the French philosophes, and the
regressive one of their opponents.∞∑ Yet as José Antonio Valero suggests
(187–89), Andrés’s attempt to preserve a measure of connection between
the literatures was no more regressive than the Encyclopédie’s own at-
tempt to preserve a unitary perspective—D’Alembert’s rational ‘‘system
that is one’’ (Diderot na9). The di√erence is that the unifying principle
was no longer, for Andrés, the philosophes’ universal reason.
Interestingly, if not surprisingly, such a unifying principle—which
introduces an element of relativism to the otherwise objective univer-
sality of reason—is what Andrés called ‘‘critical history,’’ or ‘‘philosophi-
cal history’’ (Dell’ origine 1:i–v). Let us remember that history, for both
Voltaire and Jaucourt, was a branch of the belles lettres (though for
Voltaire the situation could be improved by applying ‘‘to the writing of
history, what has already happened to physics’’; see Oeuvres historiques
46). As such, history was not the end of knowledge, but just a key to the
practical and useful sciences. Here, instead, it is history—Andrés’s goal is
‘‘to write their [sciences’] history’’—that appears as the end and ultimate
summation of all knowledge. This does not mean that history is no
longer a branch of the belles lettres: on the contrary, history remains
similar to poetry in so far as ‘‘illusion has to be created in history just as
in poems’’ (Andrés, Dell’ origine 3:118); and it obeys the same narrative
rules as the novella when its task becomes ‘‘to choose among the infinite
facts only those that are worth narrating’’ (3:146). The di√erence be-
tween Jaucourt’s and Andrés’s history, instead, lies in the latter’s capacity
of synthesis and abstraction that only philosophy, the science of reason,
possessed for Jaucourt and Voltaire. History is the ultimate philosophy
for Andrés, not only because it can discuss the origin and progress of all
sciences but also because its method is inherently a philosophical one:
‘‘Not the vast erudition, but the philosophical zest and spirit is the only
force capable of forming, out of a confusion of materials, a fabric conve-
nient to the wonderful richness of the world’’ (3:96). History, selecting
those facts alone that are ‘‘worth narrating,’’ is the only true philosophy.
Andrés’s concern with history is interesting (and unsurprising), first
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of all because it follows what can be characterized as a general trend of
literary studies in the eighteenth century. Earlier epochs had studied the
corpus of a poetic tradition ‘‘not with a properly historical . . . interest,
but from a rhetorical point of view’’ (Getto 2) by singling out authorita-
tive examples, possibly to imitate, in a given literary tradition. Only in
the eighteenth century is a predominant rhetorical interest abandoned
in favor of a chronological organization (alternative, incidentally, to the
arbitrarily alphabetical one of the encyclopedia). What Andrés thought
to have found was that such novel interest in chronology was in fact not
so general, and had instead its own geography: the French, under the
spell of Cartesian reason and Montesquieu’s general spirit, had failed to
develop chronology into true history. Jean Pierre Niceron’s Mémoires
pour servir à l’histoire des hommes illustres de la République (1729–45), or
Prosper Marchand’s Dictionnaire historique (1758–59), were for Andrés
mere fragmentary and itemized collections of biographical details. Even
the Histoire littéraire de France (1733), developed by the Benedictines
under the direction of Antoine Rivet de la Grange and Charles Clem-
encet, arguably ‘‘the model [of literary historiography] that other na-
tions have taken on themselves to imitate,’’ remained for him ‘‘farthest
from the perfection that this kind of work requires. It is anyway mainly
biographical; it follows with too much individuality the authors and
their works; it fails to present with due precision the true picture of the
general state of literature in the various ages it describes’’ (Andrés, Dell’
origine 3:372).
A true sense of history, for Andrés, had to be found in Montesquieu’s
south—notably in his adoptive Italy, where history, not modernity, was
the leading glory of the country; where the archeological excavations of
Pompei and Ercolano (begun in 1748), not the modern marvels of Ver-
sailles (Ange Jacques Gabriel had completed the Petit Trianon in 1768)
gave a sense of place; and where Gian Mario Crescimbeni, already in
1698, had produced an Istoria della vulgar poesia. Crescimbeni’s his-
tory had been followed by the literary histories of Giacinto Gimma
(1723), Francesco Saverio Quadrio (1739–52), Francesco Antonio Zac-
caria (1750), and, last but not the least, by the Storia della letteratura
Italiana (1772–82), by the ‘‘wise’’ Girolamo Tiraboschi (Andrés, Dell’
origine 2:xiv). What attracted Andrés to these texts was that they all pre-
sented, through history, an explicit defense of Italian culture against the
accusations of Dominique Bouhours’s Les entretiens d’Ariste et d’Eugène
(1671): that Italian modern poetry, starting with Petrarch’s taste for the
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‘‘embellishment,’’ and more so under the influence of the Spanish ba-
roque, had become ‘‘unreasonable’’ (on this, see Maugain; Fubini; Puppo
33–36). Girolamo Tiraboschi, for instance, had prefaced his work by
saying that ‘‘the desire to add new glory to Italy, and to defend it still, if
necessary, against the envy of some foreigners, convinced me to begin
this general history of Italian literature from its most ancient principles
to our own days’’ (1:v).
Anticipating Andrés, Tiraboschi had strategized his ‘‘defense’’ as a
‘‘history of the origin and the progress of Science in Italy’’ (1:x). Tira-
boschi’s historicist defense of Petrarch, and of his confluence in the
rhymes of Marinismo and Secentismo, consisted in claiming that the
significance of Petrarch had to be measured not on the basis of exoge-
nous standards—say, reason—but as the manifestation of the particular
cultural development of Italian literature in Petrarch’s own epoch. The
advantage of such a method was that it could be immediately applicable
in the defense of Spain against French accusations of Spanish ignorance,
lack of culture, taste, and letters. In other words, historicism might have
appeared to Andrés as the best instrument to settle some accounts with
the French.
It had been a Frenchman, after all, Marc Antoine Muret, who in 1588
had blamed the Hispano-Latin writers Seneca, Lucan, and Martial for
the corruption of Latin letters and already prompted a response from
Andrés in 1776 (see Mazzeo 23; Domínguez Moltó 70–71; Andrés, Carta).
And it was not so much Bartolomeo de Las Casas’s 1553 Brevísima re-
lación de la destrucción de las Indias, but the ‘‘Huguenot translation’’
(Hanke 50; Keen) of the Relación in Dutch (1578) and French (1579) that
had spread the ‘‘Black Legend’’ of Spain’s (incidentally true) inhumanity
in the service of France’s colonial designs and against Spanish interests in
the Americas.∞∏ In the eighteenth century, when the Spanish empire
had already crumbled, Muret’s indictment of Spanish aesthetics and the
echoes of the Black Legend had persisted in the enlightened caricature of
the Spaniard as inquisitorial, ignorant, uncultured, vain in the nostalgia
of a lost empire, and religiously fanatical—the image, that is to say, of
Spain’s baroque excesses. What was at stake in this novel wave of His-
panophobia was obviously no longer colonial expansion, but France’s
hegemony as the cultural standard of Europe—as the center, any distance
from which would be plain error.
Despite the fact that Italians were no less the victims of Bouhours’s
and Muret’s Francocentric logics than the Spaniards were, the hegemony
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of the French discourse had o√ered Italian intellectuals the possibility
(or scapegoat) of blaming Spanish influence for its own faults. The
Mantuan Saverio Bettinelli, but also the much admired Girolamo Tira-
boschi, had in fact promoted yet another querelle: whose fault was the
crisis, if any, of Italian letters (see Palazón 16)? Andrés had answered with
a polemical letter to the Italian ‘‘brother’’ Gaetano Valenti Gonzaga:
significantly, the title with which the letter would be published in 1776
hinted at an alleged reason for the corruption of Italian taste. In short,
the alleged Spanish influence had nothing to do with a crisis (alleged,
too) of Italian literature. The arguments that Andrés found in the letter,
and which later would become part of Dell’ origine, certainly managed
very well to ‘‘[defend] the honor of the [Spanish] Nation . . . from the
o√ense that some Italians have advanced, when they have accused Her of
having corrupted Italian taste’’ (Carta 4). Tiraboschi immediately re-
tracted in front of Andrés’s ‘‘good taste,’’ and declared himself ‘‘sorry’’
for his own lack of judgment (Venturi, Settecento 1:262–66). Neither
Saverio Lampillas nor Juan Francisco Masdeu, who had written with the
same intentions as Andrés, had managed to achieve such retraction from
the proud (and certainly authoritative) Tiraboschi. The fact is that Lam-
pillas and Masdeu had advanced ‘‘a violent defense of the national cul-
tural patrimony [of Spain] realized as an apologetic praise of Spanish
literature said to have been an important contribution to Europe’’ (Mi-
cozzi 54); Andrés, instead, had forgone any apology and questioned the
very logic—or ‘‘taste’’—that allowed Muret, Bouhours, and Boilau—the
French, that is—to order literature in a hierarchy in which France oc-
cupied the top, and Spain, but also Italy, the defective bottom. In other
words, Andrés, di√erently than the virulent Lampillas and Masdeu, had
managed to strike a strategic cultural alliance between the Spaniards and
the Italians.
The strategy of the letter to Gonzaga was to produce the polemical
backbone of Dell’ origine. Rather than attacking the Italian despisers of
Spain, Andrés saw both Italy and Spain as a brotherhood of victims of
French prejudice. He then went directly to the source of that prejudice—
and he found himself in the midst of Montesquieu’s Lettres Persanes,
whose seventy-eighth letter could, after all, be quoted in its entirety
(it has already been done by José Cadalso) as a monument of French
eighteenth-century Hispanophobia. An ‘‘invincible enemy of work’’
(Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:249), Montesquieu’s Spaniard constantly af-
fects a culture that—be it clear to all!—he certainly does not possess:
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‘‘The eyeglasses [that all Spaniards wear] show demonstratively that the
one who wears them is a man enlightened by science and a profound
reader—so profound indeed that his eyesight has weakened. [In Spain]
any nose adorned or weighed by [glasses] can be passed o√, with no one
daring to question, as a savant’s nose’’ (2:248). For Montesquieu, the
Spaniard’s is an inferior intellect, and it is devoid of culture—culture
being, of course, that essentially French attribute otherwise known as
raison: ‘‘Surely you can find some intelligence and some commonsense
people among the Spaniards; but don’t look for any in their books. Take,
for instance, their libraries, with their fantastic literature on one side,
and the scientific works on the other. It is as if the whole thing had been
arranged and collected by some secret foe of human reason’’ (2:250).
Montesquieu’s Spaniards, quite unflatteringly, are also excesses of hy-
pocrisy. ‘‘So devout that you can hardly call them Christians,’’ they pos-
sess ‘‘little formalities which in France would appear out of place; for
example, an o≈cer never strikes a soldier without asking his permission;
and the Inquisition always apologizes to a Jew before burning him.’’ Sure
enough, these monstrous Spaniards, devoid of culture, empty of intel-
lect, and clear of a moral sense, must have something to distinguish
them, at least, from the beast. And in fact, Montesquieu concedes: ‘‘They
are always in love. In dying of languor under their mistress’s windows
they have not their match in the world . . . . They are, firstly, bigots—
secondly, jealous . . . . They allow their wives to appear with uncovered
bosoms; but they would not have any one see their heels, lest hearts
should be ensnared by a glimpse of their feet’’ (2:249–50). Yet passion, as
we know already from De l’esprit des lois, only ‘‘multiplies crimes’’ and is
hardly the decorous attribute of the reasonable honnête homme! To have
a clear example of the latter, on the other hand, we only have to look at
France, the ‘‘most ancient and powerful kingdom of Europe’’ (2:279), the
center of a new reasonable sociability whose example needs to be ex-
tended to the whole continent: ‘‘One says that man is a sociable animal.
In this sense, I believe the Frenchman is more a man than any other—he
is the quintessence of man since it seems he acts only for society’’ (2:261).
It is not this immediate level of Montesquieu’s Hispanophobia, how-
ever, that Andrés was determined to tackle. Compared to the philosophes’
sclerotic insistence on a suprahistorical, universal reason, Montesquieu
presented for Andrés the added danger of seeming capable of reconciling
such universality with history. Climate had given Montesquieu oppor-
tunities both to theorize di√erence within Europe and to order di√er-
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ence hierarchically by measuring it against the standard of a French
‘‘good’’ weather. It is this ‘‘too strong influence of climate’’ (Andrés, Dell’
origine 5:609), therefore, that Andrés had to eliminate as the e√ective
cause of cultural excellence:
It is quite common to attribute to climate an influence on everything,
and especially on artistic taste and on the perfection of literature. I cer-
tainly agree that climate also has some role in all that pertains to the
strength of the spirit. But to claim that the influence of climate deter-
mines the true origin and essence of the culture of various nations seems
to me an assertion not backed by experience, and unconfirmed by facts.
Under the same climate, with no great planetary change, the Greeks,
brutes at first, became then for an extended period the wisdom of the
world; and that same Greece, which was for many centuries the garden of
Europe, has lately become a sterile [intellectual] desert. (Andrés, Dell’
origine 1:26)
In other words, what Montesquieu—and, by implication, the French—
had done, was more than attacking Spain. While hypostatizing their
own men as ‘‘more men,’’ they had indicted the whole south. The reason
they had alleged for their indictment, once again, was climate: ‘‘ ‘Cold,’
says Montesquieu, ‘tightens the pores, and makes the body stronger; at
the same time, makes the nutritional juices coarser, and the spirit be-
comes less lively.’ The fame of the author would deserve a longer criti-
cism than the one needed by the weakness of his reasoning. I would only
like to ask Montesquieu if, France being colder than Spain, we should
conclude that the French have stronger bodies and less lively spirit’’
(Dell’ origine 1:27). In this sense, Montesquieu had little to do with
universal reason, and was the mouthpiece, rather, of a merely French
reason eager to declare itself superior and universal: De l’esprit des lois,
for instance, ‘‘is not for other nations than France a reason to envy
France’’ (Andrés, Dell’ origine 6:385). Only the French, who gain from it,
can see in Montesquieu’s theory any universal truth: for the rest of
humankind, ‘‘I have to say, I do not find that work too engaging, let
alone instructive’’ (3:126).
For Montesquieu’s climatological and spatial logic (whose alleged cau-
sality, in truth, Andrés had to exaggerate a bit), Dell’origine substitutes
a historical one: there is hardly any ‘‘necessary relation’’—no ‘‘law’’—
between natural and social facts; same climates and same places—say,
Greece—have known di√erent stages of success. The law of reason must
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be replaced by history, a critical understanding of di√erences in taste and
habit that have little, if anything, to do with natural causes. And—just to
hit the French where it hurts—submitting history to geography and
climate is nothing less than unreasonable. History, which Andrés de-
clares to have learnt from the Italian, thus emerges as the discipline
capable of undoing French Europe from its climatological basis. As such,
history is said to have a hermeneutic potential that no other science
does: history can explain what climatology cannot.
Far from being the uncultured border of Europe, and far from repre-
senting only Europe’s cultural past, the present south of eighteenth-
century Italy became then for Andrés the very capital of Europe’s most
powerful science—history. The French have their climatologists, seemed
to say Andrés; but Italy has, in the present of today, its literary historians:
‘‘Other writers have written biographies, have compiled factual details,
have collected monuments, which have greatly served to enlighten liter-
ary history; but only Tiraboschi has given us a literary history. France
and Spain have their literary histories, but theirs are still imperfect; only
Italy has a complete and finished one—Tiraboschi’s’’ (3:385). This was
only marginally a praise of the Italians, as it was, in a deeper sense, the
attempt to depict the south as a place in which culture was still active,
and not merely a thing of the past. Most important, this was the attempt
to find in history an alternative method to reason for the study of
literatures.
This brings me to the second reason why Andrés’s historical turn (so
to speak) is at the same time interesting and unsurprising. In his 1948
Harvard lecture titled ‘‘Vico and Aesthetic Historism,’’ Erich Auerbach
had already observed that historicism ‘‘practically originated in the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century, as a reaction against the European
predominance of French classicism’’ (185).∞π For Auerbach, historicism
had emerged as ‘‘the conviction that every civilization and every period
has its own possibilities of aesthetic perfection; that the works of art of
the di√erent peoples and periods, as well as their general forms of life,
must be understood as products of variable individual conditions, and
have to be judged each by its own development, not by absolute rules of
beauty and ugliness’’ (183–84). In truth, we should not exaggerate the
range of what Auerbach calls ‘‘every civilization and every period’’ here.
Certainly born within Europe, and certainly short-circuited in the at-
tempts to articulate ‘‘variations on a master narrative that could be called
‘the history of Europe,’ ’’ as Dipesh Chakrabarty has maintained in Pro-
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vincializing Europe, eighteenth-century historicism can hardly be seen as
some kind of multiculturalism aimed at going beyond the strict confines
of a Eurocentric universe: Europe, writes Chakrabarty, ‘‘remains the
sovereign, theoretical subject of all histories’’ (27).∞∫ What the emergence
of historicism signals, however, is that the very center of this Eurocentric
vision becomes a contested site of theoretical discourse around the eigh-
teenth century: against a fixed notion of European culture promoted by
French classicism and rationalism, historicism pits its own alternative
centers. The history of historicism is, then, the story of a battle for the
definition of Europe and its culture that a homogenizing notion of
Eurocentrism unfortunately runs the risk of obliterating.
Put bluntly, historicism had emerged, by the second half of the eigh-
teenth century, as the ideology and methodology of a subaltern Europe—
Vico’s Italy, Herder’s Germany, and Andrés’s Spain—pitted against the
unbearable hegemony of France.∞Ω Historicism was a theory of history
radically opposed to the linear universal history of Montesquieu and
Voltaire. Progress was not a line that went simply from east to west, or
from south to north. For Andrés, who had Giambattista Vico’s Scienza
nuova under his belt, each place had a history of its own—and had to be
judged on the basis of this local history, not from the perspective of a
putative end of history located in a western and northern modernity.≤≠
‘‘Progress’’ was to be understood not as a teleology of continuous per-
fectibility, but rather as the simple passage of cultural hegemony from
one nation to another, after the new nation had ‘‘inherited’’ from the
previous one the lights of its culture. For instance, if the Romans had
come after the Greeks, and had inherited from them some ideas about
rhetoric and metaphysics, this did not mean that the Romans had to be
better: literature had ‘‘progressed’’ from Athens to Rome—but a com-
parative judgment of the two was simply beyond the point of history.
Progress was for Andrés a movement toward a di√erent place, not a
movement forward to an ultimate end.
In this context we should understand Andrés’s insistence that France
had no histories: certainly, Bossuet had produced an entire Discours sur
l’histoire universelle. Yet Bossuet’s was only a pseudohistory, ‘‘mono-
logic’’ (Greenblatt) and centered only on ‘‘what Europe is in the uni-
verse’’ and on ‘‘what Paris and the Ile de France mean within Europe’’
(Bossuet 4). Even Voltaire, who had avoided Bossuet’s simplistic Franco-
centrism, and who Andrés had praised as a ‘‘Prometheus . . . who found
a new way of treating Universal History’’ (Dell’ origine 3:89), had been
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unable to produce more than a collection of ‘‘mostly false or altered
chronicles, impious reflections, and scandalous doctrines’’ (3:90). More-
over, Tiraboschi’s di√erence between biblioteca and storia—between the
erudite collection of biobibliographical data, on the one hand, and a
true history of origins and progress, on the other—was still valid for
Andrés: French history, for him, remained ‘‘anyway mainly biographi-
cal.’’ Yet Andrés was more willing than Tiraboschi to see anything posi-
tive in French historiography (Palazón 30).
Andrés’s di√erence from Tiraboschi may be of some importance here:
the Italian had denied France any historical sense—French histories
were wrong and bibliographical. In this sense, Tiraboschi was applying
an essentially French logic—there is one universal reason and therefore
one reasonable way of doing history—against France itself. Arguably,
Andrés was trying to go beyond Tiraboschi: France’s spirit of scientific
inquiry that Cartesianism had helped to promote was not necessarily
antihistorical, but could establish, instead, some kind of empiricist his-
toriography. This was the case, for instance, of Montesquieu’s geographi-
cal and climatological history. In what ways did that history di√er from
the one Andrés was proposing? For Montesquieu, there was one rea-
son, which took di√erent shapes and degrees of perfection according to
di√erent geographies and climates. History was, then, the advancement
of this single reason, and was, therefore, representable as a single line
of progress from one place to another (Barraclough 84). For Andrés,
instead, reason itself was historical, and relative, therefore, to a time and
place. Each place, accordingly, had a history; and each place has some
kind of historiography—even France. However, such admission of a
French capability to write history constituted, paradoxically, a more
radical criticism than Tiraboschi’s of French rationalism: for the French,
history was submitted to reason; for Andrés, reason had to be submitted
to history.
Still, not France, but ‘‘Italy really leads . . . in literary historiography’’
(Andrés, Dell’ origine 3:383). Historical relativism—I will come back to
this point—did not preclude for Andrés the possibility of passing judg-
ments and organizing hierarchies of value. While Italy produced his-
torians, rationalist France could only produce a prescriptive and norma-
tive ‘‘modern code of good taste, not only in poetry but in the Belles
Lettres in general’’ (2:204). Not that this was such a great achievement
either. Nicholas Boileau’s Art poétique (1674), to which Andrés was refer-
ring, had submitted literature to reason—verisimilitude, clear and dis-
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tinct phrasing, normative rules of action and conduct, decorum of char-
acters. This was for Andrés symptomatic of a more general, and utterly
wrong, French attitude, theorized for instance by Jaucourt, to submit
aesthetics—the key—to the superior relevance of practical sciences.
Andrés did not mind the progress of the sciences, which he consid-
ered, on the contrary, a ‘‘document of the sublimity, and I would dare say
of the divinity of human spirit’’ (Dell’ origine 4:1). Assuming the Jesuit’s
resistance to the new scientific spirit would mean to buy into the com-
monplace concocted for polemical reasons by the philosophes them-
selves. As Aldo Scaglione remarks: ‘‘The Jesuits were trying their best to
teach both [science and the humanities]. Nonetheless, since the Jesuits’
pedagogy has often been criticized for disregard toward the sciences and
the practical or technical arts, it must be pointed out, as a symptomatic
detail, that of the 130 astronomical observatories in existence in Europe
in 1733, 30 belonged to the company’’ (87). In the specific case of Juan
Andrés, it should su≈ce to say that he had been granted access to the
Academy of Mantua thanks to his prizewinning dissertation on
hydraulics. Neither ignorant of, nor predisposed against, the practical
sciences, Andrés only minded the submission of the belles lettres to that
scientific and mathematical language whose hegemony had been abun-
dantly theorized in France by the likes of Bernard le Borier de Fontanelle
and Maupertuis (Venturi, Settecento 1:355; Palazón 87–90):
One could lament with good reason the promiscuity, and the abuse, that
goes back and forth between these two kinds of literature [i.e., experi-
mental sciences and belles lettres]. Perhaps, the determination to use the
rhetorical figures of the belles letters in the sciences will spoil, eventually,
the exactitude and just precision of the sciences; it is certain that the
belles letters are already damaged by the habit of ruining them through
the use of geometrical expressions and scientific idioms; and by the
misuse of many words that are proper to mathematics, physics, chemis-
try, and other sciences into eulogies, academic prose, and even poetry.
(Dell’ origine 2:18–19)
Despite the lamenting tone, the defense of poetry against the practical
sciences occupies here a philosophical, more than a merely polemical, di-
mension. The encyclopédistes, and D’Alembert in particular, were ready
to see in the belles lettres the key to the superior practical sciences: the
student-citoyen, as we have seen, needed to learn to read before be-
ing able to become a scientist. In this logic, the belles lettres occu-
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pied a subordinate, instrumental role vis-à-vis the practical sciences. To
D’Alembert’s pedagogical argument, Andrés added a genetic one: ‘‘The
first written document extant to us belongs to history and poetry, not
to philosophy’’ (Dell’ origine 1:1). The argument, already familiar to
sensism (Palazón 62), had been used in Italy by Vico as a way to show not
the superiority, but the very limit of science. What did it mean, for
Andrés after Vico, to declare poetry the origin of a literature that then
progresses with science? It meant to illustrate the blindness of a science,
stuck in its dependence on alleged empirical facts and observable certain-
ties, to even face the problem of its origin. Can facts arise outside of the
language that constitutes them? Can certainties exist outside the words
that verify them? Can science ever escape its own origin in language?
Science had symptomatically marginalized the question of language as
irrelevant for the purpose of ‘‘natural philosophy’’ (Chovillet). However,
the fact remained that science had to use that very language to whose
origin it remained programmatically blind. To say, as Cartesian formal
logic did, that if A = B and B = C, then A = C, was to formulate
something that could be true only within a linguistic convention in
which the possibility that A ‘‘is’’ C was not a paradox but a ‘‘fact.’’ The
definition of a scientific law (as the Copernican one, which Galileo
Galilei expounded in the rhetoric of a dialogue on world systems in
1632), or the very demonstration of a mathematical theorem, were as
much a matter of syllogisms and enthymemes as they were of algebra
(Goetsch 49–87). Andrés’s ‘‘discovery’’ of the poetic origin of literature,
echoing very closely Vico’s project of a new science, seemed, then, to
suggest the idea that all knowledge—Andrés’s literature—originated as/
through rhetorical figures. For both Vico and Andrés, whereas Cartesian
and encyclopedic sciences had found their legitimization in the facts of
the physical world, a new science was fundamentally a metaphysics, a
science of the language that founded the knowledge of the physical
world. Just as history had ‘‘to choose among the infinite facts only those
that are worth narrating,’’ so had science to choose, among the infinite
epiphanies of the real, those that were worth considering as facts. We
thus have Descartes, on the one hand, whom ‘‘the French want as the
creator of a good physics’’; and, on the other, Galileo, for whom ‘‘figures,
numbers, and algebraic signs are the language of the Universe’’ and
whose ‘‘profoundest reflections . . . give birth to metaphysics’’ (Andrés,
Dell’ origine 1:419, 1:490). Or, in another antithesis deriving from the
same rhetorical structure, we have Isaac Newton’s physics, on the one
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hand; and, on the other, John Locke, ‘‘the Newton of metaphysics,’’
whose only goal was ‘‘to reflect over himself, and over his own thoughts’’
(6:326). This di√erence between adherence to the facts and linguistic
(self-)reflection of what constituted a fact was fundamental for Andrés’s
elevation of literary historiography to a metaphysical, systematic theory
of the ‘‘literatures of the whole world.’’
The rationalist paradigm is thereby inverted. It is not language that is
subordinated to reason, but reason to language: ‘‘Contrary to popular
belief, reason has more dependence on and greatest need of the faculty
of the imagination; if philosophers want to make progress, they must,
whether they want it or not, sit next to the poets’’ (Andrés, Dell’ origine
1:41). The theoretical consequences are impressive: Boileau’s submission
of belles lettres to reason implied a universality of reason—the idea that
‘‘human nature was permanent and unchanging, wherever and when-
ever it was found, and . . . therefore . . . norms could be prescribed to it’’
(Reiss 71). Such universality of reason, however, was untenable for An-
drés, since reason itself depended on the original poetry of languages.
Reason was, accordingly, relative to any specific language. What Boileau
recommended as reason was therefore something originating within a
French linguistic culture, which, in turn, was imposed by a hegemonic
state on the periphery of Europe under the assumption of its own uni-
versality. This was a rather original way of restating the question of the
genius of languages, which had traditionally granted France the hege-
mony of civilization: in Andrés’s version of it, the genius of French
language was not so much its propensity for the rational discourse, but
rather, if tautologically, a propensity for a discourse perceived as rational
only within the same language. In other words, neither reason nor en-
lightenment were for Andrés ‘‘an impressively unified process across
Europe, indeed a remarkable demonstration of the essential cohesion of
European history’’ (Israel 137). There were many reasons, many enlight-
enments, and many histories as well.
This left Andrés with a major problem: if historicism is the relativism
of judging ‘‘each by its own development,’’ how can a hierarchy between,
for instance, the ‘‘good’’ histories of the Italians and the ‘‘bad’’ ones of
the French still be maintained? More seriously still: once such a principle
of relativism is introduced, how is it possible, even in eight quite lengthy
volumes, to cover ‘‘the origin and progress of all literatures in all times
and in all nations’’? It is for this reason, I believe, that Andrés continu-
ously qualified history with adjectives such as critical and philosophical.
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To begin with, it is interesting that for Andrés critical and philosophical
are not at odds with each other. In the article on ‘‘Belles Lettres’’ for the
Encyclopédie, Voltaire had written that ‘‘criticism today is not necessary,
and the philosophical spirit has replaced criticism’’ (7:599). Andrés in-
sists, rather, that there is no philosophy without criticism.
What criticism meant for Andrés was the selection (giusta censura) of
the representative works in each single literature. Critical was the inter-
pretation of those works (attenta lettura) in the context of their place
and time, and not according to allegedly universal criteria. Once its
literature was then judged ‘‘each by its own development,’’ what re-
mained to be assessed was what, within each literature, had contributed
to the general advancement of literature in the world. No matter how
important a work or an author could have been in her or his historical
and national context, what remained to be done was to select those that
had contributed to universal language. The notion of universality thus
reenters the theorization of literature, but is no longer limited to the
geography of France or any other single nation: ‘‘Who on earth are Leon
and Villages—Italians will say—compared to Costanzi and Speroni? And
who cares about Philips and Canitz—will say the Spaniard—compared
to Erera and Schilace? All nations will find my text lacking in promoting
their own authors, and too prolix in discussing others. I beg the readers
who will bring such an accusation against me to remember that I am
discussing universally all literatures, and not particular national ones’’
(Dell’ origine 2:xii–xiii). In order to assess which works and which au-
thors were indeed relevant to universal literature, a philosophy, a unitary
conception and idea of the progress of all literatures, was needed. Philo-
sophical, in other words, described a principle of hermeneutic coher-
ence, one opposed to the cumulative method of erudition and of na-
tional literature, that could trace the idea of progress (‘‘che descriverà
filosoficamente i progressi in ogni sua parte’’) in ‘‘such a cornucopia of
facts’’ (1:v).≤∞ The philosophical was the power that could abstract, out of
all the infinite literatures of all times and nations, one single, meta-
physical history, with an origin and an end not yet in sight:
In general, I believe that we can consider Asia as the true motherland, the
cradle of literature. Because Asia was the first country to be populated
after the Flood, it was the first to cultivate the sciences. It can also be said
that the light of letters, like that of the sun, began to enlighten the Orien-
tal quarters, following then its westward course, casting light first on
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Egypt, and then on Greece, and after that illuminating our western re-
gions [i.e., Europe]. God willing, this light will stay above us a little
longer, or maybe will stop its course in our hemisphere, rather than keep
moving toward the West transferring the splendor of sciences to America
and leaving Europe in the same darkness of ignorance that nowadays
casts a shadow not only on the Asiatic nations, but also on Egypt and on
the eastern parts of Europe. (1:19–20)
A critical and philosophical history was, then, the key for Andrés to
begin to ‘‘vindicate his native land’’ (Mazzeo 45), ‘‘oppose the implanta-
tion of the restraining Gallic literary tenets and precepts of the neoclassi-
cal school of thought . . . [and] counteract the influence of Encyclo-
pedism’’ in Europe (Mazzeo 45).≤≤ Looking at literature not from Jau-
court’s utilitarian perspective, but from a historicist one, Andrés had
already achieved two objectives: first, his contemporary south emerged
not as a cultural wasteland, but as the active producer of a vibrant
historicist culture; second, southern literatures were di√erent than the
French ones (southerners write literary histories while Frenchmen com-
pose the Arts of Poetry), and they could not be measured with the same
standards. There was still one problem that literary historiography now
needed to solve: where did modern Europe begin? Was it, really, in
Montesquieu’s Frankish woods that an ancient cycle of literature was
historically transcended into modernity? Or did European modernity
begin in the south after all?
The Discreet Charm of the Arabist Theory
But now, having brought to your attention this synthetic
picture, with its many details, I fear a question may be raised:
Is then all our civilization of Arabic origin?
—A. GONZALEZ PALENCIA, ‘‘Islam and the Occident’’
Who were the fellow Muslims Abd al-Rahman found
in al-Andalus, and how had they come to be there?
What was that place, Europe, where they lived?
—MARIA ROSA MENOCAL, The Ornament of the World
The image of a light of culture moving from Asia to Europe as if follow-
ing the sun and stationing over the Iberian peninsula before ‘‘moving to-
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ward the West transferring the splendor of sciences to America’’ sounds
so enlightened and Voltaire-like, that the reader, who at this point is only
at page 19 of Dell’origine, is almost led to believe in Andrés’s encyclo-
pédisme. Like Voltaire, Andrés was following the same biblical story
of post-Adamitic civilization beginning in Asia, and then moving west-
ward along with the sun. What Voltaire could not have possibly imag-
ined was the Jesuit’s (historicist) presentiment that the light of culture,
perhaps, would not stay in Europe forever. Whereas history was for
Voltaire a teleology leading to Europe, Andrés’s historicism, instead, was
based on the assumption that no place and no time was the ultimate end
of history.
At any rate, in Andrés’s account the light of literature has not yet
transferred to America: it has just abandoned the eastern parts of Europe
in the dark and is now moving toward the Atlantic.≤≥ Where do we find,
then, the light of culture now? Without being exceedingly surprised, we
find the light exactly around Spain and Portugal, where it is hesitating
(and why would any light like to abandon beautiful Iberia!) to jump to
the other shore of the ocean. The image is halfway jingoistic tastelessness
and sheer beauty: by reclaiming the importance of Spain as the last
Thule of Europe’s culture before light would move to the New World,
Andrés is already hinting at where modern literature really is. Paris is
passé; New York may be the future. Madrid, no doubt, is the present.
The image does, in fact, summarize quite well the scope of the eight
volumes of Dell’origine, progressi, e stato attuale d’ogni letteratura. As a
transnational (and transcontinental) literary history, Andrés’s book of-
fers a look at various national literatures, but, above all, a chronology of
the world’s great literary epochs—those epochs in which the culture of
one nation became patrimony of all literatures to follow. Briefly, this is
Andrés’s chronology, already su≈ciently summarized by the cited image:
the first great epoch of literature is in Asia after the Flood; literature then
moves westward, first to Egypt (for the satisfaction of Martin Bernal),
then to Greece, where it knows exemplary perfection (2:26–31). It then
moves to imperial Rome; and then . . . . Then where? Chronology is of
the utmost importance here because to understand where the light of
literature moved after Rome meant nothing less than understanding in
which language, and in which nation, resided the cultural origin of
modern Europe. Voltaire had already said that ‘‘modern history . . .
follows the decadence of the Roman Empire’’ (Oeuvres complètes 11:157);
and August Wilhelm von Schlegel would soon canonize that same esti-
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mate for the Romantic generation: modernity, he wrote in the Vorlesun-
gen über dramatische Kunst und Literatur (1809), is born out of the
‘‘encounter of Latin with the ancient German dialects,’’ which, following
the fall of Rome, inaugurates a ‘‘new European civilization’’ (13).
So, where does the light of culture find refuge after the fall of Rome?
Montesquieu’s answer had been unequivocal: after culture had but dis-
appeared in the immediate and darkest years following the demise of the
empire, it was in Charlemagne’s Frankish schools and monastery that
‘‘Arts and Sciences seemed to reappear. One can say that the people of
France was destroying Barbarity’’ (Oeuvres 1:1095). For Jaucourt, it was
in French Provence that modern European culture begun: ‘‘In a word, all
our modern poetry, comes from Provence’’ (Diderot 12:840).≤∂ Whether
it was Charlemagne or the troubadours, one thing was certain: an origin
of modern Europe was to be located somewhere in France.
It was this certainty that Andrés intended to demolish. First of all, if
Charlemagne had managed to make anything reappear, it was only the
pseudoculture of mediocre theologians, ignorant clerics, and illiterate
priests (Andrés, Dell’ origine 1:110): ‘‘Because in fact the Emperor, Al-
cuinus, Theodulf, and all those who were working for a reformation of
studying had only one goal: service to the church. Accordingly, their great
schools taught little more than grammar [useful only to read the psalms]
and ecclesiastical singing’’ (1:108–9). In Frankish Europe, in other words,
‘‘Schools were created; but only to teach reading, singing, counting, and
little more. Teachers were formed; but it was enough that they knew some
grammar, and if one was ahead of his peers enough to know also a little
bit of mathematics or astronomy, he was considered an oracle. But a
Terence, a Cicero, a Quintilian did not exist in all France’’ (1:111).
Boileau had submitted literature to reason; Jaucourt to science; and
Charlemagne to religion. They all had ‘‘drowned Europe in so much dia-
lectical nonsense’’ (1:182). There had to be something rotten in France!
Moreover, as we know from Aldo Scaglione, mentions of Alcuin’s schools
were often a veiled criticism of Jesuit education, accused of straying away,
by teaching all the heathen Greeks and Romans, from proper knowledge
(51). So if culture survived or revived in Europe, this could scarcely be the
merit of Charlemagne and his educators.
As for the claim of a Provençal origin of modern literature, this was, as
Andrés probably learnt from Vico, just the ‘‘arrogance’’ (alterigia) (An-
drés, Dell’ origine 2:11) and ‘‘pretentiousness of the French, who brag
about monuments of superior antiquity both in prose and in verse’’
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(1:266).≤∑ First of all, Provençal, the idiom that ‘‘so much ado created all
over Western Europe’’ (1:292), originally was not the French of Lan-
guedoc, but, in case, Catalan (1:294). Second, and more important, what
has French Provençal poetry ever achieved if not much bragging about
such a mediocre poem as the Roman de la rose, ‘‘where absolutely noth-
ing happens but the picking of a rose’’ (1:338)? Rather than creating
modern poetry, the French had drowned Europe in the darkness of
scholasticism: ‘‘None of the first scholastics was a Spaniard. None of the
early controversies that excited the scholastics excited Spain. And none
of the early scholastic sects was born in those places. Spaniards got
scholastics from the Gauls’’ (1:168).
If the French had not invented modern poetry, then who did? There
was only one answer for Andrés: Arab literature had been the central
influence in the rebirth of modern Europe (1:x). With a prose reminiscent
of the One Thousand and One Nights, Andrés described Baghdad as the
very light of modern culture—as the locus, namely, where a shift from
classical languages to the vulgar ones ‘‘accessible to the people’’ had been
transacted: ‘‘One sees hundreds of camels entering Baghdad, charged
only with paper and books; and all the books, in whatever language they
were written, were immediately translated into Arabic’’ (1:120). From
Baghdad, the hegemonic center of the ninth century, literature had then
been exported to the entire world—and had reentered Europe to cast
some lights in its dark ages: ‘‘So, throughout the vast Arab domains, in all
the three parts of the world [the ones known at the time: Asia, Africa, and
Europe] where their empire had been extended, we see Saracen letters
enter triumphantly, and dominate, like their armies, the globe. Since the
ninth century of our era, the light of Arabic literature began to shine, and
for six or seven centuries it kept glittering brightly’’ (1:124). Not unaware
of the consequences of such an assertion, Andrés conceded that
[this is] a truth that many will take as a ridiculous paradox; namely, that
modern literature, not only in the sciences, but also in the Belles Lettres,
recognizes the Arab as its mother. Paper, numerals, gunpowder, the com-
pass came to us from the Arabs. Maybe also the pendulum and the law of
gravity, and other recent discoveries . . . were known by them long before
they came to our philosophers. Universities, astronomical observatories,
academies, literary institutions do not think they have an Arab origin,
and perhaps they will not be very grateful to me for having refreshed
their memory with the remembrance of such an old event. (1:xi)
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Accordingly, Andrés would devote to what will later be known as the
Arabist theory the lengthiest and most problematic chapter of his entire
treatise—a chapter he was not even sure how to title in order to render it
more palatable to his European readers: vaguely, Della letteratura degli
arabi (Of Arabic Literature) in the Parma edition; programmatically,
Dell’influenza degli arabi nella moderna coltura delle belle lettere (The
Influence of the Arabs in the Modern Culture of Belles Lettres) in the
Venetian and Prato editions; hiding the Arab, Dell’introduzione della
lingua volgare nella coltura delle lettere, particolarmente nella poesia (The
Introduction of Vulgar Languages in Literature, especially in Poetry) in the
Roman and Pisan editions.
Andrés was not the first to formulate the Arabist theory. In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, in fact, this theory was a rather common
(if not uncontested) one (Menocal, ‘‘Pride and Prejudice’’ 67; Mazzeo
156–57; Monroe 67). In England, hermetics and Rosicrucians had already
recognized Arabic as ‘‘the linguistic medium through which much of the
Hermetic corpus had been transmitted to Europe in the medieval period’’
(Matar 89). Even in France the thesis of a Provençal origin of both
rhymed poetry and the novel (roman) had been questioned in the name
of the Arabist theory.≤∏ Pierre Daniel Huet, the bishop of Avranches, had
begun his 1670 letter to Monsieur de Segrais by saying that ‘‘it is neither in
Provence nor in Spain, as many believe, that one can hope to find the first
beginnings of this pleasant amusement of honest relaxation [i.e., the
roman]’’ (4). Such beginnings, instead, were ‘‘due to the Orientals—
namely, Egyptians, Arabs, Persians, and Syrians’’ (11). Similarly, as far as
modern poetry was concerned, ‘‘it is the Arabs, in my opinion, who have
given us the art of rhyming’’ (15). But it was especially in Italy, where
Andrés was exiled, that the question of an Arab influence in the develop-
ment of European ‘‘wisdom’’ had been tackled—since Nicolò Cusano’s
De docta ignorantia (1440)—with the ‘‘patriotic’’ aim of pointing to Py-
thagoras’s school of Crotone as the Italic origin of Western philosophy
(Casini). Vico had impugned the same thesis, with clear anti-Cartesian
intentions, in De antiquissima italorum sapientia (1710).
In the domain of the belles lettres, Giovanni Maria Barbieri, whose
Rimario (1570) Andrés had read through Tiraboschi (Palazón 19), had
already proposed an Arab origin of rhymed poetry: because the Arabs
liked to sing more than write and recite poems, they had replaced Greco-
Roman prosody, based on the length of the syllables, with the more
musical rhyme.≤π Following Barbieri, Ludovico Muratori’s Dissertazioni
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sopra le antichità italiane (1751) had singled out the much-despised Arabs
as the unexpected preceptors of ‘‘our Elders’’—the Tuscan Dante, Pe-
trarch, and Boccaccio. Subsequent chronologies and histories of Italian
poetry had thus seen the origin of a secular lyrical tradition not in the
courts of Provence, but in the Sicilian school of Fredrick ii, whose court
‘‘between 1225 and 1250, nearly two centuries after the Arabs had been
politically deposed by the Normans, was as brilliant and refined a center
of Arabic learning as any in the Middle East or in Spain’’ (Menocal,
‘‘Pride and Prejudice’’ 74). The Sicilian school had not only introduced
the secular topos of love (Boase 62–75), which would later become
central in the early-thirteenth-century stil novo (the new style) up to
Dante and Petrarch; it had also brought rhyme in Italian versification,
and, more important, the sonnet form, which was the likely modifica-
tion of the zajal, an Arab stanza of six verses popular with the Arabs
living in Sicily and rearranged in the final sextet of the Italian (not the
later English) sonnet (Oppenheimer; Wilkins, ‘‘Invention’’; Wulstan).≤∫
It is from this Italian tradition of patriotic Arabism, not from Huet or
the Rosicrucians that, in my opinion, Andrés developed his own Arabist
theory. His interest was not a philological but a (geo-)political one: to
remove the centrality of France in the history of modern Europe.
For Andrés, it was ‘‘unreasonable [to suppose] that the use of rhyme
began with the French, and from them was spread all over Europe’’ (Dell’
origine 1:307). Instead, ‘‘both French and Provençal must recognize the
Arabs as their teachers’’ (1:301). Arab was the ‘‘invention’’ of rhyme
(2:35–38) and the origin of the roman: ‘‘Fantasy drove the Arabs to
pleasant descriptions and gracious fables, and to every kind of works
that come from imagination and good taste. The roman was particularly
consistent with their genius, and they were received with such expecta-
tion from both learned men and the people that one commonly believes
them born out of Arabic ingenuity’’ (1:139–40). In short, the Arabs had
invented two of the pillars of modern European culture: ‘‘Maybe their
language . . . presents to the creative genius words and expressions,
which generate ideas’’ (2:8).
Arabic, also, was the origin of literary historiography (1:137), mod-
ern philosophy (1:141), mathematics (1:147), astronomy (1:148), medicine
(1:150–51), and jurisprudence (1:153)—all of modern literature, in fact,
with the only exception of modern theater, which originated instead in
Europe’s south between Italy (Angelo Poliziano’s Orfeo) and Spain (Fer-
nando de Rojas’ Celestina), came to ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘Arabia’’: ‘‘Arabia, this
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inglorious Asian peninsula; Arabia, barbarian country, place of igno-
rance and wilderness—Arabia gave shelter to the lost literature [of the
ancients], and o√ered sacred asylum to the gentile culture that Europe
had rudely cast away’’ (1:116).
As suggested above, Andrés did not invent the Arabist theory. He was,
however, taking it away from the restricted domain of Arabists, theorists
of national literature, and critics of literary genres. What for Huet was a
mere philological question had become for Andrés a more radical re-
orientation of the putative origin of modern Europe. By rearticulating
an old theory within a new comparative perspective, he was positing the
rather controversial hypothesis of a non-French, and non-European,
origin of Europe’s modern culture—let alone the debt Christian Europe
had contracted with the Islamic world (Arato, Storiografia 437). The
question is how to interpret correctly Andrés’s controversial proposi-
tion. In 1941, Ramón Menéndez Pidal had liquidated any opposition to
the Arabist theory as ‘‘a very rooted prejudice: the belief in the lack of
intellectual communication between the two worlds, the Christian and
the Islamic’’ (34). In more recent times, Maria Rosa Menocal has claimed
that the Arabist theory ‘‘first ceases to be discussed and then becomes
altogether taboo’’ in the second part of the nineteenth century, when ‘‘a
European sense of self emerged . . . which was the height of the colonial-
ist period, and the prevailing attitudes precluded, consciously or sub-
consciously, any possibility of ‘indebtedness’ to the Arabic world . . . it
would have been inconceivable or very di≈cult for most Europeans to
imagine, let alone explore or defend, a view of the ‘European’ as being
culturally subservient to the ‘Arab’ ’’ (‘‘Pride and Prejudice’’ 67–68).
The introduction to the present book has made clear (I hope) that a
European sense of self did not need to wait for the nineteenth century in
order to emerge. Moreover, I am inclined to believe that an attempt to
undermine the theory of an Arab origin of rhymed poetry begins in fact
long before Andrés’s own theorization of such origin. Michele Amari,
for one, considered seriously the possibility that already the (Christian)
scribes and copyists of the thirteenth century, when transcribing the
early Arab-Sicilian rhymed poetry, were so ashamed of even quoting that
material that they minimized the Arab influence in that poetry (Storia
4:759). What needs to be added at this point is that it would be a gross
misreading of the Arabist theory (and of Andrés) to suppose that its
goal was to ‘‘view the ‘European’ as being culturally subservient to the
‘Arab.’ ’’ Although Adolfo Domínguez Moltó imagines Andrés as an ‘‘ad-
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mirer, defender, and popularizer’’ of Arab culture (73), nowhere does
Dell’ origine show much sympathy toward the Arab, that ‘‘itinerant and
nomadic nation’’ (Andrés, Dell’ origine 1:116), the pyromaniac of Alex-
andria’s library, and the one bamboozled by Mohammad, ‘‘that famous
impostor’’ (1:131). Arab literature, after all, often fell short of that ‘‘natu-
ralness of feelings, simplicity of concepts, truth and propriety of figures’’
that characterized Andrés’s own European standards of good taste: it lost
its balance in ‘‘excessively daring metaphors,’’ ‘‘endless allegories,’’ and
‘‘excessive hyperboles’’ (1:134–35).
That Andrés was not concerned with the destiny of the Arab in partic-
ular, or with the destiny of multiculturalism in general, is evident from
his total disinterest in trying to learn the language, and his reliance on the
Spanish translations of the Escorial. Arab literature was treated by him
only insofar as it meant something for the history and genesis of Euro-
pean culture. Not that Europe was for him, as for Bossuet and Montes-
quieu before, the necessary end of history. The progress of literature,
however, was now ‘‘above us . . . in our hemisphere, [before] transferring
the splendor of sciences to America.’’ A philosophical history of literature
had, then, to be written in view of such progress. Sure enough, Montes-
quieu’s and Voltaire’s Eurocentric prejudice was repeated here: it never
occurred to Andrés that making present literature climax in Europe
(though a more southern Europe than Montesquieu’s and Voltaire’s)
could constitute a mere error of perspective. At any rate, Europe still
represented modernity for Andrés—the nowadays of progress. Accord-
ingly, Chinese and Indian literatures (Andrés, Dell’ origine 1:13–14) could
be liquidated in the space of one paragraph each because unimportant
for the progress of literature. Besides the Arabs, only Caldeans ‘‘can stay
in our memory, because from their doctrines the Greeks drew many
notions’’ (1:14); and Egypt ‘‘only deserves, from the whole of Africa, our
consideration, Egypt having been the school of the Greeks’’ (1:17).
Absolutely uninterested in establishing any ‘‘subservience’’ of Europe,
disinclined to claim Arab literature as the origin of European modernity,
Andrés only wanted to promote Spain, and, at most, southern Europe, as
origins. What operated on Andrés was, in this sense, the discreet charm
of the Arabist theory. The Arabs had sowed the seeds, but southern
Europe made them bloom: ‘‘Where Arab science bloomed more, where
the light of their knowledge shined brighter, where the reign of their
literature got fixed, so to speak, was in Spain’’ (1:122). In sum, ‘‘the first
flashes, which gave blinded Europe some light, came from Spain; there-
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fore, we can reasonably say that the origin of modern literature derived
from Spain’’ (1:174).
Answering the Hispanophobic prejudice, in Menocal’s words, that ‘‘as
an appendage of the Oriental world of Islam, the civilization of Spain did
not constitute an integral part of Europe’’ (‘‘Close Encounters’’ 50–51),
Andrés restored the crumbled empire to its old position of glory. Spain,
marginal south of a northbound Europe, came out of his pages as the
synthesis of world culture—as the topos, namely, where east and west
met. Spain was the last Thule, moreover, of European culture, before the
light would move to the New World. Even more important, Spain was
depicted as the very origin of all that is modern in Europe—the origin of
rhymed poetry, of the roman, and of modern theater (nuovo teatro)
(2:400). The paradigm of northern European hegemony was, at least
in Andrés’s intentions, flipped upside down: Pierre Corneille had to
learn from Spain how to build ‘‘the magnificent edifice of French the-
ater’’ (2:401); the modern epic had to be copied from ‘‘southern poetry’’
(2:134); and Spain was still to rule as the light of a new Europe.
Eager still to imagine itself as the ideal center of Europe, Spain was
certainly ready to salute the work of its exiled child with the greatest
euphoria: ‘‘Charles iii, the very monarch who expelled the Jesuits from
Spain, was so favorably impressed by the scope and quality of [Andrés’s]
work that he instructed the authorities at the Real Colegio de San Isidoro
and at the University of Valencia to adopt it as the o≈cial text in the
course of literary history given at those institutions, thus making them
the first European centers of learning to o√er a course on the history of
universal literature’’ (Mazzeo 45). The work that was supposed to decen-
ter a profoundly Francocentric Europe; the work that was supposed to
undermine the presuppositions of a nationalistic way of looking at liter-
ature through the magic of a nascent comparativism—this same work
became a nationalist monument to Spain’s nostalgias and ambitions. In
truth, only Andrés was to blame. Incapable of extending the implica-
tions of his historicism to a critique of any centralism, Andrés was in fact
the historical product of Auerbach’s ‘‘individual conditions’’ of his own
place and time—a time, I will argue in the next chapter, during which
ideas of Europe had started to merge, if not wane, into theories of
nationalism.
A fundamental blindness had prevented Andrés from seeing the full
consequences of both his historicism and of his Arabist theory: that his-
torical relativism could hardly be reconverted into a theory of Spanish
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(or southern) centralism; and that the Arab origin of European poetry
could hardly justify his commitment to keep east and west as cultural
antitheses of each other. Southern Europe, it is true, was promoted by
Andrés from Montesquieu’s past of European history to the very origin
of Europe’s modernity. A south conceived as causa prima of Europe,
however, was hardly a south understood as causa sui: the Europeanness
of the south was still claimed as the putative beginning of what Europe is
‘‘today.’’ In this, rather than representing any solution, Andrés remains
for us the allegory of the problems and di≈culties that we may still face
when attempting to provincialize Europe from its interior borders—
problems and di≈culties, however, that should not justify any uncritical
embracing of monolithic notions of Eurocentrism. As for the question of
European studies, the prevalent assumption that Europe took permanent
shape in the writings of Montesquieu and the philosophes should se-
riously be questioned, lest that Europe, which emerged from the histori-
cal circumstances of French hegemony, be not mistaken as a truth of
universal validity. Against that Europe, Juan Andrés had begun, in 1782,
to theorize a di√erent one: it was a Europe seen from the south; it did not
end ‘‘where Christianity ends,’’ but began where the Orient began.
4 Mme de Staël to Hegel
THE END OF FRENCH EUROPE
Germany, for its geographical location, can be considered the heart
of Europe, and the great continental association will never be able
to recover its freedom if not through the freedom of this country.
—MADAME DE STAËL, De l’Allemagne
Germany? But where is it? Here’s a country I cannot find!
—FRIEDERICH SCHILLER, ‘‘Das deutsche Reich’’
The sort of nationalism that Juan Andrés had pitted against a Franco-
centric Europe was not a peculiarly Spanish or southern phenomenon.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, while Andrés was already
working on Dell’ origine, the idea of the nation was a≈rming itself in
Europe against the cosmopolitan ideals of the Republic of Letters: ‘‘The
particular against the general, the individual against the universal. Ex-
actly because the fear is that universality will su√ocate individuality, and
that the general will su√ocate the particular—for this very reason, the
promoters of national individuality hold a strong polemical attitude
against [Francocentric] Europeanism’’ (Chabod 122).
After the ‘‘Discours’’ of Dijon and the letter to D’Alembert, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau had penned some ‘‘Considérations sur le gouverne-
ment de Pologne’’ in 1772. The ‘‘Considérations’’ had been occasioned by
the latest events in Poland’s political history. At the opening of the
eighteenth century, Poland was still under the sphere of influence of its
powerful neighbors—Prussia, Austria, and, especially, Russia. In 1768,
local resentment against foreign influence had led to the formation of
the so-called Confederation of the Bar. For four years, the confederation
attempted to govern Poland as an independent nation, to protect its
constitution, and to make of Roman Catholicism, as opposed to ortho-
dox eastern Christianity, the religion of the land. The confederation was
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supported, at a distance, by both France and the Ottoman Empire. In
1772, however, Russian military intervention brought the experiment of
the confederation to an end. Austria and Prussia, afraid of a complete
Russian takeover, struck some deals with the czarina Catherine ii, pro-
posing to partition Polish land for the sake of continental peace. The
proposal was accepted by Catherine ii, who managed, however, to keep
control of most of Poland. In 1772, therefore, the aspirations of an inde-
pendent nation had been sacrificed at the table of European diplomacy.
Who was to blame? The three powers, for sure; but in the ‘‘Considéra-
tions,’’ Rousseau went as far as to blame the entire concept of Europe—a
concept, elaborated in the salons of Paris, too quick to celebrate cosmo-
politanism and universalism at the expense of any national spirit:
Today, there are no longer Frenchmen, Germans, Spaniards, and English-
men, whatever you call them—only Europeans. All have the same tastes,
all the same passions, customs, because not a single one of them has
received a national form by a distinctive legislation. In the same circum-
stances they would all do exactly the same things. They will all tell you
how unselfish they are, and act like scoundrels. They will all go on and on
about the public good, and think only of themselves. They will all sing the
praises of moderation, and each will wish himself a modern Croesus.
They all dream only of luxury, and know no passion except the passion
for money; sure as they are that money will fetch them everything they
fancy, they will all sell themselves to the first man who is willing to pay
them. What do they care what masters they serve, or what country’s laws
they obey? Their fatherland is any country where there is money for them
to steal and women for them to seduce. They are everywhere at home.
(Oeuvres 3:960)
This was not the first time that Rousseau had expressed some distrust
toward cosmopolitanism, and, more specifically, against Europeanism.
Already Émile, in the eponymous novel of 1762, had been taught to
‘‘distrust those cosmopolites’’ (4:249) who try to better ‘‘Man’’ and fail
to improve the citizen. La nouvelle Héloise (1761) had also praised the
Englishmen, who ‘‘don’t have the need to be Man’’ (2:216), for being
nationalists and insular at heart. As I have suggested in the previous
chapter, Rousseau’s distrust for such concepts was largely motivated by
his suspicion that behind them lurked the hegemony of some state
powers—France, or even Russia in the case of Poland—which were ar-
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rogant enough to legitimate their interests, ambitions, and even ways of
living as universal or European. Had not the partition of Poland, after
all, been legitimated in the name of European peace?
At the risk of rewriting universal history against Montesquieu and
Voltaire, the ‘‘Considérations’’ were a frontal attack against Europe first,
and against European Russia, the archenemy of Polish nationalism, con-
sequently. In De l’esprit des lois, Montesquieu had praised the czar Peter
the Great (1682–1725) for ‘‘giving European customs and manners to a
European nation’’ (Oeuvres 2:565). Voltaire, too, had o√ered a simi-
lar monument to Peter the Great, who transformed Russia, hitherto
‘‘scarcely known in Europe,’’ into a great European Empire (69). In sum,
for both Montesquieu and Voltaire, Peter had brought Russia to the
eighteenth century—that is to say, to modernity—by bringing it to Eu-
rope: after that, Russia was no longer the ‘‘Orient’’; it became a European
empire. For Rousseau, instead, exactly because of that Europeanness
conquered through Peter’s love for the West, ‘‘the Russians will never be
really civilized . . . Peter had the genius of mimicry; but not the true
genius that creates and makes everything out of nothing . . . . He made
[of his people] a German one, a British one, instead of starting to make
of it the Russian people’’ (Oeuvres 3:386).
What was this abhorred Europe for Rousseau? In the Extrait du projet
de paix perpétuelle de M. l’abbé de Saint Pierre (1761), Europe did not
sound like such a bad deal after all:
All the powers of Europe constitute, among themselves, some kind of a
system that unites through the same religion, through the same set of
laws, customs, letters, and commerce, and provides the necessary balance
of forces. Add to this: the particular situation of Europe, which is more
populated and more united than other continents; the continuous mix-
ing of interests that ties of blood and of commerce, of arts and colonies,
have instituted among European monarchs; the multitude of rivers and
the variety of their courses, which make communications easy; the rest-
less mood of its inhabitants, which makes them travel incessantly, and
brings one in the country of the other; the invention of the printing press,
and the common taste in the arts, which has made possible the sharing of
scholarship and knowledge; and finally, the multitude and small size of
the European States which, interdependent in their common need for
luxury and in the di√erence of climates, has always made each people
necessary to all others. All these causes together make of Europe not only,
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like in Asia or Africa, an ideal collection of peoples that only have one
name in common, but a real society with its religion, its habits, its cus-
toms, and even its laws, which no single people can break without imme-
diately causing some danger to the others. (Oeuvres 3:567)
Yet, as it is already implicit in the Extrait, this ‘‘real society,’’ perhaps
exactly because it is real, remains quite distant from any ideal: this system
of Europe, capable only of satisfying ‘‘luxury’’ and the ‘‘sharing of schol-
arship and knowledge,’’ careful only about its internal ‘‘balance of forces’’
that had led to Polish partition, was a perennial threat to the ‘‘originality’’
of its single parts. Hence the inherent dissatisfaction in all notions of Eu-
rope, including those that aimed for a perpetual peace. Perpetual peace,
once obtained through the European balance of forces, when detrimental
to national originality, was capable of leading only to its exact con-
trary: ‘‘The perpetual dissent, brigandage, thrones usurped, revolts, wars,
homicides which daily sadden this respectable home of the Wise, this
brilliant asylum of the Sciences and the Arts . . . the pretended fraternity of
the Peoples of Europe is a name to be laughed at, a name, ‘fraternity,’ that
expresses with irony their mutual animosity’’ (Oeuvres 3:567–68). A
repressed sense of nationalism, sacrificed at the altar of a common and
supposedly balanced Europe, returns through the symptoms of perpetual
dissent and war. This is all that can be achieved in the name of Europe.
It is in this sense that Rousseau was said to close an old, cosmopolitan
epoch in order to father a new one—called Romantic and hinging on the
question of national specificities. Against the uniformity of Europe, the
nation starts a≈rming itself as the true center of a true fraternity: free-
dom, which for Montesquieu was the end of European history, begins
now with a savage ‘‘disdain of European pleasures’’ (Rousseau, Oeuvres
3:182), and with a recuperation of more local, national desires. Rousseau,
along with Andrés, contributes to the logic that at the eve of the French
Revolution starts undoing, rather than consolidating, the very idea of
Europe.
Yet the distance between the old and the new, between doing and
undoing, should not be overestimated here: Does such novel logic of
nationalism truly undo the idea of Europe? Or is it, rather, a reformula-
tion of it—a denial of cosmopolitan Europe, that is, advanced in the
name of a new Europe of nations? The rhetoric of Rousseau’s logic is so
explicitly and blatantly critical of Montesquieu’s Europeanism that it is
easy to miss in it that rhetorical unconscious that still ties the Polish
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considerations to De l’esprit des lois. With an echo of Machiavelli, Mon-
tesquieu had written that ‘‘in Europe the natural divisions of the terrain
form a plurality of States . . . . This forms, in turn, a spirit of freedom’’
(Oeuvres 2:529). Twenty-four years later, Rousseau similarly located in
‘‘the multitude and small size of the European States’’ the reason for a
return to national freedoms—but also, as a matter of paradoxical facts,
the very Europeanness of nationalism.
The Unbearable Europeanness of the French Revolution
In the eyes of Europe, we can be the model.
—MAXIMILIEN DE ROBESPIERRE, Discours
Should the Revolution only be French, just as
the Reformation was Lutheran?
—NOVALIS, ‘‘Die Christenheit oder Europa’’
‘‘What is a nation?’’ asked Ernest Renan in 1882. First of all, he answered,
a nation is not ‘‘the vast agglomerations of men found in China, Egypt or
ancient Babylonia, the tribes of the Hebrews and the Arabs, the city as it
existed in Athens and Sparta, the assemblies of the various territories in
the Carolingian Empire’’ (9). Montesquieu’s ‘‘extended territories’’ are
thus not only ‘‘despotic’’ (Oeuvres 2:362): ‘‘Vast agglomerations,’’ adds
Renan, are also ‘‘without a patrie [homeland].’’ Europe, the land of
Montesquieu’s freedom, is therefore also the land of Rousseau’s ‘‘nations,
such as France, England and the majority of the modern European
sovereign states’’ (Renan 9). In truth, it is not simply Europe that func-
tions as the homonym of nation: neither the Greek city-states of Athens
and Sparta nor the Roman Empire were nations in any sense of the
word. Only modern Europe, as it were, has nations: ‘‘Nations . . . are
something fairly new in history’’ (9). In European history, that is, if such
specification is still needed after Montesquieu. The newness of history
began for Renan with yet another echo of Montesquieu: when ‘‘the
Germanic invasions . . . introduced into the world the principle which,
later, was to serve as the basis for the existence of nationalities’’ (9). One
sees the slow work of construction of the idea of Europe, the unfolding
of its rhetorical unconscious here: feudalism, private property, and free-
dom were for Montesquieu the beginning of a modern Europe brought
about by the German Franks. Renan also adds to the picture of German
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achievements the introduction of nationalism in modern European his-
tory. That modern history had begun with Montesquieu’s Gallic feudal-
ism: it had climaxed, however, only with the revolution of 1789. ‘‘France,’’
declares Renan with the clearest sense of patrie, ‘‘can claim the glory for
having, through the French Revolution, proclaimed that a nation exists
of itself. We should not be displeased if others imitate us in this. It was we
who founded the principle of nationality’’ (12).
In a way, Renan was attributing nothing less than everything to the
French Revolution, and theorizing, once and for good, the intimate
relation between nation and revolution. The syllogism went like this: the
nation is the highest embodiment of a people’s freedom; freedom is a
will of law and self-determination that pits a people against the old order
of empire and absolute authority; ergo, the nation is the product of a
revolution. By ultimately realizing what the Germans had ‘‘introduced’’
in the history of the universe, 1789 was thus for Renan the climax of a
modern Europe united no longer by the spirit of cosmopolitanism but
by its plurality of nations. ‘‘Africa . . . and Asia,’’ had written Machiavelli,
‘‘have always been one or two empires at most . . . ; only Europe has had a
few empires, and an infinite number of republics’’ (Opere 585). ‘‘In
Europe,’’ had echoed Montesquieu, ‘‘the natural divisions of the terrain
form a plurality of States’’ (Oeuvres 2:529). Renan could then conclude:
not unity, but national di√erence is the essence of Europe. Nationalism is
not the undoing of Europe, but the final realization of a modern Europe
spurred by the French Revolution.
It may sound curious that such a modern Europe of nations is made to
begin in 1789, and not, for instance, in 1776. In that year, on July 4, on the
other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. Declaration of Independence had al-
ready mentioned ‘‘citizens’’ and ‘‘their Country’’—let alone equality and
liberty—thirteen years before the Jacobeans would utter those same
words again. The fact is that inheriting the Enlightenment’s belief in the
universality (and originality) of French values, it could only be France,
not the thirteen United States of America, that could paradoxically see in
French nationalism not a peculiarly French desire, but, paradoxically, a
European one. As the count Honoré de Mirabeau told the National
Assembly after the fall of the Bastille: ‘‘The influence of such a na-
tion [France] will undoubtedly conquer the whole of Europe’’ (qtd. in
Davies 713).
And conquer it did. ‘‘After 1789 everyone knew that the world could
be turned upside down, that determined men could mobilize the so-
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cial forces and psychological motors which underlay the surface of the
most tranquil society’’ (Davies 713). More important, after 1789 everyone
seemed to know that modern Europe was defined neither by Voltaire’s
letters nor by Montesquieu’s feudal institutions, but by national revolu-
tions. Take William Blake’s Europe: A Prophecy of 1794, for instance,
where Europe is the apocalypse of revolutionary hubris—‘‘in the vine-
yards of red France appear’d the light of his fury’’ (66)—liberating itself
from the yoke of paltry reason, petty religion, and ancient regimes. Or
take William Wordsworth’s 1804 poem entitled ‘‘French Revolution as It
Appeared to Enthusiasts at Its Commencement’’: from France to the
British Isles, Europe entire sings the Revolution’s ‘‘pleasant exercise of
hope and joy’’ (1:636).
Certainly, not everybody was enthusiastic about this new revolution-
ary Europe of nations. Edmund Burke, for one, in the Reflections on the
Revolution in France (1790), lamented the end of a once-glorious Europe,
and the beginning of a petty bourgeois one: ‘‘The age of chivalry is gone.
That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the
glory of Europe is extinguished for ever. Never, never more shall we
behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission,
that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept
alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom’’ (126).
In Considerations sur la France (1796), Joseph de Maistre went so far as
to interpret the revolution as God’s punishment against France, whose
monarchy had betrayed its providential mission, thus leaving Europe,
demoralized, in the hands of philosophes and libertines:
Every nation, like every individual, has a mission which it must fulfill. It
would be futile to deny that France exercises a dominant influence over
Europe, an influence she has abused most culpably. Above all, she was at
the head of the religious system, and it was not without reason that her
king was called most Christian: Bossuet has not overstressed this point.
However, as she has used her influence to pervert her vocation and to
demoralize Europe, it is not surprising that terrible means must be used
to set her on her true course again. (50)
This was neither Burke’s time, however, nor Maistre’s. It was the time of
revolution, and Nabulione General Bonaparte was antonomasia and
personification of this very revolution.
On May 5, 1789, the reunion of the General Estates in Versailles had
opened a new cycle in the history of France by converting the old regime
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into a constitutional monarchy. On August 10, 1792, the monarchy was
overthrown and, on September 21, France was declared a republic—an
event symbolized by the spectacular beheading of the king and queen.
Monarchic Europe had obviously followed the French events with in-
creasing preoccupation. Already in 1789, revolutionary forces, inspired
by the French example, had declared a United States of Belgium and
overthrown Joseph ii, the emperor of Austria. In 1791, the Poles de-
manded once more a national constitution and independence from Rus-
sia; in 1794, led by Tadeusz Andrzej Bonawentura Kociuszko (who had
just come back from North Carolina where he fought against Britain
under General Nathaniel Greene), the Poles started their own national
revolution. In Germany, resentment against Prussian hegemony was on
the rise in all the other states. Since 1791, the Patriote français, edited by
Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, had started a crusade for the military
liberation of the peoples of Europe—‘‘only Robespierre,’’ observes Stuart
Woolf, ‘‘asked himself to what extent those peoples would welcome the
French as their liberators’’ (‘‘Storia’’ 152–53).
The coalition that Austria, Prussia, Russia, Holland, and England
formed against France could not do much to halt the spread of revolu-
tionary ferments. Worse, it could not do much to stop its military ad-
vance in Europe. In 1796, the Directorate of the Revolution had planned
a strategy of simultaneous wars for the liberation of Europe: General
Lazare Hoche was to invade Ireland; the generals Jean Victoire Marie
Moreau and Jean Baptiste Jourdan Germany; and the young debutant
Napoléon Bonaparte had to start the Italian campaign with the putative
goal of freeing Italy from the Austrian yoke, and the more concrete
economic objective of having Italian taxes pay for the reconstruction of
postrevolutionary France. In a few months, Napoléon liberated Milan,
besieged Mantua, and broke the Austrian lines in Rivoli. It was an as-
tounding beginning of his career.
‘‘Ce n’est qu’un début,’’ went the Parisian slogan of 1968, ‘‘this is only
the beginning.’’ In a period in which the principle of a ‘‘revolutionary
expansion’’ of France, theorized by Larevollière Lepaux and legalized in
1792 by the Republican Convention (Ricceri 57), was becoming some
kind of Frenchman’s burden, Italy truly was nothing more than a begin-
ning for Napoléon Bonaparte: ‘‘You [Italians] are the first example . . .’’
(qtd. in Woolf, ‘‘Storia’’ 162; emphasis mine). What was the end, then? A
perfect reintegration and novel Europeanization of Europe. The histo-
rian Stuart Woolf describes Napoleonic integration in these words: ‘‘If
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the Orient was ‘orientalized,’ as Said argues, Europe had been ‘Euro-
peanized’ by the construction of a unifying grid of civilization, against
which all cultures could be measured and classified’’ (‘‘Construction’’
89). What this meant, in Napoléon’s own words, was ‘‘to found a Euro-
pean code, a supreme Court for all Europe’’; and to make of Europe ‘‘a
single European people . . . a truly united nation [so that] everybody, no
matter where he traveled, would always have been in the common fa-
therland of all.’’ Focused on such a modernizing mission, Napoléon,
who may have read De l’esprit des lois, certainly shared with Montes-
quieu the idea of a Frankish origin of Europe fathered by Charlemagne.
Asking to be crowned in Aix-la-Chapelle, once the capital of Charle-
magne’s reign, Napoléon presented himself as the new father of a new
Europe. Just as Charlemagne had reunified and regenerated the Roman
Empire, so was Napoléon to reunify and regenerate the Holy Roman
Empire into, so to speak, the new revolutionary French Europe: ‘‘There
is not enough sameness among the nations of Europe. European society
needs regeneration. There must be a superior power which dominates all
the other powers, with enough authority to force them to live in har-
mony with one another—and France is best placed for this purpose’’
(qtd. in Thompson 38–39).
Europe, in turn, seemed quite eager to be regenerated by the example
of revolutionary France: the Swiss were ready to declare the Helvetic
Republic, in 1798, against the aristocratic cantonal governments; and
the Italians themselves, in large measure, were quite enthusiastic that
the revolution was entering, with Napoléon, Italy as well. This state
of euphoria, however, was not to last long. If the welcoming of the
French liberators had been quite triumphal, the following fiscal pres-
sures (someone had to pay for all these liberations!), the military draft,
political interferences, and the fundamental disinterest of the French in
Italian nationalism quickly turned the Italians against the rescuers of
their freedom (Banti, Risorgimento 18–31). The French, wrote Vincenzo
Cuoco, who was certainly not a conservative of the likes of Burke and
Maistre, had brought a revolution that was ‘‘too French and scarcely
Neapolitan’’ (qtd. in Casini 244). ‘‘The French have deluded themselves
about the nature of their revolution, and believe to be universal what is,
in fact, the product of the specific political circumstances of the French
nation’’ (Cuoco 37). Other peoples, like ‘‘the stupid Belgians and the
bestial Germans’’ (in the words of the directorate, qtd. in Woolf, ‘‘Storia’’
161), were not much happier than the Italians about this liberation im-
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posed through the means of military occupation. Especially in Germany,
which was at the time a collection of small states under the control of
Prussia, the project had become that of the construction of a German
nationalism far from the French model. Robespierre might have been
right, after all: Why would people welcome unconditionally the French
as their national liberators?
The limits of wars of liberation are certainly a hot topic today. In the
time we are discussing, even hotter was any mention of the archenemy of
Napoleonic imperialism—Anne Louise Germaine Necker, married de
Staël. ‘‘Bonaparte had so persecuted her that people said in Europe
one had to count three Great Powers: England, Russia and Mme de
Staël,’’ o√ered Mme de Chastenay (qtd. in Isbell 6). England had not
won Waterloo yet (Napoleon’s chief of police, at any rate, would blame
Mme de Staël, not Wellington, for the fall of Napoléon); and Russia had
scarcely come out unscathed from the Polish quagmire. Mme de Staël,
instead, in the small town of Coppet, Switzerland, was already starting
to dismantle Napoleonic Europe: anti-French, national, Romantic—the
sort of Europe imagined by her was undoubtedly a novel one. Most
notably, cultural hegemony had shifted from France to Germany. Yet
even this new Europe kept being divided, just as in the times of Montes-
quieu, between north and south.
German Europe Considered in Her Relation to Religion
Marriage: Europe owes once more to the church
the small numbers of good laws it still has.
—CHATEAUBRIAND, Génie du christianisme
The product of a revolutionary age, and written by an active participant
in the revolution—first as a Girondist moderate republican, then as
a constitutional monarchist, and finally as an outlaw of Robespierre’s
Directorate—Anne-Louise Germaine Necker Madame de Staël’s De la
littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions socials was in its
own right a revolutionary work.∞ To begin with, this was the first work
proposing to study literature not simply in itself but according to the
‘‘influence that religion, customs, and laws have on literature, and the in-
fluence that literature has on religion, customs, and laws’’ (Staël, Littéra-
ture 64). For the first time, literature was caught in a dialectics with soci-
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ety and was said to be, in some sort of Gramscian way, not only a product
(representation) but also a producer (creation) of social institutions.
Just as revolutionary was Staël’s message: concluding De la littérature
with a peculiar praise both of medieval Christianity and the Enlighten-
ment culture of the ancien régime, Mme de Staël depicted revolutionary
France as a moment of corruption in European history—one in which
the humanism of Christianity and the Enlightenment had turned into
the culture of fear called the Age of Terror or of the guillotine. Moreover,
against the model of the French Revolution, De la littérature had begun
to praise a di√erent one—that of a bourgeois Germany centered not on
the militaristic cult of heroic revolutions, but on that of ‘‘domestic hap-
piness’’ (171). Staël would later develop this thesis in De l’Allemagne
(1810), a true call for a new Europe with the ‘‘German race’’ (1) at its
center. Germany, according to Staël, was the nation in which ‘‘men are
the most learned and most meditative of Europe’’ (23) whose universities
were ‘‘the most knowledgeable of Europe’’ (244), and whose ‘‘influence
on thinking Europe dates from the times of Protestantism’’ (67). Already
with the publication of De la littérature, however, Staël’s move against
Francocentrism—if not blunt anti-Gallicism—and in the direction of a
German Europe quickly aroused the anger of the Directorate of the
Revolution, which decreed the arrest of Mme de Staël in 1796. After
having avoided prison for the intervention of her husband, in May 1800,
less than one month after the publication of De la littérature and the
vehement attacks from the French press, Staël decided to leave Paris for
her husband’s estate in Coppet, Switzerland. There she formed a salon
frequented by the likes of Benjamin Constant, Simonde de Sismondi,
Charles Victor de Bonstetten, and August Wilhelm von Schlegel.
In spite of its political daring, however, De la littérature was quite a
conservative book in some respects. Although its attention to the social
relevance of literature (and its attention to gender) made of De la littéra-
ture a breakthrough in literary theory, the idea Staël seemed to have of
literature was, after all, hardly a revolutionary one. It was downright
parochial, in fact, when compared to previous works such as Andrés’s
Dell’ origine, or even when measured against Voltaire’s opening, in the
Essai, on the literary world of China, India, and Arabia. Both Andrés and
Voltaire had spent pages on the great literatures of the Orient. One
paragraph on Mohammad (inspired perhaps by a premature vision of
Samuel Huntington and Silvio Berlusconi) instead su≈ced for Staël:
‘‘Mohammad . . . gave birth to a fanaticism with the most astonishing
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insouciance . . . . His religion was destined only for the people of the
south, had as its only goal to stir a military spirit by o√ering compensa-
tions for military exploits. This religion created conquerors, but did not
bring any seed of intellectual development . . . Islam was stationary in its
e√ects: it halted the human spirit’’ (167). According to Mme de Staël,
both literature—which rather canonically comprehended ‘‘poetry, elo-
quence, history, and philosophy’’ (91)—and its progress were a European
prerogative. Hardly any word needed to be spent to justify such a Euro-
peanist assumption. ‘‘I believe that we can consider Asia as the true
motherland, the cradle of literature,’’ had said Andrés. For Staël, instead,
literature had begun, more simply, in Greece: ‘‘One can consider the
Greeks, as it concerns literature, as the first nation [peuple] that has ever
existed’’ (93). Literature, in other words, was the unfolding of nothing
else than the ‘‘moral and political Europe’’ (61). Staël’s study of literature,
in turn, was becoming yet another theory of Europe.
Even less revolutionary than her blunt Eurocentrism was Staël’s unas-
sailable faith in the idea of history as continuous progress. Inherited
from Montesquieu, and filtered through the philosophes, the postulate of
an infinite ‘‘perfectibility of the human species’’ (Staël, Littérature 59, 87)
shaped the entirety of her narrative. ‘‘My goal,’’ she assertd, ‘‘is to observe
the progress of the human spirit, and only philosophy can indicate such
progress with certainty’’ (120). Certainly, also the southern Andrés had
talked about progress—but not as an ideal of linear perfectibility; and
not as something that ‘‘only philosophy,’’ without the aid of a critical
spirit, could indicate with certainty. Mme de Staël, however, seemed (I
will come back to my word choice soon) not to have ever heard of such
Andrés.
Literature, instead, was for Staël a story of continuous perfectibility
that went, more or less, like this: literature began in Greece, the ‘‘child-
hood of civilization’’ (Littérature 94). The foundation and origin of
literature, the Greeks ‘‘could not imitate anyone’’ before them. They
were thus rough but pure (or pure but rough, depending on the point of
view). ‘‘Having only nature as a model,’’ the Greeks began literature as
pure representations of nature (111). One of the limits of their art, espe-
cially in the theater, was ‘‘the exclusion of women’’ (117). Exit the Greeks.
The Romans enter in Mme de Staël’s literary theater of universal (Euro-
pean) history: ‘‘The Greeks gave the impulse to literature and the fine
arts. The Romans marked the world with the traces [empreinte] of their
own genius’’ (128–29). The Romans, in other words, were the first trace
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of progress in the infinite betterment of literature that the Greeks had
only begun: the Romans reached ‘‘an authority of expression, a gravity
of tone, and a regularity of periods’’ (131) that easily surpassed anything
Greek. They did not, however, reach ultimate perfection. For that, we
must patiently wait for their fall and for the inauguration of a new and
most beautiful era—modernity—heralded by ‘‘the invasion of the Peo-
ples of the North, the establishment of Christianity, and the Renaissance
of the Letters’’ (162).
We have seen in the previous chapter how Andrés had rescued the
Middle Ages, the Dark Ages, from their canonical image of gloominess
and decline and promoted them as the origin of a modern Europe
starting from Al-Andalus. Staël’s palimpsest, however, was not Andrés,
but Montesquieu. Like Montesquieu, Staël saw the Middle Ages as a pe-
riod of inexorable progress and the beginning of a modern Europe ini-
tiated not by the Muslims of Al-Andalus, but by ‘‘our German fathers’’:
People count in history more than ten centuries in which one usually
believes that the human spirit regressed. This would be a strong objection
against the system of progress [système de progression dans les lumières], if
such a long period, if such a considerable portion of time known to us,
had seen the great work of perfectibility recede. But this objection, which
I would consider very seriously, if it were founded, can be refuted in a
very simple manner. I do not think that the human species regressed
in this period; I believe, on the contrary, that giant steps were made
in the course of these ten centuries, both for the spread of knowledge
[lumières], and for the development of intellectual faculties. (163)
What were these ‘‘giant steps’’ that knowledge made in the Middle Ages?
Put simply, they were the entry of ‘‘the nations of the North’’ into
‘‘civilized society.’’
When the northern nations entered civilized society, however, they
did not come in timidly knocking at the door. They shattered a Roman
Empire. They ended an epoch, and ushered in a new one—modernity. It
was an age no longer complacent in the imitation of nature: ‘‘Imitation
does not allow . . . for infinite perfectibility’’ (179), since nature, after all,
remains (for Staël at least, before Hegel) always the same. What Mon-
tesquieu’s ‘‘German fathers’’ brought in was a ‘‘new development of
sensibility and a deeper knowledge of human character.’’ The much-
admired Friedrich Schiller had mentioned something similar, also in
1800, in Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung: the poetry of the
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ancients was naive contact with and imitation of nature; ‘‘our’’ mod-
ern art instead, ‘‘because nature has disappeared from our humanity’’
(Schiller 194), was a sentimental art, swallowing in the melancholia of
what was lost.
Once again, we can easily see the influence of Montesquieu on Staël’s
idea of Europe: progress is the transgression of ‘‘the laws that God has
established’’ and the overcoming of a natural state. The end of this
progress is the establishment not only of human laws but of human
literature as well—a ‘‘philosophical’’ literature disentangled from the
mere imitation of God’s creation. As in Montesquieu, moreover, the
spirit of Europe, after dispensing with any comparison with the Orient,
became for Staël a dialectic of north and south: ‘‘There exist, I be-
lieve, two completely distinct literatures: those that come from the south
and those that descend from the north; those for which Homer is the
first source, and those of which Ossian is the origin’’ (Littérature 203).
The only di√erence to Montesquieu—quite substantial, in fact—is that
France no longer constituted the north, but the border of a south ending
before Germany, the new caput mundi, the real heart of Europe, and the
ultimate antonomasia of the north (212–16).
At any rate, for Staël there was one literature with ‘‘two completely dis-
tinct’’ origins—Homer, and Ossian, the ‘‘primitive’’ and ‘‘Germanic’’
poet that James Macpherson had completely fabricated, unbeknownst to
Mme de Staël, in 1765 (see Haywood). The progress of literature, then,
coinciding with a progress of Europe, was a movement from the ancient
south—Greece, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula (Staël, Littérature 193)—
to a modern north. As the idea of progress implied the idea of the inferi-
ority of the origin, Staël coherently announced that ‘‘Greek tragedies are,
then, I believe, much inferior to our modern tragedies’’ (110); and ‘‘it is
not less true that the moderns, in metaphysics, ethics, and sciences, are
infinitely superior to the ancients’’ (121). In short, ‘‘I have given my
preference to the literature of the North over that of the South’’ (54).
There was one thing, however, in which the ancients, that is, the south-
erners, excelled—to the point that they were better at it than the north-
erners ever were: history. What about progress then, one might ask! Does
not the admission that something was better in ancient times contradict
the whole idea of necessary progress? Staël was genuinely at pains when
trying to explain this apparent contradiction, to the point that one
wonders why, rhetorically speaking, she even mentioned history if it
threatened to disrupt her entire logical edifice. Was she trying to respond
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directly to someone in particular—say, Andrés—who had claimed the
superiority of the south in works of history? We cannot know with
certainty. We can agree, instead, with Staël—once she had mentioned the
southern superiority in history, she owed some explanation:
I must present here some reflections on the causes of the superiority of
the ancients in the genre of history. I believe that these reflections will
prove that such superiority is not in contradiction with the following
progress of thought. There are histories that are accurately called philo-
sophical histories; there are others whose merit consists in the truthful-
ness of their pictures, in the warmth of their narrative, in the beauty of
their languages. It is in this last genre that Greek and Latin historians have
excelled. One needs a more profound knowledge of man to be a great
moralist than to be a good historian . . . . In ancient history one finds
neither the philosophical analysis of moral impressions, nor the unper-
ceived symptoms of the soul’s a√ections. (152–53)
So even if southerners would claim that they were better at histories, this
did not compromise, but actually reinforced, the thesis of the south’s
inferiority vis-à-vis the north: southerners could be better historians
because they had not progressed as philosophers. Progress—Mme de
Staël could now conclude after this most arduous test—was the preroga-
tive of the north; and philosophy, pace Andrés, had nothing to do with
history.
After literature was presented as the unfolding of a progress of the
‘‘moral and political Europe,’’ Europe returned, then, in De la littérature,
as the very same dialectic of north and south that Montesquieu had orig-
inally proposed in 1748. The history of Europe was the story of its prog-
ress from Montesquieu’s amoral south—‘‘The peoples of the south . . .
fiery tempers, easily duped, easily fanatical, su√ered all the superstitions
and crimes that reason ever su√ered’’ (Staël, Littérature 168)—to a north
‘‘born from the morality of sentiments’’ (116). The north, then, was
modernity, the climax of a progress that defined Europe. The south
constituted the past of that same Europe—purer, yes, but hardly perfect.
In Schiller’s formulation: ‘‘They are what we were’’ (180).
De la littérature thus reestablished ‘‘such a di√erence of character
between those of the north and those of the south’’ (Staël, Littérature
167) that the whole idea of Europe ran the risk of obliterating. There was
not one Europe, but, at the very least, two: north and south. This did not
mean that two Europes could not be reconciled into one: just as litera-
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ture was one—going from the ancient naive one of Homer to the mod-
ern and sentimental one of the German Romantics—so was Europe one,
from south to north. What kept the two Europes together? Not new
to doubting, but unaccustomed to despair, the intrepid Mme de Staël
had the right answer for all: literature, obviously, was an element that
bonded the modern northerner, Ossian in hand, with his southern an-
cient brother (the sisters, after all, though inspirations to their men,
‘‘have not composed truly outstanding works’’; Staël 171–72). Yet even
more and above literature, it was religion that had made Europe one:
‘‘Christian religion has been the bond that has united the peoples of the
north with those of the south; it has melted, so to speak, in one opinion
two opposed customs . . . [northerners and southerners] have ended up
becoming nothing else than one single people disseminated in di√erent
countries of Europe. Christian religion has contributed powerfully to
that’’ (168–69).
‘‘If you go from one end of the continent to the other, what is it that
says you are in Europe?’’ asked recently, in December 2003, Italy’s deputy
prime minister Gianfranco Fini when the Polish delegation was denied a
substantial reference to Christianity in the preamble of the Constitu-
tion of the European Union. ‘‘The presence of the Church’’ was Fini’s
answer—and Staël could not have agreed more. Mohammad may have
given birth to fanaticism, but the fundamentalist idea of Europe as
Christianity is born here, in the impossibility to keep ‘‘such a di√erence
of character’’ together if not through the invocation of God.
Both north and south, for Mme de Staël, were Christian, and this
was enough—pace all atheists, Jews, Gnostics, and residual Muslims of
Europe—to make the continent one. Religion, in the end, operated the
miracle that kept north and south together as Europe. Staël’s confes-
sional idea of Europe was not a total novelty in 1800. The German poet
Friederich Leopold von Hardenberg, otherwise known as Novalis, had
already celebrated the Christian unity of Europe in 1799, with Die Chris-
tenheit oder Europa: Ein Fragment. Novalis’s was not too far removed
from Staël’s: Christianity and the Roman papacy, in the Middle Ages,
had ended years of European wars through the invocation of a common
faith in Christ. In 1798, however, the French armies of Marshal Berthier
had marched against the pope, deposed him, destroyed Rome, trans-
formed the Papal States into a republic, and taken Pius vi prisoner to
Paris. Just a few weeks before the writing of the Novalis’s fragment, the
pope had died in exile, and the Directorate of the Revolution had for-
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bidden electing a new one. Novalis’s nostalgia for Christian Europe was
thus perfectly in tune with Staël’s enmities toward revolutionary France,
which both saw as the greatest danger to the unity of Europe. Chris-
tianity was the only power capable of a ‘‘reconciliation of north and
south’’ (Staël, Littérature 170); revolutionary France could only colonize,
as an empire, north and south, but it could hardly reconcile them.
Mme de Staël’s discussion of Christianity marked in yet another way
her epochal desire to move away from a Francocentric to a new, Ger-
manocentric Europe. For her, the cementing force of Christianity could
no longer be Novalis’s papacy, but, rather, Protestantism. And where was
Protestantism to be found in the year 1800? Cardinal Mazarin had made
of France a Catholic country; the revolution had secularized its institu-
tions. If, ‘‘in general, what gives the modern peoples of the north a more
philosophical spirit than the one possessed by the peoples of the south, is
the Protestant religion’’ (Staël, Littérature 211), then France had become,
pace Montesquieu, a miserably southern country: Catholic and des-
potic. Its literature, accordingly, would be discussed by Staël with the
southern ones; its classicism demoted to a mere imitation of the models
of Greece and Rome. Once the modern project of Protestantism had
been betrayed by Mazarin’s France and by Napoléon’s revolution, Ger-
many was not only the climax of progress but also the Protestant engine
of European union. The trait d’union between Montesquieu’s French
Europe and a new German one, on the other hand, was Madame de
Staël’s salon in Coppet.
The Law of Marriage and the Order of Desire: Theorizing Sex
There were two great systems conceived by the West for governing
sex: the law of marriage and the order of desire.
—MICHEL FOUCAULT, The History of Sexuality
It continually resurfaces as a question of either/or: freedom
or servitude, the liberation of desire or its subjugation.
—MICHAEL HARDT AND ANTONIO NEGRI, Empire
Open the seraglios of Africa, of Asia, and of this
southern Europe of yours.
—DONATIEN ALPHONSE FRANÇOIS DE SADE,
La philosophie dans le boudoir, ou les instituteurs immoraux
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The project that Mme de Staël began with De la littérature, and which
she tried to complete at Coppet, was, properly speaking, one of transla-
tion. Montesquieu’s idea of a dialectical Europe—north and south, Prot-
estant and Catholic—had to be translated from a French to a German
center. Montesquieu’s German fathers, moreover, had to be translated
into a new theory of gender (see Tenenbaum) attempting to look at the
‘‘changes that have been operated in literature at the epoch in which
women have started to become part of the moral life of man’’ (Staël,
Littérature 101). Undoubtedly, De la littérature was led by an unprece-
dented attention to the question of gender in the context of literary
studies: what did it mean—asked Staël—‘‘to write and think as a woman’’
(64)? What was the role of women in the development of literature? The
question raised an even larger one: What had gender and sex to do in the
constitution of a theory of Germanocentric Europe?
Already in his Lettres persanes Montesquieu had shown a great inter-
est in questions of gender, and had o√ered what has been called ‘‘a
typology of political relationships between men and women’’ (Mosher
25). Gender relations represented di√erent typologies of government.
Europe, besides being associated with a particular kind of politics (free-
dom against Oriental despotism) was also associated with a particular
kind of gender politics. The Lettres persanes were an epistolary novel
that described, through the ironic perspective of Persian voyagers, the
peculiarities of European culture. Many were the di√erences—as we can
expect from the pen of Montesquieu—between free Europe and the
despotic Orient; but one was more striking than any other: the social
and familial role of women. Montesquieu symbolized the position of
women in the Orient through the figure of the harem—a model of
despotism without limits. In the harem, the one male master—symbol
of the absolute monarch—demanded a constant subjection, control,
and isolation of his citizens/women (see Grosrichard). How di√erent,
the fictional voyagers observed, was the social role of women in the West!
‘‘To the peoples of Europe,’’ they noticed, ‘‘all the wise precautions
of the Asiatics —the veils that cover the women, the prisons [i.e., the
harem] where they are detained, the vigilance of the eunuchs—seem
more proper means to increase the activities of this sex, than to restrain
them’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 1:211–12). In Europe, according to the
Persians imagined by Montesquieu, women were, for good and for bad,
‘‘free.’’ In Asia—this was Montesquieu’s unspoken conclusion—they
were instead enslaved.
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An important subplot of the Lettres persanes was thus the revolt that
the preferred wife of the male despot, Roxanne, organized in the harem
while the master was still in Europe. Montesquieu suggested that the
problem with the political model of the harem—a model, I repeat, of
monarchic absolutism—was not that it was patriarchal. As we have seen
in the discussion of feudalism (chapter 2), patriarchy and patriarchal
inheritance were in fact the very foundations of European freedoms. The
problem with the harem model, instead, was that its very excess, its
absolute and hyperbolic subjection of women to their patriarch, threat-
ened patriarchy with the constant possibility of revolt. The governmental
model of the harem, in other words, was ‘‘ruined by its own internal
vice’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres 2:357), a vice of excess and immoderation.
What the Lettres persanes o√ered, then, was the presentation of two
antithetical models of authority exemplified through the simile of gen-
der relations: Oriental (patriarchal) authority was the complete sub-
jection of women and citizens alike; European (patriarchal) authority
granted instead some measure of liberty to its subjects—citizens and
women—in turn creating a guarantee of social order. The isolation of the
women in the harem, their dependency on the sexual desire of one single
male, quickly engendered dissatisfaction. The desire to escape one’s gen-
der role transformed the seraglio into a sanctuary of sexual transgres-
sions. The slave wife Zelid had begun by having an a√air with the white
eunuch Cosrou (1:208). Even Roxanne, the most faithful of the wives,
had in the end ‘‘seduced your eunuchs’’ (1:372). By the last part of the
novel, the frantic letter of the chief eunuch to his master hinted with
despair at the spread of homosexuality in the harem: ‘‘Things have
gotten to an unsustainable point: your women have thought that your
departure [for Europe] has left them in a state of complete impunity.
Horrible things are happening here’’ (1:362). De l’esprit des lois had
reached similar conclusions: ‘‘Possession of many women—who could
have guessed! —leads to that kind of love that nature disavows’’ (2:513);
that is, the only way to satisfy sexual desire in the constrictive structure
of harem relations is homosexuality.
Whereas the smallest unit of European society, the family, was thus
built on the binary of male and female, the smallest unit of Oriental
society, the harem, threatened social order not only through excessive
despotism but also through a continuous proliferation of gender roles
that reacted to such excess. The paradox was quite curious for Montes-
quieu (‘‘who could have guessed!’’): the most despotic regime, that of the
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harem, was so extreme that it became, ironically, impossible to maintain.
By promoting a perpetual desire to escape one’s gender role, it engen-
dered a proliferation of such roles. In the West, both men and women
could find freedom and satisfaction by observing the limits (laws?) of
their gender roles. In the Orient, they simply could not, and they had to
find new, deviant roles. Men needed to invent, so to speak, the eunuch as
the guardian of women’s virtue. Women had to discover homosexuality
to compensate for the sharing of the husband’s sexual services.
The greater freedom that Europe gave to its women, concluded Mon-
tesquieu, was, then, the guarantee of its social order. This did not mean
that Europe was immune from this kind of Oriental disorder: in ancient
Greece, De l’esprit des lois reminded the reader, ‘‘love took a form one
does not dare mention’’ (2:342); in the Roman Empire, ‘‘young boys were
priceless’’ (2:335) to older men; in contemporary Italy, the castrati looked
to Montesquieu like horrendous monsters (2:1261); and even in England
—free and constitutional England—women were so scarce that men
‘‘throw themselves into debauchery’’ (2:580). What this meant, there-
fore, was that Europe, in theory was a social order of men and women.
Yet in practice, this Europe, too, was still on the way to final perfection.
Also the Encyclopédie, in its unmistakable jargon of scientific authen-
ticity, left the practice of gender out of its theoretical framework. Homo-
sexuality, for one, did not even appear. And here is the usual, indefati-
gable Jaucourt (also the author, incidentally, of the entry on ‘‘Sex’’):
‘‘Woman (Natural law). In Latin, uxor. Female of the man, considered as
long as she is united to him by the bond of marriage [considérée en tant
qu’elle lui est unie par les liens du mariage]. Look then under Marriage
and Husband’’ (Diderot 6:471). Like north and south were the two parts
of that perfect and self-contained idea that was Europe, so were male and
female the two complementary elements to be synthesized in marriage.
At the entry ‘‘Marriage,’’ still considered by Jaucourt under the heading
of ‘‘natural law’’ and described as an ‘‘institution of nature,’’ we read a
praise of Montesquieu’s remark that the perfectly ‘‘natural’’ union is that
of (one) man and (one) female. In this resided for Jaucourt the ‘‘natural
freedom’’ of the woman.
Natural or not, however, this union was also said, in the same Encyclo-
pédie, to be specific to Europe only. The curator of the entry argued that
marriage was an institution established by Christianity, which brought
‘‘in all European countries’’ a new social model of compassionate pa-
triarchy. Before Christianity, and still in non-Christian lands, men, ac-
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cording to cultural ‘‘prejudices,’’ were considered superior to women.
This prejudice legitimated, for instance, the enslavement of women in
the harem. Christianity, instead, was an ‘‘exception’’ to this otherwise
general prejudice: in Europe, it ‘‘established . . . a real superiority of man,
and yet preserved for the woman the rights of equality . . . . Domestic
servitude of women and polygamy made Orientals distrust the fair sex,
and, eventually, made the fair sex distrustful’’ (Diderot 6:468). In sum,
for Europe the real inferiority of women—as opposed to the inferiority
sanctioned by mere prejudice—never signified for the latter a loss of
liberty: women, within Christianity, were objectively inferior, but not
slaves. Quite an interesting way of justifying patriarchy in the West, one
might argue: the specter of Oriental prejudice legitimated European
discrimination of women as a benign—let alone realistic—form of pater-
nalism. What had European women to complain about, when their fate
was measured against that of a commonplace Orient concocted by the
fantasy of Montesquieu! European women had to be quite grateful of
being still free, despite their ‘‘real’’ inferiority.
Compared to the Encyclopédie, Montesquieu had advanced a more
secular hypothesis concerning the di√erence of European sexual mores
arising along with, but not necessarily because of, the spread of Chris-
tianity. The sort of chivalric conduct sung in the chanson de geste and in
the chanson d’amor had represented, perhaps invented anew, a novel
relationship between the sexes in which ‘‘our [man’s] connection with
women is founded . . . on the desire of pleasing them, because they
are quite enlightened judges of personal merit’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres
2:822). With similar intentions, Jaucourt had suggested (as mentioned in
chapter 2) that the chanson Provençal and the chivalric romance had
opened the age of modernity in Europe: the kind of modernity intro-
duced by the chanson entailed a new relationship between the sexes.
Women had now an authority of judgment, and the cavalier attitude of
men was informed by a code of courtship and an expectation of refusal.
Above all, love as a ritual of courtship had been formed. As an example
of the gender relations appearing in the chanson, let us read, at random,
from an anthology of troubadour poetry:
Midons que te mon cor gatge
prec, si com cel que merceia,
que no m’aia cor voltage,
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ni fals lauzengiers no creia
de mi, ni s’albir
qu’eu vas autram vir
que per bona fe sospir
e l’am ses enjan
e ses cor truan;
qu’eu non ai ges tal coratge
com li fals drut an
que van galian,
per qu’amors torna en soan
[As someone who asks for grace,
I pray you my lady,
who keep my prisoner of love:
do not be inconstant in your love to me,
and do not trust false rumors about me,
or do not suppose that I turn my attention toward any other woman.
Because I su√er in good faith,
loving you without deceit and without disloyalty:
my heart is not like the one of lying lovers,
who cheat and make love becomes debased.]
(Sansone 327)
The chanson by Gaucelm Faidit, circa 1180, was quite typical of the genre
and of the time: the speaker was a male poet, and prayed a woman,
elevated to the status of judge (to use Montesquieu’s word) and almost to
that of an earthly divinity, to accept his plea of love. The woman had the
power of making the male poet either happy or forlorn. The male poet’s
love was not sexual eros, but an almost spiritual—platonic—form of
desire. This love, moreover, was without disloyalty, in the sense that it
was monogamous. Any di√erent kind of love, any polygamous one,
would be debasing of the very word. This was, arguably, the kind of love
that Jaucourt found at the center of Christian ethics; but it was also a
kind of love that, from Montesquieu’s secular perspective, set the param-
eters for the kind of gender relations—monogamous and heterosexual—
that both the Lettres persanes and De l’esprit des lois considered as the
basis of modern Europe. Against the objectification of the woman in the
Oriental harem, the European society predicated by Montesquieu did
preserve a patriarchal hierarchy between the sexes—the male is still the
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privileged author-poet and his reader-interlocutor—but without objec-
tifying the woman, who was elevated, instead, and even venerated, as the
judge of manly courting.
Much of Madame de Staël’s often-celebrated recuperation of the Mid-
dle Ages was, if we look carefully at it, exactly a recuperation of Montes-
quieu’s promotion of woman as a subject in the context of the chanson
and the chivalric romance. The Middle Ages of chivalry, in fact, o√ered
Staël an alternative model to the despotic one of Napoléon’s France. The
sort of French imperialism that Napoléon had begun with the Italian
campaign in 1976 smacked too much, for Staël, of Oriental despotism.
Napoléon had crowned himself in Aix-la-Chapelle, but he was no Char-
lemagne—he was, actually, the new Saladin. As the despotism of the
Orient was based on the enslavement of women in the harem, so was
postrevolutionary despotism based on the increasing marginalization of
women: ‘‘Since the Revolution, men have thought it politically and mor-
ally desirable to reduce women to the most absurd mediocrity’’ (Staël,
Littérature 335). What’s worse: she was right. After the coup d’état of the
eighteenth Brumaire of 1799, Napoléon had been quick to declare that
‘‘since women have no political rights, it is not appropriate to define
them citizens’’; and the Napoleonic code, architected by that paladin of
family values that was Jean Etienne Marie Portalis—‘‘good fathers, good
husbands, and good sons make good citizens’’—had marginalized the
social role of women to mere ‘‘obedience’’ (Bock 108–9). So, while this
Napoleonic revolution was proposing itself as the model for a new Eu-
rope, Staël recuperated the Christian model of the Middle Ages as an
alternative version of Europe—one in which the putative freedom of
women stood for the more general freedom of society at large.
Within Christian Europe, women were never the authors of ‘‘truly su-
perior works,’’ warns Staël (171). They did not write chivalric romances,
nor (pace Bogin) the poetry of the troubadours; ‘‘nevertheless, women
have not served [in that time] the progress of literature in lesser ways
than men, as they have inspired men an abundance of thoughts on the
kind of relations they are to entertain with those beings [women] so
mobile and delicate’’ (171–72). What Staël meant, simply, was that the
almost complete totality of troubadour poetry in fact presented itself as
inspired uniquely by the (male) poet’s love for a most beautiful, lofty,
and unreachable woman—a woman that only in the later traditions of
the Italian stil novo and Petrarchism would start acquiring a proper
name: Beatrice, Laura . . . . For Staël, then, Christianity entered Europe
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to dispel ‘‘the odious institution of [familial] slavery’’ and to institute
‘‘conjugal love’’ between one man and one woman (170–71). The roman,
‘‘varied production of the spirit of the moderns’’ (179), was but the
literary equivalent of the religious institution of Christianity—what the
Catholic critic C. S. Lewis once called the ‘‘allegory’’ of Christian, mo-
nogamous love and marriage.
European modernity, in other words, was produced, for Mme de Staël
as for Montesquieu, by a set of epochal transformations that occurred
after the fall of the Roman Empire. First, the nascent hegemony of the
German tribes introduced in Europe ‘‘a respect for women that is un-
known to the people of the south’’ (Staël, Littérature 211)—a respect
parallel to the new ‘‘spirit of a free people’’ (206). Second, the spread of
Christianity replaced an ancient (and southern) culture of sensual plea-
sure, war, ‘‘vengeance and passion’’ (202), exemplified by Homer’s epics,
with a new culture (Ossian’s) concerned with ‘‘the brevity of life, the
respect of the dead’’ (205), and the cult ‘‘of domestic happiness’’ between
husband and wife (171). Third, as the new literature created a new role
for the woman, who was now both free and responsible for domestic
happiness, it also discovered a new idea of love. The latter was no longer
understood as immediate sensual pleasure, but as the celebration of the
almost mystical courtship and union of man and wife. In this epochal
transformation, Europe ultimately realized itself—qua freedom—as a
new internal dialectics not only of north and south but of female and
male as well. Just as the dialectics of north and south had served Montes-
quieu the necessity to theorize a Europe ‘‘that cannot be compared to
anything else,’’ this new dialectics of male and female served Staël to
eliminate the Orient, with its unruly gender confusion and its despo-
tism, from the scene of European literature.
The picture of Staël’s Eurocentric universe was thus clear: the ‘‘new,
dreamy, and profound sensibility, which is one of the great charms of
modern literature’’ (Littérature 181), began in (northern) Europe with
the emergence of woman as the subject of poetry and as the judge of
man’s love. Modernity, ergo, was once again a European success story
from which the Orient was once more excluded. One problem, however,
arose at the moment in which Staël decided to argue that the index of
European di√erence could be found in its modern literature of love. In
other words, if the great epochal shift of modernity consisted in a turn-
ing toward love, was one to assume that no other time and place but
modern Europe had such a notion of love? First, one had to eliminate
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the poetry of Sappho, singing Lesbos’s poetess’s love already in the sixth
century bc—not a big problem, arguably, since such poetry hardly fell
within the strictures of heterosexual love imposed by Staël. Second, one
had to eliminate the Kama Sutra (sixth century ad) and the ars amatoria
of Ovid (ca. 2 ad) for being too materialistic—being about sex, in other
words, rather than about loftier forms of love. Third, and more prob-
lematically, one had to eliminate the whole tradition of Arab love poetry,
devoted to the poet’s quite monogamous love for a most beautiful, lofty,
and unreachable woman: ‘‘I have Allah as my only Lord, oh Abda, / So I
have gotten to take your face as my one Lord,’’ wrote for instance Bassar
ibn Burd (qtd. in Galmés de Fuentes 18) in the seventh century ad. Was
not the love for Abda as heterosexual, monogamous (as for the one
God), and spiritual as the love of Gaucelm Faidit? As Simonde de Sis-
mondi would observe in 1813, in the midst of the dispute fired by Staël’s
thesis of the fundamentally European nature of love,
this delicacy of the sentiments of the troubadours, this mysticism of love,
has a more intimate relationship with Arab poetry than one would think,
given the vicious jealousy of the Muslims and the cruel persistence of
polygamy. The women of Muslims are divinities in their eyes, and slaves
at the same time. The seraglio is at the same time a temple and a prison.
The passion of love has, among the peoples of the south, a livelier ardor, a
greatest impetuosity than in our Europe. (1:95)
The main problem for Staël’s thesis was that the Oriental tradition,
which was supposed to work as the antithesis of Europe, presented, in
fact, remarkable similarities to what was supposed to be the uniqueness
of Europe. Was Mme de Staël so sure that the uniquely European poetry
of love of the Middle Ages did not come from preexisting Arab models?
We are thus back to the very problem raised by Juan Andrés’s Arabist
theory: was modern poetry—in rhymes and about love—a European
invention? Or did the Arabs bring it to Europe? Andrés’s doubt, in the
meantime, started concerning not only the origin of modern European
literature but, more radically, the origin of European gender relations,
which were symbolic, in turn, of social and power relations. In other
words, if the Arabs had developed such a notion of love in their poetry,
the whole edifice of European freedom as the antithesis to Oriental
haremlike despotism was in danger of crumbling. In truth, Staël never
mentioned Andrés—but she still had to face his theory, and argue, at the
very least, that the Arabs did not bring modern poetry to Europe. On the
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contrary, the Arabs only learned love poetry from the Europeans: ‘‘The
Moors established in Spain borrowed from chivalry and its romans their
cult of women. Such cult did not exist in the national customs of the
Orient. The Arabs who remained in Africa were not similar, from this
point of view, to those established in Spain. The Moors gave the Span-
iards their spirit of magnificence; the Spaniards inspired the Moors their
love and their chivalric honor’’ (Littérature 193). So if the Arabs learned
love poetry from the Spaniards, where did the southern Spaniards learn
it from? No doubt from ‘‘the northern peoples, [who] judging from the
traditions that are still remnant and from the customs of the Germans,
have always and in all times had a respect for women that is unknown to
the people of the south’’ (211)! If this chronology—modernity begins
with the Germans, who spread it to Spain, whence it is picked by the
Andalusian Moors—sounds too much like a bilious response to Juan
Andrés’s Arabist theory, that is because, quite likely, it really was.
Europe from Coppet
Coppet is the headquarters of European opinion.
—STENDHAL, ‘‘De l’amour’’
The group that from 1766 to 1817 met at Staël’s salon in Coppet seemed to
be quite concerned with the question raised by Juan Andrés’s Arabist
theory, which threatened to comprise at its core the attempt to theorize
Europe as the moral and political place of love. François Raynouard,
who would begin the publication of the Choix des poésies originales
des troubadours only in 1816, had already introduced the work of Juan
Andrés to the members of Coppet in 1801, when he had started his
correspondence with Simonde de Sismondi. For the collection he was
preparing, Raynouard wanted to defend the thesis that Jean-Baptiste de
Sainte-Palaye had elaborated in Mémoires sur l’ancienne chevalerie (1753)
and in the Histoire littéraire des troubadours (1774). Sainte-Palaye’s the-
ory was quite similar to the one Mme de Staël had elaborated concerning
the origin of love poetry in the European Middle Ages (see Passerini 211–
30). For that reason, arguably, Raynouard had developed an interest in
the work of the Coppet group and was curious to know how they would
handle the recently translated work of Juan Andrés. The Histoire des
sciences et de la littérature depuis les temps antérieurs à l’histoire grecque
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jusqu’à nos jours (this was the curious French title of Dell’ origine, 1805)
seemed to confirm the hypothesis of Thomas Warton’s History of English
Poetry (1774), which had already claimed, but without strong arguments,
that love poetry had entered Europe through the Arabs and was not
a specific European invention. Andrés, arguing as we have seen, that
the Arabs brought a totally novel idea of poetry—syllabic, in rhymes,
and about love—into Europe, o√ered textual and stylistic confirmation
to Warton.
Sismondi was the first one in Coppet who faced the problem of An-
drés’s Arabist theory in a direct way. In 1813, after a long correspondence
with Raynouard, he published De la littérature du midi de l’Europe. The
book began with a short summary of Staël’s and Sainte-Palaye’s ar-
gument: chivalry and Provençal poetry had been born together under
the influence of Christianity; they had both engendered a new cult of
woman and love. In more ways than one, Sismondi’s project was hom-
age to and the ideal continuation of Mme de Staël’s De la littérature. As
the latter had established the distinction between ‘‘two completely dis-
tinct literatures,’’ so was Sismondi certain he could ‘‘detach [southern
people] from the people of the north’’ (1:ii–iii), and ‘‘romance languages
from Germanic ones’’ (1:10). As Staël had studied the ‘‘influence that
religion, customs, and laws have on literature, and the influence that
literature has on religion, customs, and laws,’’ so did Sismondi want ‘‘to
show the pervasive reciprocal influence that the political and religious
history of peoples has had on their literatures’’ (1:ii). And as Staël had
promoted the Middle Ages as the origin of Europe’s modernity, so was
Sismondi’s study intentioned to posit a medieval origin of modern Ger-
man Romanticism. What stood between Sismondi and the realization of
all of these goals was none less than the friar Juan Andrés.
Sismondi’s first mention of Andrés occurs in the very first chapter of
the Littérature du midi—in fact, in the first note to the entire book. Its
ambiguous tone of praise and scorn sets from the very outset the relation
of mock respect that Sismondi wants to assume vis-à-vis his predecessor:
I only know of two works that comprehend the history of this entire part
of literature [that of the south of Europe]. The first, with an even wider
scope, is that of Andrés, Spanish Jesuit, Professor in Mantua: Dell’ origine
e de’ progressi d’ogni Letteratura . . . . He overviews the history of all
human sciences in all the languages and in the entire universe; and with a
vast erudition, he develops in philosophical fashion the general march of
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the human spirit; but since he never gives one example, never analyzes
the particular taste of one nation, and only gives rapid judgments scarcely
motivated, he does not leave any clear idea of the writers and works
whose names he has assembled together. (1:14–15)
Better, then, the other of the two works, incidentally, Friedrich Boutter-
werk’s Geschichte der schönen Wissenschaften, 1801–10, which Sismondi
judges at least ‘‘credible’’ (16).
Despite such exordium, Sismondi drew quite liberally from Dell’ ori-
gine. Call it a tribute to Andrés, here is, for instance, what Sismondi
wrote in his chapter entitled ‘‘Literature of the Arabs’’: ‘‘One sees hun-
dreds of camels entering Baghdad, charged only with paper and books;
and all the books that men of letters thought worthy of being brought to
the people, in whatever language they were written, were immediately
translated into Arabic’’ (1:47).
Here, instead, is what Andrés had written in Dell’ origine: ‘‘One saw
hundreds of camels entering Baghdad, charged only with paper and
books; and all the books thought to be proper for public education, were
immediately translated into Arabic to be accessible by everyone’’ (1:120).
Plagiarism!—denounced Andrés’s biographer (Mazzeo 87–90). Plagia-
rized from Andrés’s book, in fact, could also be Sismondi’s indictment
of Arab poetry, which for Andrés was filled with ‘‘excessively daring
metaphors . . . endless allegories . . . excessive hyperboles’’ (1:134–35), and
for Sismondi relying ‘‘on too daring metaphors, endless allegories, and
excessive hyperboles’’ (1:60).
Yet Sismondi’s thesis was, rather than plagiarism, a total rewriting of
Andrés’s theory. On the one hand, it is true, Sismondi agreed with
Andrés’s claim that ‘‘Arabia gave shelter to the lost literature, and o√ered
sacred asylum to the gentile culture that Europe had rudely cast away’’
(1:116). In Sismondi’s words, the Arabs, ‘‘who had contributed more
than any other nation, with their conquest and fanaticism, to destroy the
cult of sciences and letters’’ (1:40), were the ones who revived in Europe a
love for Aristotle and the classics when the whole ‘‘West was drowned in
barbarity’’ (1:39). To Arabia, Sismondi’s Europe, in a clear echo of An-
drés, also owed ‘‘the invention of paper’’ for books (Sismondi 1:73),
the inventions of gunpowder, the compass, and the numerals ‘‘without
which the science of calculus could not have been pushed to the stage we
know today’’ (1:74). Still following Andrés, Sismondi also argued that
rhyme entered Al-Andalus with the Arabs (1:104). Seemingly contradict-
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ing Mme de Staël and confirming Andrés, Sismondi even went as far as
declaring that ‘‘it is from them [Arabs] that we have received . . . this
drunkenness of love [enivrement d’amour], this tenderness, this delicacy
of sentiments, this religion, this cult of women, which have had such in-
fluence on chivalry, and which we find in all southern literature, which,
because of these traits, has an Oriental character’’ (1:66). In short, ‘‘Arab
[literature] gave an altogether new impulse to literatures in Europe’’
(1:10), and ‘‘modern Europe [was] formed at the Arab school and en-
riched by it’’ (1:10).
Was Sismondi, then, to conclude, following Andrés and against his
hostess at Coppet, that the Arabs (or Spain) were the origin of modern
Europe? Not so fast. First, asked Sismondi, ‘‘What has left of so much
glory?’’ (1:76). The question, as well as the answer to it—‘‘the vast regions
where Islam dominated or dominates still are now dead for all sciences’’
—was less naive than one might think at first glance. To say that Arab
culture, once glorious, was dead at present meant to situate that culture,
once again, in the past of the European telos of progress: ‘‘This immense
wealth of Arab literature, of which I have given only some glimpses, no
longer exists in any Arab country, or in any of the countries where the
Muslims dominated’’ (1:77). Arab culture, in other words, was the last
stage of the ancient world, a continuation of the Aristotelian legacy
(1:70)—something that, at any rate, no longer is. Modernity, instead—
European modernity—began after that, and, to some measure, indif-
ferent to the great discoveries of the ‘‘ancient’’ Arabs.
Andrés’s mistake, from the point of view of Sismondi, was that he had
considered literature as a whole, as one organism progressing in history
and moving from one nation and continent to another. Accordingly,
modern literature had begun for Andrés with the Arabs, who had intro-
duced it to Al-Andalus. From there, literature had enlightened Spain,
and, in the end, the whole of modern Europe. For Sismondi, instead,
there was not one but two literatures. Mme de Staël had been clear: there
are ‘‘two completely distinct literatures.’’ Accordingly, Sismondi could
distinguish between a southern literature, revitalized by the Arabs, and a
northern one, ‘‘like’’ the Arab in some respects, yet ‘‘easily distinguish-
able’’ from it. Andrés, for instance, had maintained that rhyme had been
brought to Europe from Arabia. For Sismondi, instead, ‘‘Arab poetry is
rhymed like ours’’ (1:60; emphasis mine), but it was Andrés’s mistake
to believe that Arab rhyme was the model followed by the Provençal
poets of France. Rather, the European troubadours developed rhyme like
MME DE STAËL TO HEGEL 163
the Arabs did, but independently from them. Also the roman, Andrés
had suggested, was Arab in origin. Though similarities between Arab
storytelling and the European romance also existed for Sismondi, ‘‘Arab
imagination, which sparks in all its brilliance in these tales [A Thou-
sand and One Nights] is easily distinguishable from the chivalric imagi-
nation’’ (1:64).
The influence of the Arabs was, then, in Sismondi’s last analysis, lim-
ited to the literatures of the south: ‘‘The people of the south . . . formed
their poetry at the school of the Orientals’’ (1:10); and ‘‘Oriental style . . .
spread to all romance languages’’ (1:42). Germanic languages, on the
other hand, seemed free from such Oriental origin. That is why, since
Germany was the essence of Europe, Spanish literature was not entirely
‘‘European: it is Oriental’’ (1:42). And that is why southern literature
presented itself as the very antithesis of the austere, ethical, and Prot-
estant European literature: ‘‘Studying the literature of the south, we
have often been surprised of the subversion of morality, the corruption
of all principles, of the social disorganization that this literature indi-
cates’’ (4:19); reading such southern literature, ‘‘we will then be happy to
breathe, in a language close to ours [Spanish], the scents of the Orient
and the incense of Arabia; happy to see, in a faithful mirror, the palaces
of Baghdad . . . and to comprehend [comprendre], in a European people,
this brilliant Asiatic poetry, which created so many marvels’’ (4:179).
Happily and gleefully, Sismondi could then make Asia and Arabia
disappear from his theorization of modern Europe: not only because the
love that Staël singled out as constitutive of Europe was ‘‘easily distin-
guishable’’ from Oriental love poetry; but also, and more important,
because Europe contained within itself its own Oriental Other. As for
Montesquieu, the Oriental was comprehended within Europe’s south
and spoke its romance languages. Quite cunningly and brilliantly, Sis-
mondi started from (or plagiarized) Andrés’s Arabist theory to claim
exactly the opposite of what Andrés had claimed: not that the south was
the heart and origin of Europe’s modernity, but that the south was, as
Montesquieu had already declared, its internal antithesis (on Sismondi’s
north and south, see also Rosset).
Compared to such cunning, the other members of Coppet had a much
more pedestrian way of dealing with Andrés, the south, and Arabist
theory. With the exception of Benjamin Constant—‘‘I don’t like our
ancient poetry, nor our chivalry’’ (qtd. in Duranton 349)—everybody at
Coppet argued, at one time or another, on the question of medieval
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romance, chivalric poetry, and the question of Arab influence. August
Wilhelm von Schlegel, in Observations sur la langue et la littérature pro-
vençales (1818), steadfastly rejected the Arabist theory while declaring
himself shocked that someone (Andrés) could think that such a cruel
and misogynist people as the Arabs could have invented a form of poetry
based on the adoration of women. Even if, Schlegel contended, the Arabs
had invented the use of rhyme, they most certainly did not invent love:
‘‘Muhammad’s sect has never had the slightest influence on anything
that constitutes the original genius of the Middle Ages’’ (67–69). The
founder and editor of the journal Europa, Friedrich von Schlegel, would,
like his brother August, in the end radicalize Sismondi’s thesis: not only
was Arab influence limited to Al-Andalus—even the Spanish ‘‘muse of
old Castile is . . . free from Arabic or oriental admixture’’ (Schlegel 247);
moreover, the evolution of northern (European) literature was radically
distinct from the literature ‘‘of Catholic countries, such as Spain, Italy,
Portugal’’ (246; see also Duranton; Cometa). Even more fundamentalist
was Charles Victor de Bonstetten’s L’homme du midi et l’homme du nord,
published as late as 1824. Europe, for Bonstetten, was divided into two
climates. What L’homme du midi added to Montesquieu was the racial
ramification of climatology—there were two distinct races of ‘‘man’’—
and more than an echo of the Coppet discussions about troubadour
love: ‘‘In the South Love appears to the senses, and through them be-
comes inconstant. In the North it drifts into dreaminess, and oftentimes
constitutes the destiny of a whole life’’ (87).
The sort of Europe that Montesquieu had started imagining in 1748
sedimented in the literary theories of Coppet. Asia, to begin with, was
not essential to define the culture and literature of Europe. Its influence,
if any, was limited to the south. A definition of Europe proceeded in-
stead, dialectically, from the antithesis of north and south—an antithesis
that, dialectically indeed, was imagined as a spiritual progress from an
old past to a modern north. This dialectic was sustained by the religious
unity of Christian Europe, which provided the fundaments for its cul-
ture. Even this unity—Christianity—was in turn dialectically split be-
tween Protestantism and Catholicism.
In this definition of Europe, the emergence of a new continental hege-
mony, and of new levels of subalternity, were already visible. Greece had
almost disappeared from these discussions about Europe, except to re-
turn in mentions of ancient and classical literature—a primal origin, in
other words, too remote to still be of any significance. Neither Turkey
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nor Malta was even suspected of being part of Europe. Eastern Europe—
Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Slavic states—was so marginal as to be
unworthy of any discussion. Sismondi, exemplary of all this, had main-
tained that there were ‘‘three distinct races [in Europe]: the Latin, the
Germanic, and the Slav’’; but his plan was to discuss only ‘‘Romance
literature and Germanic literature,’’ which alone comprehend the total-
ity of ‘‘civilized Europe’’ (1:iii). Southern Europe was Italy, Spain, and
Portugal: it was Romance, somewhat Oriental, ‘‘ancient,’’ and Catholic.
Northern Europe was England, Helvetia, Scandinavia, and above all,
Germany: it was Germanic, Western, modern, and Protestant. The status
of France, uncertain between north and south, was that of an eclipsed
hegemonic power. Now it was Deutschland über Alles.
Dialectics, or Europe
They see themselves at the end of a long European dialectic.
—THOMAS PYNCHON, Gravity’s Rainbow
Montesquieu’s understanding of Europe as a self-contained system—
‘‘history cannot compare it to anything else’’—divided into two comple-
mentary parts—north and south—was, then, as Europe (in Theory) has
suggested so far, the beginning of a Eurocentric approach to universal
history that the Romantics of Coppet simply reformulated in a Ger-
manic (rather than Frankish) key. As Enrique Dussel suggests, this Euro-
centric position, which ‘‘reinterpreted all of world history,’’ ultimately
cohered in the Germanocentric philosophical system of Georg W. F.
Hegel, ‘‘for whom the ‘Orient’ was humanity’s ‘infancy’ (Kindheit), the
place of despotism and unfreedom from which the Spirit (Volksgeist )
would later soar toward the West, as if on a path toward the full realiza-
tion of liberty and civilization’’ (Dussel, ‘‘World-System’’ 221).
The Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte (published post-
humously in 1822) was perhaps Hegel’s most coherent attempt to theo-
rize Europe as the center of the world. The centrality of the German
Confederation (Deutscher Bund) in the new Europe, after all, was but
the political outcome of the recent Congress of Vienna, which in 1815 has
restructured Germany on the imperial model of Charlemagne. Hegel’s
text, in a way, only wanted to theorize, after the fact, this already existing
Germanocentric Europe. It also wanted to systematize the entire Euro-
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pean ‘‘ ‘periphery’ that surrounds that center’’ (Dussel, ‘‘Eurocentrism’’
65). Hegel’s periphery, following Montesquieu, was ‘‘Europe’s own Ibe-
rian peninsula,’’ and, more generally, Europe’s own south: Greece, Malta,
Portugal, Spain, southern France, and Italy (65–71). Hegel’s recentering
of postrevolutionary Europe on the Germanic world (see Thompson 58)
needed to theorize systematically what had remained just an implicit
suggestion in Montesquieu: the idea of Europe’s historical progress, that
is, as dialectics. A full-fledged theory of dialectics, in other words, was
what Hegel wanted to add to Montesquieu’s Eurocentric position.
What this meant was that the negativity of the south, theorized from
Montesquieu to Coppet, and contrasted only by the unsuccessful chal-
lenge of Andrés and his southern historians, was not just an accident of
European theory. In other words, the negativity of the south was not
theorized because, accidentally, the south in 1748 or in 1800 happened to
be an economic and political margin of Europe. The negativity of the
south, on the contrary, was the necessary condition for all these Euro-
centric theories of Europe. If Eurocentrism is the tendency to explain
history ‘‘without making recourse to anything outside of Europe’’ (Dus-
sel, ‘‘Europe’’ 469–70), then Eurocentrism needs a figure of antithesis
internal to Europe itself—it needs to posit a south as the negative mo-
ment in the dialectical progress of the spirit of Europe. In sum, what a
theory of Europe needed, and what Hegel provided, was a full-fledged
theory of dialectics. Montesquieu had theorized ‘‘a kind of balance be-
tween the southern and the northern nations [of Europe]’’; Staël had
theorized ‘‘two completely distinct literatures’’ and their ‘‘melting’’ to-
gether through the bond of Christianity; and both had theorized Europe
as a progress from south to north. What Hegel needed now to theorize
was the very connection between progress and the much-discussed dif-
ference of north and south.
The stated aim of the Philosophie der Geschichte was to provide a philo-
sophical history of the world—philosophical in the sense that, rather
than being concerned with mere facts, such history would divine the
transcendental significance of history and give meaning to each single
event. Hegel’s assumption, accordingly, was that world history, or uni-
versal history, was a rational theodicy—a succession of events that made
sense: ‘‘The history of the world . . . presents us with a rational process’’
(Hegel 9). This was the premise Hegel asked his reader to accept: ‘‘In be-
ginning the study of Universal History, we should at least have the firm,
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unconquerable faith that Reason does exist there; and that the World of
intelligence and conscious volition is not abandoned to chance, but must
show itself in the light of the self-cognizant Idea’’ (10; original emphasis).
The idea that history was a rational process of continuous betterment—
from savagery to the law—was, of course, Montesquieu’s. Hegel, certainly
not accustomed to praise anybody but himself, for once was ready to
acknowledge the debt: ‘‘It is only a thorough, liberal, comprehensive view
of historical relations (such as we find in Montesquieu’s ‘Esprit des Loix
[sic]’), that we can give truth and interest to [history]’’ (6–7). The Philo-
sophie der Geschichte was therefore concerned exactly with finding such
‘‘thorough’’ and ‘‘liberal’’ historical relations among disparate world
events and facts. These relations, in turn, were to show that universal
history had to be ultimately coherent and aiming toward a single end:
‘‘The History of the world is none other than the progress of the con-
sciousness of Freedom’’ (19). The echo of Montesquieu—freedom is the
end of history—is certainly audible yet again. Also in Hegel’s treatment of
the despotic Orient the reader should have no problem to trace the logic
back to De l’esprit des lois:
The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man as such
—is free; and because they do not know this they are not free. They only
know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of that one is
only caprice; ferocity—brutal recklessness or passion, or a mildness and
tameness of the desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature—mere
caprice like the former.—That one is therefore only a Despot; not a free
man. (18)
If freedom was unattainable for the Orientals, it was, then, to Montes-
quieu’s ‘‘German fathers’’ that Europe owed the knowledge of freedom:
‘‘The German nations, under the influence of Christianity, were the first
to attain the consciousness that man, as man, is free’’ (Hegel 18). This
was, arguably, Montesquieu filtered through the religiosity of Coppet
(whose sense of Christianity Hegel praised in some footnotes devoted to
the Schlegel brothers; see Hegel 58 and 160). Also influenced by the
discussions of Coppet seemed Hegel’s interest in patriarchy as ‘‘the pri-
mary form of conscious morality, succeeded by that of the State as its
second phase’’ (41). Despite this Coppet-like religious patriarchalism,
however, the project of the Philosophie der Geschichte remained Montes-
quieu’s more secular one: freedom, said Hegel, was not found in a state
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of nature or given by a transcendental God; rather, ‘‘to the Ideal of
Freedom, Law and Morality are indispensably requisite . . . . Society and
the State are the very conditions in which Freedom is realized’’ (41). The
spirit of the law, in other words, was the realization of freedom. Free-
dom, in turn, is what ‘‘tirelessly transgresses,’’ as Montesquieu had writ-
ten, the natural laws that God has established. The di√erence, noticeable
indeed, was that Montesquieu’s spirit of the laws had become, in Hegel’s
postrevolutionary age of nationalism, a spirit of the state.
All these similarities between the Philosophie der Geschichte and De
l’esprit des lois, however, are just barely relevant when compared to a
much more essential one: the way, that is, in which Hegel understood
history exactly on Montesquieu’s geographical basis. ‘‘The Geographical
Basis of History’’ is in fact titled the central section of Hegel’s course on
world history. For Hegel, history was not simply a chronological issue
but one of space, too: history ‘‘falls under the category of Time as well as
Space’’ (79). History happened in places, and chronology could best be
described as the advancement of the spirit (of freedom) from one site to
another: ‘‘The History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe
is absolutely the end of History, Asia the beginning’’ (103). The plot
traced by true history, moreover, was the climatological advancement of
the spirit from a ‘‘torrid’’ south to a ‘‘temperate’’ north: ‘‘The true the-
atre of History is . . . the temperate zone; or, rather, its northern half,
because the earth there presents itself in a continental form, and has a
broad breast, as the Greeks say. In the south, on the contrary, it divides
itself, and runs out into many points’’ (103).
As Massimo Cacciari and Franco Cassano have separately observed,
the division of the south meant here the southern inability to cohere into
a nation-state—an inability overcome, of course, by the nascent German
nation (Cacciari, Arcipelago 20; Cassano, Pensiero 22). History was thus a
movement from east to west; but, in fact, its ‘‘true’’ theater was a move-
ment limited only to Europe, and going from south to north. After
eliminating America and Australia (Hegel 83), too immature and ‘‘new’’
to be part of true history (Gerbi 582–614), the Philosophie der Geschichte
also got rid of Asia and Africa from the true theater of history. Africa, to
begin with, ‘‘has remained—for all purposes of connection with the rest
of the World—shut up’’ (Hegel 91). It could then be no part of world
history. Sure enough, Carthage and North Africa had their moment of
glory; but ‘‘this part [of Africa],’’ said Hegel, ‘‘was to be—must be at-
tached to Europe’’ (91). So, Hegel could quickly
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leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the
World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical move-
ments in it—that is in its northern part—belong to the Asiatic or Euro-
pean World . . . . What we properly understand by Africa, is the Un-
historical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere
nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of
the World’s History. (99)
Once he crossed the threshold and got to Asia, ‘‘the region of origina-
tion,’’ Hegel soon informed his reader that ‘‘in Asia arose the Light of the
Spirit, and therefore the history of the World’’ (99). This concession to
be an origin, however, could not guarantee Asia a much better fate than
the one Hegel had just administered to Africa: because the ‘‘empire of
fanaticism’’ (100) failed to develop, as it were, ‘‘in a really historical
form.’’ The ‘‘beginning of history may be traced to them’’; but ‘‘they have
not attained an historical character.’’ In other words, even if Asia ‘‘pre-
sents the origination of all religious and political principles . . . [only]
Europe has been the scene of their development’’ (101).
Europe thus remained as the sole stage for Hegel’s true theater of
history. Not that this was a limitation! The loss of Asia, Africa, Australia,
and America was not, after all, a major one or to be lamented: ‘‘Europe
[is] the mingling of these several elements’’ (103); by itself, Europe was
synthesis of the whole of world history. In a sense, even Europe was too
much for Hegel to deal with. An entire part of it had still to be elimi-
nated. Hegel’s Europe was divided not in two (north and south) but,
rather, in three parts: southern Europe, ‘‘looking towards the Mediterra-
nean’’ and including ‘‘Greece also’’; the ‘‘heart of Europe,’’ of which
‘‘France, Germany and England are the principal countries’’; and ‘‘the
north-eastern States of Europe—Poland, Russia, and the Slavonic King-
doms.’’ My reader should not worry, however, that the whole idea of a
Europe (in theory) predicated on the antithesis of north and south
would come to a halt here: northeastern Europe was, for Hegel, de trop.
‘‘These people [from eastern Europe] did, indeed, found kingdoms and
sustain spirited conflicts with the various nations that came across their
path . . . . Yet this entire body of peoples remains excluded from our
consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent
element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World’’
(350). In other words, eastern Europe, along with Asia, Africa, America,
and Australia, was dispensable too. Europe—or world history, which is
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to say the same—only needed two, and no more than two parts: north
and south.
The way in which Hegel could be so confident that a history of the
whole world needed no more than a look at a small part of Europe is cer-
tainly striking. Yet Hegelian history did happen in such a small theater.
And a theater it was. Like a modern comedy, it had four acts—which
Hegel, theatrically indeed, gave the more scientific name of ‘‘phases.’’
Asia was the ‘‘first phase’’ of history, but a phase ‘‘really unhistorical’’
(105–6); the ‘‘Greek World’’ truly began history by positing, against Asi-
atic despotism, the idea of ‘‘individualities forming themselves’’ (106–7);
‘‘the third phase is the realm of abstract Universality (in which the Social
aim absorbs all individual aims): it is the Roman State’’ (107–8); its
fourth and ‘‘ultimate result’’ was the ‘‘Germanic World,’’ the moment of
the spirit’s ‘‘perfect maturity and strength’’ when freedom is founded not
on despotism (first stage), individuality (second), or empire (third), but
in the state, understood as the perfect, Montesquieu-like synthesis of
individual and communal needs (108–10). Europe was, then, the history
of a progress from the absolute negativity of despotism to the final (and a
bit Hollywood-like) happy end of conquered freedom. In fact, the mo-
ment of despotism (Asia) was not even part of this progress—it was
merely the origin and prologue through whose negation history could
truly begin.
What was peculiar about Hegel’s understanding of Europe was not the
idea of its self-su≈ciency, progress, historicity, or, even, of its north-
south di√erence. All these ideas we have repeatedly encountered—in
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Jaucourt, Staël, Sismondi, Bonstetten, and the
Schlegels. What was peculiar was the way in which all these elements
cohered now into a philosophical system, one Hegel could, and did, call
Europe. In such a system, history and progress were produced by inter-
nal di√erences and antitheses: each of the four stages of Hegel’s world
history, in other words, was not just a process of linear evolution but
a process of negation of the preceding stage. History began when
the Greek individual a≈rmed itself as a negation of despotic authority:
the individual found subjective freedom. The Roman state, in turn, was
the negation of the individual self-su≈ciency and its alienation into the
superior good of the republic: it was the moment in which the objective
freedom of the state triumphed. The fourth and last stage of Europe/
history—the Germanic world—was the moment in which this alienation
was negated, and the individual found itself free in the state: the mo-
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ment, in other words, when subjective and objective freedom coincided.
I am free because what I want is what the state wants:
This is the point which consciousness has attained, and these are the
principal phases of that form in which the principle of Freedom has
realized itself;—for the History of the World is nothing but the develop-
ment of the Idea of Freedom. But Objective Freedom—the laws of real
Freedom—demand the subjugation of the mere contingent Will—for this
is in its nature formal. If the Objective is in itself Rational, human in-
sight and conviction must correspond with the Reason which it embod-
ies, and then we have the other essential element—Subjective Freedom—
also realized. (456)
If Montesquieu had theorized Europe as the modernity of universal
history, Hegel was now theorizing Europe as a process of historical
dialectics—a process that was certainly unique to Europe:
Universal history . . . shows the development of the consciousness of
Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realization of that
Freedom. This development implies a gradation—a series of increasingly
adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, which result from its
Idea. The logical, and—as still more prominent—the dialectical nature of
the Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined—that it assumes succes-
sive forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process of
transcending its earlier stages, gains an a≈rmative, and, in fact, a richer
and more concrete shape. (63; original emphasis)
Africa was nature. Asia was the prehistorical unfreedom of despotism.
Only Europe ‘‘developed’’ toward freedom, and such development was
of a ‘‘dialectical nature.’’ What this meant is that the idea of freedom
‘‘advances to an infinite antithesis’’ (Hegel 26) by constantly negating
and ‘‘transcending . . . earlier stages’’ of freedom toward an ever-richer
Germanic one. No antithesis, no progress. The south was, then, the
necessary antithesis that Hegel’s Germanic north had to imagine in
order to imagine itself as progress and modernity—in order, namely, to
be Europe. Put di√erently, the south had to occupy the place of nega-
tivity (the ‘‘immaturity’’ of history), lest Europe, as progress, would stop
existing once and for all as modernity.
5 Orientalism, Mediterranean Style
THE LIMITS OF HISTORY AT THE MARGINS OF EUROPE
And you advise me to write history? To record the outrageous
crimes of the men by whom we are still held down?
—MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ‘‘Letters to Atticus’’
When Edward Said denounced the whole of Oriental studies in 1979 as
‘‘a conspiratorial system of domination and exploitation of the east’’
(Orientalism 1), the world of academia found itself divided, in Aijaz
Ahmad’s rather unappreciative words, ‘‘between inordinate praise and
wholesale rejection’’ (168). Many have since subscribed to Said’s hypoth-
esis and investigated supplementary ways in which academic knowledges
such as Orientalism frame, legitimate, and at times produce systems of
dominance and power (e.g., see Marrouchi). Others have defended the
field from Said’s ‘‘politicization’’ and insisted on at least some versions of
Orientalism that are not ‘‘singularly informed by a colonial administra-
tive objective,’’ but rather by cultural and literary interests (Rice 236).∞
It might be worth noticing, however, that such a divide has been
scarcely noticeable in southern European receptions of Said, where Ori-
entalism has instead most often been received with the highest degree
of enthusiasm. Jane Schneider, editing a volume entitled Italy’s ‘‘South-
ern Question’’: Orientalism in One Country in 1995, was quick, for in-
stance, to declare that southern Europe, too, ‘‘was certainly a√ected by
Orientalism’’ (5), and more eager still to adapt Said’s paradigm for the
understanding of the southern European context. As if following Gyan
Prakash’s suggestion that ‘‘it is up to the scholars . . . including Euro-
peanists’’ to use the theoretical frameworks of postcolonial and sub-
altern studies (‘‘Subaltern’’ 1490; see also Prakash, ‘‘Writing’’), southern
Europeanists seem to have found in Said a new lexicon to discuss the old
facts of Europe’s internal colonialism. Franco Cassano’s Southern Think-
ing (Pensiero meridiano), 1996, opened with a clear echo of Said’s notion
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of the ‘‘objectified’’ Orient: ‘‘Southern thinking means, fundamentally,
to give back to the south its ancient dignity as subject of thought; to
interrupt a long sequence in which the south has been thought as an
object by others’’ (3). Also Franco Piperno, in Elogio dello spirito pub-
blico meridionale (1997), denounced the prejudice of southernism (meri-
dionalismo)—its reduction of the south to a ‘‘premodern relic of the
past’’ (13)—in a way that was quite reminiscent of Said’s indictment of
the Orientalist prejudice that ‘‘primitiveness . . . inhered in the Orient,
was the Orient’’ (Orientalism 231).
Historical reasons to see similarities between Said’s Orient and the
European south are certainly not lacking. In chapter 2 of the present
book, I have noticed the way in which nineteenth-century ethnographies
of the European south (Lombroso, Niceforo, etc.) had been historically
inspired by, if not directly modeled on, previous notions of what con-
stituted the Orient. The Italian poet Giuseppe Go√redo has discussed a
more recent Orientalism of the south, at work still in the European
Union’s policies of the ‘‘two Europes’’ (two-lane, two-speed, and all vari-
ations thereof): ‘‘The Orientalists represent the South as an estranged
fetish, crystallized in a chronic backwardness, arrested in a ruined pres-
ent’’ (66). This has not necessarily been a European attempt at colo-
nizing postcolonial studies, but a more genuine search to frame theo-
retically an old southern feeling (which precedes the development of
postcolonial and subaltern studies), historically expressed from both the
Left and Right of the political spectrum (Alianello; Galasso). It is this
feeling that has made southern scholars seek in Said’s Orientalism a way
to express and codify some of their own anxieties.
Admiration and usability, however, should not prevent us from un-
derstanding why a bunch of southern Orientalists who want ‘‘to separate
themselves from their predecessors of the north’’ and who refuse to
‘‘align themselves with the European Arabists of the north’’ have started
to sound frankly aggravated at that book, ‘‘in which both British and
French cultural hegemony are a≈rmed in their relation to the Orient,’’
and in which all other Orientalisms are so cavalierly dismissed and
‘‘denied [their] rightful place’’ (Jubran 8). Let us refresh our memory
with the beginning of Said’s book:
The French and British—less so the Germans, Russians, Spanish, Por-
tugese, Italians, and Swiss—have had a long tradition of what I shall be
calling Orientalism . . . . The Orient is not only adjacent to Europe; it is
174 CHAPTER 5
also the place of Europe’s greatest and richest and oldest colonies, the
source of its civilizations and languages, its cultural contestant, and one
of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other. In addition, the
Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image,
idea, personality, experience. Yet none of this Orient is merely imagina-
tive. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and
culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and
even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions,
vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies
and colonial styles. (1)
The fact remains that, despite having a shorter tradition, these other
Orientalisms may have been just as important as the British and French
ones to ‘‘help . . . define Europe (or the West).’’ They should, then, be
important to me, at least, in the writing of a book called Europe (in
Theory). This does not mean that politics and knowledge live on dif-
ferent grounds, but simply that other Orientalist traditions can give us a
less reified version of such a relationship. Is it too simplistic to suppose
that there may be a ‘‘bad’’ Orientalism (in the service of colonial exploi-
tation) and a ‘‘good’’ one that does not legitimate the structures of
European domination, and dismantles instead its theoretical system?≤ In
addition, some of the minor Orientalist traditions that Said brackets
away did live an Oriental identity that was all but ‘‘merely imaginary’’:
the Russians were the Orient of Europe, and may still be; the Spaniards
fought against their Oriental self in 1492 to become Europeans; and
southern Italians, as I will discuss below, lived an Oriental experience
that in some sort of reevaluation of all values, was itself a system of
domination and exploitation (sometimes enriching, sometimes merely
brutal) from the east.
This chapter thus begins with a hypothesis and a paraphrase, both
from Walter Mignolo’s Local Histories/Global Designs. The hypothesis
is that, after all, ‘‘I am where I think’’ (both geographically and his-
torically speaking); the paraphrase, hence, is a question: How can you be
a southern European Orientalist without twisting the very concept of
Orientalism?
In truth, much more than Orientalism may be twisted in this southern
operation: the very theory of Europe as antithesis to the east (discussed
in chapters 1 and 2) and a theory of historiography that, according to
Gyan Prakash, ‘‘projected [Europe] as History’’ (‘‘Subaltern ’’ 1475), may
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come out irremediably perverted. This is not to suggest that an Orien-
talism from the south necessarily constitutes the antithesis of Said’s
French and British Orientalism—a strategy of liberation, for instance.
On the contrary, this intends to be an illustration of a problematic kind
of ‘‘border gnoseology,’’ a ‘‘critical reflection on knowledge production
from . . . the interior borders of the modern/colonial world system’’
(Mignolo, Local Histories 11). And since the interior border I will discuss
here is not Mignolo’s Spain—displaced ‘‘from hegemonic position by
England’’—but Sicily—that had nowhere to be displaced from—it will be
important to maintain an internal distinction even between Spanish and
Sicilian Orientalisms. If the former was understood as ‘‘a branch of
national culture’’ (Américo Castro, qtd. in Jubran 12), Sicilian Oriental-
ism emerged ambiguously in the mid-nineteenth century (Marchianò)
as a branch of nationalism, a branch or Europeanism, and as the crisis
of both.
The following pages will be devoted to the work of Michele Amari—if
not the founder, certainly one of the most influential and interesting
figures of Italian Orientalism. Italy had a respectable history of Oriental
studies before Amari. Already in imperial Rome, interest for the Orient
was alive, and it continued uninterruptedly throughout the Middle Ages.
The model for humanistic education in fifteenth-century Rome and
Florence required the knowledge not only of Latin and Greek but also of
Hebrew, Arabic, Chaldean, and Aramaic. The teaching of Hebrew, Ara-
bic, and Chaldean was institutionalized in Rome in 1481, under the
Studium Urbis of Pope Sistus iv. In the sixteenth century, Rome was
the European capital for Oriental studies, and other languages such as
Coptic and Armenian were taught in the university.
A figure of considerable importance for the knowledge about the
Orient he provided to Europe was Leo Africanus. G. J. Toomer writes:
A Spanish Muslim who had migrated to Fez at an early age, and was
moderately well educated there, he was captured by Christian corsairs in
1518, and brought to Rome, where he was handed over to Pope Leo X.
After a two-year imprisonment, during which he was allowed to use the
Arabic manuscripts in the Vatican Library, he was baptized, changing his
name from al-Hasan b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Wazzan to Johannes
Leo, in honour of his patron the Pope. After his release he lived in Italy
for a while, where he taught Arabic to Cardinal Aegidius of Viterbo,
before eventually returning to Morocco and Islam. He wrote a number of
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works in and on Arabic, including a grammar. Most of these have not
survived, but a version of his ‘‘Description of Africa,’’ which he composed
in Italian, was republished many times, in Latin and other languages, in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and long remained a principal
source for European knowledge of the Islamic world. (21)
The presses of Italy were among the first in Europe to publish in Arabic.
The first book printed in Europe with Arabic moveable types was the
Book of Hours published in Fano in 1514. In 1538, the complete Koran was
published in Venice, a city tied by an age-long commercial relationship
to the Orient. In 1584, Giovan Battista Raimondi, a teacher at La Sa-
pienza University in Rome, opened a press devoted to the exclusive study
of the Orient, the Stamperia Orientale Medicea.
In the seventeenth century, the Vatican bought the Arabic moveable
types of the Orientale Medicea—and scholarly interest in the Orient
quickly transformed into missionary zeal. The Sacra Congregatio Propa-
ganda Fide, founded in 1622 with the intent of spreading the Christian
faith in the world, became probably the biggest European producer of
books in Arabic, ‘‘but the types of literature published [by the Congrega-
tio] were very circumscribed, being principally liturgical and homiletic.
This was in accordance with the missionary and apologetic goals of
those who controlled the presses; rigid supervision and censorship by
the ecclesiastic authorities stifled any tendencies to further enquiry’’
(Toomer 24).
In the eighteenth century, interest in the Orient was not limited to the
Arab countries. In 1732, the Collegio de’ Cinesi, or Chinese College, was
inaugurated in Naples to become one of the very first centers of sinology
in Europe. Italian Orientalism, at any rate, remained focused on the
Arab world. In the meantime, however, British and French colonial
interests in the east had made such investments in the study of the Orient
that no Italian state could ever hope to match. While institutes and
departments of Oriental study multiplied in England, France, and (for
di√erent reasons) Germany, no Oriental school was instituted in Italy
until 1903, when Celestino Schiaparelli (1841–1919), a disciple of Michele
Amari, would open the Orientale of Rome. Until then, Hebrew and
Arabic were taught merely as languages in the universities, while Coptic,
Chaldean, and Aramaic had but disappeared. When Michele Amari was
appointed professor of Arabic at the University of Pisa in 1859, his inten-
tion was that of reforming completely not only the study of Arabic but
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also that of Orientalism. Caught in some kind of Orientalism envy,
Amari wanted to promote Italian universities to the rank of European
ones: put bluntly, if Paris, London, and Berlin had their Oriental schools,
a city in Italy also had to create its own. The kind of Orientalism Amari
had in mind, however, was hardly one ‘‘informed by a colonial admin-
istrative objective.’’ Orientalism was not, for Amari, the study of a far-
away object to be known, colonized, exploited, and administered. It was,
rather, the study of his own history and a reflection on the place that his
native Sicily, the most marginal and southern province, occupied in Italy
and in Europe itself.
The General Law of Europe: Vienna, 1815
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Sicily was technically a Spanish
colony. Practically, it was a European one. After the storm of the revolu-
tion and of the Napoleonic wars, the Congress of Vienna had opened, in
1814, with the stated objective of ‘‘restoring the general law of Europe’’
(Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, qtd. in Duroselle 313). The territories
that had been ‘‘unlawfully’’ occupied by Napoléon were now to be re-
turned to their legitimate sovereignties. These had to be found largely
among the four main allies responsible for the defeat of Napoléon:
Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Or better: it is not that legitimate
sovereignties had to be found in Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia as
nations. If one thing was clear to the participants in the congress, it was
the necessity to declare the age of nationalism over. Careless of the
protests of the nascent ‘‘German Nation’’ (Fichte), utterly uninterested
in the ‘‘ardent[ly] love[d] fatherland’’ of the Poles (Rousseau, ‘‘Govern-
ment’’ 31), and certainly impatient with Italian calls for national unifica-
tion, the participants in the congress, in a ‘‘spirit of cheerful cynicism’’
(Davies 582), divided, shared, and exchanged among themselves the
lands that the spirit of nationalism had conceived as one.
The logic of Vienna was simple: sovereignties, neither national nor
popular, were legitimate sovereignties of the monarchic families that
had ruled Europe for centuries before. In short, this is what happened:
small kingdoms and principalities were preserved within their confines;
the part of central Europe that once constituted the core of Charle-
magne’s empire was divided and organized into a German confederation
of thirty-nine states, of which four were free cities, and the rest belonged
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to one or the other monarchic families of Europe; King Frederick Wil-
liam iii of Prussia expanded his territories to Saxony, Westphalia, the
Rhine, and a small partition of Poland; George i of the German House of
Hanover, the ruler of England and Ireland, obsessed now with overseas
colonies, was content with just the small islands of Malta and Helgoland
(and with the promise that no one would interfere in his a√airs in
Ceylon, Cape Colony, and the West Indies); the Hapsburgs, the hosts of
the Congress, got their share of Poland (the lot of it went to the Russian
czar Alexander i) and most of northeastern Italy, which was divided
among various branches of the family; the House of Bourbons, after
Louis xvi had been guillotined, was sat back in France (Louis xviii) and
Spain (Ferdinand vii), and confirmed, with greatest consequences for
both history and this chapter, as the ruler of both southern Italy and the
island of Sicily.
Starting from Fürst Metternich’s assumption that ‘‘Italian a√airs do
not exist,’’ and from Count Angeberg’s assurance that Italy was but ‘‘a
combination of independent states, linked together by the same geo-
graphical expression,’’ the congress had been less than charitable to the
aspirations of the Italians. Not only had Hapsburgs and Bourbons di-
vided between themselves most of Italy, leaving only Rome to the pope
and Piedmont to the House of Savoy; moreover, the Bourbons had
decided, trampling on any Sicilian feelings of autonomy, to unite the
Kingdom of Naples (southern Italy) and the Kingdom of Sicily into the
single Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with Ferdinand its first king and
Naples its capital. For the urban bourgeoisie of Palermo, until then the
capital of the Kingdom of Sicily, the annexation of Sicily to Naples
sanctioned by Vienna meant not only the loss of an independence that
‘‘had a long and jealously guarded tradition of political and administra-
tive autonomy’’ (Riall 31); it also meant, more pragmatically, the loss of
administrative jobs and an outflow of tax revenues. To make things
worse for the Bourbons, middle-class resentment only added to the
aristocratic one. Eager to keep under check the power of a distrusted
aristocracy, the Bourbon reforms of 1815 aimed at creating ‘‘a new class
of non-noble landowners in the countryside’’ (Riall 33) through the
eradication of feudal and church property, the establishment of commu-
nal lands, and the redistribution of the estates. Such reforms had ob-
viously fueled the hostility of the upper classes at a moment in which the
loss of Sicilian autonomy prevented the middle classes to be euphoric
about land redistribution (Barone, Benigno, and Torrisi 86). Last but
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not the least, even the peasants, in part stirred up by the nobility, in part
animated by grievances of their own (see Riall 57), were becoming part
of the Bourbon problem.
Practical recriminations of Sicily’s various classes were, to say the least,
amplified by a general attitude of dismissal and su≈ciency that had
become politically operative with Vienna (Natoli 252). Already at the
congress, Sicilian requests were welcomed with utter indi√erence: in the
words of a Swiss delegate, ‘‘One does not seem to be willing to listen to
them, although they say that they can neither harm nor help the Euro-
pean equilibrium, and although they promise not to be ambitious’’ (qtd.
in Straus 94). Immediately after Vienna, Sicilians had not been heard
when their parliament was dissolved; their opinion had not been asked
when their flag was abolished; and the fact that freedom of the press and
assembly had been suppressed did not seem to be a concern, according
to either Ferdinand or Metternich, for Sicilians themselves (Mack Smith
2:352–53). To paraphrase William Roscoe Thayer: Were Sicilians satis-
fied? ‘‘No. Had they been consulted? No. Did their dissatisfaction mat-
ter? No. That generous but deluded knight, Don Quixote, once mistook
a flock of sheep for a hostile army; Metternich, the champion of the Old
Régime, mistook the human populations of Europe for sheep’’ (121).
It is not altogether clear whether the Sicilian sheep really turned into
an army. But on July 14, 1820, the fourth day of the celebrations of the
patron saint Rosalia, a popular insurrection exploded in Palermo at the
cry of ‘‘Long Live Santa Rosalia! Long live Sicily! Long live freedom!’’
Governmental o≈ces were burnt down, o≈cers killed, and their heads
paraded around the town. The requests, unsurprisingly, were for a con-
stitution like the one of Spain, and for the political autonomy of the
Sicilian nation from Naples. Although the revolt failed to move outside
of Palermo, Ferdinand’s fear must have been such that he sent a whole
division headed by General Florestano Pepe to quench the insurrection;
and then a second one, in February 1821, led by Pietro Colletta, who,
incidentally, combined his military career with that of a historian.
The insurrection of 1820 was subdued on March 26, 1821: sixty people
were tried, and eleven put to death. Only those who had participated in
public lynching were executed, the others merely imprisoned. The ha-
tred for Ferdinand of the Bourbons, and for the European order sanc-
tioned by the Congress of Vienna, in the meantime, was growing: as one
insurrection was being repressed, a new one was being prepared in
Palermo, one that was supposed to take to the streets on January 12, 1822.
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It was uncovered before anything happened, and on January 23, its four-
teen organizers were arrested, tried, charged, and sentenced to death.
The roster of the fourteen nationalists, an example in itself of the inter-
classist reach of anti-Bourbonism in Sicily after 1815, included priests
(Buonaventura Calabrò, Vincenzo Ingrassia, and Giuseppe La Villa),
menial workers (Giuseppe Candia, Antonino Pitaggio, Natale Seidita,
Michele Teresi), a poet (Giuseppe Lo Verde), members of the middle
class (Dr. Pietro Minnelli and the notary Gaetano Di Chiara), and noble-
men (Salvatore Martinez, Gioachino Landolina, Gerolamo La Manna,
and Michele’s father, Ferdinando Amari). The latter group would have
their sentence commuted to life in jail—partly because of their social
status, and partly because of some alleged collaboration with the police.
At any rate, not even these arrests could stop the Sicilians’ enmities
toward the king, nor their opposition to the new European order sanc-
tioned by Vienna. But in truth, Vienna was not the only obstacle for the
Sicilians. Sure enough, Metternich could never allow Sicily—‘‘a people,
half barbarous, superstitious without limits, fiery and passionate like the
Africans’’ (qtd. in Aymard and Giarrizzo 684)—to be considered at the
same rank as a European state. The major problem, however, was that
not even the European revolutionaries were ready to accept any part of
Italy, let alone southern Sicily, as a modern European nation.
Ideas of freedom, brotherhood, and equality soon arrived from revo-
lutionary France, and proliferating Masonic lodges had made Jacobin-
ism a presence all over Italy. Yet the aspirations of the Italian Jacobins
soon met the skepticism of the European Jacobins themselves. On No-
vember 19, 1792, the Republican Convention of revolutionary France had
published a declaration granting ‘‘fraternity and help’’ (qtd. in Woolf,
‘‘Storia’’ 153) to any people fighting for liberty. Revolutionary France had
been eager to help the patriots of Belgium, Holland, and Renania in their
respective struggles for self-determination. It had been even more eager,
later in 1822, to help the ‘‘descendants of the wise and noble peoples of
Hellas, we who are the contemporaries of the enlightened and civilized
nations of Europe’’ (Greek patriots, qtd. in Woolf, ‘‘Construction’’ 91).
French revolutionaries, however, had been more reticent when con-
sidering whether to encourage French ideas of freedom and nationality
in Italy too. The citoyen François Furcade, in 1790, had recommended
‘‘not even to think about making Italy a Republic. Its people is not
disposed in the least to receive liberty—nor would it be worthy of it’’
(qtd. in Venturi, ‘‘L’Italia’’ 1127). In 1796, when the French foreign minis-
ORIENTALISM, MEDITERRANEAN STYLE 181
ter Charles de Gontant Delacroix asked his agents in Italy about the
possibility of encouraging a revolution there, he got back a unanimous
answer: the Italians were not mature enough for freedom. One of the
agents, François Cacault, wrote: ‘‘One should not trust at all the ex-
treme petulance of the vivacious youth of Italy, moved and transported
by the ideas borrowed from our revolution, and who want to stir up a
new state of things without knowing how, without knowledge . . . . One
would need, coming to Italy, men truly mature for liberty. But the evap-
orated men [l’homme évaporé] of this country are just stupid’’ (qtd. in
Woolf, ‘‘Storia’’ 158–59). The curious metaphor of evaporation was in
fact plainly understandable, in this context, for anyone who had Mon-
tesquieu under his belt: how could one expect men from the heated
south to be mature enough for freedom? So when Napoléon came to
liberate Italy in the spring of 1796, liberation was achieved through
military conquest and military control over the territory. ‘‘We have given
you liberty,’’ proclaimed publicly Napoléon (qtd. in Woolf, ‘‘Storia’’ 162).
Privately, however, he concurred with the judgment of his council: ‘‘All
information we have gathered about the spirit of the Italians, announces
that they are not mature for freedom’’ (qtd. in Woolf, ‘‘Storia’’ 178).
If maturity was lacking in Italy, it was certainly nonexistent in its
southernmost part, which, by the time Ferdinando Amari was arrested,
had been labeled by Hegel’s philosophy as the ‘‘immature’’ part of world
history (see chapter 4). Between 1794 and 1795, the dispatches of the
French diplomats in Italy continuously remarked on how much worse
southern Italy was than the north: ‘‘Its people are more corrupted . . .
and more prone to crime’’; the south is a ‘‘very vicious country’’; in
short, it is no material for freedom and revolutions. Sure enough, as
Jaucourt had written under ‘‘Sicile’’ in the Encyclopédie, ‘‘all the revolu-
tions that Sicily has su√ered make the history and the description of this
island interesting’’ (Diderot 15:165). But the word revolutions, in the
Encyclopédie’s pre-1789 contest, merely meant, as it is clear from Jau-
court’s short history of the island, nothing more than a continuous
change of dynastic successions (on the vague use of the term before 1789,
see Goulemot, Masseau, and Tatin-Gourier 185–86). At any rate, even
those revolutions were history now: ‘‘Sicily has nothing of interest to-
day, except its mountains and the tribunal of the Inquisition’’ (Diderot
15:165). Or, as Alexis de Tocqueville put it in a less known work on
revolutions and democracy, ‘‘You [Bourbons] have bastardized her [Sic-
ily’s] heart, replacing her desire of fame with courtly ambition, her
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desire for merit and courage with the power of favoritism’’ (Voyage 158).
Sicily, ‘‘denatured by oppression, [its national character] crushed,’’ is no
place for a revolution; it is no nation either (59). Whether because of its
southern climate or because of its history of oppression, Sicily hardly
qualified as a revolutionary subject in 1820. As the northern Italian
Francesco Trinchera observed: ‘‘It does not take much intelligence or
insight to understand that a people that is so profoundly degraded . . .
cannot think seriously about freedom, cannot understand it, want it, die
for it’’ (qtd. in Moe 145). The Milanese Gian Rinaldo Carli, a collaborator
of Il ca√è, reiterated the point by going back to the origin of the dichot-
omy in Della disuguaglianza fisica, morale e civile fra gli uomini: ‘‘As
Montesquieu has judiciously remarked, northern men are more coura-
geous than southern men’’ (qtd. in Berselli Ambri 175).
No understanding of freedom, no understanding of nation either. Was
not a nation, after all, the by-product of a people’s revolution—like that
of 1789—that had broken with the past of monarchical inheritances and
restituted the state to the free sovereignty of the citizenship? Had Sicily
ever had such a revolution? Were not sectarian interests—such as, for
example, the split between Palermo and Messina in 1820—the symptom
of the Sicilian inability to agree on a specific political project for a
revolution (on this issue, see Aymard and Giarrizzo 675–83)? The Si-
cilian historian Francesco Renda, almost apologetically, recounts the
ways in which the avowal of a Sicilian nation was reiterated ‘‘as a peculiar
way for the island to participate in the profound movements of reno-
vation and freedom, common at the time in a great part of Europe’’
(Storia 31). Nicolò Palmeri, writing about the Sicilian vesper in the Sag-
gio storico-politico sulla costituzione del Regno di Sicilia (1817), had men-
tioned a ‘‘nation recomposing itself ’’ already at the time of the Angevins;
Giovanni Evangelista Di Blasi, in 1821, had presented his Chronological
Storia of the Viceroy of Sicily as a tribute of ‘‘love for the country and the
nation’’; and Rosario Gregorio, in the Introduction to the Study of Sicilian
Public Law, published five years after the French Revolution, had reiter-
ated the existence—since the time of the Normans!—of a Sicilian nation
(qtd. in Renda, Storia 27–28). So much insistence was meant to respond
to the accusations, for instance, of the anonymous French pamphleteer
of 1804 quoted by Benedetto Croce, who found that people in the south
‘‘do not have a national character, and possess instead qualities diametri-
cally opposed to it.’’ It was to counteract the idea that, in the south, ‘‘the
concept of nation, in general, has no political consistency’’ (Giuseppe
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Maria Galanti, qtd. in Croce, Storia del regno 278–79). Yet insistence
notwithstanding, the commonplace was well set: Sicilians, stolid in their
heated climate, were unable to prepare a modern revolution. Ergo, Sicily
and nationhood remained oxymoronic terms in the thesaurus of revolu-
tionary Europe.
So while father Ferdinando languished in the royal jails of Palermo for
having taken part in a nationalist revolution that few Europeans were
ready to accept as a national one (or, for that matter, as a revolution), the
son Michele, at age twenty-six, was working hard trying to solve the
problem that had obsessed him since the night of the arrest: how to
promote an undeniably Sicilian revolution—without, of course, ending
up in jail.≥ The solution adopted was, so to speak, a generational one:
with the increased police control brought about by the repression, the
Sicilian revolutionary youth could only opt for either the underground
or for the ‘‘participation in literary circles that were, apparently, not
immediately political’’ (Banti, Nazione 27). The second alternative had
the unquestionable advantage of being less risky; perhaps more impor-
tant, it was also capable of imagining, even for people who had not read
Benedict Anderson, the symbolic elements necessary for the di√erent
communities of, say, Messina and Palermo to feel part of one nation.
The tactic had already started having impressive results on the penin-
sula: Ugo Foscolo, just writing novels ( Jacopo Ortis is from 1798) had
done more to inspire the patriotism of the likes of Giuseppe Mazzini
than any Bourbon abuse (Banti, Nazione 38). Not to speak of Vittorio
Alfieri, whose fiery Rime of 1789 made for compulsory reading for the
cadres of the Italian resistance.
Also in Sicily, the questions of Sicilian patriotism and independence
had to become, at least for a while, less a matter of throwing stones at the
police than of singing Sicilian patriotism with epic tones. Lionardo Vigo
had written, for instance, about Sicily’s preeminence in southern Euro-
pean history (Atlantide, unpublished), and, more poignantly, about Sic-
ily’s love for freedom and independence (Ruggero, 1822). Following the
same route, young Michele Amari thus determined he would serve his-
tory, to use his expression, by becoming a ‘‘hero of ideas,’’ and not, like
the unfortunate father, one of deeds.∂ Put bluntly, in 1832 Michele Amari
had decided to bequeath to the written word the responsibility to deliver
revolutions—a less hazardous way of doing politics in Sicily, indeed, and
a respectable compromise between revolutionary hubris and instincts of
self-preservation.∑ A translation in Manzonian decasyllabic blank verse
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(!) of Walter Scott’s Marmion was Amari’s Trojan horse, a Maussian gift
surreptitiously published in the citadel guarded by the unsuspecting
Bourbon censorship.∏ From the outside, Marmion was the usual great-
literature stu√—bouncy couplets, profundity galore, and the loftiness of
so-called universal experience: ‘‘And come he slow, or come he fast / It is
but death who comes at last.’’ But inside this hollow belly, the true and
insidiously revolutionary meaning resided, ready ‘‘T’ invade the town,
oppress’d with sleep and wine’’ (Virgil 2:347): not only was Walter Scott
the token of a new liberalism that reconciled Voltaire and Rousseau to
David Hume, William Robertson, and Lord Byron (Amari, Appunti 16).π
Moreover, the Scottish patriot and bard had written Marmion in 1797,
while organizing a resistance against the French . . . . Get it? The problem
is that actually no one, with the possible exception of the biographer in
search for the usual early signs of a committed youth (for example,
Bonfigli), ever got it.∫ The Sicilian cultural jet set, including the Bourbon
one, even accorded Amari a respectable position in society (Amari,
Appunti sheet 21). In spite of all this success, it did not want to be a book
for ‘‘that cancer of the barons’’ (quel canchero dei baroni), for the ‘‘aris-
tocratic scum’’ (canaglia aristocratica), and not even for ‘‘middle class
libertines, who wanted bigger reforms and were swindled or swindlers
by the word freedom’’ (i libertini del ceto medio i quali aspiravano ad
una maggiore riforma ed erano ingannati o ingannatori col nome di
libertà). Marmion’s ideal reader, at least in Amari’s hopes, had to be the
popular masses, the people, the revolutionary ‘‘third estate’’ (terzo stato;
Amari and Palmeri xxix) that Augustin Thierry, by then sick and blind,
would only later theorize in the Essai sur l’histoire de la formation et des
progrès du tiers état (1853). This people was a more secular entity than the
multitudes of Mazzini, always driven by God’s Providence; and most
certainly it was not the Francophile middle class that François Pierre
Guillame Guizot, in his courses at the Sorbonne, was theorizing in those
years as ‘‘the spark of European civilization’’ (qtd. in Verga 39). The
antithesis of a bourgeoisie ‘‘with a big belly, rosy-cheeked, with cham-
pagne and pâté de foie gras in their hands, and a constant fear of social-
ism’’ (Amari and Palmeri 18), Amari’s people was the Romantic idea of a
potentially revolutionary subject that alone could construct the nation
still to be realized (Peri 39–42). The problem, and a serious one at that,
was that this third estate did not have the foggiest idea of what, politically
speaking, Marmion was supposed to mean. Untrained in the art of alle-
gorical reading, it could scarcely imagine that, mutatis mutandis, Scott’s
ORIENTALISM, MEDITERRANEAN STYLE 185
French stood for the Bourbon colonists and Scotland’s freedom was to
mean Sicily’s. In other words, Marmion was no popular success.
It was not a political success either. For that, a more explicit subject
was needed. Amari’s friend Salvatore Vigo, with arguable wisdom, ‘‘ad-
vised me to drop poetry and all the Marmions of the world’’ (Amari, Il
mio sheet 28), and pushed Amari, instead, in the direction of political
pamphleteering and political historiography. So Amari tried with some
scholarly Observations against the Neapolitan historiographer Giuseppe
del Re (1833)—they only ‘‘gave him some trouble, also from some lib-
eral circles’’ (Tommasini 288); with a history of the 1820 revolution—
obviously too risky and aborted (Peri 31–32); with the Sicilian Political
Catechism (1839)—all too explicit about independence, published under-
ground, anonymously, and a big distribution hassle. In sum, Amari was
starting to realize that he had to find the very delicate balance between
getting to the people and avoiding censorship at the same time—or, as he
once put it, to hail revolution without getting caught (‘‘gridare la rivo-
luzione senza che il vietasse la censura’’; Amari, Guerra 1:xxvi).
With this end in mind, he was left with, roughly, one possible topic,
and two options on how to deal with it. The topic—of this, at least,
Amari was certain—could no longer be allegorical. If Amari wanted to
speak to, or simply move to action, a potentially revolutionary Sicilian
third estate, he could not talk about Scotland and Celtic lore. The topic
had to be a Sicilian one. The so-called Sicilian Vesper of the twelfth
century was a famous-enough Sicilian revolution, so that deciding to
write about it must have proven a relatively easy choice. The story was
already a best-selling topic, avidly consumed by both Italian revolu-
tionaries and Sicilian autonomists:
[Fausto] Niccolini wrote about it in 1831, in Giovanni di Procida . . . but
already in 1822 Francesco Hayez had represented the scene of the re-
bellion in a painting commissioned by the Marquise Visconti d’Aragona,
second wife of the Marquis Alessandro Visconti d’Aragona, who was
investigated for the Milanese plot of 1821 . . . . The painting had been
replicated in 1835 by Hayez for a commission of Francesco Arese, who
had just been liberated from the Spielberg jails after a sentence for his
participation in the insurrection of 1821; the painting was then replicated
once more in 1844–46. (Banti, Nazione 84)
Once the topic was chosen, what remained now to decide was how to
write about it. Given the advice ‘‘to drop poetry,’’ only two options were
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left to Amari: ‘‘The form of the historical novel was the one he chose at
the beginning. Francesco Domenico Guerrazzi had used it to write his
relevant Una grande epoca della storia italiana, which celebrated the
resistance of Florence against the invader. Guerrazzi had said: ‘I wrote
this book because I could not fight!’ Amari, similarly, wanted to write a
book that could amount to a battle’’ (Tommasini 289–90). Brandishing
historical novels had other illustrious precedents: the usual Scott, but
also Alexandre Dumas, the hero of the Parisian revolution of 1830, who
had recently come to Sicily to cure himself from some disease or another,
look for action, and bring the message of revolutionary Giuseppe Maz-
zini’s Young Italy to the island (Bonfigli 4–5).Ω It had also the advantage
of being a popular-enough genre to read: it converted historical reality,
as Georg Lukács famously said, into ‘‘mass experience’’ (23). It was peda-
gogically useful for the education of the masses.
The second and last option was to write a straightforward history
book. The advantage would have been its closer adherence to facts. A
‘‘greater quantity of historical circumstances’’ (Manzoni 2:1737), in other
words, could render the pedagogical message of the book, rhetorically at
least, more credible. Leopold von Ranke was already discrediting the
novel’s ‘‘fantastical reconstructions’’ to the point that writing novels
always ran the risk of making one’s work less relevant in political terms.
That is why in revolutionary Italy, fostered by ideals of national indepen-
dence, there was a clear tendency ‘‘to professionalize history, historiog-
raphy, and historians’’ (Verga 48–50)—to sell the words and messages
written in a history book as hard, undeniable facts; and, possibly, as
examples for the future. History was thus being subdivided in the Italian
academy into various hyperprofessionalized and hyperspecialized fields.
The number of specialized journals was multiplying accordingly. The
institution of the deputazioni di storia patria (the first in Turin in 1833),
which were ministerial think tanks devoted to collecting national docu-
ments and to publishing for the glory of the country, was making abun-
dantly clear the impressive strength of historiography in concocting
national myths—no matter if the nation in question was Piedmont, Italy,
or Sicily. It is not that the belles lettres, and the historical novel in
particular, were being completely dethroned: Massimo d’Azeglio, for
instance, a rather institutional figure in the future Piedmontese par-
liament and already a promoter of Italian unification, kept publishing
best-selling and outright patriotic historical novels still in 1833 (Ettore
Fieramosca) and 1841 (Niccolò de’ Lapi ). Also Francesco Domenico
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Guerrazzi and Silvio Pellico—to name only people from what has been
called the canon of Italy’s insurrectional youth (Banti, Nazione 45)—
were staying the course of the historical novel. Yet the epochal trust in
the superior relevance of history seemed to have made the decision for
Amari: ‘‘It is well known that the author of the Vesper pondered seriously
whether to write a novel or a researched history. The second option was
chosen in the end: although Amari held in high regard works of imagi-
nation, he considered history now as the knowledge of the people’s
consciousness to be achieved through the research of a collective mem-
ory’’ (Marcolongo 8). In short, Michele Amari found himself a historian.
The Europeanization of Sicilian History
Europe invented historians and then made good use of them.
—FERNAND BRAUDEL, Civilization and Capitalism,
15th–18th Century
The greatest of Italian historians is Amari.
—HENRY FURST, ‘‘A Controversy on Italian History’’
But history was not his purpose.
—ILLUMINATO PERI, Michele Amari
As he began his new book, Amari then made his intention quite explicit:
he wanted ‘‘to make history, not novels’’ (Guerra 1:xix). This did not
mean that the temptation of the historical novel had completely disap-
peared. After all, as Alessandro Manzoni had written in a letter to Mon-
sieur Chauvet, historiography had the despicable tendency of erasing the
point of view of the vanquished ones, and of registering only the ac-
tions, not even the thoughts, of those who have won: ‘‘All that is sacred
and profound in defeat [sventura]’’ escapes historiography (qtd. in Rai-
mondi 107). Accordingly, it was not certain that history, magister vitae
for some, could be the best teacher in downtrodden, subaltern, and
ultimately colonized Sicily: the Manzonian thoughts, hopes, and the
disillusionment of the Sicilian people had to be reconstructed, whether
archival evidence was enough or not.
Literary and narrative in its style and concern, the history that Amari
published in Palermo in 1842, initially titled Un periodo delle storie sici-
liane del tredicesimo secolo (A Period of the Sicilian Histories of the Thir-
teenth Century), was arguably a hybrid narrative attempt, still under the
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shadow of Waverley and Queen Margot, to translate revolutions into a
popularly accessible mass experience: ‘‘I have, then, decided, being Si-
cilian, to narrate the change of domination that happened in my island
at the end of the thirteenth century, in the face of an excess of tyranny
that very rarely one has seen the like’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:2). In narrating
his storia, in presenting himself as a character with thoughts, hopes,
and disillusionments, Amari constantly supplemented the archive with
flights of rhetorical fantasy—as in the reconstruction, for example, of the
climactic scene:
On the eve of Easter, the streets of the capital [Palermo] were covered
in mirth; the porticos, the temples, the palaces adorned with di√er-
ent designs of gold drapes and silks; the lamps spread the light of day
on all quarters; in the cathedral, where the vesper was being celebrated,
the dazzle of endless candle, as big, writes Speciale, as columns, was
blinding; the noise of trumpets, horns, and drums, symbols of the war
that deafens peace, was won by the harmony of more delicate instru-
ments and by the cheerful songs of the people. They were to spend the
entire night in such amusements. At the break of the day, which was
the twenty-fifth of March, Fredrick was anointed and crowned king of
Sicily. (2:288–89)∞≠
Amari’s story, which closed on March 25, 1296, with the coronation of
Fredrick iii of the house of Aragon, had begun at the hour of the vesper
on March 30, 1282. At that highly symbolic time when the sun sets,
sparked by the o√ense of an Angevin soldier who had begun a legendary
body search ending in the breasts of an abundantly virginal and most
beautiful woman (1:194), a popular insurrection broke out. It was the
end of the tyrannical rule of Charles I of Anjou, who had taken Sicily
away from the Hohenstaufens (who had replaced the Normans, who had
conquered the Arabs . . . ) and subjected it to Frankish rule.∞∞ The above-
mentioned notoriety of the episode within insurrectional circles; the
pathos of the Italian (or Sicilian) honor trampled on by the foreigner;
the epic of the popular revolt—these elements had made the history of
the vesper a very attractive topic for the engaged historian. What better
subject than this already realized Sicilian revolution to celebrate and
salute popular revolts to come! After all, this was an event that had
‘‘shaken the whole of Southern Europe’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:5); it had had a
much better ending than the 1820 insurrection;∞≤ and it even illustrated
the necessity to take that most serious business of revolutions away from
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disorganic intellectuals and give it back to the people, ‘‘sole foundation
for equality and a free life’’ (1:6), Romantic Volk giving foundations to
the putative Sicilian nation: ‘‘Sicily owes to its people, not to its domi-
nant classes, that revolution, which saved her in the xiii century from
extreme shame and misery’’ (1:xix–xx).∞≥
What better subject than this, indeed! As Amari once reminisced,
‘‘One could not find a better subject for my goal: it had five centuries
of antiquity to oppose to censorship; yet it illustrated the way to pre-
pare, I believed, a terrible and victorious revolution’’ (1:xxvii). Moreover,
by depicting the Spanish Fredrick iii as the liberator of Sicily against
French brutality, Amari could well hope the Bourbons would mistake a
call to arms against them for the historical praise of their past service to
Sicily. In sum, the same rhetorical translatio that in Marmion had sub-
stituted the Scots for the Sicilians and the French for the Bourbons, was,
in part, still at work here: the evil Angevins of the Vespro were to be read
as metaphorical precursors of the Bourbons; but the historical subject
of the revolution—the Sicilian people—was here historically coinciding
with the real thing. The message was clear: the Sicilian people had a
glorious revolutionary past. It was now time to recall it with historical
precision, without rhetorical artifice.
As history, Amari’s book was an unprecedented success. Its author
must not have regretted the Marmion left behind. Unhindered by tropes
or ‘‘fantastical reconstructions,’’ and not dulled by too many flights of
belles-lettrism, the true meaning of the work came across, this time,
loud and clear (Marcolongo 70; Giu√rida xvi; Tommasini 298): popular
revolution was the only way to Sicilian freedom.
The Bourbon police, unfortunately, soon noticed the clarity of the
message, too: ‘‘Palermo, October 24, 1842. Dear Don Leonardo [Vigo],
my work has been prohibited; the copies of the book have been requisi-
tioned; I have been suspended from my clerical duties and called to
Naples to be interrogated; the three censors who had licensed my book
have been fired’’ (Amari, Carteggio 3:11). Amari, who knew well the ways
of the police, never went to the ‘‘interview’’ in Naples and fled to Paris
instead, where he rented at 48, rue de Luxembourg. There he was canon-
ized—the first Sicilian, perhaps, to make it big in Paris—with the French
translation of his book. With the translation, the title changed into La
guerre des vêpres de Sicile (The War of the Sicilian Vesper), and the sense
widened considerably to become a manual not for Sicilian insurrections
only, but for Italian and even European ones.
190 CHAPTER 5
The first revolution the book meant to prepare was, obviously, the one
against the Bourbons—and a manual to prepare terrible and victorious
revolutions the Vespro certainly was. It taught lots of very useful things—
such as how to organize an informal army for a war of maneuver; ways
to isolate the enemy militarily and politically; the art of strategic al-
liances with foreign powers; and the bitter necessity, too, of violence and
death (Amari, Guerra 1:219). Above all, however, and from the very first
words (echoes of Machiavelli), the book was a celebration of the people’s
power: ‘‘The reputation of strength, through which the sovereign con-
trols the State, is a very delicate balance; it therefore happens that, at the
very moment in which control of public life seems to be lost, power is
restored, either by the virtue of the prince, or by the impetus of the
people. Then, great events will shine: injurious foreign ties will be bro-
ken, corrupt political orders will crumble, and the State will strengthen
itself through healthy reforms’’ (1:1). The power and strength of the
constituted order, in other words, is all ‘‘reputation,’’ in the eyes of the
beholder: the people can break that balance. And, with an echo of the
discussions on natural law that had fired the eighteenth century (Hof),
sometimes the people ought to break it through revolutions, for exam-
ple, when sovereigns failed to operate ‘‘healthy reforms’’ and break the
social contract with their subjects.
The central role of a revolutionary people in the events of the vesper
seemed to be, in fact, the very point of Amari’s book. Until now, Amari
suggested, historiography of the vesper had confined itself within a sim-
ple plot:
John of Procida, for love of country and personal revenge, decides to take
Sicily away from Charles of Anjou; he o√ers it to Peter, king of Ara-
gon . . . ; conspires with Peter, with the pope, with the emperor of
Constantinople, with the Sicilian barons. When all is ready, the conspira-
tors give a sign; kill the French; raise Peter to the Sicilian throne. This has
been, more or less, the history of the Sicilian Vesper. In truth, some
modern historians, mostly from the other side of the Alps, have doubted
such a vast, secret, and successful conspiracy; but this theory of the
Vesper has always been the prevalent one, and the majority of the histo-
rians, especially the Sicilian ones, have repeated it over and over again;
and history has built on the conspiracy. (Guerra 1:xix)
Refuting the theory of Sicilian historians, and building instead on the
skepticism of a few historians ‘‘from the other side of the Alps,’’ Amari’s
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book then rewrote the old story by making courtly conjurors and ‘‘indi-
vidual protagonists shrink, and the people grow bigger’’ (1:xxx).∞∂
It may be easy to understand why historians, ‘‘especially Sicilian ones,’’
may have insisted on the theory of the vesper as a war of dynastic
succession. After all, these were intellectuals coming from, and writing
on behalf of, the baronial classes of Sicily (Casarrubea). They had no
sympathy, obviously, for insurrections beyond their class’s control. A
more European perspective was thus needed by Amari to rinse Sicilian
history from its baronial legacies. Yet as Denis Mack Smith suggests,
‘‘Some people [other than Sicilian historians] had an interest in main-
taining that John of Procida and Aragon had been the chief actors all
along: the Angevins needed to ascribe their defeat to more than a civilian
mob, and it suited the Aragonese to take credit for everything’’ (1:73).
European historians, in other words, were still looking at the vesper not
as a revolution, but as a war of dynastic succession. For Amari, instead,
the fact that the betrayed vesper ended with a dynastic succession, and
yet another colonization of Sicily, did not mean, post hoc, ergo propter
hoc, that dynastic succession was the motive of the revolution: ‘‘The
revolution was born from the people, and popular was its beginning; as
soon as the aristocracy infiltrated it, the old laws of monarchic restora-
tion came back’’ (Guerra 2:479–80).
What seems at stake here is not only the political question of whether a
‘‘civilian mob’’ can become the ‘‘people’’ and subject of its own destiny
but also the geopolitical question of whether the Sicilian mob in particu-
lar could ever conceive of the idea of freedom or concoct a revolution.∞∑
Could it be casual, for instance, that the hero of historians, ‘‘John [of
Procida,] was an Italian from the mainland’’ (Mack Smith 1:71), and not
a Sicilian? There can be little doubt that Michele Amari, in the reevalua-
tion of his people, was yielding to a certain provincial pietas. Yet it is
my impression that he was also doing a little more than that. To start
illustrating this ‘‘little more,’’ I will begin from the end of the Vespro. In
its concluding chapter—the one supposed to ‘‘show my political and
philosophical beliefs’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:ix)—Amari implied that this
Sicilian event of the thirteenth century may have not only anticipated the
‘‘storm of the French Revolution’’ but that it should have—though it did
not—helped Sicilians to ‘‘correct’’ (correggere) that storm when it came
to Italy (2:490). In what sense could the experience of the vesper, retold
by Amari, correct the French Revolution? Amari’s very insistence on the
people, and his lack of squeamishness vis-à-vis revolutionary violence
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certainly do not authorize an interpretation of this correction in anti-
Jacobean and conservative function (see Bollati 62–70; Marcolongo 8).
It seems to me that what Amari was doing when elevating an episode
of Sicilian history to the status of national revolution, and, even, as an
‘‘example for Scotland, the Flanders, and Switzerland’’ (Guerra 2:484),
was not so much writing a history of a revolution or a theory of revolu-
tions in general. Rather, he was operating a true revolution—a correc-
tion indeed—of theory. I am referring, of course, to that theory of Eu-
rope that we have been trying to follow since chapter 1 of the present
book. According to such theory, freedom is the genius of Europe: ‘‘In
Europe, the natural divisions [between states] forms, year after year and
in the perpetuity of the centuries, a spirit of Freedom. On the contrary, a
spirit of servitude reigns in Asia, and never quits that region’’ (Montes-
quieu, Oeuvres 2:24).∞∏ If freedom is the ultimate goal of universal his-
tory, imagined, for instance, by Immanuel Kant as the teleological ap-
proaching of ‘‘a perfectly just civic constitution’’ (Our History 16), then
Europe is also the very subject of universal history.
Montesqueiu’s theory of freedom, as we have already seen, coincides
with a theory of Europe. But Europe, in this theory, is a di√erence be-
tween a positive north, ‘‘free and independent’’ (Montesquieu, Oeuvres
2:793), and a negative south incapable of the ‘‘daring action’’ that fosters
revolutions and engenders freedom (2:475). Freedom, in this sense, re-
mains the spiritual endowment of Europe’s north—a north, that is, with
Paris at its center. As the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, once
noticed: ‘‘Today we judge freedom, equality, and association on the sense
given to these words in France. At the origin of such prejudice is the idea,
which we believe is false despite its almost universal hold, that France is
the mover of the European continent’’ (Opere 2:550–51).
Montesquieu’s theory of a Europe moved by French freedom is not
subverted, but only supplemented, by the myth of the French Revolution
as the epiphany of progressive freedom—the latter being, as François
Cacault wrote, one of those ‘‘ideas borrowed from our revolution,’’ and
that no alleged other revolution could have envisioned before. Bertrand
Barriére made it clear: France was the origin of European freedoms, and
French language ‘‘that which first consecrated the rights of man and
citizen, the language whose task is now to transmit to the world the most
sublime thoughts of freedom’’ (qtd. in Hazard, Révolution 121). Cacault’s
and Barriére’s is the theory, as James Blaut calls it, of ‘‘di√usionism’’:
events (modernity, revolution, liberation, etc.) like history originate in
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Europe, and are then ‘‘di√used’’ from there as from the center. What we
may add to Blaut, is that Eurocentric theory is supplemented by yet
another internal center, an ideal north, where all originates and from
where all is di√used. Sicily, in this supplementary theory of Europe, is
margin and periphery.
It is according to this theory, arguably, that a contemporary historian
of the stature of Denis Mack Smith, like the historians against whom
Amari revolted in 1842, still needs to deny the vesper as a ‘‘political revolt.’’
Against the very cosmopolitan spirit that animated the philosophes, the
vesper, for Mack Smith, is expression of the ‘‘most violent feelings of
xenophobia [vis-à-vis the French],’’ lacking all constructive aims. In the
end, Sicilians remain spiritually incapable of Montesquieu’s daring ac-
tions: they ‘‘submitted without di≈culty to the rule from Spain’’; and
‘‘this proves that the rebellion of 1282 cannot have been against foreign
domination as such’’ (Mack Smith 1:71, 1:75). For Mack Smith, in conclu-
sion, nothing else than chauvinism has ‘‘made it possible for a horrible
massacre to be magnified [by Amari] into the most glorious event in
Sicilian history’’ (1:72). Not altogether di√erently, Amari’s interpretation
of the vesper as a popular revolution is for Steven Runciman the sign of
the chauvinism of the Sicilians, ‘‘a proud and not a modest people’’ (291).
Sure enough, Amari’s gesture can be said to be exaggeratedly chau-
vinistic, embodying even a sense of the cultural superiority of Sicily (first
true revolutionary of Europe) vis-à-vis the rest of the world. But is this
su≈cient to dismiss the whole of Amari’s gesture, as if the puerility of
this intellectual from the margins who evokes his own version of origins
were not comparable to the puerility and chauvinism of a hegemonic
center resting on the unquestioned certainty of being the origin of all?∞π
The fact remains that such a gesture, chauvinistic or not, is quite more
radical than Mack Smith and Runciman are willing to acknowledge.
Besides claiming a Sicilian origin for revolutionary Europe, it also as-
pires to contextualize such a revolution, well beyond ‘‘Sicilian history,’’ as
a glorious event in universal history—exemplary indeed, beyond Sicily,
‘‘for Scotland, the Flanders, and Switzerland.’’ Antonio Gramsci had
already grasped this tension between ‘‘local history and universal de-
signs’’ (to paraphrase Mignolo, Local Histories) as the very kernel of
Amari’s sicilianismo. Is Sicily a subject of universal history or is its his-
tory, as Croce famously put it, ‘‘not ours, or ours only in small part’’
(qtd. in Gramsci, Risorgimento 169)?∞∫
In other words, Amari intends here to claim Sicily as a place in which
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freedom originated independently from the French version of it, which
equals to say that Sicily is for Amari neither the past nor the immaturity
of European history, but rather an integral part of its modernity. Free-
dom, to begin with, is not immanent to Europe, but rather ‘‘su√ocated
by Europe’s political order’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:xxiv)—a political order
that clearly refers to the Congress of Vienna. Besides denying the French
Revolution the status of origin (di√usionism), Amari engages Montes-
quieu’s Franks, reduced to the evil caricature of the tyrant Charles, in an
intertextual game whose stake is the very relocation of freedom. For
Amari, reminiscent here of Juan Andrés, freedom did not originate
among the Franks, but in Sicily. Not so naive to ‘‘forget the imperfec-
tions of those ancient parliaments’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:102), Amari saw in
the Sicilian constitution prepared after the vesper exactly what Montes-
quieu had located up north—balance and separation of powers directly
resulting from the division of property:
In the old Sicilian constitution, principality and aristocracy balanced
each other; barons did not have unlimited power on people, nor on their
livelihoods; peasants were less serfs than elsewhere—no country worker
was a serf; bourgeois and city dwellers, also those from feudal lands, felt
their freedom, and protected their immunity. Judicial power, depending
directly on the prince, did not serve all the wants of feudalist barons.
Taxes were acceptable; services were mild; universal levies were very rare;
and only parliaments could impose them. (1:67–68)∞Ω
A division of power had thus been realized in Sicily—thereby making the
island a part, if not the origin, of the European sphere of freedom. The
constitution, albeit ‘‘imperfect’’ and still relying on the good will of the
prince, was ‘‘unknown in the continent, while it had existed in Sicily for
seven centuries, until the Bourbons stole it from our parents, giving
them in exchange Napoleonic despotism minus Napoléon’s power and
glory’’ (1:xxiv).
From quotations such as this, it already becomes clear that the strength
of the Vespro is also, however, its major limitation. In creating the image
of a constitutional, revolutionary, freedom-seeking Sicily, Amari was
clearly trying to counteract the (Montesquieu-like) commonplace of a
savage, backward south, which preunification Italy knew well from the
pages of Augusine Creuzé de Lesser, who claimed, in 1806, that ‘‘Europe
ends at Naples and ends there quite badly. Calabria, Sicily, all the rest
belongs to Africa’’ (qtd. in Moe 37). Against such claims, Amari’s inten-
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tion was to give Sicily a bond with the rest of Europe (see Peri 37)—both
methodologically, by using the methods of documentary historiography,
and ideologically, by measuring its degree of civilization on the consti-
tutional standards set by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Edward Gibbon, and
Hume. Far from being local history, the story told by the Vespro was one
of Anjou and Provence, of Aragon and Catalonia, France and Spain, and
of popes and emperors from the east and west. This Sicilian story was not
only an example for Switzerland, the Flanders or Scotland; it was a
paradigmatic tale for a whole Europe that, after a revolution, the Terror,
and Napoléon, was still reflecting on the themes of political freedom,
despotism, and national and popular self-determination.
Echoes of the European debate on democracy (see Mastellone)—from
Alexis de Tocqueville’s La démocratie en Amérique (1835–40) to Giuseppe
Mazzini’s Pensieri sulla democrazia in Europa (1847)—are felt in Amari’s
discussion of liberty and freedom. The stress on constitutionalism, far
from being incomprehensible outside of Sicily, was common currency in
a Europe more and more disillusioned about the prospects of enlight-
ened absolutism and moving already toward forms of liberal representa-
tion. The epic of a people erupting into terrible and just violence against
tyranny, moreover, breathed the same European air as did Thomas Car-
lyle’s French Revolution (1837) or Jules Michelet’s La peuple (1846), which
had made of revolution the best-selling topic of the age.≤≠ Even the
question of a putative Sicilian nation was very much in line with a
general European feeling, moving beyond Voltaire’s cosmopolitanism
into an era of ‘‘imagined communities’’ (B. Anderson). This was a story,
in other words, focused on Sicily—but about and for Europe. Benedetto
Croce, for one, understood it very well: the Vespro, he wrote, was ‘‘the
first [Sicilian] work that, at the time, seemed worthy to be placed near
foreign ones’’ (Storia della storiografia 228).
And placed near foreign ones it was—in the French Librairie Euro-
péenne: the flair of the revolutionary who had defied censorship first,
and later the panache of the exile, had given Amari a European notoriety
that no other Sicilian writer had ever enjoyed before. Amari, in sum,
made it to Europe. The problem, however, was that Amari and his Sicily
were joining the European table as the parvenu, the Giovannino-come-
lately at an already busy banquet. Or, to put it more earnestly, Sicily was
entering universal history, but only because it was said to have reached
some standards of freedom and civility that were set, judged, and mea-
sured, as Mazzini had noticed, ‘‘on the sense given to these words in
196 CHAPTER 5
France.’’ I am not thinking so much of Gyan Prakash’s ‘‘foundational’’
traps here—that Amari, namely, failed to ‘‘displace the categories framed
in and by [European dominant] history’’ (‘‘Writing’’ 399) and legiti-
mated them instead. I am talking of the much simpler desire of the
wannabe—to imitate and please, and shun di√erence from a putative
standard as the worst of shames.≤∞ As his friend Salvatore Vigo once
wrote to Amari, ‘‘foolish is that nation that, in Europe, does not take part
of Europe’s modes and orders’’ (qtd. in Amari, Carteggio 3:65). And, lest
Amari’s Sicilian nation would be taken for foolish, the writer of the
Vespro had made it part of such European modes and orders. Sicily was
part of Europe because it was proved to be a national Volk like Herder’s
Germany; because it had a revolution not altogether di√erent than the
French one; because it had now a history of its civilization (Amari’s)
comparable to Voltaire’s Age de Louis xiv ; and, last but not the least,
because its political order had been as good as the much celebrated
English model theorized by John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government
(1690) and hypostatized as exemplary (suggests Hof 195) by Enlighten-
ment Europe: ‘‘Both the English and the Sicilian constitutions had a
common origin [i.e., balance of power], and the Sicilian was reformed
on the basis of the English one in 1312’’ (Amari, Guerra 1:xxiv).
Especially this last point had already been rehearsed by another Si-
cilian, the legal historian Rosario Gregorio. In Considerazioni sopra la
storia di Sicilia dai tempi dei Normanni sino ai presenti (1805), Gregorio
had proposed the theory that the Normans, after ‘‘freeing’’ Sicily from
the non-European Muslim domination, had established an administra-
tive organization on the model of the system of William the Conqueror
of England: Norman Sicily’s system of taxation, the duana de secretis had
consisted of two divisions, one supervising accounts and the other col-
lecting taxes and paying expenses. This structure was seen as fundamen-
tally similar to the organization of the exchequer of England, which
consisted of the upper and the lower exchequer. Gregorio’s thesis had
achieved some authority in Europe, and even in England (see Takayama
61–62). It is thus understandable that Amari, at the epoch of the Vespro,
was still willing to stick to it as a way of granting Sicily its passport as a
modern European nation. The problem of Gregorio’s thesis as inherited
by Amari, however, was that it made the prerequisites for Sicily’s dignity
still dependent on a putatively northern wind of freedom. In fact, the
whole reevaluation of Sicilian history that operated in the Vespro de-
pended on notions of constitutionalism deriving from northern enlight-
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enment: the civility of a people had to be measured on the basis of its
historical progress toward freedom, which, in turn, was based on its
capacity to generate a revolution. Answering the sort of revolution envy
that had haunted Europe after 1789, Amari, like Nicola Palmieri before
him, could then propose that ‘‘the maturity of France only came one
century after the English one, around two centuries after the Dutch, and
five centuries after the maturity of the Sicilians’’ (qtd. in Giarrizzo 356).
Yet it was not iuxta propria principia that Sicily had acquired dignity on
the European scene, but because it was shown to fit a theory of revolu-
tionary Europe that saw civilization as political maturity, progress to-
ward the liberal freedoms of the rights of ‘‘man,’’ and readiness for a
revolution (on the fundamentalism of liberal principles, see Cassano,
Pensiero). With the Vespro, Amari was thus widening the confines of
Europe to include his Sicily, but he was not widening a theory of Europe.
He might have achieved exactly that in his next major historical work,
when, against Gregorio, he argued, for instance, that Sicilian constitu-
tionalism, and the duana de secretis in particular, had little to do with the
exchequer or other forms of European constitutionalism: it derived,
instead, also etymologically, from the Arabic administrative organiza-
tion of Sicily, and specifically from the dîwân at-tahqîq (Amari, Storia
3:324–31). Before Amari could look outside of Europe for new symbols
of Sicilian dignity, however, a disillusion with Europe had certainly to
occur. In 1848, exiled in Paris in the revolutionary days of the fall of Louis
Philippe and the creation of the Second French Republic, Amari had
followed with renewed hopes the events of the coeval Sicilian revolution,
which had begun on January 12 (King Ferdinand’s birthday). The revo-
lution was not limited, this time, to Palermo, but involved the whole of
Sicily, cities and countryside alike. With joy, he had read in the French
papers about the provisional government of Palermo, and of the e√orts
to adopt the Sicilian constitution of 1812. With republican pleasure, he
had learned from his friends’ letters that the new government had de-
throned King Ferdinand ii, and crowned and sworn to the constitution
Alberto Amedeo of Savoy. But then, on May 15, 1849, the mood of the
news swung like a pendulum: the Sicilian armies had been defeated by
Ferdinand’s, France and England had refused to help, Catania and Mes-
sina were in rubble, the parliament had been dissolved. And then, on
December 2, 1851, the eighteenth Brumaire, the imperial mantle finally
fell on the shoulders of Louis Bonaparte, and the epoch of revolutionary
France was closed once and for good. It was at this climax of disappoint-
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ment that hopes in French models—revolutions, constitutions, and the
like—seemed to wane. Amari grew ‘‘weary of walking in the boulevards
rather than in Montepellegrino; of attending soirées rather than hunts;
of drinking tea rather than wine; of speaking French or English, not
Italian; and of living in a country from which we expect generous politi-
cal thoughts, and where we find only the idiocy of the market, or worse’’
(Carteggio 3:55).≤≤ At this point, when all over Europe the forces of
the restoration came back triumphantly and with a vengeance, Amari
needed to look outside of France, and perhaps outside of Europe too, in
order to find a feasible model, or perhaps a founding myth, for the hope
of a democratic Sicilian nation. In other words, the issue that was to
legitimate a Sicilian revolution could no longer be the insistence that
Sicily, too, was a European nation; but that Sicily, exactly because Other
and not merely European, may have the seed to escape the history of
Europe’s present barbarity. In the prophetic words of the Vesper : ‘‘While
in the rest of Europe the northern brethren had lost the virtues of the
barbarians, and preserved their vices only, Sicily, like Spain, lived under
the domination of the Arabs, who were at least learned if not civilized’’
(1:9). What learning did the Arabs leave to Sicily, and to Europe as well,
to oppose the ultimate failure of European civilization?
The Other Europe of Michele Amari
And all rulers are the heirs of those who conquered before them.
—WALTER BENJAMIN, ‘‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’’
The idea to write ‘‘of the wandering of Sicilian Arabs, and of other Arabs
that navigated the Mediterranean, too’’ (Amari, Carteggio 3:28) had
come to Michele Amari around 1843, while he was living at number 48,
rue de Luxembourg (Henry James, living in the same street at number
29, wrote instead of one navigated American in 1875). It would take
eleven years for Amari to publish the first book of what he already
thought would be his masterpiece, and eighteen more years (no tenure
clock ticking, obviously) to issue the last, and fourth, volume in 1872.
Historically, a book about the Arabs of Sicily would have reconstructed
pretext and context for the revolution of the Vespro: the Angevins, after
all, had been given Sicily by Pope Clement iv (in 1266), who wanted to
Christianize an island that still ‘‘looked Muslim to all the good Christians
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of the West’’ (Amari, Storia 3:731). Politically, a book about the Sicilian
Arabs might have worked as the continuation of the Vespro’s celebration
of the people; it was to suggest, also, a revision of the previous autono-
mist tendencies. By pointing to, for instance, the Muslims’ disunity—
tensions among Arabs, Berbers, and Persians—as the very cause for their
decline (3:150), Amari wanted to suggest the need for unity between Sicily
and all the rest of Italy.
Much had happened, in the twenty-nine years between the conception
of this work and its final conclusion, for Amari to be able to keep the
idea of Sicilian autonomy at play. For one, the failed revolution of 1848
must have convinced autonomists that a strategic alliance in the name of
Italy’s liberation (from Austria in the north, the pope in the center, and
the Bourbons in the south) had become a political necessity. Finished
was the viability of fragmented resistances carried out for the sake of
some identity politics.≤≥ On February 20, 1848, when things were still
going well for the revolutionaries, and the Bourbon King was ready to
grant them a constitution fashioned on the French one of 1830, Giuseppe
Mazzini, arguably the most authoritative voice of the Italian revolution,
had warned Sicilians of the dangers of autonomy in an open letter to
their leaders: ‘‘Local individualism,’’ he wrote, would eventually let ‘‘Eu-
rope decide for you’’ (Opere 2:372). When a restoration of European
powers—the balance of Power—punctually happened, and the Sicilian
revolution was crushed once again, it became quite di≈cult for Amari
and the autonomists not to swallow Mazzini’s pill—‘‘you belong to us
[Italy]’’ (voi siete nostri)—and to accept that ‘‘only a religion of Unity
can give glory, mission, and purpose to Sicily . . . in Europe’’ (Mazzini,
Opere 2:370–71).
According to Mary Poppins’s principle that just a spoonful of sugar
helps the medicine go down, Amari had thus gulped Mazzini’s unity
down with the sugar of its eventual success, which he remembered in
1872, concluding his magnum opus: ‘‘I started this hard toil as a Sicilian
yearning freedom for a small State. I conclude it hoping that all Italians
will become one bigger and bigger family; hoping they will see in unity
and liberty the well-being and honor of all and each one’’ (Storia 3:922).
Accepting the process of national unification, and the promotion of
Sicily to an Italian province in Mazzini’s Europe, did not mean, however,
that Sicily was to accept passively the modality in which such an imag-
ined community was built. A tension between the historical necessity of
unity and the will to di√erence opens up for Amari after 1848 (and
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explains, perhaps, the contradictions noticed by Peri). It is perhaps the
very abandonment of political autonomism, in fact, that exasperates the
need to assert cultural diversity: whereas the Vespro had claimed a Euro-
pean place for Sicily as a modern constitutional nation, the new work
was now to insist on the di√erence that Sicily marked in any precon-
ceived ideas of Europe. The criteria for a composition of Europe could
no longer be identity with a set of standards, but the acceptance of
di√erence. Sicily’s culture and history, in other words, had to become
part of an amended theory of Europe capable not of assimilating Sicily,
but of recognizing it in its di√erence.
The story that Amari started telling in 1843 was quite straightforward,
almost classical in its simplicity: one place (Sicily) and one (Braudelian!)
long time spanning from the seventh to the thirteenth century. The
action—a kind of national-popular mixture of historical and detective
novel framed by the documentary evidence of philological historiog-
raphy—was that of the Arab conquest of Sicily (year 827); of the estab-
lishment of a very rich Muslim civilization on the island (next century);
of the decline and fall of the Muslim colonial power by Norman hands
(1060–91); and of the survival, maybe flourishing, of Muslim civilization
in Sicily still at the court of Fredrick ii (1197–1250). The detective-like
spin concerned the way in which the annals of history had completely
lost the memory of these five centuries of Muslim presence in Europe,
five centuries that—as Andrés had already suggested to us, and Amari
will never tire to repeat—were in fact fundamental for the creation and
establishment of European civilization itself.
The Mystery of the Missing Muslim, à la Eugène Sue or Arthur Conan
Doyle, would have made for good sales. But Amari, despite being unem-
ployed, almost destitute, and supported financially by his friends, was
certainly not interested in financial success: ‘‘Readers will judge if my
work stinks of market,’’ he wrote in the preface to Ibn Zafer’s Political
Consolations (Muhammad ibn Abd ix). He found academia, instead, less
stinky, and trying to land a job in either Pisa or Florence, he opted for
the arguably more bookish title of Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia (His-
tory of the Muslims of Sicily). The result, despite a misleadingly academic
title, was the greatest Sicilian epic ever.
Amari’s epic, however, did not begin in medias res. Sicily, after all, had
been a land of conquest long before the Arabs had arrived there. Amari
thus began with the Greeks, good colonists (with some recorded excep-
tions), who had made the island glorious and magna; and then the
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Romans, who had exploited it as if it were their ‘‘big estate’’ (Amari,
Storia 1:108); after that the ‘‘Northern barbarians,’’ who had finished
transforming it into a wasteland with no social institutions, and noth-
ing, alas!, worth mentioning (1:117). The Byzantine Empire had but
continued this long litany of abuses, until, a little tongue-in-cheek, re-
demption had come from high for the battered Sicilians:
If we were to rely on pious local legends, Christianity had early and
splendid beginnings in Sicily. Saint Peter, so we are told, quickly sent to
Sicily bishops from Antioch in the year 44. And all those bishops, per-
secuted and persecutors alike, tear down pagan temples, silence oracles,
kill dragons; the Bishop Marciano, hiding in the subterranean labyrinths
of the capital, builds an altar with the image of the Virgin Mary, and is
strangled by the Jews. Mary and Teja face martyrdom in Taormina to
defend their chastity; and near their tombs is erected the first monastery
for women in the whole Christian world. (1:119)
Despite the anticlericalism he had learned from Father Quattrocchi, a
‘‘revolutionary and atheist,’’ and from his other teachers, ‘‘all unbelievers
and liberal priests’’ (Amari, Il mio terzo esilio sheets 7–8), Amari was not
trying here to dismiss Christianity, but rather to recognize its historical
(albeit secular) relevance as the carrier of moral, social, and political
aspirations of the people (Storia 2:264–65).≤∂ Besides dragon hunting
and virginal ecstasies, Amari meant, Christianity’s original role in Sicily
had been that of ‘‘fighting the lively strength of principality, aristocracy,
and learned classes; all these social groups together, feeling threatened by
the new power that was rising in the world, did all they could to combat
it’’ (1:121). Early Sicilian Christianity, in other words, had been a popular
mass movement from below—not altogether di√erent than the one of
the vesper—rebelling against the barbarity of the powerful, the privi-
leged, and the courtesan intellectual.
With the writing of the Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia, Amari, at the
same time, was trying to go beyond the mere writing of historical events.
His attempt was to organize the disparate facts of history into some kind
of unitary vision—into a universal or philosophical history, namely, that
would avoid, however, the pratfalls of Montesquieu’s theory of progress
from an ancient south to a modern north. He had thus started looking at
the past from within the intellectual frame of Vico’s philosophy of his-
tory, which o√ered the clear advantage of undoing the teleological line of
positivist historicism (which divided the universe and Europe between
202 CHAPTER 5
backward and modern nations), through ‘‘the famous corsi e ricorsi that
are Vico’s form of the cyclical pattern of the succession of civilizations’’
(Berlin 85). As a matter of fact, not only in Vico, but also in Ibn Khaldun
—‘‘who widened the scopes of the philosophy of history even more than
Giambattista Vico’’ (Amari, Storia 1:180–81)—Amari had found a cycli-
cal vision (or philosophy) of history that was capable of undermining
the foundations of Montesquieu’s linearity of progress. Civilization, for
Vico and Ibn Khaldun, was not a teleology that moved from south to
north, but rather a cycle that repeated itself in every place, north and
south alike.
From Vico and Ibn Khaldun, Amari took the idea of the three stages of
every civilization. The first was an age of barbarity (Ibn Khaldun) or ‘‘of
the Giants’’ (Vico), in which force ruled and poetry was the form that
gave sense to the world: ‘‘Common vices are superstition, preying, re-
venge, and cruelty; everybody possesses quick intelligence, clever words,
propensity to eloquence and poetry’’ (Amari, Storia 1:143).≤∑ There were,
after that, heroic ages (1:145), when chivalrous heroes—Muhammad for
Ibn Khaldun, the princes for Vico—instituted the law. Finally came
human and democratic ages, in which natural equity naturally reigned
in the free commonwealth. After that, the cycle began once again. Invari-
ably, the return of barbarity coincided for Amari with a newly formed
ruling class betraying the people. In the Vespro, a revolution ‘‘born from
the people’’ had become monarchic restoration (the dynastic succession
of the Aragons to the Anjou) ‘‘as soon as the aristocracy infiltrated it’’
(2:479–80). In the case of Christianity, not altogether di√erently, an
initially popular fight against ‘‘the lively strength of principality, aristoc-
racy, and learned classes’’ came to a halt as soon as a new hierarchy—new
principality, aristocracy, and learned classes—was formed from within
the same once-popular church: ‘‘As the Sicilian church grew old, a hier-
archy emerged from it. Hence, the ecclesiastical order shaped itself in the
image of the empire’s administrative order. And we clearly see, by the
beginning of the fifth century, that the bishop from Rome exercises
metropolitan power on the island’’ (Storia 1:123).
Realigned with Byzantium, the church restored social hierarchies;
landed property reemerged; Sicily, which had freed itself from its subjec-
tion to metropolitan Byzantium through the church, became again a
margin of the metropolitan center of Rome; and the old Byzantine
estates were shared among the church’s high o≈cers.
Through Vico and Ibn Khaldun, a first tenet of European historiogra-
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phy, progress, was thus denied. At any rate, it was in this Christian Sicily,
ordered in the image of the empire, hierarchically divided, and preyed
on by the new barbarians in papal robes, that the Arabs came to inaugu-
rate a new heroic age that would, slowly but surely, lead up to the ricorso,
a new cycle of democracy. It would have been ‘‘a frightening challenge to
Christian Europe’’ (Mack Smith 1:3). Christian Europe, however, was too
busy to notice: ‘‘It was busy arguing a very subtle and otiose theologi-
cal question: if the works of God made man in Jesus Christ were led by
two wills—one divine, one human—or by a single will, which Mono-
telites called ‘teandric,’ meaning divine-and-human-at-the-same-time’’
(Amari, Storia 1:188).
Between Christian distraction and the vagueness of Arab chronicling
(1:195), the only thing certain is that the Arabs must have made it to Sic-
ily on a morning, approximately between October 31, 649, and June 17,
653:≤∏
At any rate, the extant writings of Pope Martin and the accounts of the
Pontifical Book that are not unacceptable by criticism, confirm without
doubt the incursion, which must have happened between the end of
October, 649, and June 17, 653, or actually between 650 and 652, because
the first and last year should be eliminated, since it is not credible that a
thousand men would venture on a naval expedition in a season other
than the summer. And the year 652 sounds quite convincing. (1:194)
The battle which took place on that morning without a certain date had
to be the first in a long series, which, after more or less one century and a
half, would finally give Sicily to the Muslims. Their victory would even-
tually free a ‘‘people whose mind su√ered between the chains of the
monks and those of the emperor, and whose body under the whip of
emperor and militaries. In one word, Sicily had become Byzantine in
and out; sick with the phthisis of a decaying empire. So, when we look
at the poor conditions of this people, we cannot complain about the
Muslim conquest, which shook and renewed Sicily a bit’’ (Amari, Biblio-
teca 349).
The similitude between this Muslim conquest and the history of the
vesper is worth noticing. Once again, canonical historiography had read
the Muslim invasion of Sicily as the story of a courtly plot (Amari, Storia
1:367) aimed at nothing more than a dynastic succession (this time with
some more exotic characters). Sicilians, now as always, were incapable of
Montesquieu’s freedom and only gave themselves to this or that ruler in
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some kind of historical variation of the game of musical chairs. Also
Arabs, incidentally, were incapable of real conquests according to the
canonical historiography that Amari had consulted: history, after all,
was the history of European aristocracy and principalities determining
the fate of the world. Once again, Amari refuted these canonical inter-
pretations and proposed one in which popular resentment, not courtly
or invisible hands, prepared the conditions for the new Muslim regime
to come. What Amari saw in Sicily at the eve of the Arab invasion was a
true popular ferment that determined the fall of Byzantium’s rule.
Arab domination, in turn, became a continuous alternation, according
to Ibn Khaldun’s and Vico’s cycles, of barbaric rule (Ibrahim ibn Ahmad,
875–901), popular insurrections (the Palermo uprisings of 912, 913, and
1019), and attempts, like Ibn Qurhub’s in 913, ‘‘to order Sicily into a
legitimate and stable government, with all the liberty that was conceivable
for orthodox Muslims’’ (Amari, Storia 2:175). After that, it is yet more
cycles of counterrevolutions (916), barbarity (the sack of Palermo in 917),
and joys. The latter climaxed, in the year 351 of the hegira (962 a.d.), in
the Great Circumcision staged with due pomp and circumstance in the
public square of Palermo: ‘‘Starting with the son and brothers of the emir
Ahmad, and then on from the nobles to the lower classes, reaching a total
of fifteen thousand circumcised boys’’ (2:295–96).
The Arabs, too, then fall into that pattern of universal history that
Amari had drawn from Vico and Ibn Khaldun. The fact would be in
itself relevant, but what it actually signals is that history, in this case, no
longer coincides with, or is limited to, Europe. In European history,
‘‘Islam is confined to the past and qualified as ‘oriental’ which means
antihistoricistic, while the West proves through this acquisition its entry
into modernity, a lay modernity based on historical becoming’’ (Scarcia
Amoretti 172). In Amari’s Storia, instead, the ‘‘Orientals’’ are agents and
subjects of history too. In fact, when compared with the Byzantine-
Christian cycle, the Arab one seems definitely more fruitful for the
history of Sicily: ‘‘As the population grew, and the wars of conquest
ceased, learned studies began to grow, and even to put some leaves and
fruits. Research was favored also by a more familiar contact with the
vanquished population, by a more liberal education and doctrine that
the African Muslims had brought, and by the example set by the jurists
sent to order the judicial system in Sicily’’ (2:253). And, ah!, what won-
ders these Arabs brought to the desolate island that had once been of
the pope! Far from being the barbarians depicted by many, and despite
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the Montesquieu-like ‘‘scorching climate and a dried-out soil’’ (Amari,
Storia 1:134) from which they came, Amari’s Arabs land in Sicily as the
bearers of civilization. They give Europe, contrary to any theory of Euro-
pean di√usionism, and long before Montesquieu’s celebrated Franks
(who, after all, brought only Charles to Sicily), a spirit of the law, the
sharia or Islamic law, ‘‘of the same kind as the European one of many
centuries later’’ (1:152).
In Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah (1377), which translates as Introduction
to History, Amari had found, first and foremost, a way to correct Mon-
tesquieu’s climatology. In the second prefatory discussion to the Muqad-
dimah, Ibn Khaldun, following Aristotle through Averroës and Ptolemy,
had divided the known world into seven zones—iqlîm, from Greek
klima, or climate—going from north to south. The Mediterranean, in
the fourth and median zone, blessed by a temperate climate, was the very
Aristotelian middle between nature and civilization:
The north and the south represent opposite extremes of cold and heat. It
necessarily follows that there must be a gradual decrease from the ex-
tremes towards the center, which, thus, is moderate. The fourth zone (i.e.
the Mediterranean) is the most temperate cultivated region . . . . There-
fore, the sciences, the crafts, the buildings, the clothing, the foodstu√s,
the fruits, and even the animal that comes into being in the [Mediterra-
nean] are distinguished by their temperate character. The human inhabi-
tants of these zones are more temperate in their bodies, colour, character
qualities, and general conditions . . . . They avoid intemperance quite
generally in all their conditions. Such are the inhabitants of the Maghrib,
of Syria, of the two Iraqs . . . as well as of Spain . . . . The Iraq and Syria are
directly in the middle and therefore are the most temperate of all. (Ibn
Khaldun 1:167–68)
Although Ibn Khaldun’s geometric sense of the world had omitted to
mention another country ‘‘in the middle,’’ Sicily, this was enough for
Amari to declare that in the Mediterranean, not in the north, was to be
found the true cradle of civilization.
Reminiscent of the southernist polemics that had crossed Italy in the
late eighteenth century, and which I have recalled in chapter 2, Amari
summons up Juan Andrés’s Arabist theory and adds that a genius of their
language (Amari, Storia 2:610) made philology and poetry flower among
the Arabs (1:147, 2:526). Coming from Asia, Africa, and Al-Andalus, the
Muslims gave Sicily, therefore, the honor of developing a new form of
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troubadour poetry, rhymed and sung, that would later ‘‘infiltrate the
whole of Europe’’ (3:729–31).≤π
Amari, in fact, is quite close to believing that all sciences flourished
with the Muslims of Sicily in an age when they were getting lost in the
rest of medieval Europe. For instance, ‘‘as the darkness of barbarism fell,
geography became idiotic in Europe, like every other science; it was
reduced to shapeless scribbles, to summaries of summaries’’ (3:683).
Idrisi’s Garden of Civilization, with its most compelling descriptions of
Sicily, was ‘‘the first book worthy of the name ‘general geography’ ’’
(1:49) ever published in modern Europe. More important, Ibn Khaldun,
‘‘the most ancient writer of the philosophy of history, properly speaking’’
(1:84), gave Europe that first theory of history.
Amari saw his book on the Muslims of Sicily not simply as local
history but as a veritable history of the origin of modern Europe. As he
later explained to the German Orientalist Friedrich Arnold Brockhaus,
‘‘the age of Muslim Sicily was one of the causes of the rebirth of sciences
and letters in the whole of Europe’’ (Amari, Carteggio 119). In this regard,
‘‘the Muslim wars in Sicily from the seventh through the twelfth cen-
turies can be divided into two orders of events: one is the material for a
local history, but not the other’’ (Amari, Storia 1:29). In other words, if
the conquest of Sicily was material for local history, the civilization of
Muslim Sicily, on the other hand, was material for nothing less than a
universal storia dell’umanità—a history of humankind (1:178).
Besides giving modern Europe its arts and sciences, its first geography
and philosophy of history, Muslim Sicily, as opposed to Montesquieu’s
Franks, introduced in the continent a new spirit of the law, the ‘‘basis of
any civilization’’ and the very cause of ‘‘European civilization’’ in par-
ticular (2:255). The law, in fact, had such devout followers among the
Muslims of Sicily that, for instance, ‘‘professor Abù Said Luqman ibn
Yùsuf, martyr of exegesis, is said to have died of a wound he grew on his
chest from the corner of the desk where he used to write his commen-
taries’’ (2:257). No wonder jurisprudence had in Islam ‘‘greater civic and
literary influence than in either the heathen or the Christian West’’
(2:255)!
Besides greater influence, the law had in Islam ‘‘wider borders’’ (2:255)
than in Europe, as it covered not only the (national) citizen and the
powerful but the foreigner and the weak as well: ‘‘A Qurayshi [i.e.,
someone belonging to one the leading families of Mecca] had taken
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away, with no qualms, all the goods of a foreign merchant. Many gen-
erous people, among whom Muhammad, still twenty-five years old,
gathered and tried to devise ways to protect, in the city of Mecca, the
weak, the foreigner, free men and slaves—anybody from anybody else,
from whatever family they were’’ (1:152). It is from this law protecting the
weak from the powerful, not from the French Revolution with its rights
of man caring for citizens and private property only,≤∫ that true democ-
racy and freedom, suggests Amari, originated: ‘‘It was social democracy,
as we would call it today. Its form fit quite well the fundamental princi-
ples of Islam: equality and fraternity. It was the realization, rare in the
world, of a sovereign people’’ (1:171).
Amari’s thesis is clear: Sicily has nothing to learn from the northern
nations and has known liberté, fraternité, égalité from Islam—long be-
fore any other European country. The first problem with such a thesis
was, of course, that it ran counter to the historiographic doxa: that the
revolution of 1789, namely, ‘‘was really the first time that a state, em-
bodying the entity called ‘the nation,’ issuing from a clean political break
with the past, produced a novus ordo seculorum: democracy or the gov-
ernment of the people’’ (Englund 89). Such doxa, for Amari, who might
as well have had in mind Walter Benjamin’s ‘‘Theses on the Philosophy
of History,’’ was but an act of suppression that the victorious Norman
chroniclers had perpetrated against the vanquished Muslims: along with
a ‘‘true and grim religious persecution’’ of the Arabs (Amari, Storia
3:444–47), Amari wrote, Christian chroniclers had operated another,
‘‘concealed and slow’’ form of persecution (3:541): they had cleansed
European history from the Arab presence.
In short, to argue that Sicily did not need the benevolent authority of
Europe to know democracy, historiography was, at best, insu≈cient. At
most, it was the obstacle. To remove such obstacle, and recuperate what
had been cleansed and concealed by history, Amari thus resolved to
supplement ‘‘those few studies that Europeans have done so far’’ about
Sicily (3:863) with nothing less than the work of ‘‘our . . . Orientalists’’
(2:17): Orientalism was called on to compensate for the deficiency of
historiography; Orientalism, not history, singled out in Islamic law—
a mixture of prescriptions from the Koran, pronouncements of the
Prophet, and corollaries of the doctors—the very reason for an Arab (as
opposed to a European) propensity for liberté, fraternité, égalité. Orien-
talism, moreover, could be capable of demolishing the whole edifice of a
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European philosophy of history—with its prejudices, presumptions, and
half truths—in which freedom was theorized as a ‘‘climate’’ frankly and
ultimately unattainable for Sicily.
Through Orientalism, finally, those same words—liberty, fraternity,
equality, democracy—which had defined modern Europe since at least
the French Revolution and which had, in Mazzini’s expression, the
‘‘sense given to these words in France’’—could acquire a new and original
meaning. Relying on the archive of the Oriental writers themselves, the
Storia not only erected Muslims Sicily as the origin of those concepts but
retheorized them as well. Montesquieu, for instance, had famously made
freedom—the pillar of Europe’s identity—coincide with the ‘‘individual
right to own the property that civil laws give him’’ (Oeuvres 2:768). The
European notion of freedom, if not ‘‘entirely derived from this concept of
possession . . . [was] powerfully shaped by it’’ (Macpherson 3). Freedom
as freedom to property had been the basis for the two revolutions that
had shaped the very identity of the modern West in the eighteenth
century—the French (Barnave) and the American (R. McKeon). The
Declaration of the Rights of Man, cited here in Thomas Paine’s transla-
tion, summarized the principle in its third article: ‘‘The end of all politi-
cal associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible
rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property’’ (115).
Amari, on the contrary, saw an inescapable contradiction between the
right to liberty and the right to property. Freedom began for him with
Islamic law’s kind of social democracy—with the alienation of property,
that is, onto the figure of the transcendent that grants the true rights of
man. Human beings are not the owners of natural resources. God has
simply entrusted them with a ‘‘viceregency’’ (khilafa) of his creation
(see Moosa 196). Summarizing the point that Ibn Khaldun had made in
the twelfth discussion (on Islamic jurisprudence) of his introduction,
Amari made community, cooperation, and shared property—that is,
asabiyah (for a discussion of the term, see Baali)—the pillars of the
perfect Islamic society: ‘‘For sure, since Muslims admitted the existence
of a Creator, they had to make Him lord of his own creations; but they
thought He had left the land, and also water, air, fire, and light for
universal use to all his creatures—not only to Muhammad, and even less
so to the caliphs that were his successors’’ (Amari, Storia 2:18–19). The
palimpsest of John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government is still readable
here: ‘‘If it be di≈cult to make out ‘property’ upon a supposition that
God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common, it is impos-
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sible that any man but one universal monarch should have any ‘prop-
erty’ upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs
in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity’’ (Locke 5:115). Yet
Locke had concluded that ‘‘to make use of [property] to the best advan-
tage of life and convenience’’ God had let individuals ‘‘appropriate’’
nature for the benefit ‘‘of any particular men’’ (5:115–16); Amari, instead,
left property public, as the very foundation of a sort of collective state.
This did not mean, incidentally, that the Arabs lacked the famous idea of
property, which just as famously Locke (like Rousseau after him) had
conceived of as the beginning of civil society. It meant, rather, that the
Prophet ‘‘tempered with wisdom and sometimes with humanity the
exercise of that beastlike right’’ (Amari, Storia 2:21).≤Ω
Whereas Locke had posed an unenforceable limit to private property,
coinciding with a vague notion of personal need—‘‘as much as any one
can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils’’ (5:117)—Amari
celebrated instead the Islamic system of taxation that redistributed the
benefits of private usage among civil society as a collective entity:
Koran and Sunna recognize the full property of cultivated land, as they
recognize the use property of any other assets. Property is taxable: ten
percent on the produce of the land, and two and a half percent on cattle
and other assets. Muhammad had the sublime idea of calling this tax
sadaqât, that is to say, goodwill o√er; and zakâh, which is translatable as
‘‘purification’’: purification, he meant, of the sin that the rich would be
judged for if he were to let the poor die of hunger, and the State treasury
shrink. (2:19)
It was a kind of purification, indeed, which could redeem society from
that very Marxian original sin that is accumulation. At any rate, once
community rights overruled private property rights, as Amari suggested
through his reading of Islamic law, the rights of man as formulated by
Paine seemed now less universal and more the historical product of
Western needs and circumstances. Aside, or even against them, another
kind of rights of man, drawn from Islamic law, could in fact be imagined
(similar controversies are recently addressed by Arkoun 106; Moosa;
An-Na’Im).
If freedom was the essence of Europe, this essence, first of all, came
from the Orient. More important, from the Orient came also the neces-
sity to redefine that very essence of Europe, and to disentangle it from
the structures of private property. In other words, Europe, like freedom,
210 CHAPTER 5
could now be retheorized anew through the archives of Orientalism. As a
matter of fact, not only freedom but also the notion of identity—be it a
European or an Italian identity—had now to be retheorized starting
from ‘‘Oriental’’ Sicily. If a politics of identity—Sicilian national identity;
identity of Sicily with the norms of Europe—had been the goal of the
Vesper, the Storia, instead, seemed now weary of exactly that notion.
Just as the Normans had forced the populations of Sicily to Christian-
ize, says Amari, their historiography had Europeanized Sicily: a sense of
ethnic identity, in other words, was thrust on Sicily; the island’s pluri-
lingual (Amari, Storia 1:322–24), plurireligious (3:541–43), and pluri-
ethnic (2:458) vicissitudes were erased, along with any trace of its Arab
and Jewish history. The memory of the Oriental past, at best, was kept as
a memento of a fundamental Sicilian imperfection that only European
intervention, in the form of blonde warriors ‘‘whose language, complex-
ion, and social order confirmed their Germanic origin’’ (3:18), could
be capable of correcting. Sicily, corrupted and de-Europeanized by the
Muslims, was at the receiving end of history—the history of freedom
that, as in Montesquieu, was di√used from a Germanic north. To under-
stand the forcefulness of this rhetoric of Europeanization concocted by
early Norman historiography, and to imagine the resilience of such a
rhetorical unconscious in the historiography of the island that spans
across the centuries, it is enough to remember what Rosario Romeo, the
authoritative historian of Sicily, would still write in 1950: ‘‘During the
High Middle Ages, Sicily remained almost completely extraneous to the
life of the West. What operated, instead, was . . . Arab influence . . . . Only
with the Normans’ intervention Sicily was reconquered to Europe; in
fact, . . . the reconquest was achieved only some centuries after the
Saracens were expelled from the island’’ (Risorgimento 11).
Amari’s interest in making of Sicily a proper subject in the history of
the West, and of relegitimating it to Europe, however, had ended with
the Vesper. The stake was now higher: Sicily was part of Europe and
universal history not because it has been reconquered to it, but, simply,
because it was. The original laboratory of social democracy, the experi-
ment of some kind of exchequer of Muslim Sicily, the island had little to
envy or to learn: it required to be part of universal history not because it
adhered to some putative European standards, but because of its unique
history and its di√erence.
Although Amari’s Sicily declared itself ready to join the Italian revolu-
tion, and although it sounded eager to enter Europe as a free subject—
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one that had known freedom since the Arab conquest—Sicily did not
join as sameness. Like Mazzini in ‘‘The Present Conditions and the
Future of Europe’’ of 1852, Amari also believed that ‘‘the map of Europe
must be redrawn’’ (Mazzini, Opere 2:521)—at the very least, to include
Sicily as subject, not object, of continental politics. Yet whereas Mazzini
believed that European ‘‘unity is necessary,’’ and that ‘‘unity of faith, of
mission, of intents’’ had to be reached within Europe (Opere 2:545),
Amari’s redrawing of the map shunned any such concept of unity: ‘‘Con-
trary to the Byzantine society that left Sicily, the Muslim one that took its
place brought elements of activity, progress, and discord’’ (Storia 2:1). It
was this element of discord that a theory of Europe had to be made to
accept: discord in the sense of Attilio Scuderi’s ‘‘physiological cultural
conflict,’’ which is not the intolerance of ignorance, but the ‘‘only way
to construct multiple identities.’’ The Storia thus introduced, as facts,
the multiethnic presence of Muslim Sicily as an element of discord in
the Europe of standards. Methodologically, Orientalism, supplementing
history, sounded a quite discordant note in the otherwise monotonous
theorizations of Europe’s freedom. In the end, Orientalism, not history,
could make of Sicily a part of Europe, and claim, at the same time, its
di√erence. Or could it?
A Sicilian Muqaddimah
The day Amari woke up to find himself an Orientalist, he was an exile
in Paris. His Orientalist education had been suspiciously French and
imperial—under ‘‘the living legacy,’’ as Said would have it, of Antoine
Isaac Silvestre de Sacy and his disciples.≥≠ Noël Des Vergers’s 1841 French
translation had introduced Amari to Ibn Khaldun; the classes of Joseph
Toussaint Reinaud, the successor of Sacy at the École des Langues Orien-
tales Vivantes, to Arabic; and the Bibliothèque Impériale to the archives.
Yet the Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia had very little intention of con-
tinuing any legacy at all—nor had its author the usual timidity of the
parvenu in a new academic field. While declaring himself ‘‘forced,’’ with
sarcastic confidence, to having to reject the usual authorities (Amari,
Storia 1:18), Amari entered the field of Oriental studies with the clear
intent of subverting it—the same way he, ‘‘hero of ideas,’’ had been
wanting to subvert the Bourbon monarchy for years. The intention was
not lost on his readers. The Italian Orientalist Isidoro Carino, in a review
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for the Archivio storico siciliano, 1873, soon noticed that ‘‘Amari rejects
the authority of this writer [Rampolli, author of the Muslim Annals],
which on the contrary had been fundamental for the critical works of his
predecessors; he lends authority, instead, to more than eighty Arabs,
whom he studied in their printed works and in the manuscripts they
have left in various libraries; he then compares them to Western chroni-
clers’’ (224–25). Pace Carino, what Amari was doing was nothing more
than what many Orientalists and historians suppose they ought to be
doing: work the archives and compare the sources. He had announced
quite candidly: ‘‘I compared the texts [of Western scholars] with the
original codes; I collected historical fragments, geographical descrip-
tions, biographies, and both the prose and the poems of the Sicilian
Arabs, or at least the titles of the works that had been lost—all that had
been written in Arabic’’ (Storia 1:19). But of course one does not need to
beg the authority of Said to realize that Amari was really not doing what
Orientalists used to do: for the latter, the Muslim was a document, not a
historian. A Muslim voice had been silenced by European Orientalism as
the voice of an exotic Other so alien to the logic and rigor of (European)
scholarship that it could only be studied and catalogued like the flora
and fauna, but not engaged in conversation. In short, using Oriental
sources as historical subjects, as writers (not merely objects) of history, or
as a perspective on historical facts, was nothing short of a theoretical
revolution for Amari and his public.
Just as European historiography had obscured the Arab as an accident
and obstacle in the giddy progress of universal history, so had Oriental-
ism obscured the Muslims of Sicily as something that could disturb the
predetermined image of absolute di√erence and exoticism that any Mus-
lim was supposed to embody. For Orientalism, in short, Muslim Europe
could not have possibly ever been: ‘‘Despite all the intellectual culture
the Muslim colonies of Spain and Italy contributed to European civiliza-
tion, it has happened that their history has long remained obscure and
neglected, as if it were the history of barbarian people’’ (Amari, Storia
1:1). As Carino noticed for us once again, Amari, after supplementing
history’s deficiency with the knowledge of Orientalism, was now operat-
ing a ‘‘complete rewriting’’ of Orientalism itself (277).
In Amari’s privileging of the ‘‘eighty Arab writers’’ there was, there-
fore, not only a retheorization of historiography but also a retheoriza-
tion of Orientalism in which the Arab had undergone a quite radical
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transformation—from object of study to subject of history, from docu-
ment to speaker. The authorities that Amari was challenging, in the last
analysis, were those of instituted Orientalism itself. If, so far, the Orient,
the Oriental, and ‘‘Orientalism belonged . . . to European scholarship’’
(Said, Orientalism 130), it started looking as if Europe, for Amari, could
now belong to Arab historiography.
As I reach this felicitously subalternist conclusion, I would like to take
advantage of the sense of accomplishment I have thus acquired and go
back to that murkier and most ill-defined morning between the years 649
and 653 when the first Muslim battleship approached Sicily. This is an
important morning, quite obviously, as it stages a first encounter between
Sicilians and Muslims, between Europe and the Orient. But it is a morn-
ing of which we still know next to nothing: How was this first inter-
cultural experience? Was it love at first sight? Certainly not on European
accounts: ‘‘European memoirs all agree that they irrupted with great
fury’’ (Amari, Storia 1:216). Benedictine monks, exaggerating as usual,
‘‘made the Muslims invade Sicily one century before Muhammad, and
savagely kill Saint Placid along with thirty monks and nuns who lived in
his monastery in Messina’’ (1:220). No doubt, according to Amari, we
should not rely on European history. And we cannot rely on Orientalist
scholarship either. On the other hand, Arab memoirs say—nothing. They
do not really seem concerned with what was seen, from Muslim eyes, as
yet another military triumph. In a variation of the Catholic ‘‘tell the sin
but not the sinner,’’ they sometimes mention a victory, but not the
vanquished (1:217), so that, were we to rely on them, we would never be
sure whether we were reading a history of Tripoli or of Syracuse.
What Amari figures out is that Sicily, in truth, was not a major goal for
the Muslims. At most, after the conquest of Spain (after 711), they looked
at Sicily as a potential bridge with the African colonies. Here, some very
pesky Berbers were keeping the Muslim war machine so busy, and the
Arab chroniclers so focused—one relentless insurrection after another—
that any conquest of Sicily could neither be accomplished nor narrated
for a few centuries still. Even long after 652, when Byzantine Sicilians and
Muslims seemed more and more divided by religion, and kept together
by commerce only (1:359); when warfare between the two nations be-
came a daily a√air; when the possibility to colonize the island, taking
advantage of the people’s unhappiness with Byzantium, seemed close at
hand—even then a conquest of Sicily was not on Arabs’ minds:
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In early 827, the Muslim forces discussed the utility of a Sicilian cam-
paign. When another faction proposed to raid Sicily without remaining
there and creating colonies, one Sahnûn ibn Qâdim got up to dissent:
‘‘How far is Sicily from Italy? he asked. ‘‘You can go back and forth two or
three times from dawn to sunset,’’ was the answer. ‘‘And between Sicily
and Africa?’’ And the answer: ‘‘One day and one night travel.’’ ‘‘Oh, even
if I had wings, I wouldn’t fly to that island,’’ concluded Sahnûn, punning
on his name that is given in Africa to a very cunning bird. At any rate, the
witticism did not work. The majority, speaking in one voice, deliberated
in favor of the war. But it had to be a war for the booty, not for a colonial
conquest. (1:390)
Not only was Sicily nowhere to be found on the Muslims’ strategic plans;
the battering of Sicilians was not in their chronicles either:
In the end, Sicily endured an incursion, of which we only know it hap-
pened in the year 204 of the hegira (between June 28, 819, and June 16,
820); that the attack was led by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allâh ibn al-Aglab,
cousin of the Aghlabite prince Ziyadat Allâh; and that the Muslims, once
they made enough prisoners, went back to Africa. It must have been,
then, just a raid, or the venting of religious rage in some kind of punitive
mission. (1:359)
So, comme un boucher, like a butcher, with no particular hatred or
intention but a vague desire to ‘‘vent religious rage,’’ these Arabs, these
future saviors and bearers of a new heroic age, would hit Sicilians, take
them prisoners in Africa, and enter barely enough information in their
chronicles to satisfy ordinary administration.
When the Muslims finally do conquer Syracuse in 827, helped by ‘‘a
disgruntled general in the Sicilian army who led a mutiny and asked for
help from the Aghlabids of Kairouan’’ (Mack Smith 1:3), the noncha-
lance of Arab chroniclers is only comparable to the partisanship of the
Europeans. The latter, led by Tommaso Fazzello, a Dominican monk
who wrote in 1560 the most voluminous Sicilian chronicle ever—De
rebus siculis decades duae—were certainly eager to highlight the infidels’
ontological inhumanity. They reported with self-righteous indignation,
for instance, of how ‘‘Halbi (that’s how they misspelled names and con-
fuse chronology) would have sent forty thousand Saracens to Sicily, led
by Fazzello, upon landing in Mazara burned his own ships, and con-
quered Selinunte, captured its citizens, and, to give an example to the
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whole of Sicily, cooked them in copper cauldrons. As evidence of such
events, Fazzello mentions Muslim annals and Leo the African, but does
not explain who wrote, who translated, and who published such annals’’
(Amari, Storia 1:360–61). Leo the African, on the other hand, writing his
memoirs at the court of Pope Leo X, to whom he had been given as a gift
by some pirates from Djerba, was not the most reliable source either.
Part of it was that he had to please Christendom, to which religion he
had recently converted (until he had enough of popes, Eucharists, and
holy cities, converted back to Islam, and disappeared from Europe for-
ever). Even if he had never written a line about the cooked people of
Selinunte, his writings had the newly convert kind of bias. Worse, the
only documents he could find in the pope’s library were in fact Christian
ones—hardly an alternative point of view to European histories. To sup-
plement those documents, the well-learned Leo only had his Muslim
memories—the ones from before the pirates, the abduction, and the
holy water. And this is what really annoyed Amari about the African: in
those memories, much like in Arab memoirs, there seemed to be no
place for the conquest of Sicily. Here is Amari:
It is likely that Leo, mixing up clear memories with murkier speculations,
must have heard the name of Alcamo while in Rome. Or perhaps he
heard it from the Berbers. In any case, he must have put that name
together with that of Assad—the only name he was certain had some-
thing to do with Sicily, so little had he read about it. As proof of the fact
he knew that little about the Sicilian conquest, su≈ce it to read the short
paragraph where he mentions it en passant. (1:363)
These ‘‘few lines’’ that Leo knew about the conquest of Sicily were not so
much proof of the African’s scholarly negligence as of the fact that there
was next to nothing in the whole of the Arab chronicles, the ta’rikh, the
histories, or whatever you want to call them, about the conquest of Sicily.
Sure enough, Amari the historian compares imperial compilations
with Arab sources (this was his trademark Orientalist retheorization of
historiography, after all). He even finds Oriental records more ‘‘genuine’’
(1:373) than the European ones. And yet, even forgiving the Orientals for
relying sometimes on second- and thirdhand sources (1:376–77), or for
exaggerating things ‘‘with the excuse that ‘so is said,’ ’’ (1:377) how can
one ever excuse the sated nonchalance with which they mistake the day
that forever changed Sicily and Europe—and the blood, and death, and
Sicilian su√ering—for ‘‘yet another one’’?
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Our heart was trembling—an Arab chronicler writes—trembling for old
captain Assad, when, after praying, he suddenly turned to us: ‘‘These are
the same barbarians you have found in the northern coast of Africa. They
are your slaves! Do not fear them, oh Muslims!’’ So, he ran down the
middle of the battlefield, and found himself soon caught up with the
enemy. He came out of it all drenched in blood, blood dripping from the
spear, blood through the arm, blood down to the armpit—so tells us the
narrator, astounded by the bravery of the old warrior! The bravery of all
other Muslims, courage being such an ordinary virtue among them, is
never mentioned. All the chroniclers have to say is that this was a day like
hundreds of others: heavy fighting, God on our side, great Muslim con-
quest, excellent loot, exemplary massacre of the Infidels. (1:398)
The Muslim conquest of Sicily, the event that Amari wants to inscribe in
the annals of universal history, is but ‘‘a day like hundreds of others’’!
The whole chronicles of the conquest repeat this gesture of marginaliza-
tion over and over again: ‘‘Byzantine chroniclers say nothing of the
event, for fear of shame; the only record is preserved by the Arabs, but
brief and vague’’ (1:469). From a di√erent perspective hinging on the
Arabocentrism of someone who ‘‘condemns as physical and moral vices
all characteristics that are unusual to him’’ (2:353), the geographer Ibn
Hawqal ‘‘pontificates: Palermo has no intelligent people, no learned
men, no wits, no religion. There are no dumber people in the world,
nor more odd. They are utterly uninterested in virtue, and quite eager
to learn more vices’’ (2:351). But he does not even take the time to
understand—in Amari’s historicist variation of Ludwig Andreas Feuer-
bach’s ‘‘Der Mensch ist was er isst’’ (A person is what he eats)—that ‘‘at
the roots of so much iniquity is the fact that they are reduced to eat
uncooked onions, lunch through supper, whether they are rich or poor’’
(2:351).
Ibn Khaldun does not do better, either, writing five centuries later,
when he overlooks again the exploitation and poverty of the Sicilians
and remembers one abuse ‘‘with hurry, as customary’’ (Amari, Storia
1:199), another massacre ‘‘briefly and vaguely’’ (1:440n). So, ‘‘lucky the
one who can find a reference to the situation of the people of Sicily
during the Muslim domination’’ (2:33)!
One starts understanding the frustration of Amari: the history that he
is trying to rescue from obliteration has been caught between the rock of
European falsifications and the hard place of Arab satiety. It is a history
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lost between two dominances—the old Arab and the new European
one—that, to draw from Ranajit Guha’s arguably parallel experience,
ruled Sicily without hegemony: their histories, in other words, did not
need to create any consensus about either domination in Sicilian con-
sciousness (see Guha). The question is: How to write a history of such
consciousness lost in the memory of all who conquered? How to write
the story of ‘‘a bunch of men who, after all, could devote themselves to
culture for one century or so, were subjugated as soon as they would
start harvesting their first intellectual fruits, and then persecuted and
cast away the next century. What is astounding is that, after all this, little
bits of literary memories of them exist at all’’ (Amari, Storia 2:527). And
how to find, in those ‘‘little bits of literary memories,’’ the traces for a
history with no center and no ethnos, made by ‘‘the ferment of the many
heterogeneous elements that together formed the people of Sicily, and
above all of Palermo: many races; Islam and latent or living remnants of
Christianity; unequal civil rights, wealth and misery, war and industry;
tower of Babel where arrogance, resentment, abjection, and endless so-
cial sores would grow’’ (2:353)?
All these questions, once the Orientalist supplement had revealed itself
to be insu≈cient, had to remain unanswered by Amari. His Storia dei
Musulmani di Sicilia was, then, more than a history, the narrative of an
impossibility. The Mediterranean perspective on universal history that
Amari’s Orientalism had introduced certainly looked at things from a
di√erent angle than the one of hegemonic European historiography.
Sicily could now even be claimed as a discordant part of Europe. And
even the concept of Europe, at this point, could be retheorized again, to
make it not the antithesis of the Orient, but an integral part of its history
and civilization. This was thus a good story to tell. Yet even such a
Mediterranean perspective could hardly give a history and an image to
subaltern Sicily. It could, at its very best, summarize its disappearance
between Europe, on the one hand, and the Orient, on the other. ‘‘I
conclude,’’ Amari wrote at the close of his book, ‘‘moved by an irresist-
ible urge to look into obscurity’’ (4:921). As if the history of Europe from
the perspective of the pigs, in the end, could not possibly be told.

Notes
1 The Discovery of Europe
1. In Santiago, in the north of Spain, Catholic resistance against Islam was
formed around the twelfth century. The Christian Reconquest of Iberia
made the cult of Saint James (Santiago) and the pilgrimage to his site a major
symbol of Christian mobilization against the east. After the final defeat of
the Moors in 1492, the symbol of Santiago Matamoros (Saint James the
Moors Killer) became the figure of national unity for Catholic Spain under
Ferdinand and Isabelle. While proposals to include Christianity as the reli-
gion of Europe abound around the project of a European constitution, it
might be worth noticing that ‘‘for the Council of Europe, what is now a sign-
posted routeway—the Camino de Santiago—becomes a symbol of European
cultural itinerary, a symbol of the ideal of European integration’’ (Gra-
ham 26).
2. By this I mean a post-Bismarckian kind of political science. For Bis-
marck, we remember, ‘‘anyone who speaks of Europe is wrong.’’ Peregrine
Horden and Nicholas Purcell suggest that this assertion, scribbled on the
back of a telegram form 1876, only meant ‘‘that designations such as ‘Europe’
are empty and arbitrary’’ (15).
3. ‘‘Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common
sense, or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very
things, and as if naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model.
It tends to suspect or repress anything that bends, overdetermines, or even
questions’’ (Derrida, Other Heading 55).
4. History is understood here in the sense of Marc Bloch’s ‘‘historical
semantics’’ (Craft) and Antonio Gramsci’s philological ‘‘history of terminol-
ogy,’’ as ‘‘a study of words [that] can help us understand the very limit of
words, and avoid that metaphors materialize themselves, almost mechani-
cally, [into truth statements]’’ (Gramsci 85).
5. This is a theory, incidentally, that became instrumental in the eigh-
teenth century to claim not so much a Christian, but a Frankish origin of
Europe: Charles Martel’s Europe of Poitiers, maturing in Charles’s grand-
son’s, Charlemagne, Holy Roman Empire, would be, according to such the-
ory, the origin, kernel, and truest essence of Europe. In chapter 3 of this
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book, I will discuss the way in which Juan Andrés will question the Franco-
centrism of this theory and will propose another with Arab Spain at its
center.
6. Or, in the pseudo Aretino’s less orthodox version: ‘‘Per Europa godere,
in bue cangiossi / Giove, che di chiavarla avea desio; / e la sua deità posta in
oblio, / in più bestiali forme trasformossi’’ (Aretino 189).
7. If we accept Momigliano’s theory—that since the Greeks started talking
about Europe, they must have also begun it—then it follows the recurrent
claim that ‘‘the forerunner of European civilization . . . is to be found in the
Hellenic world’’ (e.g., Likaszewski 40). Not that such claim, trite as it may
sound, will (or should) be without contention: as we will see by the end of
this introduction, such a Mediterranean beginning of Europe (Said’s ‘‘A’’)
will be quite inconvenient when the objective is to argue (B) a more north-
ern essence of Europeanness on the part of, say, the French philosophes of the
eighteenth century. For that, Robert Bartlett’s Charlemagne (or Bernard
Lewis’s Charles Martel) will undoubtedly do much better.
8. Edith Hall identifies Aeschylus’s Persians as ‘‘the first unmistakable
file in the archive of Orientalism, the discourse by which the European
imagination has dominated Asia ever since by conceptualizing its inhabi-
tants as defeated, luxurious, emotional, cruel, and always as dangerous’’
(99). Thomas Harrison warns, however, that ‘‘the assumption of a continu-
ous tradition of the Orient—and a corresponding idea of Europe—may
indeed play into the hands of those who ascribe very di√erent values to East
and West, who believe . . . that . . . the Western community is nevertheless . . .
called upon to lead the world’’ (42). It should be remarked, however, that
Aeschylus does not use the term Europe himself and that such discussions, in
the last analysis, may be more revealing of our concerns about Europe than
of the Greeks’.
9. ‘‘Europe, in Strabo’s definition, included Iberia, Celtica (between the
Pyrenees and the Rhine), and Brittany. In the east, it was divided by the
Danube. On the left bank were the Germans, the Getae, the Tyregetae, the
Bastarnae, and the Sarmatians; on the right bank were Thracia, Illyria, and
Greece. . . . Strabo had practically no knowledge of Scandinavia (since he
confused the Baltic with the Ocean) or of the huge plain which stretches
between the lower Baltic and the Don’’ (Duroselle 64–65).
10. ‘‘The limes, the ‘frontier line’, was a vital feature of the Empire’s de-
fence. It was not, as is sometimes supposed, an impenetrable barrier. From
the military point of view it was more of a cordon, or series of parallel
cordons, which, whilst deterring casual incursions, would trigger active
countermeasures as soon as it seriously breached. It was a line which nor-
mally could only be crossed by paying portaria and by accepting the Empire’s
authority. It was, above all, a marker which left no one in doubt as to which
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lands were subject to Roman jurisdiction and which were not. Its most
important characteristic was its continuity. It ran up hill and down dale
without a break, and along all frontier rivers and coasts. In places, as in
Britain, it took the form of a Great Wall on the Chinese model. Elsewhere it
might carry a wooden stockade atop earthworks, or a string of linked coastal
forts, or, as in Africa, blocks of fortified farmhouses facing the desert inte-
rior’’ (Davies 185–88).
11. ‘‘The medieval ‘t-o’ maps represent the earth schematically divided
into three by the Nile and Tanais running north and south forming the head
of the ‘T,’ the Mediterranean running West from the juncture of the ‘T,’
sometimes marked as the site of Jerusalem in the center of the world, and the
whole thing inscribed in the circle of ‘the Ocean.’ These maps express the
blend of the classical and biblical heritages characteristic of the West. They
superimpose onto the three sons of Noah—Sem, Ham, and Japheth, iconic
ancestors of the world’s races—the divisions devised by the Ionian historians
and geographers, who took the Aegean to be the fulcrum of meaningful
contact and conflict. The inner sea, ever since Isidore of Seville called the
Mediterranean such, is the upright leg of the ‘T,’ the axis around which this
universe revolves’’ (Moulakis 16).
12. ‘‘Can other aspects of Europe’s distasteful recent past be reconciled
with the notion of European identity? Europeanness has to embrace the
unacceptable: Srebrenica and Auschwitz as well as High Gothic cathedrals,
romantic castles, utopian Renaissance town planning and symphonic music.
The memorable history of Europeans embraces pogrom, persecution and
prejudice, near-continuous internecine war, oppression and genocide. The
twentieth century has seen mass death, carpet-bombing of cities and, above
all, the Jewish Holocaust of 1933–45. This remains archetypically ‘Euro-
pean’ heritage, and arguably the most serious challenge facing contempo-
rary European society in creating a sense of common identity. European
Jews—ironically the principal European people not nationally defined—
were deported and murdered by Europeans in Europe in pursuit of a Euro-
pean ideology’’ (Graham 44).
13. ‘‘Medium Aevum, ‘the Middle Age,’ was a term first used by devout
Christians who saw themselves living in the interval between Christ’s first
and Second Coming. Much later it was taken up for di√erent purposes.
Renaissance scholars began to talk in the fifteenth century of the ‘Middle
Age’ as the interval between the decline of antiquity and the revival of
classical culture in their own times. For them, the ancient world stood for
high civilization; the Middle Age represented a descent into barbarism, pa-
rochiality, religious bigotry. During the Enlightenment, when the virtues of
human reason were openly lauded over those of religious belief, ‘medieval-
ism’ became synonymous with obscurantism and backwardness. Since then,
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of course, as the ‘Modern Age’ which followed the Middle Age was itself
fading into the past, new terms had to be invented to mark the passage of
time. The medieval period has been incorporated into the fourfold Conven-
tion which divides European history into ancient, medieval, modern, and
now contemporary sections. By convention also, the medieval period is
often subdivided into early, high, and late phases, creating several successive
Middle Ages. Of course, people whom later historians refer to as ‘medieval’
had no inkling of that designation’’ (Davies 291).
14. Just to avoid possible misunderstandings deriving from my sometimes
synonymic use of Frank and German: the Franks were, according to the
Oxford English Dictionary, one of the ‘‘Germanic nation, or coalition of
nations, that conquered Gaul in the 6th century.’’
15. ‘‘It is true that Christians are made—by baptism—not born, but the
vast majority of those born in Christian Europe . . . underwent baptism as a
matter of course. They could easily think of themselves, not as voluntary
recruits to a particular community of believers, but as members of a Chris-
tian race or people. . . . The ethnic sense of ‘Christian’ can be found repeat-
edly and perhaps increasingly in the High Middle Ages. The term ‘the Chris-
tian people’ (populus Christianus), which was common, implies no more
than ‘the community of Christians’; but when the Saxons were forcibly
converted by Frankish arms in the decades around the year 800, adoption of
the new religion made them ‘one race, as it were (quasi una gens), with the
Franks’ ’’ (Bartlett 251).
16. ‘‘Medieval Europeans commonly referred to Muslims as ‘Saracens,’ an
epithet derived from the Arabic word sharakyoun or ‘easterner’ ’’ (Davies
258).
17. According to William of Malmesbury, however, the pope himself
claimed, when preaching the Crusade in 1095, that nothing less than ‘‘Eu-
rope’’ was at stake (see Hay 30–31).
18. Parataxis being, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘‘the plac-
ing of propositions or clauses one after another, without indicating by con-
necting words the relation (of co-ordination or subordination) between
them.’’
19. ‘‘April 1215 . . . is the first time that the word universitas is attested as a
description for the collected academic world in Bologna. Perhaps this date
can be regarded as the birthday of the universities, though this is a slightly
misleading interpretation, as there was nothing special in the word univer-
sitas. This was a purely technical term taken from the doctrine of corpora-
tions in Roman law. . . . It has no special ideological content and is used quite
neutrally of the total mass of teachers and students at the Bologna law
schools. It was only much later that the word acquired a specially philosoph-
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ical meaning: in the middle ages studium generale was and remained the
o≈cial term of the university’’ (Pedersen 144–45).
20. ‘‘Certain doctrines of Aristotle’s writings did not harmonize with
Christian revelation: namely, his judgments concerning the eternity of the
world, the immortality of the soul . . . and, lastly his concept of a Supreme
Being who took little account of the world and the men in it. . . . Perhaps for
reasons like [these], the bishops of the dioceses near [the university of ] Paris
met in a local synod and decided to forbid ‘books of Aristotle on natural
philosophy . . . .’ ’’ Yet the 1255 curriculum of Paris ‘‘was very heavily weighted
in favor of Aristotle. The very books forbidden by the provincial synod some
forty years before now formed part of the ordinary lecture materials’’ (Daly
82–83). On the Europeanness of Aristotle, Nicolas Bakhtin had to say: ‘‘Eu-
rope was always essentially Aristotelian. Also it still is in so far as it remains
truly Europe’’ (qtd. in Botz-Bornstein 179–80).
21. ‘‘Crusader, linguist, philosopher, ornithologist, patron of the arts, pro-
tector of Jews, and master of a harem, Fredrick ii was twice excommunicated
by the Pope for disobedience and o≈cially condemned by a General Council
as a heretic. He ruled in the south as a despot, imposing an e≈cient, cen-
tralized administration on Church and State alike. He even encouraged an
imperial cult of his own person. He presided over a brilliant, cultured court
at Palermo—a magnificent blend of Latin, German, Jewish, Greek, and
Saracen elements. To his contemporaries he was quite simply the stupor
mundi, the ‘wonder of the age’ ’’ (Davies 351).
22. Hay talks instead of a ‘‘confusion’’ between Christendom and Europe:
‘‘From 1400 to 1700, and in certain areas and contexts perhaps beyond this
terminus, the new unity was confounded with the old’’ (96).
23. ‘‘In Abraham Ortelius’s Thesaurus geographicus (1578) we have a telling
entry under the word ‘Christiani’: ‘vide Europaei’ ’’ (Hay 109).
24. One should keep in mind, however, that a di√erence between name
and adjective may not have been perceived with the same intensity by Enea
Silvio as it is by us. Fourteenth- and fifteenth-century grammars (Thomas of
Erfurt, Nicholas Perotti, Aldo Manuzio, Antonio de Nebrija) see the nomen
adiectivum as a mere modal variation of nomen substantivum. A real separa-
tion between the two classes of words will not be achieved until the eigh-
teenth century (see Scarano 12).
25. What becomes increasingly inaccurate to maintain, as Europe (in The-
ory) intends to show, is that there is such a thing as a Romano-Germanic
unity of Europe: ‘‘The Romano-Germanic world was itself by no means
homogeneous. Di√erences arising from their di√erent backgrounds had
deeply marked the various societies of which it was composed. Yet, however
pronounced these di√erences may have been, how can we fail to recognize,
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over and above them, the predominant quality of a common civilization—
that of the West?’’ (Bloch, Feudal xx). Such a theorization of Europe as ‘‘the
West,’’ which relies on the bracketing away of di√erences between north and
south in the name of a ‘‘predominant’’ yet indemonstrable ‘‘quality of a
common civilization,’’ is exactly what Europe (in Theory) means to question,
looking instead at the crisis between north and south in the theorization of
Europe.
26. The quotation marks hope to indicate my relative position regarding
the use of the term discovery as it is applied to America: more explicitly, I
stand between Edmundo O’Gorman, who suggests that discovery is a mis-
leading term since ‘‘Indians’’ already knew the continent quite well, and
Alphonse Dupront, who reevaluates the term discovery as the necessary
European false consciousness that could legitimate and even entail conquest.
27. According to Federico Chabod, Machiavelli’s would be ‘‘the first for-
mulation of Europe as a community which has distinctive features beyond
mere geography, with characteristics that are purely ‘earthly,’ ‘secular,’ non-
religious’’ (48).
28. Whereas previous ages had not privileged a single orientation for their
maps, the north was now definitely ‘‘up’’ in all European maps, as ‘‘the result
of historical process, closely connected with the global rise and economic
dominance of northern Europe’’ (Turnbull 8).
29. On the small size of Europe, already Pierre de Ronsard had noticed
that ‘‘L’Europe est trop petite’’ (Europe is too small) (1:299).
30. ‘‘Historians . . . have tended to pay little attention to what Marx
regarded as the second major source of primary accumulation, namely,
colonial plunder. Such indi√erence is unfortunate; for it is not possible to
imagine how a credible history of capitalism can be reconstructed without
comprehending colonialism . . . the Spanish mining of silver with forced
labour in the Americas; the forcible transfer of millions of Africans as slaves
across the Atlantic; and the levying of tribute on Asian shipping and land.
England came in time to be the major beneficiary from all these three
practically simultaneous processes of forcible subjugation and destruction
of non-European economies’’ (Habib 21).
31. As a persona, Europe also had one story to tell, and one history to
unfold: ‘‘The sixteenth century also marked the beginning of an endless
series of histories of Europe leading o√ with the Florentine Pier Francesco
Giambullari’s Historia dell’Europa (1566) and the Spanish Alfonso Ulloa’s
Historia de Europa (1570)’’ (Mikkeli 41).
32. Lusitania was the old Roman province comprising today’s Portugal
and part of Spain.
33. ‘‘The point of this contrast—which from every point of view is extreme
—lies surely in the nature of the Dutch achievement: its entirely practical
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nature. And this in turn brings to mind its overwhelmingly prosaic charac-
ter; beginning with sieges and dikes and ending with sermons and paintings.
‘Prose’ is not a term of contempt or denigration: there can be a poetry of
prose. But consider; is it even imaginable that this society should, like Spain,
produce a picaresque novel? (In 1600 Amsterdam is indignantly suppressing
vagrancy, if necessary, by shutting up the o√enders.) Or a Don Quixote?
There are no two ways about it; there is no context in the life of the Dutch
Republic in which Don Quixote, with his strain of lofty and pathetic ideal-
ism as well as his ridicule, could have a meaning in relation to perceived real-
ity around Holland: whether in his capacity as the socially aimless, crazed
hidalgo subject to endless delusion (forget the unfamiliarity with windmills)
or as a symptom of some deep cultural want’’ (Lehmann 166).
34. Since then, ‘‘the cardinal problem in defining Europe has centered on
the inclusion or exclusion of Russia’’ (Davies 3).
35. Also Curzio Malaparte sees the Reformation as the crisis dividing
north and south that begins modern Europe: ‘‘The Reformation is not the
birth of a critical modern spirit proper of Western and Northern civiliza-
tions, but the separation of such spirit from catholic dogmatism, which
belongs instead to Eastern and Southern civilizations, and which is the
essence of Latin civilization. When these two contrary tendencies finally
separate, and when the former escapes the control of the latter, and becomes
in turn the hegemonic one, what happens is a crisis. The history of Europe is
contained, in its entirety, in this irreconcilable contrast’’ (358–59).
36. In 1642, the French statesman Demarets de Saint-Sorlin had drama-
tized a similar line of thought in his play Europe: ‘‘Europe was not a success-
ful play, but it is none the less symptomatic that a statesman should interest
himself in propagating his hostility to Spain (the ‘Ibere’ of the play) in terms
which some generations earlier would have seemed purely mythological.
‘Europe’, the princess, is full of concern for all her children (and it is stressed
that all the nations are of common stock) but chooses to be defended by
‘Francion.’ It was a programme of a European peace in which peace would
be kept by an alert and powerful, but beneficent and disinterested, France’’
(Hay 119).
37. Ideas of peaceable federations, in fact, go well beyond the chronologi-
cal limits I suggest: already Dante, in De Monarchia (1308), had for instance
theorized the possibility of a unity of di√erent principalities under the prin-
ceps unicus, the pope. At the other end of my chronology, Winston Churchill
and Franklin D. Roosevelt made some references to Sully (Rougemont 93),
and their project of an Atlantic Charter was explicitly inspired, at the end of
World War ii, by Sully’s one for perpetual peace. The European Union,
fantasized by and realized in the Treaty of Rome (Savinio), is another fruit
growing in Sully’s plant.
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38. According to Paul Hazard, however, the east retained a fundamental
role as the antithesis of Europe and the mirror of her identity: ‘‘Of all those
regions which competed for her [Europe’s] attention, she responded most
readily to the East. It was an East gravely distorted by the European view of it;
nevertheless, it retained enough of its original impressiveness to loom forth
as a vast agglomeration of non-Christian values’’ (European Mind 28).
39. This reevaluation of the Greek and Roman past was part of a more
general trend: ‘‘The seventeenth century also saw a departure from estab-
lished cultural patterns. Knowledge of some Greek, but particularly Latin,
continued to be required in all schools above the primary level, but little
writing was done in Latin after 1600 except in international law, natural
science and Roman Catholic theology. . . . Outside the academy, new ap-
proaches in science began to emphasize empiricism and induction, rather
than the essentially deductive reasoning that the earlier religious orientation
of education had required. . . . Even in literature the ancients were revered
more in terms of themselves and as adornments of an educated person than
as practical guides, and they certainly had little impact on creative activity’’
(Nicholas 430).
40. To complicate the whole matter, Europe was not only the end of
history but also, more often than not, its beginning: a new interest in the
chronology of world epochs (Hazard, European Mind 41–48) began, with a
clear intention to disprove the claims, supported by Egyptology and sinol-
ogy, that Chinese and Egyptian societies were not only older than European
ones but even older than the three thousand years proposed by the Bible as
the age of post-Flood civilizations. For the most complete treatment of these
chronological controversies, see Paolo Rossi’s work. For the ways in which
the claimed anteriority of Europe vis-à-vis the so-called New World legi-
timated, in turn, claims of Europe’s (colonial) superiority, see Antonello
Gerbi.
2 Montesquieu’s North and South
1. A more recent return of the atavist theory can be found in Banfield;
Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti; and Fukuyama. It must be kept in mind,
however, that 1870 is the year of Italy’s unification: as north and aouth are
united, in theory, for the first time, theory starts articulating internal di√er-
ences and disunities.
2. Similarly, Benjamin Disraeli notices the ‘‘legacy of oriental sires’’ still
remnant in Mediterranean Europe (Pemble 146).
3. The inspiration of the Argentinean criminal code of 1921, Enrico Ferri’s
Sociologia criminale (1884) argued for the necessity to couple punitive mea-
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sures with preventive ones: among these, physical education was a remedy
for crime.
4. Already in a public lecture to the Academy delivered on August 25, 1720,
titled ‘‘Of the Causes for the Transparency of Bodies,’’ Montesquieu had been
clear about the ineptitude of the Greeks in tackling the most serious prob-
lems facing modern science: ‘‘At first sight, it would seem as if Aristotle knew
what transparency was, since he defined light as the act of transparency as
transparency; in truth, however, he knew nothing of either transparency or
light’’ (Oeuvres 1:27). And in the Pensées (number 1458), he wrote: ‘‘The
majority of the ancients’ reasonings are not exact’’ (1:1345).
5. Trying to open a trading route with the east, Jean Baptiste Colbert had
failed, first, to found a colony in Madagascar. He had managed, instead, to
establish ports in Bourbon and Île-de-France (now Réunion and Mauritius),
but by 1719, despite such success, the French Eastern Company was already
near bankruptcy. The company would finally be dissolved in 1769, when it
was clear to everybody that it was unfruitful to maintain.
6. In fact, a look at book 8, chapters 15–20, also informs us of the political
and social dangers of territorial expansions. Prefacing the discussion with
the assertion that ‘‘I cannot be understood until you have read the four
chapters that follow’’ (2:362), Montesquieu tells his reader that ‘‘a small
territory’’ is more proper to a republic, and an ‘‘average extension’’ to a
monarchy. Only despotism can guard over huge territories: ‘‘Do not even
think to counteract my argument by mentioning Spain here; Spain only
proves what I have already said. To control America, it did worse than
despotism itself: it destroyed the inhabitants’’ (2:362–64). And despotism, as
we know, is not a properly European form of government.
7. The war of the Spanish succession (1701–14) was precipitated in 1700 by
the death of King Charles ii of Spain, the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs.
Charles ii had died without heirs and had named the grandson of King
Louis xiv of France, Philip, as his successor. The prospect of united Spain
and France led Britain to form an alliance with the Austrian Hapsburgs and
to declare war on France and Spain.
8. In C. B. Macpherson’s more skeptical understanding of the issue of
property limits, ‘‘Locke’s astonishing achievement was to base the property
right on natural right [nature’s fruits are originally given by God to man]
and natural law [man needs to appropriate nature for his living], and then to
remove all the natural law limits from the property right’’ (199). This elimi-
nation of all limits, which would open the alley, theoretically speaking, to
capitalist accumulation, would be done not only by claiming the supposedly
vacant lands of the Americas but also by the introduction of money: as ‘‘gold
and silver do not spoil; a man may therefore rightfully accumulate unlimited
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amounts of it’’ (204). On these issues, see also Tully, ‘‘Aboriginal Property’’
58-62; and, including a discussion of the limits and legacy of Macpherson,
Tully, Approach 71–136.
9. Although Montesquieu is correct here, and although, by 1830, three
quarters of European commerce is in fact intercontinental, it can be noticed,
against Montesquieu, that the products from the colonies provide a very
substantial, and economically integral, part of eighteenth-century inter-
European commerce (see Goodman and Honeyman 53).
10. Also the ‘‘Causes that Can A√ect the Spirit’’ insists on this division of
Europe: ‘‘In our Europe, there are two kinds of religions: the Catholic one,
which demands submission, and the Protestant one, which wants indepen-
dence. The peoples of the north have embraced Protestantism from the
beginning; those of the south have defended Catholicism’’ (Montesquieu,
Oeuvres 2:62).
11. Etymologically, the word Sirocco connects the south with the east again:
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Sirocco derives from the Arab
sharq, east—the same root for the word Saracen. Under this wind, southern
Europe is ‘‘Saracen.’’
12. On how much that ‘‘almost’’ could cover, interpreters have fervidly
fought: criticizing R. N. Stromberg’s indictment of ‘‘Montesquieu’s mon-
strous and historically barren error in attributing all human di√erences to
geographic environment,’’ Roger B. Oake has, for instance, stressed that
‘‘even ‘savages’ are stated only to be almost entirely dominated by ‘climate’ ’’
(59; original emphasis).
13. ‘‘In the last analysis, only Europe seems to know the mutability of
time. . . . Here’s Europe, then: a geographical and historical space’’ (Goldzink
145).
14. Originating from Isocrates (see chapter 1), the commonplace of the
coincidence of the history of Europe with a history of freedom is central, for
instance, in François Guizot. In the Cours d’histoire moderne (see Verga 38–
47), a series of lessons he gave at the Sorbonne in 1828, the palimpsest of
Montesquieu is clearly visible: France is the center of Europe because it is its
most modern and progressed nation; France’s progress, which is central to
European progress, is the progress of freedom, which coincides with a mod-
ernization of the law (and a progressive privatization of natural resources).
As we will see in chapter 4, also German historiography and philosophy—
from the Schlegel brothers to Hegel—makes Europe coincide with a concept
of freedom. Against Montesquieu and Guizot’s faith in progress—as progress
of continuous civilization—the Schlegels and Hegel seem to think in terms
of destiny: it is the destiny of Europe to realize freedom.
15. Jacob Grimm’s Deutsche Grammatik (1819–37) had not only con-
firmed the derivation of French from Latin but also its fundamental un-
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Germanness: whereas Germanic languages, in the course of their evolution,
had seen the transformation (the so-called Grimm’s Law) of unvoiced con-
sonants (p, t, k) into their aspirate equivalents (ph, th, kh), French instead,
along with the other Romance languages, had remained extraneous to such
changes. Latin pater had, for instance, changed to the German Vater and the
English father ; but in Romance languages, there had been no shift from the p
to the ph sound: there was the French père, the Italian and Spanish padre,
and the Portuguese pai. With Grimm’s Law, the destiny of French southern-
ness, of its belonging to an un-German Romance margin, would for ever be
sealed. Montesquieu’s German aspirations, however, had absolutely no pre-
monition of all this.
16. ‘‘The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of
his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence
on the will of others, and freedom is a function of possession. . . . Society
consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society be-
comes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the
maintainance of an orderly relation of exchange’’ (Macpherson 3).
3 Republics of Letters
1. The Encyclopédie, which would soon start defining a whole epoch, had
started as the simple idea of the printer André Le Breton to translate Cham-
bers’s English Cyclopedia into French. Denis Diderot, nominated by Le Bre-
ton as the editor in chief for the project, transformed the original idea, with
the help of D’Alembert and Jaucourt, into a more ambitious attempt at
creating a true synopsis of knowledge. The seventeen volumes of the En-
cyclopédie, which were distributed and read throughout most of Europe,
were published between 1751 and 1772; supplements were added in 1777 and
1780. The initial subscription for the text counted five thousand people.
2. However, already in the ‘‘Discours sur les motifs qui doivent nous
encourager aux sciences’’ (1725), Montesquieu had argued that Europe’s dif-
ference from savagery (in the specific case, America) consisted in the fact
that Europe had (European) arts and sciences, whereas savage nations did
not (Oeuvres 1:53).
3. Such a linguistic shift certainly fit well the nationalist ambitions, for
instance, of Gallican Protestantism. It also reflected, as Mark Painter has
pointed out, a profound crisis of traditional linguistics, most notably, the
Augustinian faith in a coincidence between Word and World, between sign
and thing. In this sense, ‘‘The very question of knowledge seems already
caught up in the dynamics of language’’ (6). The belief of pre-Lutheran
theology is that the word, as possessed by humankind, is a reflection of God’s
order—or, in the terms of classical philosophy, of logos. A word carries with
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it an ontological significance. The word not only brings humankind closer to
God but it also o√ers a way of knowing God’s creation as logos. Humankind
finds itself in an ordered cosmos, and language, separating humankind from
nature, gives access to and knowledge of that order. But since, in Lutheran
theology, God’s order is ultimately unknowable, language, the guarantor of
such knowledge, loses its privileged position. Incapable of accessing the
theologized logos, language remains bound to knowing only earthly matters.
Neither Latin nor Greek or Hebrew are thus any way closer to knowing the
will of God. National languages, at least, have the advantage of knowing the
will of the state!
4. Curricular changes suggested by D’Alembert in the entry ‘‘Collège’’ for
the encyclopedia included: ‘‘Close study of French grammar; substitution of
French for Latin composition, since study of Latin is for the single purpose
of reading the texts of great authors; introduction of foreign language into
the curriculum; development of history courses, a study that should be done
à rebours, that is to say with the contemporary period as the point of de-
parture (an idea that D’Alembert considers ‘very just and philosophical’);
precedence of philosophy over rhetoric, ‘for, after all, one must learn to
think before one writes’; moral instruction based on Seneca, Epictetus, and
the Sermon of the Mount; early training in geometry and experiments in
physics’’ (Mortier 65). For a concise summary of Cartesian modern educa-
tion, exemplified in the Logique de Port-Royal, see Perkinson. On the refor-
mation of European schools to meet the requirement of usefulleness, the
institution of curricula in engineering, accounting, and modern medicine,
see Hof 215–16.
5. ‘‘[After the decision] people say the Pope is haunted by visions. People
say he strolls around the Papal rooms, screaming he has been forced to sign
the decree of suppression: ‘Compulsus feci! Compulsus feci!’ He su√ers a
herpes that deforms his face . . . . After a long agony, he dies on September 22,
1774. Rumor has it that he has been poisoned . . . . Obviously, the assassins
are the Jesuits’’ (Del Rio 145).
6. It may be a stretch, especially when compared to the nearby and argu-
ably more lively Milan where Cesare Beccaria had published Of Crime and
Punishment (1764) under the influence of De l’esprit des lois; where the Verri
brothers had disseminated the ideas of the French Enlightenment through
the journal Il ca√è (1764–66); and where Giuseppe Parini had begun to
divulge his antiaristocratic sentiments in the Gazzetta di Milano since 1769.
At any rate, the historian Carlo Denina, in Le rivoluzioni d’Italia (1793),
compared the Mantua of Andrés and Bettinelli to the cultural wealth of
Weimar: ‘‘where Wieland, Goethe, Herder, and Berthuch live’’ (qtd. in Car-
panetto and Ricuperati 393).
7. Mantua had become a safe haven for many exiled Jesuits, including
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Andrés’s archenemy Esteban Arteaga. Andrés, however, did not pursue a
career in state education, and, more traditionally, became preceptor of the
Marquis Bianchi’s family (the stipend being supplemented by a pension still
coming from Madrid). Andrés studied mostly in the Bianchis’ library, and,
through the marquis, he got to know, in quite typical Italian fashion, the
Mantua that counts, which introduced him to a membership in the local
Accademia Reale di Scienze e Belle Lettere.
8. ‘‘Di√erently from what happened in France, where the philosophes
formed, although not without internal contrasts, a front opposed to govern-
ment, the academics of Milan . . . starting with Pietro Verri, devoted their
entire careers to public o≈ce, and collaborated with the government to
implement reforms’’ (Bonora 97).
9. ‘‘Therefore, we declare that we did not dare facing all alone a task bigger
than our own strengths. Our role as editors has then consisted merely in giv-
ing order to the materials in great part provided by others’’ (D’Alembert) 75.
10. An eighth volume was added to the 1785 Parma edition (printed by
Bodoni); it is the one on which I am basing this study. For a history of the
text’s various editions and translations, see Mazzeo 78–79, 194–96.
11. ‘‘Regarding literature in eighteenth-century literary historiography, it is
a known fact that the term was understood in the pre-modern sense, as a
term whose meaning covered the entirety of human knowledge in written
form, and not only the belles letters’’ (Valero 171).
12. ‘‘The discipline of comparative literature . . . is unthinkable without
the historical circumstances of exile’’ (Apter 86). Also: ‘‘It does not seem
casual . . . that the first contemporary scholar of what he calls ‘the Andrés
case’, is an exile of the last civil war, Francisco Giner de los Rios’’ (Pala-
zón 16).
13. ‘‘Jesuit and other missionary activities raised two problems to which
Europe was very alive even at the end of the eighteenth century. One of these
problems was how to reconcile a new religion [Christianity] with a tradi-
tional culture. This led men like De Nobili to identify themselves totally with
the local culture. They recognized the di√erences between the two cultures
and the danger of asking the Indians to give up their way of life while
embracing a new religion. This was perhaps the first understanding, how-
ever vague it might have been, of the problems of imposing one culture upon
another’’ (Mukherjee 10).
14. Wellek’s resistance to Andrés can be easily explained through Wellek’s
aporetic resistance to historicism, which, as I will discuss in a moment, is the
very basis of Andrés’s method. For Wellek’s hostility to history, and for his
notion of the work of art as ‘‘monument, not document,’’ see Wellek, ‘‘Re-
view’’ 254–55.
15. Already in 1939, Robert Palmer warned the scholar of the eighteenth
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century about seeing ‘‘two distinct groups . . . pitted against each other, a
group of philosophes who favored new and enlightened ideas and another
group, mostly clerical and frequently Jesuit, who stood directly across the
path of intellectual development. This view of the matter is essentially that of
the philosophes themselves’’ (‘‘French Jesuits’’ 44). The kind of opposition to
enlightenment I am arguing here is in no way an obscurantist maneuver, but
a chapter in the readjustment of the idea of Europe that included also, but
not exclusively, those who had remained faithful to the Roman Church.
16. In 1969, Benjamin Keen complained: ‘‘References to the Black Legend
almost invariably proclaim foreign rivals’ envy of Spain’s American riches
and their desire to take over the empire as the principal reasons for the
creation and di√usion of the Legend.’’ This amounted, for Keen, to absolving
Spain from its historical actions in the Americas, whereas other, and more
authentic reasons, were behind the fortune of the Black Legend: alongside
imperial interests, also ‘‘nationalist aspirations and religious and other ideo-
logical conflicts with Spain of the Counter-Reformation, sometimes even an
authentic humanitarianism . . . all played their part’’ (713–14). Without
absolving Spain, and without questioning ‘‘authentic humanitarianism,’’ I
would, however, insist on the weight imperial designs had in the spread of
the legend.
17. Since my English spell-checker keeps flagging historism, let me move to
historicism by first reminding my reader that only by the 1940s the latter
term, fashioned after Benedetto Croce’s Italian storicismo, started competing
with, and finally replacing, the former, inherited instead by the German
historiographical tradition of Historismus.
18. Abdesselam Cheddadi insists on the Europeanness of history—and the
instrumental way in which the Islamic ta’rikh is often translated as ‘‘history’’
only to establish a comparison whereby the Eastern ta’rikh would appear as
faulty history. See Ibn Khaldun and Cheddadi. For Giovanna Calasso, who
draws from Cheddadi, a supplementary di√erence between ta’rikh and an
eminently European sense of historiography consists in the fact that in ‘‘the
‘ta’rikh’ by Arab authors, we find no trace of the concept of ‘universal
history’ ’’ (205).
19. Georg Iggers (who sees the emergence of historicism in Friedrich
Schlegel’s 1797 ‘‘Of Philology’’) similarly claims that historicism had intro-
duced in the analysis of human events an ‘‘orientation which recognized
individuality in its ‘concrete temporal-spatiality’ . . . distinct from a fact-
oriented empiricism,’’ as well as from an objective Cartesian reason (130).
20. Viconian is for instance Andrés’s claim (Dell’ origine 1:1) that poetry
(not reason or philosophy) is the first language: ‘‘The first writings that came
to us from antiquity are historical and poetical, not philosophical.’’ Also in
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tune with Vico is the attempt to ‘‘diminish’’ the alleged antiquity of some
non-European cultures—Chinese, Egyptian—to some kind of national pride
(1:3–4), what Vico had called ‘‘boria delle nazioni.’’ On some of these points
in Vico, see Dainotto.
21. ‘‘When, in the second half of the eighteenth century, one advocates a
‘philosophical perspective,’ what is meant by the term implies, in general, the
defense of the new critical method, from which a complete vision of all
knowledge can be built. . . The new literary history, in its attempt to give a
totalizing and integrated view of all knowledge, coincides then with en-
cyclopedism’’ (Valero 183–84). On the opposition between philosophical
method and erudite method in the context of eighteenth-century literary
historiography, see Guglielminetti 14–15.
22. Another Spanish Jesuit in Italian exile, Francisco J. Llampillas, had
already devoted to the anti-Gallic and pro-Spanish cause the volumes of his
Saggio storico apologetico della lettratura spagnola (1778–81), another exam-
ple of Italian Jesuit literary historiography.
23. On Andrés’s albeit partial and tentative reevaluation of Russia as part
of Europe, see Bérkov 461–69.
24. As late as 1942, Provençal poetry still defined Europe. During the
Congress of the European Youth, held in Vienna in that year, Baldur von
Schirach spoke: ‘‘The song that once upon a time filled the valleys of Prov-
ence; that same song that is today the triumphal song of Europe and its
civilization; the song of the troubadours as expression of those superior
sentiments that distinguish us from the Jews and from Black American’s
jazz—that song is something that the Jewish mind will never be able to
understand’’ (qtd. in Lipgens 103).
25. That the French liked to claim a French origin for everything was a fact
that Andrés really took at heart to dispute time and again. As if the question
of poetry and the roman were not enough, also the invention of a language
for deaf-mutes had been claimed by the French for their Abbée Apée. An-
drés, however, could not let the lie pass and explained to the whole world
who the real (and un-French) inventor was (see Andrés, Lettera dell’origine).
26. ‘‘The influence of Arab culture was so pervasive that it was hardly nec-
essary to leave Occitania to hear the melodies of Andalusia and Arabia. Much
of southern France had been conquered by Moslem invaders in the mid-
eighth century. Although the Saracens, as they were called, did not maintain
their hold for long, they left their mark in place names, and, undoubtedly, in
the folk imagination. Toward the end of the eleventh century refugees from
southern Spain began to settle in the area of Nîmes and Montpellier, bringing
Arabic and Arab culture once again to Occitania’’ (Bogin 46).
27. Barbieri’s is the often-cited book, incidentally, that Girolamo Tira-
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boschi reprints in Modena in 1790, in the midst of the Arabist polemics, with
the new programmatic title Dell’origine della poesia rimata. On this, and the
general controversy, see Eusebi.
28. Wilkins would later retract his theory of the invention of the sonnet by
claiming, arguably not very convincingly, that the idea of the sextet came to
the Sicilian Giacomo from Lentini in a burst of sheer inspiration. See Wil-
kins, Invention of the Sonnet 35.
4 Mme de Staël to Hegel
For the quite adventurous biography of Mme de Staël (interesting but
beyond the scope of this chapter), see Balayé; Diesbach; and Winegarten.
5 Orientalism, Mediterranean Style
1. Said himself, however, found in Raymond Schwab’s writing ‘‘the avoid-
ance of ethno- and anthropocentric attitudes’’ and ‘‘an interest in oriental
literature for its own sake’’ (Schwab xv). It is hard, on the other hand, not to
see Orientalism’s point. A collusion of knowledge and power in that disci-
pline was certainly not lost, for one, on the founder of the British Asiatic
Society, William Jones, who wrote in 1771: ‘‘Since a variety of causes which
need not be mentioned here give the English nation a most extensive power
in that kingdom [India] . . . the languages of Asia will now perhaps be
studied with uncommon ardour . . . the limits of our knowledge [will be] no
less extended than the bounds of our empire’’ (qtd. in Mukherjee 80). Also,
Italian fascism did not miss the nexus of colonialsm and Orientalism. Dis-
cussing Italy and the Orient in the Florentine Fascist Studies, Carlo Capasso
wrote in 1932: ‘‘The Great Powers have always had stakes in the Orient. It is
therefore natural that, in all the major European countries, a voluminous
literature on the Orient has been produced. . . Italy has come last in this
interest for the Orient’’ (v–vi). For a panorama of reactions to Said, see
Marrouchi 210–14.
2. Lest my point is mistaken for a simplistic variation on the National Rifle
Association theme that ‘‘it’s not guns that kill,’’ let me drop a more theoreti-
cally appropriate allusion to Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of Caesarism,
which ‘‘can be both progressive and reactionary’’ (Gramsci, Selections 217).
3. ‘‘To hail revolution while avoiding censorship’’ is revealed to be, a
posteriori, in a preface of 1851, the very program, and problem, of Michele
Amari’s first historical book (Guerra xxvi).
4. ‘‘History needs heroes of ideas as well’’ (Amari, Guerra 2:323). Ac-
cordingly, this chapter assumes a fundamental discrepancy between Amari’s
deeds and ideas: whereas his deeds move from initial positions of radical
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democracy to the moderate Cavourism of his later years, his ideas grow
toward a rather heroic opening of the very concept of Europe.
5. These included the financial support of the fatherless family, which
meant, in turn, a humiliating clerical job for the Bourbon secretary of state
that put thirty-five monthly ducats into Amari’s pockets—barely enough for
‘‘a piece of bread’’ (Bonfigli 3).
6. ‘‘The gift is . . . something that must be given, that must be received and
that is, at the same time, dangerous to accept’’ (Mauss 215).
7. ‘‘The feeling of veneration for the past, which in the pages of Hume and
Gibbon had already become value and meaning of national history, was
given by Scott all the power of imagination’’ (Romeo, ‘‘Michele Amari’’ 160).
8. So, for instance, Alessandro D’Ancona sees Marmion as a gift of love to
the unreciprocating Agatina Peranni, while Renata Pucci Zanca views it as a
vague hymn to heroism to compensate for the father’s cowardice. See Amari,
Carteggio 315–97; Pucci Zanca 254–55.
9. For those interested in biographical details, there is actually a little
mystery concerning Amari’s personal knowledge of Dumas before 1842. At
any rate, it is certain that in 1842 Amari held Dumas in such consideration as
to send him a copy of his new book. See Marcolongo 66n.
10. Indebted to the style of Scott and Dumas, Amari’s story is also strik-
ingly similar to the Arab humanists’ notion of akhbar, or narrative history,
as opposed to chronology history, or ta’rikh. For Arab humanists and scho-
lastics, ‘‘akhbar-history is . . . one of the three divisions under prose com-
position, along with applied rhetoric, i. e. letter-writing and speech-writing’’
(Makdisi 170).
11. Amari alludes later to the commonplace (and historic problem) of
Sicily as ‘‘eternal colony’’: ‘‘From early histories to recent ones, many foreign
peoples came to walk on the soil of Sicily: Carthaginians, Vandals, Goths,
Byzantines, Germans, French, Spaniards. . .’’ (Storia 1:105). The citation of a
pathetic Sicilian prince is at this point de rigueur: ‘‘We are old, Chevalley,
very old. For more than twenty-five centuries we’ve been bearing the weight
of many superb and heterogeneous civilizations, all from outside, none
made by ourselves, none that we could call our own. We are as white as you
are, Chevalley, and as the Queen of England; and yet for two thousand and
five hundred years we’ve been a colony’’ (Tomasi di Lampedusa 170).
12. The parallelisms between the insurrection of the vesper and the failed
one of 1820 had already been established in Michele Palmieri’s 1834 Customs
of the Court and the People of the Two Sicilies, published in French in Paris.
See Giarrizzo.
13. ‘‘Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture.
Its symbolism is drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peas-
ants, of the Volk’’ (Gellner 57).
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14. In this, one can detect Amari’s skepticism regarding the usefulness of
secret plots in revolutionary action—and a very direct attack against the
underground sects of Freemasons and carbonari, who, in Amari’s mind,
were usurping the people’s historical place.
15. Hints of that can be found in Leonardo Sciascia: ‘‘And I must say that,
of all the reasons he [Amari] o√ers against the theory of the courtly plot. . .
the most convincing remains the one he adduces as a Sicilian who know
Sicilians’’ (979).
16. Also Said identifies the nexus freedom-Europe as ‘‘an idea that will
acquire [after the Crusades, and climaxing in Chateaubriand] an almost
unbearable, next to mindless authority in European writing: the theme of
Europe teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty’’ (Orientalism 172).
17. ‘‘The passion with which native intellectuals defend the existence of
their national cultures may be a source of amazement; but those who con-
demn this exaggerated passion are strangely apt to forget that their own
psyche and their own selves are conveniently sheltered behind a French or
German [or British] culture which has given full proof of its existence and
which is uncontested’’ (Fanon 209). ‘‘Before Said, Fanon, his maître à penser,
recognized that in the triangular dialogue between the settler, the native, and
the native intellectual, there is ‘a prominent confrontation on the phan-
tasmatic plane.’ Versions of origins are o√ered and resisted in a continuing
dialectic’’ (Marrouchi 288).
18. Back to Gramsci’s Caesarism. Like it, sicilianismo ‘‘can be both progres-
sive and reactionary’’ (Gramsci, Selections 217). On ‘‘reactionary’’ and ‘‘pro-
gressive’’ sicilianismo, see Marcolongo 9.
19. Amari was, however, more cautious when writing for a French public:
‘‘Sicily is the only Italian state which has possessed for a long time this form
of monarchic and representative government that is called today ‘constitu-
tional.’ The Sicilian people has been the first in Italy to use this word, ‘consti-
tution,’ rather than the more abstract ‘reform.’ ’’ (Quelques observations 1).
20. As Giuseppe Mazzini put it in 1852: ‘‘The literature of Europe in the last
few years has been largely political, revolutionary, made for war. Out of ten
historical works, seven at least discussed, whether favorably or not, of a
realized or an unfinished revolution; out of ten polemical, economical, or
political works, no less than seven welcome or reject the symptoms of an
imminent revolution’’ (Opere 2:541).
21. As in Alessandro Manzoni’s authentic horror of diversity: ‘‘Haven’t you
heard, great and good Lamartine, that there is no worse word to throw at
Italy than diversity? And that this word only reminds Italy of a long time of
su√ering and decay?’’ (qtd. in Bollati 61).
22. On the French ‘‘genius of the market,’’ an ironic variation on the theme
of the genius of the French language mentioned in chapter 2, Giuseppe
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Mazzini wrote: ‘‘French intelligence creates little, but assimilates a lot; led by
a manufacturing instinct, it always receives its raw materials from abroad.
Quick, agile, active, and full of self confidence; naturally inclined to monop-
oly, and helped by a clear and distinct language, the French genius takes
ideas, embellishes them, and puts them into circulation. Often, to make
things easier, French intelligence dismembers ideas, reduces them into little
fragments. . . In all this lies the life and the importance of the French genius’’
(Opere 2:552). I should mention, without meaning by this a dismissal of
the Italian anti-French polemics as simply fascist, that much of this fervor
against France, which is also a redimensioning of the French Revolution as
the event that changed the world forever, will become central in Italian
fascism’s understanding of its own (alleged) revolution.
23. On January 12, the birthday of King Ferdinand ii, the Sicilian revolu-
tion takes Palermo, then all of Sicily. Once again, the requests are for au-
tonomy and a constitution. The insurrection soon moves to the Italian
mainland, and then to France, Austria, Hungary, and Germany. Ferdinand’s
bombing of Messina and Palermo earned him the nickname of King Bomba,
by which he is known in the annals of American literature (Melville).
24. On the problems Amari had to face because of his anticlericalism, see
Carino 279. For a sample of Amari’s anticlericalism, the following: ‘‘Every-
body knows that the curia is not an aristocracy, but the fattest part of the
middle and lower bourgeoisie’’ (Biblioteca 1:324–25).
25. Like Vico’s ‘‘giants,’’ Amari’s early Arabs ‘‘They are tall, robust, lean,
pure caucasian visages, moderate beard, strong teeth, self-assured, penetrat-
ing eyes’’ (Amari, Storia 1:141).
26. Mostly from the Aghlabid families from Kairouan (in today’s Tunisia),
it is unclear who these Arabs really were, or from where they came. They
were probably a coalition coming from di√erent places, including Africa
(Berbers as well), Spain, and Asia. Also, their social extraction was quite
varied. From around the year 948, the rule of the Sicilian colony goes to the
Kalbite families from Syria (and possibly of Yemeni descent).
27. On the Arabic derivation of troubadoric poetry and of the very word
troubadour, see Menocal ‘‘Close Encounters.’’
28. On the ‘‘xenophoby’’ of French nationalism, see Vovelle (18–19). At
this point of his narrative, however, Amari had to bracket away the way in
which Christians and Sicilians did not enjoy, in fact, equal rights in Muslim
Sicily: non-Muslims were, as Amari will acknowledge only in the last chap-
ters of the Storia, ‘‘protected persons’’ (dhimmi), ‘‘barred from enjoying
some crucial liberties that are available to Muslims’’ according to a strict
interpretation of Islamic law (Moosa 202).
29. ‘‘ Terrible and perhaps unnecessary right’’ was property right for Bec-
caria (71).
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30. ‘‘The living legacy of Sacy’s disciples was astounding. Every major
Arabist in Europe during the nineteenth century traced his intellectual au-
thority back to him. Universities and academies in France, Spain, Norway,
Sweden, Denmark, and especially Germany were dotted with the students
who formed themselves at his feet’’ (Said, Orientalism 129).
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